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MAKING THE MODERN SLUM: HOUSING, MOBILITY, AND POVERTY IN 
BOMBAY AND ITS PERIPHERIES
Sheetal M. Chhabria
This dissertation examines the formation of urban poverty and slums which have long 
stigmatized South Asian cities. It focuses on the emergence of markets in housing through the 
19th and early 20th centuries in Bombay primarily, and Karachi and Aden secondarily. It is the 
first historical study of slums, or poor and stigmatized housing, in colonial Western India. It 
critically engages with the terms of global urban modernity and the historiography of colonialism 
in South Asia, challenging the broader nationalist frames in which scholars have understood 
South Asia’s poverty. While this is not a comparative project, the dissertation interrogates many 
of the implicit and explicit comparative claims that have been made about colonial cities and 
their legibility in the discourse on global slums.
Housing was a visible marker of inequality on the urban landscape and therefore a useful 
site through which to examine the changing relations between migrants and settlers, laborers and 
capitalists, and society and the state. The changing political economy of Western India resulted in 
a laboring and urban poor whose housing issues became productive of regional, colonial, and 
national difference. By following circular migrants across city and country, this study builds on 
the subcontinent’s Early Modern history of a pervasive rural-urban continuum of human 
networks. Everyday workers used their mobility and habitation practices to negotiate a changing 
world, bringing cities like Bombay, Karachi, and Aden into their routes of mobility to earn a 
livelihood. Increased opportunities combined with the intensification of production, market 
crises, growing demographic pressures on the land, and the spread of indebtedness to produce 
and reproduce inequality. This dissertation also compares the subsequent management of the 
urban poverty problem in cities across Western India, which heightened concerns over public 
health and sanitation. Newly financed poor housing initiatives sought to correct these at the turn 
of the century, but their limitations made modern slums. By addressing the eventual obfuscation 
of the once-transitioned status of the modern slum-dweller, this study delineates the bases for the 
conceptualization of a distinctive third world poverty and urban form.
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Note on Abbreviations and Use of Terms
! The name “Bombay” is used instead of “Mumbai” for most of this study, even though the 
name of the city was officially changed in 1995. I follow the usage of the name prevalent to the 
period under study. Likewise, I use “Karachi” instead of “Kolachi” which was one of the names 
of Karachi in pre-colonial times. Only in Chapter One, where contemporary Mumbai is a part of 
the analysis, do I use the name “Mumbai,” and there the politics of the name change is a part of 
the narrative.
 Non-english terms are italicized and their meaning is explained in the first instantiation. 
Some quotations are in non-English languages; I provide translations for these in the text. 
Abbreviations used for primary sources are below:
BLCP! ! ! Bombay Legislative Council Proceedings
COBC ! ! City of Bombay Census
COBIT! ! City of Bombay Improvement Trust
COBP!! ! Census of Bombay Presidency
GOB ! ! ! Government of Bombay
IOR! ! ! India Office Records
MCRCOB! ! Municipal Commissionerʼs Report for the City of Bombay
MSA! ! ! Maharashtra State Archives




 Origin stories provide convenient shorthands with which to signal the subsequent texture 
of a city’s history; as metonymic tropes, they function as efficient producers of an 
historiographical culture. One of the origin stories for the city of Bombay involves the gifting of 
the island as dowry when a Portuguese king gave his daughter, Catherine of Braganza, in 
marriage to the English king, Charles II, in the year 1661.1 This story is similar to an origin story 
for Manhattan which claims that, “the Manhattan real estate market was born when the Dutch 
paid $24 in shells to the Indians...”2 Both stories inaugurate the island-cities’ modern histories 
through a transaction in the seventeenth century, but the similarities end there. The primary 
transaction in Bombay involved not shells, a kind of money, but a bride, suggestive of an archaic 
ritual of polity building. The Portuguese gifted a bride along with the island of Bombay to 
establish an alliance with the English against Spain, having just been abandoned by the French in 
that very endeavour.3 The giving of Bombay was part of a royal marriage and thus a visible 
ritual, not a private transaction. It was not meant to extinguish a relationship but to enhance a 
social bond.4 Moreover, this social bonding through a marriage alliance was a European drama 
playing out on Indian soil.
1
 
1 The other origin story, that Bombay was nothing more than a fishing village, is the subject of the first 
chapter.
2 Elizabeth Blackmar, Manhattan for Rent, 1785-1850 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 1.
3 Both Bombay and Tangier, a small town in northern Morocco, were given as dowry to Charles II on his 
marriage with Catherine of Braganza. Once the island was in Charles II possession, he gave it to the East 
India Company in exchange for a loan. The story of how the Portuguese had gotten the island of Bombay 
in the first place is that they acquired Thane, northern Bombay, from the Sultan of Gujarat in exchange for 
mercenary assistance against Humayun, the second Mughal emperor. Humayun had launched an 
unsuccessful campaign to annex the Gujarat Kingdom in 1535. 
4 Marcel Mauss, The Gift; Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies (Glencoe, IL: Free 
press, 1954).
 These differences between New York’s and Bombay’s histories is produced by a 
particular genealogy of the urban modern which prevents the writing of Bombay’s history as a 
modern story. The origin stories suggest that Manhattan is a natural place of commerce while 
Bombay is a place of obligations and bonds which function until the present day as atavistic 
forms. Exchanges in Bombay are ostensibly mired in relationships of indebtedness, bondage, and 
reciprocity; labourers are recruited through jobbers, patrons solicit production through private 
arrangements rather than anonymous market pressures, credit is obtained based on personal 
affiliations, and links between real estate developers and the police control housing. Whereas 
media such as money and contracts create internationally legible markets within which New 
York is a powerful node, personal bonds presumably present an obstructive layer to the 
exchangeability of Bombay’s assets.5 
 Challenging these generalizations is difficult due to the existence of arguments which 
serve to turn contrary evidence into support for the original generalization. If one suggests that 
Bombay isn’t the site of these traditional forms of exchange and argues instead that Bombay was 
once a place of industry replete with factories and mills which provided wage labour, from the 
1860s until the mills left Bombay in the 1970s, then the defense arises that Bombay was in such 
a state because it was a junction or interface between a modern West and a traditional Indian 
interior. All may agree that Bombay was the commercial hub of the British Indian Empire in the 
long 19th century, but many will qualify this claim by noting that it was an exception in British 
India. At best, Bombay was where an atavistic society articulated with rational markets 
2
 
5 That these “obstructions” are remarkably overcome during periods of global speculative finance and 
housing booms in contemporary urban India doesnʼt prevent the narrativeʼs prevalence. See Llerena 
Searle, “Making Space for Capital: The Production of Global Landscapes in Contemporary India” (PhD 
diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2010). 
elsewhere through local junctions created by empire, but the majority of its own social life 
remained uniquely Indian.
 The city’s infamous slums are routinely submitted as evidence to affirm the persistent 
conceptual framework which narrates Bombay as a junction between the modern and traditional 
or between the future and the past. Those characteristics of the city which cannot be reconciled to 
a preconceived theory of urban capitalist modernity are explained by the inability of modern 
Bombay to banish its traditional hinterland from its boundaries. The constant flow of migrating 
workers from hinterlands and the taking up of residences in ill-kept urban slums warrant the 
claim that tradition or the non-modern is continuously being admitted into the space of the 
modern, which prevents Bombay from generalizing into a modern urban center. Caste, too, is 
often enlisted as an explanation for this failure to modernize since caste is presumably a 
hereditarily determined privilege which locks one into a rank in society; caste cannot be 
conceived of as a flexible and mediating rubric through which one’s position on the pathways of 
capital accumulation become operative. Thus, it can seem logical that modern rational markets 
developed in New York City, but social pressures of debt, bondage, credit, and obligation turned 
Bombay into a unique and “not quite urban” space. 
 It would be interesting to know when this story about the city gifted as dowry began to 
circulate, but a scholar of Manhattan is right to remind us that, 
The persistence of this story tells us more about the justifying strategies of our own times 
than about the past. The Manhattan real estate market, the myth implies, is as natural as its 
bedrock and harbor, and real estate magnates who today pursue the ‘art of the deal’ are only 
fulfilling their forefathers’ vision of the profits embedded in Manhattan land.6
3
 
6 Blackmar, Manhattan for Rent, 1. 
Indeed, origin myths tell us a lot about our own strategies of memory, historiography, and 
deployment of the past for the present than they do about the days gone by. Their appearance in 
histories serves to set a stage for the kind of story we are going to be receiving. As efficient 
producers of a sedimented culture of historiography, these particular stories make it difficult to 
consider Western India’s urbanization and its related social problems on equivalent terms to 
urbanization in the North Atlantic or elsewhere in the colonized world. 
 Demographic data have for long provided a means to quantitatively compare population 
growth in cities worldwide. Such data has been most inspired by modernization and development 
agendas in the interwar and post-war periods. Such data can confirm that Bombay was the 
commercial capital of Western India in the 19th century, oscillating between being the second 
and third largest city in the British Empire, behind London and comparable to Calcutta, but not 
quite as large as New York City. However, without critically considering what urbanization 
means and for whom, we are left with a superficial observation from which many have 
mistakenly extrapolated Bombay’s progress on a scale of development. (See Figure 0.17) 
4
 
7 Information collated from census reports of Bombay Town and Island and Bombay Presidency Census 
of 1921 which had a summary of population growth in several Western Indian cities. All numbers are best 
possible approximations based on census records and whichever errors those may produce. *London is 
1861, 1881, 1891, 1899, 1911, 1921, 1931; 1899 being the only number for “Greater London”. **New 
Yorkʼs census dates are 1860, 1870, 1880, 1890, 1900, 1910, 1920. “New York” means only Manhattan 
before 1900 because New York city census reporters started including other boroughs after 1900, which 
was the first census after consolidation of the five boroughs. Also, Manhattan was the most populous, and 
at 23 sq. miles, its area was comparable to Bombay during the period under study. 







































































































































































































































 However, the assumptions which undergird such data involved a kind of methodological 
nationalism, where data was collected for national units of analysis. For example, Kingsley 
Davis assumed national borders as demarcators of regions so that “England’s” urbanization was 
compared to “India’s” urbanization.8 Instead, more comparable units of analysis, perhaps coastal 
regions of Western India compared to the United Kingdom might have yielded more useful 
results.9  Additionally, some migrants to London and New York city were likely urban to urban 
migrants, having first migrated in the old world from country to city, and yet urbanization data 
lead us to presume that London and New York’s population increases signal a radical 
transformation of a national peoples from rural to urban ways of life, when the process was 
likely more protracted and extended beyond national boundaries. Given coastal Western India’s 
population density, it would also be useful to challenge the definition of what counts as “urban.” 
Such dense collections of human population are also found in coastal South, Southeast, and East 
Asia and were results of migration in the latter nineteenth century, and yet some such regions are 
not formally cities. The desakotas of Southeast Asia are literally village-cities, which make up 
much of the landscape. Migrants to coastal Asia included over twenty-nine million Indians 
6
 
8 Davis distinguished urbanization from the growth of cities, where the former indicated the percentage of 
a population living in cities as opposed to the latter which meant the absolute number of people living in a 
city. It was possible, according to Davis, to have growth of a city without having urbanization. He acquired 
such data by computing urban population numbers as a percentage of a nationʼs population which was 
particularly alarming for what he classified “non-Industrial nations” such as India. In his comparisons, 
places such as India, Brazil, Egypt, Kenya, and mainland China, were experiencing the growth of cities 
without urbanization due to their population increases in the 1950s and 1960s unaccompanied by 
economic development, and thus there was widespread urban poverty. See Kingsley Davis, “The 
Urbanization of the Human Population,” Scientific American Vol. 213, No. 3 (Sept. 1965).
9 This methodology is inspired by Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the 
Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
before the 1930s.10 Finally, what is often at stake in demographic comparisons of urbanization is 
not assumptions about city life but about country or agrarian life. Agrarian migrants are too often 
conceived of as once rustic folk transformed into sophisticated, cosmopolitan and urban residents 
through their arrival into cities. In India, such assumptions have driven modernization theory, its 
use of urbanization as a marker of development, and nationalist agitations both for and against 
development. 
 Such impressions from demographic comparisons are efficiently indexed by origin stories 
which render Bombay only in contrast to New York, and imply that Indian cities lag “behind” 
their North Atlantic counterparts. However, the experience of inequity in the city of Bombay or 
any other city was remarkably similar. That the labouring and migrating poor found themselves 
across world cities dwelling in make-shift and dilapidated housing and operating within 
unreliable and fluctuating markets of labor and production outside of the purview of state 
regulation is a commonality across cities which is more difficult to theorize. This dissertation is 
an attempt to overcome that difficulty.
Markets and Housing
This dissertation is a study of the emergence and development of relations in housing 
through the 19th and early 20th centuries in Bombay primarily, and Karachi and Aden 
secondarily. It uses housing as a visible marker of inequality on the urban landscape and as a site 
through which to examine the changing relations between migrants and settlers, labourers and 
7
 
10 Densely populated and coastal Western India, areas such as the Konkan and Karnatak, are discussed 
in chapter 2 of this dissertation. For East and Southeast Asia, see Adam McKeown, “Global Migration, 
1846-1940,” Journal of World History Vol. 15, No. 2 (June 2004), 157. 
capitalists, and society and the state. It focuses on the habitation practices of everyday workers 
and rural to urban migrants to unravel the dynamics by which inequality is produced and 
reproduced. This study also focuses on Bombay’s first generation of slumdwellers, i.e., those 
people who lived in the neighborhoods where the “slum problem” was first raised. The plague of 
1896 warranted the stigmatization of dense and vertically built housing structures in First and 
Second Nagpada, Kamathipura, and Kumbharwada amongst other central wards.11 (See Figure 
0.2) In that first slum-making episode, we see how for migrants, housing existed in a state of 
tension between providing a path of mobility and proximity to new forms of livelihood in the 
city and being the medium through which those migrants could be marked as apart from the 
normal operations of a city. By looking at the formation of the “slum problem” for these 
residents, this study traces how housing became a site upon which reforms could bring in state 
officials to reorganize the relations between moneyed interests and itinerant workers.
8
 
11 Prior to 1930 at least, Kumbharwada was located in central Bombay amongst these working class 
neighborhoods and was often spelled “Coombharwada.” Kumbharwada now exists in Dharavi, the most 
infamous slum of Mumbai which is located far north of these other neighborhoods. I am not sure when 
Kumbharwada moved to Dharavi. 
Fig. 0.2 Map of Bombay, divided into wards
Source: 1867 Municipal Commissionerʼs Report of Bombay, 1867
9
 
Since the acquisition of housing was deeply embedded in complex webs of negotiation 
and mediation, the kinds of social webs which form the substance of more popular and 
stereotypical narratives of life in Bombay, it can be all the more difficult to see how housing 
functioned within interfacing markets of land, labour, cotton, grain, or money to emerge as a 
complex commodity of its own. Yet, that is precisely what this study tries to demonstrate. The 
emergence of a market in housing was a process which involved first discrediting housing 
entitlements, the kinds of dispensations of shelter that a cultivator or labourer might expect. 
While these were discredited, they weren’t dismantled, i.e., they continued to provide a way to 
negotiate the acquisition of housing. The first chapter on the making of Koliwadas, Koli 
“colonies” or neighborhoods, in the city with “indigenous” housing shows that process. Once 
everyone except the indigenous was subject to market conditions, the addition of a layer of 
regulation in poor housing on top of an already developed field in housing brought officials and 
elites into the process. The second through fifth chapters show how housing was constructed by 
migrants and how officials and elites inserted themselves into that process most notably after the 
plague. Attempts at regulation or interference in the production of poor housing furthered 
distinctions between moneyed men and those without, proving just how pervasive the market in 
housing was.
Throughout this dissertation, social relations centering on the city of Bombay are 
analyzed within a broad but single temporal and spatial analytic frame which spans across city 
and country and included a simultaneity of diverse social forms. This study follows circular 
migrants through their paths of mobility, tracing the way in which their productive activities 
were perceived by contemporary officials as opposed to how they functioned in the migrant 
10
 
labourers’ lives. The production of housing in the city of Bombay was connected to market-based 
activities which encompassed a rural-urban continuum through the 19th and early 20th centuries. 
Expanding markets in cotton and grain in Western India led to the kinds of displacements which 
would be expected from commercialization and also became the conditions under which urban 
housing was produced. Yet, urban housing was often thought of as an exclusively consumptive 
activity. The mobility of everyday people was a source of innovation and allowed migrants to 
negotiate a quickly changing world, but the motive to locate and place the population on the part 
of officials and employers led mobility to be read as an obstacle to urban settlement. By the 
1920s, labour mobility was offered by employers as an explanation for inefficient production and 
by union organizers as the reason labour could not organize for its own betterment. 
While this is not a comparative project, this dissertation challenges many of the implicit 
and explicit comparative claims that have long been made about the history of the Bombay or the 
city in South Asia, most notably that its development lags behind other cities. Such comparisons 
have been driven by the fact that the city is overwhelmed by a labouring and poor population 
who are ill-housed in shantytowns and make Bombay seem like an underdeveloped landscape. 
Besides the city of Bombay’s majestic colonial architecture in the Fort neighborhood, the slums 
serve as the most visible marker of the city’s colonial legacy and suggest that the colonial 
encounter prevented Bombay from embodying the modern urban form. Even in our present day, 
it is often the case that when an example of a city with slums is needed, Bombay serves as the 
city of choice. In an urban studies text called The City Reader, the following photograph and 
caption serves to align present-day Bombay with England’s past through its slums:
11
 
Fig. 0.3 Photograph of slums in contemporary Mumbai
Source: Plate 50 from Richard LeGates and Frederic Stout, City Reader (Routledge Urban Reader 
Series, 5th Edition, 2011).
12
 
According to the caption above, Bombay is where slums “persist,” or where sectors are “stuck in 
slum conditions as bad as those described by Friedrich Engels in the early days of the Industrial 
Revolution.” Bombay’s slums remain as reminders of a past way of life that has not yet been 
brought into the present.12 
 To produce this idea that Bombay is like London’s past requires an assumption that 
different parts of the world occupy different temporalities. How this idea “persists” would be 
worth documenting in and of itself but it is outside of the scope of this dissertation. However, I 
can point to a tendency amongst historians to narrate a distinct European transition to capitalism 
which posits merchants’ activities in an urban environment far from the gaze of feudal overlords 
as early as the medieval period, a Smithian narrative which persists as much as it has been 
critiqued.13 The result is that Europe’s cities are seen as uniquely geared towards a transition 
from centuries prior, a transition from which South Asian cities are either left out or still catching 
up. The natural separation between urban merchants and agrarian overlords in the European 
model compels us to see slums and shantytowns in South Asian cities as proof that the cities 
failed to separate from their countrysides. The persistence of unhygienic, haphazardly organized, 
13
 
12 Prior to World War I Charles Booth and Jacob Riis were exemplary of wider trends typified by the “slum 
outrages” which created political publics in cities of the North Atlantic. Charles Booth, Life and Labour of 
the People in London (London, New York: Macmillan and co., 1902); Jacob A. Riis, The Battle with the 
Slum (New York: The Macmillan company, 1902). Others included: Henry Mayhew, London Labour and 
the London Poor (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England; New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1985); Friedrich 
Engels and Florence Kelley, The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844 (New York: J.W. 
Lovell company, 1887); and Charles Dickens, George Harry Ford, and Sylvère Monod, Bleak House: An 
Authoritative and Annotated Text, Illustrations, a Note on the Text, Genesis and Composition, 
Backgrounds, Criticism (New York: Norton, 1977). Slums were cleared or suburbanized in London and 
New York in the interwar period and afterwards, leaving behind racially marked urban “ghettos.” Since the 
postwar period, slums have been invoked almost exclusively with regard to cities of the “developing” 
world, many of which trace their slum problem to the problem of colonization.
13 Henri Pirenne, Medieval Cities; Their Origins and the Revival of Trade (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 
1956). For the critique, see Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Origin of Capitalism (New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1999).
and overcrowded spaces pose a problem for the history of the city,14 their form fitting stereotypes 
of non-urban and village life created by some of the earliest urban sociologists.15 Such historical 
assumptions also frame the work of anthropologists who for long, didn’t take up the study of 
complex non-western social forms since they don’t fit expectations created by social theory. 
Arjun Appadurai has said about this that:
...the anthropology of complex non-Western societies has, till recently, been a second class 
citizen in anthropological discourse. This...involves a kind of reverse Orientalism, whereby 
complexity, literacy, historical depth, and structural messiness operate as disqualifications in 
the struggle of places for a voice in metropolitan theory.16 
The study of urban slums then, rather than being read as structurally complex spaces, are read as 
the persistence of simple, rural elements, only intensified in scale. Their presence in Indian urban 
life serves to prove that Indian cities have followed distinct and incomplete pathways apart from 
transitions which characterized Europe such that they are stuck in Europe’s past. 
 To challenge such comparisons, it is worth pursuing Bombay’s own history. Bombay’s 
population neared one million by the year 1900. Even when it was the second largest city of the 
British Empire well behind London, it was still “fearfully more dense.” It was the leading 
commercial and industrial center in all of the Indian subcontinent, full of mills, banks, and ports 
from which shipping occurred. 
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 In this study, I trace the development of the city and focus on the causes of its density. I 
narrate urbanization in Western India beginning with the development of urban life from the 
ground up by first, following the actions of everyday people who moved to the city in search of 
work and opportunities. These everyday migrants built and occupied neighborhoods like First 
and Second Nagpada, Kamathipura, Dongri, and Kumbharwada. These were located north of 
Fort and South Bombay where merchants could access international markets. Nagpada, 
Kamathipura, Dongri, Kumbharwada and others were basically working class neighborhoods 
where people migrated in droves during the cotton boom of the 1860s and the famines of the 
1870s. These dense neighborhoods came to be stigmatized upon the onset of plague in 1896. The 
disease and fear of illness and death put a halt to Bombay’s commercial eminence. The desire to 
sanitize the city so that commerce could resume led to the formation of the City of Bombay 
Improvement Trust which offered schemes to remove the city’s slums and rehouse the labouring 
poor of the city. But the ambitions of the schemes were undermined by the interests of the elite 
moneyed peoples who were financing and taking advantage of the City Improvement Trust’s 
access to government lines of credit. Ironically, the labouring and poor rehousing schemes 
envisioned by the City Improvement Trust only exacerbated the class-based forms of inequality 
in the city of Bombay. 
The kinds of migrations, networks, and markets which formed across city and country 
were also operative in Karachi and Aden. These latter two cities appear in the sixth chapter of the 
dissertation as sources of comparisons and connections with Bombay and serve to show that 
Bombay was seen as a sub-imperial city or as a monopolizer of colonial capital. Rather than seek 
new kinds of resolutions to the problems of urban inequality, Karachi’s urban leaders and 
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merchants in the early 20th century complained that they had been made subordinate to Bombay 
and wanted to catch up. They used Bombay’s attempts at the resolution of the urban poverty 
problem and Bombay’s access to government lines of credit and well-integrated markets as proof 
that they had been left behind. Karachi’s merchants and urban leaders thus sought more market-
based opportunities for themselves, asking for infrastructure which would connect Karachi to 
more proximate hinterlands in spite of suggestions that they direct funds towards the city’s poor 
housing problem. Karachi’s leaders thus managed to ignore the growing problem of urban 
poverty in their city. Meanwhile, Bombay’s merchants depended on Aden as a fueling station en 
route to other ports. When an inquiry was conducted to assess the living conditions of the 
labouring classes in Aden, Bombay’s merchants said they had no responsibility towards housing 
in Aden. They claimed they were only obliged to offer a wage, not provide housing. Thus it was 
that in Bombay, Karachi, and Aden, the problem of urban poverty continued and was produced 
anew through the early 20th century in spite of concerns and plans to resolve the poor housing 
problem. 
The images of closely huddled tin-roofed shacks on potentially unusable land within the 
city have become a mainstay of any image of present-day Bombay. However, shacks weren’t the 
first of Bombay’s slums. It isn’t that shacks didn’t exist in historical Bombay— they did, but 
those weren’t slums, they were just shacks or huts. Officials spoke of them merely to describe 
their architecture and not to question their legitimacy. Most such shacks existed in the northern 
parts of the island and along the city’s shores, as well as in a few other locations. The East India 
Company itself had shacks built to house inhabitants during the 1830s when it became embroiled 
in the problem of famine in the Madras Presidency. Migrants had come flooding into Madras, 
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which was seen as a center of authority and a place to get help.17 The first slums of Bombay were 
instead small buildings, two to four story flats which populated the dense core of the city in 
neighborhoods such as 1st and 2nd Nagpada, Kamathipura, and Kumbharwada. These slums 
were much like slums found across the industrializing world in London, New York, San 
Francisco, Shanghai, Singapore, Sydney, Nairobi, and anywhere else where human populations 
were becoming increasingly dense.
Through the 19th century, Bombay’s capacity to sustain inequality and deploy that 
inequality in its own service as a powerful node of contact with markets beyond itself was like 
other cities. Capitalists were able to escape forms of regulation and limitation to their activities 
and seek out new labour markets. Private entrepreneurs of all kinds, including building owners, 
mill owners, and shipping and commercial entrepreneurs, could have a heyday in Bombay, and 
they did. 
By the early 20th century, their role in housing was a part of their success. Housing 
created revenues for moneyed men; it was a way to manage the population, a way to discipline 
labour, and as we see in the formation of the City Improvement Trust, a way to consolidate the 
interests of moneyed peoples. There was very little to stop or regulate commercial ambitions. 
Migrants accompanied the ambitions of others and came with their own, building the city’s 
housing through a complex and changing organization of the production process. Migrants 
supplied the labour market from rapidly changing sending regions, creating intense competition 
in the labour market. Their habitation practices caused Bombay to advance rapidly through the 
phases of urban growth. Extensive urban density in the center of the city came as a result of 
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intensification of the use of land, and thus people began moving outwards and suburbanizing by 
the turn of the century. These competitive dynamics also explain why the “hinterland” of 
Bombay has always changed and why that word is not necessarily useful as a descriptor of a 
static place. The story about Aden in chapter six demonstrates the necessity of distant labor 
markets for Bombay’s capitalists. Such tactics of deploying mobility and settlement by British 
and native capitalists enhanced the social status of private entrepreneurs and sustained the 
excesses of exploitation and extraction, making Bombay a crucial node in the colonial economy.
Prior to the depression of the 1930s, homelessness in urban centers, whether legal or 
illegal, was a remarkably comparable condition of existence. Cities were where surplus labour 
could migrate for jobs and opportunities. Nowhere could the poorest urban dwellers on their 
quickly declining wages and decreasing incomes from sales afford the kind of housing that any 
private developer would build. The depression resulted in divergent remedies to the poor housing 
problem. Public housing projects in cities of the North Atlantic and the concerted effort to make 
middle classes afford housing saved New York and London from Bombay’s subsequent 
misfortunes. Bombay’s slums did not “persist” because of a fundamental failure of the market in 
housing to develop in the same way in India as it had elsewhere. They developed because in 
Bombay and even outside the boundaries of formal colonialism, “traditional” habitation forms 
were products of capitalist development writ large. Nonetheless, India played a perhaps special 
role on the world historical stage; it was made exemplary of that not-yet capitalist state because 
of its central position as a stage for imperial power. 
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The depression of the 1930s caused a decline in both the market for goods and in official 
lines of credit.18 Widespread poverty resulted in underconsumption and fewer remedies existed 
than they had prior. Between 1860 and 1930, the British imperial state had invested capital in 
India’s infrastructure as a way to make its colony profitable. Bombay’s infrastructure was built 
mainly in that period and it, along with the building of housing, kept people employed, even 
providing official relief work in times of dearth. Extensive land reclamations, roadways, trains, 
and ports integrated Bombay with regions beyond the city. Upon the depression, credit and 
investments were difficult to come by. When the City of Bombay Improvement Trust suspended 
its housing schemes for labour and the poor in 1933 and was amalgamated with the Bombay 
Municipal Corporation, it did so with a debt of Rs. 90 lakh on its ledger. Faced with bank crises 
and the now unreliable funds, the Trust sold off more than half of that debt to private investors 
and repaid the rest in 1932. 
What is a slum?
Slum dwellers are seen as out of time and out of place. According to conventions 
produced in the scholarly literature, slums are the presence of the past and not yet modern, and 
slumdwellers are displaced villagers living in the city. By contrast, this study sees inequality in 
urban housing as productive of and an outcome of transitions to markets which operated on a 
continuum across town and country and intensified competition for access to shelter in the urban 
space. Inequality in housing was a product of the very modern transitions with which the history 
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of the 19th century is filled. Social mobility within society and across space best characterized 
Indian social life. Mobility across town and country enabled peasants, merchants, landholders, 
and entrepreneurs of all strata to build Bombay. Therefore, the resultant inequality in Bombay 
was because of their disparate successes which distinguished communities from each other.
The word “slum” does not occur in the South Asian historical record until late in the 19th 
century. Native language words for slums may appear in non-English sources. For example, 
“katchi abadi” or “katchi basti” is a “raw dwelling” as opposed to a “pakka” house which is 
“cooked,” i.e. with cement walls, electrical outlets, water sources, and a structural roof. 
Sometimes called “basti” which just means dwelling, this word connotes dense living quarters 
and often refers to slums, or housing in a colloquial form. In Western India, “jhopadpati,” or 
“zhopad-pati” is the word used for a row of roofs or huts. However, these words don’t often 
correlate consistently with the legal status of the housing. Some katchi bastis or jhopad patis 
acquire legal rights over time through social organization, but some don’t. The varying 
terminology used to describe slums is significant because it places housing in its local context. 
Urban slums of the “developing” or “underdeveloped” world are most often extra-legal, 
semi-legal, or occasionally legal, makeshift proliferations of informal or organic settlements 
made from temporary materials such as tin sheets, dried mud, poor quality cement, bamboo, or 
material waste such as barrels, boxes, cartons, etc. The UN Report of 2001 states, “The urban 
poor are currently the largest producers of shelter and builders of cities in the world...”19 Slums 
are intensely dense settlements often built on unused or unusable public land.  Especially during 
the beginning phases of a slum settlement, no basic amenities are provided by the state for these 
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dwellings, but, some locales have been present long enough to garner such privileges from 
officials. This is what the majority of third-world slums have in common. However, they differ 
across cities because of the varying local contexts in which customary property relations have 
been historically transformed into a modern form. Diverse forms of housing tenure include: run-
down rentals, non-legal occupancy rights managed by networks and hierarchies of slumlords, 
temporary housing on seasonal job sites, and outright illegal squatting on vacant land. 
The word “slums” as it is used to describe poor quarters in cities of the North Atlantic is 
quite different from cities elsewhere. In North Atlantic cities, “the slums” often refer to a 
minority urban population living in dilapidated government or private (often rented) housing 
which hasn’t been maintained according to housing standards set by the municipality or 
government. Unemployment, dependence on welfare, or occasional employment can drive urban 
inhabitants into ill-kept public or private housing. The avenues for petty labour and unregulated 
production of counterfeit commodities are much restricted in the developed world, thus making 
the housed urban poor stigmatized as “unproductive” dependents on welfare and the state. In 
contrast, slums in developing cities often house the majority of the urban population, and 
accounts of slums in third world cities have moved from condescension in the 1960s and 70s  
(slums house the poorest of the poor who need to be saved) to since the 1990s, a celebration of 
the bustling productivity of slum dwellers. This shift in representation of the developing world’s 
slums has in part to do with the shifting needs for tourism and representation of third world 
poverty to first world viewers. It also has to do with a valorization of the efficiency of private 
enterprise which became important after the 1970s.
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Historically, slums were found in many parts of every major city throughout the 
nineteenth century, but they weren’t always called slums. In fact, if one were to stand in the 
middle of Bombay in 1750 and look out at the human dwellings in the surrounding vicinity, the 
vast majority of housing would be in the architectural style we would today call a slum and 
would be embedded within the social relations which today signify the “problem of the slum,” 
i.e., a small dwelling space made up of makeshift materials without a legal property right over 
the land it was on. For the next two hundred years after 1750, the modern urban home was 
introduced which included individual property rights recognized by a bureaucratic and juridical 
state. This process meant that the earliest “slums” of Bombay were once part of the legitimate 
housing stock of the city. Making homes with permanent materials facilitated the exchange of 
property in a housing market which demanded legal jurisdiction over domestic capital. Through 
housing, urban populations could become legible within urban social hierarchies, and a major 
organizing feature of social life.20 
Theorists of urbanization distinguish modern urbanism from its pre-modern form by 
capitalist transformations of urban space,21 i.e., the creation of a space neatly divided between 
class communities who are rational actors within urban economic life, as opposed to the pre-
modern walled city which divided the rulers from the ruled according to one’s proximity to the 
central king or distance from the wall.22 As cities develop, it is argued, neighborhoods should 
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become socially exclusive zones of cohabitation. Barriers of wealth can in terms of housing and 
neighborhood costs and can create networks of class-based affiliations. 
In contrast, contemporary South Asian urbanism has been characterized as “dirty 
urbanism” by urban sociologists and city planners.23 This is due to the absence of neat 
boundaries between communities of different socio-economic strata or the miscegenation of 
urban spaces by rich and poor alike such that even domesticity and the place of work are not 
neatly divided. Underdeveloped cities, with their overpopulation, absence of demarcated social 
zones, and a majority population of the disenfranchised within illegal settlements, are seen as 
sites indicative of the lack of modernization, or incomplete modernization. They are projects yet 
to be completed. Slums, due especially to their overwhelming presence in the cities of the 
developing world, became the sign of modernity’s failure to transform the South Asian social and 
urban landscape.
Colonialism, Urbanization and Poverty
 While there has been no historical study of housing in urban South Asia, conceptions of 
the Indian city have been abundant in the debates on poverty, industrialization and urbanism of 
the 19th and 20th centuries, which are reviewed below. Looking at the study of the city from an 
interdisciplinary point of view, we can discern some trends. In scholarship in geography, 
development economics, urban sociology, anthropology, history, and even area studies, the urban 
form can stand in for the greatest achievements of modernization. Free capital, free labour, and 
unrestricted human ambition result in forms of social organization structured solely to optimize 
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growth and social mobility in the city. Cities serve as nodes of contact with distant markets and 
are containers themselves of intensifying capitalist relations. Even current scholastic endeavors 
which seek to recover the pre-modern urban form offer searching clues to an upcoming modern 
revolution, teleological hints of the present in the past. Cities are thus cast as places where ethnic 
ties between kinsmen are abandoned for economic bonds of class, or where class-based bonds 
can produce the modern economy. They are homes for free associations and organizations which 
construct coalitions of power apart from the oppressive arms of the state. They serve as 
instruments to social enhancements and class mobility rather than locations of fixed hierarchies. 
They are containers of humanity’s progress; markets enable the emergence of individuals who 
form civil societies who champion progress and freedom. 
 Such a genealogy of the urban modern prevents the writing of Bombay’s history in 
modern time and in modern space. Beginning with the assumption that the city is a distinct 
sociological category from the country has cast the majority slum-dwellers of Bombay as neither 
townsmen nor country-folk, so they don’t fit the categories which would allow us to write about 
them as either productive or consumptive, tied to the land or freed, capitalistic or feudal. Yet the 
use of ontologically distinct entities, townsmen versus country-folk, is pervasive in descriptions 
of them even in disagreements about whether slumdwellers are rural or urban folk.24 The 
question of urbanism in South Asia has exemplified a struggle with these issues. 
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Quantity of Urbanism
 It is a commonly held view that the degree of urbanization corresponds to the stage of 
development of a society. In a section entitled “Ascending the Ladder of Economic 
Development” from the book End of Poverty, Jeffrey Sachs, the Economist and Director of 
Columbia University’s Earth Institute and leading figure of the United Nations Millennium 
Project which sets development goals writes, 
...we sense a progression of development that moves from subsistence agriculture toward 
light manufacturing and urbanization, and on to high-tech services. In Malawi, 84 percent of 
the population live in rural areas; in Bangladesh, 76 percent; in India, 72 percent; and in 
China, 61 percent. In the United States, at the upper end of the development spectrum, it is 
just 20 percent. Services account for under 25 percent of employment in Malawi, whereas in 
the United States, they account for 75.
In Sachs’ worldview, it makes perfect sense that the United States is a wealthier country than 
Malawi given the difference in degree of urbanization in each society. He is basically making a 
causal claim that development results in a greater percentage of society that is urbanized. He 
goes on to say, 
If economic development is a ladder with higher rungs representing steps up the path to 
economic well being, there are roughly one billion people around the world, one sixth of 
humanity, who live as the Malawians do: too ill, hungry, or destitute even to get a foot on the 
first rung of the development ladder.25
The world is a simple place from Jeffrey Sachs’ point of view; the ladder serves as a clear 
metaphor where rungs are stages towards development and cities are a marker on each rung. 
Cities are spaces of upward social mobility. That some countries don’t have a sufficient urban 
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population shows that the process of development is still incomplete. Sachs is following an old 
idea borne out of a long-standing conceit, most well executed by the anthropologist Robert 
Redfield, that urban people are more advanced than rural folk.26
 Historians of 19th century India have often proceeded on the assumption that the degree 
of urbanization in India declined as a response to British colonialism. This assumption 
accompanies the ruralization thesis, namely that India was made into a primarily rural and 
agrarian economy through the colonial encounter. Irfan Habib measured precise rates of 
urbanization using census data in Eastern India between 1812 and 1872. He concluded that the 
quantity of urban population in that period alone declined not just in relative terms but in 
absolute terms. Although he advised that precise regional studies would need to confirm this 
trend for Western and Southern India, he insisted that “...of the process itself there can be no 
doubt.”27 The problem with his method is that his enumeration stops at the year 1872. The 
implication is that famine, which was a major factor in urbanization through the 1870s and 
1880s, is not a permissible factor in the urbanization process. Additionally, we don’t have a 
regional study of Western India to show whether the quantitative trend can be generalized.
 The ruralization thesis was the complement to the notion that the Indian subcontinent in 
the 19th century de-urbanized, that the percentage of its urban population actually declined; both 
were a major part of nationalist agitation and nationalist historiography. Nationalists argued that 
colonialism had rendered India an exporter of primary agrarian products. Demands for grain and 
cotton by colonizers led to agrarian policies geared towards greater output. The increase in 
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overall population meant that more people found themselves crowding on to the land given that 
there was insufficient industrial employment to provide opportunities for alienated rural labour. 
Thus given the rise in overall population, a greater percentage of people were living in the 
villages at the end of the nineteenth century than at the beginning. A landless peasantry was thus 
the outcome of British colonial rule. Dharma Kumar’s work tried to mitigate this argument. She 
was able to argue that a peasantry existed prior to British arrival in the Madras Presidency. She 
showed that the percentage of agricultural labourers of the rural sector went up from 15-17% to 
27% in the 19th century. The first number had a larger margin of error since it was hard to count 
outcaste landless labourers and so estimates for the year 1800 had to be extrapolations from the 
numbers from 1900.28 However, her critics thought she had underplayed the importance of even 
this ten percent increase in the agrarian labour force.29 
 The quantitative study of urbanization was also bound up with the question of 
deindustrialization, the most robust condemnation of the development claims of the British 
Empire in India. According to Habib, by 1880 the de-industrialization of India was complete 
causing problems of “tribute” for the empire. Craft-based industries had been competitively 
priced out of the global market through the 19th century and thus unemployed craftsmen had 
nowhere to go for work. This contributed to the overpopulation on the land. Such expositions 
were circuitously attempting to explain the cause of poverty through the lack of sufficient 
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employment. Any evidence against the deindustrialization thesis often used the example of 
Bombay, to which critics could rejoinder that Bombay was an exception and not the rule.30 
 In the postcolonial period and after the 1950s these indictments have been carried further. 
The few urbanists of South Asia who do take up the study of the city have theorized either 
incomplete urbanization or “over-urbanization,” which is defined as a larger urban population 
than warranted by the stage of development of the society.31 The city’s infrastructure, both in 
legal and physical forms, can not accommodate the demands of the population. Some say that 
sufficient urbanization exists in cities most influenced by “western culture” but the problems of 
insufficient infrastructure and a quickly migrating rural population lead to organic urban 
settlements where the difference between city and country remains vague.32 These assessments 
are unfortunately complicit in the notion that to be urban is to be economically advanced, 
although the precise relationship between the presumed advancing and urbanization is never 
worked out in detail. 
 
Quality of Urbanism
 While the scholars mentioned above have studied the quantity of urbanization, others 
have focused on the quality of urban spaces and their development in India. They contend that 
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while cities did develop in colonial India, they were insufficiently modernized spaces. 
Overwhelmingly, slums are the most often cited reason for this interpretation, in spite of the fact 
that slums existed in all major cities through the turn of the 19th century. Especially for 
anthropologists and sociologists, slums indicated the presence of the “village” in the city, where 
recent rural migrants had settled informally without legal rights over the land nor legal claims to 
basic urban amenities.33 Rural peasants were insufficiently transformed into industrial labourers. 
Slum dwellers were seen as transitional figures, displaced peasants, who could neither return to a 
rapidly privatizing agrarian economy nor integrate as urban labourers into the inadequately 
industrialized city. The implicit history of the formation of urban slums was that they were an 
aberration of colonial modernity in which colonialism rendered capitalism incapable of 
producing the pure urban space. The reasons for this were numerous, but some included the 
notions that colonial powers had monopolized access to industrial machinery or that the 
development of wage labor was thwarted because of the monetary gains to be made for 
colonizing adventurers who could benefit from a “traditional” system of production. The 
nationalization of economies after decolonization justified state-led development programs 
which sought to industrialize urban peripheries so they could catch up. Urban planners attempted 
to provide for informal dwellers by constructing uniquely suited third world housing projects.34
The “colonial port city” paradigm has often been used to explain the development of 
cities throughout the Indian subcontinent like Bombay, Karachi, Madras and Calcutta, which are 
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seen by scholars in the 1980s, as exogenous and imposed, not a formation indigenous to 
society.35 Those scholars purport that the merchant’s ability to organize urban life after the 
decline of Mughal rule in the 18th century was indicative of indigenous trajectories towards 
town-based capitalism, but these were later thwarted by the transfer of commerce from 
“indigenous cities” to “colonial port cities” like Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras.36 Cities served 
as sites of extraction for the colonial power and places of desperate migration for famished 
migrants from the interiors in the post-Mughal colonial era. Scholars searched for indigenous 
concepts of urbanization and looked for native histories of urban growth so as not to impose 
European models.37 For these scholars, India’s difference from universal narratives of capitalist 
modernity was no longer demonstrated, but rather assumed. 
There was resistance to the “colonial city” paradigm as well, but never through the 
problem of the urban slums. Rajnarayan Chandavarkar, when introducing the emergence of 
Bombay as an industrial center, wrote:
It has, not surprisingly, become a commonplace to regard the city as the principal agent of 
westernization and the harbinger of the modern world to the sub-continent...Bombay may 
have owed its origins and early growth to the Company settlement but its commercial and 
industrial development was shaped increasingly and in important ways by its place within the 
internal economy and not simply by the ‘modernizing’ forces of the West. Its commodity 
markets were linked to wider relations of production and exchange in the hinterland. Its mills 
depended increasingly upon the penetration of the domestic market. Labour for the city’s 
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commercial enterprises not only migrated from distant regions, but retained close ties with 
the village and through the remittance of cash earnings contributed to the reproduction of the 
rural economy. 38
Chandavarkar approached a close picture of the kinds of connections between Bombay and its 
hinterlands that was necessary to understand its development. He had demonstrated effectively 
that circular migrations were strategies of survival which indicated autonomy, but his main 
concern was to show how industrialization had influenced Bombay’s growth. 
 In studies that took up these questions, the original paradigm had not been challenged, 
instead South Asia’s development was shown to “not fit” the European model, thus implying that 
South Asian economic history deviates from a Eurocentric capitalist form.39 Through 
ethnographic and archival work, for example, “feudal” relations of bondage were found between 
industrialists and labourers.40 It was suggested that the various “modes of production” outlined in 
Marx’s theory of capitalist growth needed to be abandoned and indigenous modes of production 
in Indian life found. Frustration with such debates, seen as debates internal to problems with 
marxian analyses, led scholars to pursue other questions on the issue of the Indian city. 
 Urban studies followed the trends broadly outlined by the cultural and linguistic turn. 
Whereas prior to the 1960s and 70s, work on slums occurred within modernization or Marxist 
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frameworks, there was an almost total silence on the subject in the 1980’s and 90s. The cultural 
turn in the early 80s generated new important historical questions but instead of revising the old 
ones, seemed to abandon them. While new cultural historians have had much to say about the 
“cultural” nature of the “material,” less has been said about the “material” dimensions of the 
“cultural.”41 By the early 2000’s a fitful and collaborative interrogation of this abrupt change in 
the directions of inquiry resulted in essays such as “Whatever Happened to the ‘Social’ in Social 
History”42 and debates between post-structuralists and self-proclaimed Marxists who were 
themselves varied and divided.43 At stake in these debates was the loss of a certain kind of social 
history which had broken new ground by focusing on the everyday and/or the lowest rungs of 
society, imbuing these actors with historical agency and rewriting the greatest historical events, 
such as the Industrial or French revolutions, from the perspectives of the masses. This 
groundbreaking social history made available analytical tools with which to think about 
inequality. 
After the cultural turn, the status of inequality morphed. Rather than being limited to the 
notion of disparities in productive relations or consuming capabilities, inequality was expanded 
to the politics of representations or mediations inherent in sexual, racial, ethnic, or linguistic 
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identities which had no small role in the disparities of the human condition. As William Sewell 
put it, there was a “multiplication of historians’ radical identities…” when those affiliated with 
socialism and feminism now preferred to align themselves with queer movements, post-
colonialism, or post-structuralism.44 I would add that while modernization was the discourse 
within which older social historians wrote, cultural historians wrote of modernity’s limits. 
Historical studies took on questions of culture through meaning, language, and representation, 
while some of the social sciences (economics, political science, sociology) became ossified 
within the rubric of empirical, often quantitative, data.45 
 Work on the Indian city followed such trends. Scholars of urban form contrasted 
"official" rhetoric about the colonial city and its landscape to the lived experience of native 
residents for whom there were explicit records, namely, not the poor.46 Other scholars juxtaposed 
the “old city” aside the “new city” in places like Bombay,47 Karachi,48 Delhi,49 Bangalore,50 and 
Lucknow51 to underscore the imposition from above of municipal governance, urban planning, or 
imperial architecture. The latest works of South Asian architectural urban history have either 
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posited a unique Indian urban modernity52 or more carefully analyzed the modernization process 
as one of locally specific changes and adaptations to new meanings for architecture.53 In most of 
these, the question of inequality and poverty are not central. If mentioned at all, slums appear in 
the beginning of such monographs to introduce the strange entity which is the Indian city. 
Current debates over what are called “good” or “bad” globalization invoke the urban 
slum as proof for either side of the debate: slums provide relatively cheap quarters from which to 
begin the process of upward mobility for new urban migrants or they exemplify the final step in 
downward mobility and mass impoverishment. In the most recent scholarship on urban poverty 
and slums, future utopias are imagined and invoked by re-asserting the urban slum as the frontier 
of democratization,54 capitalism,55 imperialism,56 or the impending revolution.57 Moving away 
from these grand narratives, this study interrogates the formation of slums within the larger field 
of housing and looks at how poor housing is socially and materially constructed. In doing so, it 
revisits a question of an older type of social history within insights generated out of cultural 
history such that the processes of maldistribution and misrecognition work together to produce 
inequity in urban life.
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 The last social historian of Bombay to deal with inequality in the city was Rajnarayan 
Chandavarkar. Since a primary goal of this dissertation is to contextualize, analyze, and discern 
the life of the migrating urban dweller as a social being, i.e., through an understanding of his/her 
relations within the social structure at large, it is worth reviewing that intervention. 
Chandavarkar’s history of industrial Bombay portrayed Bombay as a vibrant industrial and 
political center. Its continued links with countrysides were explained by the competitive practices 
of the labour market, which overcame a rigid interpretation of Marx’s thinking on the formation 
of a proletariat. He was working against the notion that worker consciousness was constrained by  
the economic structure in which those workers found themselves. His opponents had claimed 
that Bombay was industrialized in a particular way, i.e. workers were “part-time urban wage 
labourers” who maintained ties to their villages and used their pay as remittances to support their 
rural families, pay back moneylenders, and maintain their conditions of social reproduction in 
the country. Thus they lacked the requisite discipline and commitment to sustain an effective 
labour movement.58 In the 1920s, Bombay’s workers would often abandon a strike too early, give 
in, or return to their homes in the country. Thus for such determinist Marxists, it was the 
economic structure of the particular labouring conditions in which Bombay’s mill workers found 
themselves that resulted in failed labour movements. 
 Chandavarkar turned this question on its head; he asked why strikes occurred in the first 
place. He wanted to demonstrate the formation of working-class consciousness first and then 
delineate its decline as a subsequent development having to do with politics not the economic 
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structure. Neighborhoods and union organizations could facilitate class-based solidarities against 
capitalists, they were not constrained by their position in a structure. When explaining why the 
labour movement subsequently failed in Bombay, he focused on the decline of communist 
workers due to inter-party politicking, namely, the rise of the Congress and Shiv Sena parties as 
more credible voices to represent the mass’ concerns. Also, as good as Bombay’s organizers were 
at launching actual strikes (unlike Marxists in the rest of India who would rather debate theory), 
they failed to partner themselves with the growing Dalit movement because of their rigid 
interpretation of work and labour. Being too narrowly focused on the figure of the mill worker or 
industrial labourer alone, such histories and movements had failed to question whether the 
master narrative of capitalist transformation should result only in a factory worker? Why 
couldn’t casual labourers, day workers, construction workers, temporary mill workers, all count 
as a varied lot within the general category of labour?
 This study builds on Chandavarkar’s social history of the city but moves beyond the 
constraints of labour history. It focuses on a varied lot of everyday workers, entrepreneurs, and 
optimizing peasants to provide an image of the broad conditions of working class existence. It 
follows the insight offered by Eric Wolf’s critique of the limitations of labour history in a chapter 
entitled “The New Laborers” who Wolf saw as a forming a worldwide phenomenon: 
Their emergence upon the stage of history prompted a fear of mass irruption and social 
disorder, as well as exaggerated hopes of imminent social renewal ... when social scientists 
began to examine these new men more closely, they treated them mainly as social problems 
—problems created by a severance from their roots through detribalization or immigration— 
rather than as social actors in their own right, responding to new conditions. Even labor 
historians concentrated at first on the history of labor organizations and labor movements; 
that is, they were more interested in efforts to transcend a condition than in delineating that 
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condition itself...Less was said of what was present, the relational matrix and content of 
working class existence.59
Wolf’s concern with the “relational matrix and the content of working class existence” pointed 
correctly to the problem with labour historians interest in contemporary political change. Being 
focused on immediate political equity for labourers, while welcomed, also served to obscure 
close insights on the particular content of working class life, the kind of content which would 
have perhaps made contemporary labour agitations more effective. This study tends to that 
problem by offering the contested history of housing and habitation practices of the working 
classes in the late 19th century in Western India as one unique window on working class 
existence.
Inequality and the Rural - Urban Continuum
 A solution to the problem of the relationship between colonialism, poverty, ruralization, 
and industry, was suggested in a 1994 article by David Washbrook entitled “Commercialization 
of Argiculture in Colonial India” in which he reviewed a prior debate from the 1980s. The article 
had within it an acknowledgement of a common mistake to both sides of the debate in 
considering the applicability of capitalist analysis, or more precisely, “economic theory” to a 
study of South Asia in the 19th and 20th century. Washbrook said that everyone would agree that 
commercialization influenced rural societies. However, what scholars had disagreed on was 
whether that was good or bad. Washbrook called himself a pessimist; having studied dry districts 
in particular he found that commercialization left many people without land such that fewer and 
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fewer people maintained a form of tenancy or propriety over land.60 Bruce Robert challenged 
Washbrook when he studied Bellary, the driest district of Madras Province, and found that 
market penetration did allow some small holders to prosper.61 Washbrook conceded that he had 
underestimated the ability of some people to prosper through new commercial opportunities, but 
he still saw a decline in forms of capital invested into production such as the decline in wells and 
ploughs. Thus, Washbrook probed further into what might explain this disagreement.
 The solution offered by Washbrook was that both he and Robert had missed an important 
point. They had failed to see the possibility of a crisis in agricultural production and social 
reproduction.62 They both instead implicitly agreed that poverty must have meant lack of 
development, which both failed to properly analyze because: 
...he from the supposition that commercial growth must have produced economic growth; I 
from the supposition that the absence of economic growth must have been the result of an 
incomplete penetration of market forces. Neither of us considered that the expansion of the 
market economy, itself, might have had negative and deleterious effects on the bases of 
production and social reproduction. In retrospect, our mutual mistake was to put too much 
faith in conventional ‘economic’ theory and in models of ‘the market’ as an obvious and 
automatic source of growth.63 
The insight was that the generalization of markets would produce both chances for prosperity 
and poverty. This insight served to do away with the question of whether colonialism had held 
back the promise of capitalist growth even as the transformation was held out as a promise. It 
wasn’t that market opportunities and commercialization had failed to sufficiently generalize in 
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the subcontinent due to the colonial encounter; rather it was the way in which India articulated 
with Empire that led to poverty. This study builds on this insight advanced by Washbrook about 
the dual outcomes of market economies such that inequality is a common feature. Housing is a 
good way to probe the nature of that inequality, yet, there are very few studies which treat 
housing or urban slums in Indian cities historically.64 
 In pre-modern South Asia, while space may have been divided into towns and countries, 
these entities were both physically and socially amorphous. What some scholars have called a 
“rurban” landscape was the predominant way of life, where human population density gradually 
increased and decreased in adjacent local regions, such that a continuum between rural and urban 
was the norm and not the exception.65 Functions considered typical of an urban type could be 
found in “country villages” and “small rural towns” within many regions of South Asia and these 
were historical features of social life across the Eurasian landmass, even in parts of Europe 
which would eventually industrialize.
 To illustrate what “rurban” meant, Perlin pointed to the widespread increase of local 
mints. Local mints formed nodes of connection within trade routes and networks which were 
proliferating between the 16th and 18th centuries. This supported the increase in commercial 
manufactures, a term he suggested as a replacement for “proto-industrialization.” Over time, this 
increasingly monetized and commercial society was made up of intense relations of production 
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between merchants, money lenders, and labourers. Thus the “rurban” economy was one in which 
producers were increasingly connected to money lenders and merchants and there was social 
mobility between these classes. The word “peasant” did not exclusively signify a landless rural 
labourer and the word “moneylender” did not exclusively mean a town-based finance capitalist. 
Peasants were sometimes engaged in money-lending and moneylenders were sometimes 
landholders. 
 The creation of the analytic category “rurban” in the history of early modern Eurasia 
allowed scholars to intervene in the Eurocentric historiography of industrialization, it indicated 
dynamism before the industrial revolution and social change towards more intensive uses of 
capital and labour which was in place before the explicit attempts at restructuring production 
which happened under the East India Company.66 Criticizing the concept of proto-industrialism 
as a teleological stage on the way to an exceptional European industrial capitalism, Perlin argued 
instead for a methodologically comparative strategy which inter-linked India’s pre-colonial 
history to other areas of the early modern world. 
 Perlin was severely critical of the way in which pre-colonial South Asia was treated as a 
static or cyclical society as opposed to the dynamic, cumulative, and evolving history of Early 
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Modern European societies. The self-organized, family-based, and impenetrable rural economy 
was one such stereotype of pre-colonial South Asia. The problem of doing pre-colonial South 
Asian history was that it had, for decades, remained an “autonomous” history existing “in 
contrast” to a history of Europe, and the rural village was exemplary of this condition. In place of 
this model, Perlin asked scholars to consider the interconnections and comparisons possible 
between Early Modern South Asia and Early Modern Europe. Otherwise, Perlin observed,
The consequence is that ‘colonialism’ is endowed with the status of a deus ex machina, the 
source of a radical break with this static or reversible past, but essentially the point at which 
the possibility of irreversible change begins - in short, the start of a history of the European 
type.67 
Perlin was able to show that what Wallerstein called the commercial capitalism of the 16th 
through 18th century 68 could be observed in local contexts spanning Eurasia and beyond, and 
most importantly, that this rurban activity increasingly took place in an “international theatre.” 
The difference between Perlin and Wallerstein was that whereas Wallerstein saw distinct macro-
regions exemplified by the scale of commercial manufactures, Perlin saw similarities across local 
regions which had to be placed in one spatial unit of analysis: 
Thus I shall suggest that events within India need to be recast as an inseparable part of an 
international forum of activities, in which rural industrialization in Prussia, Bohemia and 
Bengal are best treated as aspects of a single set of both comparative and historical 
problems.69 
But if commercial manufactures rendered regions of Asia as on par with parts of Europe, then 
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how could one explain the divergence and eventual dominance of Europe in the realm of 
production in the 19th and 20th century? Perlin argued that industrialization in England came on 
the heels of long developments in forms of control over production and labour which took place 
in vast local contexts competing for the international marketplace. The development of textile 
industries in Europe, Perlin said, 
...is a story of temporary successes, inter-regional competition, decline of old products and 
crafts and the rise of new ones, and of complex, shifting complementarities between the 
different trades making up the industry; these compose a continuous history only when put 
together and synthesized.70 
Commercial capitalism did not originate in Europe in the 16th century and then incorporate  
India,71 but rather had diverse local contexts of origin which articulated with each other.
 Perlin’s work on cowries and copper, what he called “humble monetary media” to avoid 
the anthropological terminology which saw copper and cowries as signifying a residual archaic 
economic life, traced the development of this “rurban” nexus starting from the 16th century 
when commercialization of both the agrarian and urban economy increased the involvement of 
humble groups in global flows.72 Increases in both forms of coinage and mints to achieve the 
demand for money were evident in this period. The East India Company had the advantage of 
being politically centralized, militarized, and connected to sister companies of the new world 
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which allowed it to gain control over the money supply in South Asia.73 South Asia’s commercial 
“rurban” social infrastructure was undermined as the East India Company regularized and 
streamlined local mints and coinage and gained control over the money supply. This changed the 
“rurban” nexus by bringing producers and merchants into direct relations with new forms of 
money mostly controlled by the Company.
 Perlin’s recommendations was not meant to undermine the anti-imperial voices in the 
scholarly literature which pointed to the devastating effects of colonial rule on the sub-
continent’s economic, political, and social development. Nor was it meant to suggest a simple 
continuity between the early modern and modern. Instead, Perlin’s suggestions were to bring into 
focus the more precise and particular ways in which colonialism altered South Asian history, to 
move that theory of change out of a nationalist framework, which would narrate the history of 
economic dominance within a local and global framework simultaneously. Addressing 
particularly the question of de-industrialization under colonial rule in India, Perlin said, 
...it is a salutary lesson to discover that the failure to industrialize in India is simply one 
example among a large number, some cases being located in the industrial heartlands of 
north-west Europe, even in England.74 
Thus, the new question offered by Perlin was how “rurbanization” could lead to both 
industrialization and de-industrialization regardless of the process’ location in Europe or Asia. 
Perlin had effectively challenged the notion that England’s eventual dominance over India in the 
domain of manufactures in the 19th century was a result of different trajectories in India and 
England prior to colonialism. 
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 Implicit in this intervention by Perlin was also a re-assessment of the status of the city in 
the transition to modernity. While Perlin criticized the autonomous rural village notion as a 
residue of ahistorical notions about pre-colonial South Asia, he suggested an implicit critique of 
European difference as well. He challenged the idea that Europe was set in contrast to India 
because of its prior formation of dynamic merchant communities based in towns out of which 
merchant capitalism spread across the ocean and through relations of dominance, imposed 
capitalism on distant societies. Perlin said that we needed a “...framework of relevance escaping 
national or continental boundaries, and instead including European traders, Asian commerce and 
Bengali agriculture as part of a single set of processes, developments and changing structures.”75 
 Instead of heeding these suggestions, the colonial and nationalist history of capitalism in 
South Asia has remained one of “foreign merchants” and “foreign capital” penetrating and 
usurping local economies. Carrying these conceptions through formal independence, the 
decolonization of India in 1947 produced notions of distinctive third world poverty and a unique 
urban form where “development” had not yet reached.76 Indian cities became emblematic of 
underdevelopment, de-industrialization, an unorganized and unregulated labour sector, and 
poverty on such a scale as to make these spaces both quantitatively and qualitatively distinct 
from industrial and developed cities. Only a particularly colonial urbanization process could 
explain an informal economy alongside a formal economy or the persistence of pre-capitalist 
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forms of labour and housing.77
What’s striking for contemporary observers of Indian cities is that each city’s “agrarian 
past” has never been made an obsolete and distant past, but instead continues to haunt urban 
developers as they try to buy land. Producers on what are called “urban peripheries” regularly 
combine in organized strikes to challenge their dispossession and the dominance of the ever 
expanding city. Scholars have also begun to realize that the urban poor, who labour informally 
throughout Bombay and Karachi, as they do in many other cities, are neither disconnected from 
formal regulation nor are they the transitional figures we once thought.78 Marginalized urban 
dwellers, street vendors, day labourers, scavengers, and domestic servants are no longer en route 
to becoming the proletariat of the factory. Rather than transitional figures between tradition and 
modernity, the village and the city, or agriculture and industry, the city’s slum dwellers are the 
functional urban majority. However, their social formation, as indicative of an aberration in 
colonial capitalism, has prevented the writing of their history.
45
 
77 The word “informal” came to describe the traditional sector, as opposed to modern/westernized sector, 
when used by Keith Hart in his work on Ghana in 1973. Keith Hart, “Informal Income Opportunities and 
Urban Employment in Ghana,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Mar., 1973): 61-89. 
It also acquired credibility by the International Labour Organizationʼs work on Kenya in 1972. This is 
reviewed in several discussions of the applicability of the notion of the informal in South Asian cities such 
as: Imtiaz Alvi, The Informal Sector in Urban Economy: Low Income Housing in Lahore (Karachi: Oxford 
University Press, 1997); Emmanuel Romatet, "Calcutta's Informal Sector: Theory and Reality," Economic 
and Political Weekly 18, no. 50 (1983).
78 Sabyasachi Bhattacharya, Jan Lucassen, and SEPHIS (Programme: Netherlands), Workers in the 
Informal Sector: Studies in Labour History, 1800-2000 (Delhi: Macmillan India Ltd., in association with 
South-South Exchange Programme for Research on the History of Development, 2005).
Sources, Methods, and Organization of the Dissertation
 The making of the urban slum has been thought of as a non-event; it is what one scholar 
has called, “the quiet encroachment of the ordinary.”79 This denial of event-status does well to 
introduce a discussion on how slums, everyday urban dwellers, ordinary city folk, and their 
everyday housing and habitation practices have been seen as coincidental to history rather than 
motors of history. This dissertation approaches a history of urbanization in Western India in the 
long 19th century through questions on the cultures of urban housing and markets, the shifting 
meanings of shelter, the dynamics of poverty production and its relief, and the acts of human 
ingenuity which sustained the market in housing - as much as it was a slippery commodity. 
Throughout the dissertation, I strive to see agency amongst everyday actors.
 Some empirical questions which drive the research follow. What were the circumstances 
of population growth within these settlements? How did early poor communities interface with 
the rest of the growing city, i.e. through institutions of labour, commerce, servitude, and local 
politics? When were these communities first recognized as poor? How was land acquired within 
these cities for either private development or state control? What kinds of forces constrained the 
activities of dwellers in the first slums and which forces made of these residents active 
participants in urbanization? What were the variety of dwelling units like in early Bombay? How 
was legitimate and illegitimate housing determined? What is the pre-history of the “slum 
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 Building on well-documented themes of dynamic and mobile early modern societies to 
explain the growth of Bombay, this study takes the demographic, industrial, and urban 
transformations of the long 19th century and attempts to see those dynamics and their 
significances from the perspectives of the denizens of the most densely inhabited quarters. These 
mobile and everyday people became Bombay’s first stigmatized slum-dwellers in the late 19th 
century, just as their counterparts did in other major cities of the 19th century. To bring our focus 
to the divergent remedies to the problem of urban poverty, in addition to analyzing perspectives 
from inside Bombay, I also look at Bombay’s urban poverty problem from Bombay’s 
peripheries, from Karachi and Aden which provide comparative cases of the varying resolutions 
to the urban poverty problem. They also serve to show how Bombay was seen as more integrated 
into the capitalist world markets by those looking at it from its own peripheries. What follows is 
a summary of each of the chapters of this dissertation.
Chapters of the Dissertation
 The first chapter is about the making and dismantling of housing claims; while an 
indigenous claim to housing is legitimated, other entitlements to housing are discredited. To 
demonstrate this, I historicize one of the most salient origin stories of the city of Bombay. That 
story, that the Koli, a fishing people’s caste, are the indigenous inhabitants of Bombay, has 
functioned as a kind of metonym for the entirety of Bombay’s history. The story functions to 
demarcate and protect Bombay’s historiography from the kinds of interrogations which would 
connect it temporally to premodern trajectories and spatially to a dynamic rural process beyond 
the city’s boundaries. This serves to, inadvertently or otherwise and for better or worse, credit the 
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British with Bombay’s development. Instead, I argue that the story of the Koli fishing-peoples is 
itself a product of the history of the city, and its emergence at a particular conjuncture at the turn 
of the 20th century served important functions for the immediate contests over land, housing, and 
resources within the city. The construction of Koli settlements, called Koliwadas, in several 
neighborhoods in the 19th and early 20th century functioned to inscribe the authoritative history 
of the city into the urban landscape itself. 
 By following histories of Bombay City from the 16th to 19th centuries along with 
ethnographies and census reports, I locate the precise date of the creation of the now 
authoritative tale of Bombay City’s origins at 1901 CE, and then examine its functions. I also 
analyze some, peculiar on first inspection, records in Bombay’s 18th and early 19th century 
archive that document the agrarian settlement of Bombay’s Salsette islands which now only 
make sense if read within a “rurban” framework. Then, I show how the origin myth about the 
Koli served to exclude a prior agrarian and “rurban” history of Bombay. The granting of Koli 
housing and building of Koliwadas, or Koli colonies or neighborhoods, authorized both colonial 
statecraft and the perpetuation of the myth of Koli indigeneity. While the Koli acquired state-
built housing called Koliwadas, now known as native shantytowns, the rest of Bombay’s 
inhabitants were resigned to become players in the emerging field of the housing market, which 
became their only legitimate means of acquiring housing.
 By the 20th century, the market in housing was the determining force in most Bombay 
residents’ lives, except for the Koli. The indigenous become marked as containing an excess of 
culture, their survival was a repository of that excess left over from the transition to the modern. 
Deploying indigeneity served to reframe contemporary social practices as prior to modernity, as 
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if they were pre-modern practices. The culture of the Koli was framed as one of local 
significance and a prior artifact to the modern march of value-free economic practices. This was 
the way in which the economy could overcome native culture in India, and how legitimacy for 
the market in housing was established.
 The second through fifth chapters develop the contours of the market for housing and 
show how commercialization affected Western India and created the conditions for circular 
mobilty. The second chapter works against the singular history of the Koli origin story. Using 
census reports, it explores the many communities and forms of social life which together built 
Bombay in the 19th century. It shows how mobility, both spatial and social, drove the 
construction of the city of Bombay and preceded the phase of rapid urbanization. The chapter 
focuses on two particular “shocks” to the region: the American civil war in the 1860s and the 
famines of the 1870s and 1880s. We see that these created periods of intense urban population 
growth and increased everyday mobility. During these periods in regions surrounding the city, 
forms of indebtedness functioned as a wage and the trend of a decline in wages, i.e. greater 
indebtedness, would lead migrants to seeek out greater opportunities. This chapter also shows 
how pressures in urban life initiated a suburbanization process. Using a “Report on development 
of salsette” we can see how officials were always lagging behind forms of housing which 
developed from the ground up. By focusing on a range of habitation practices in the city, the 
chapter examines the changes in family life, occupational opportunities, and networks of 
community which contributed to the experience of mobility of Bombay’s inhabitants. Such 
experiences were misunderstood by what I call the official “urban gaze.” By seeing the city from 
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the everyday people’s point of view, rather than seeing the growing city as absorbing rural 
migrants, we see how mobile migrants brought the city into their routes of circulation.
 The discussion of mobility contextualizes the “urban housing problem” which is 
developed in the third chapter, which centers on the legibility of housing. Using annual 
municipal records as a main source, we see that in spite of officials only seeing housing as an act 
of consumption, the housing market was already, by the end of the 19th century, a site of 
advanced organization in which labouring, poor and socially mobile migrants were able to be 
responsive to changing demand and supply in both units of housing, materials, labour, and 
industry which drove the need to construct housing. People were able to mobilize resources to 
negotiate and produce the intensifying social relations in the city. Housing is best understood as a 
complex commodity. It combined the dynamics of other component markets in materials and 
labour, and poor housing was not "marked" as such. The attribution of significance to a housing 
type based on the materials used to construct it, the type of tenurial arrangement of its 
inhabitants, or access to public goods such as water, sewage lines, electricity, or roadways, was 
established well after the period under study here, not in the late 19th century. In this period 
however, we can see officials beginning to document those concerns but they do not 
determinedly form the set of traits meant to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate housing.    
 The fourth chapter focuses on Bombay’s part in the global plague at the end of the 
century, in 1896-1897. The plague was productive of racial tensions across the colonial divide, 
when reform projects were proposed which focused on solving the problem of poor housing 
through the eradication or sanitation of urban slums. Newspaper articles and reports by health 
and sanitation officers form the majority of the sources in this chapter. Conflict between the state 
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and society over interference in such matters was resolved through the building of a consensus 
that something had to be done to clear poor housing. The plague brought the urban poor into the 
hands of the urban rich. Broad measures were considered which were meant to organize urban 
space in ways that lent itself to surveillance, monitoring, and intervention. Accompanying this 
was the consolidation of new authorities to the moneyed classes within the city. Knowledge 
about each city was crucial to enacting these transformations. Bombay’s city census had 
constructed a kind of knowledge about housing in the city, living conditions, and family life 
which could, at times like these, serve as a tool for slum demolitions and interventions in the 
private markets of housing. Although the British Crown, especially after 1857, had resolved to 
practice non-interference in matters of native religion, the plague warranted interference in 
everyday matters. 
 Keen to restore the “sanitary credit” of the city, elites emerged who wanted to clean poor 
housing and thus they formed the City of Bombay Improvement Trust, the subject of the fifth 
chatper. The plague was crucial in forming new relations of housing production which 
distinguished the rich from poor and made space for a politics of benevolence, paternalism, and 
protection. This chapter uses reports published for each year of the City Improvement Trust’s 
work which documented the financial condition of the Trust, and the kinds of schemes it was 
engaging in. Elites interfered in housing to adjudicate how capital was to be managed in the city 
and how it could be made to circulate again. Ambiguous and changing notions of what 
constituted a proper house, the kinds of notions which had allowed migrants to create 
opportunities for themselves and define housing for themselves, gave way to housing reform 
projects which sought singular definitions. 
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 I suggest that the Trust should be seen as a kind of financial instrument which was ill 
conceived from its birth because it was designed to fulfil two goals which were at odds with each 
other. Explicitly at a financial burden to itself, the Trust was motivated by elite interests who 
depended on the city for world trade, not because there was something endemic to the housing 
type itself which indicated its rank within housing types in the city.  Financial difficulties led it to 
be amalgamated into the Bombay Municipality in the early 1930s, and it transferred its sources 
of financing from major banks to the private money market as it was amalgamated.
 The sixth and seventh chapters pursue the politics of housing in Karachi and Aden along 
with Bombay, where merchants could escape regulation and have more control of labor. The 
sixth chapter sees Bombay from the outside, from the perspective of Karachi and Aden, both 
cities which came under the administrative rubric of the Bombay Presidency. Reports by the 
Karachi muncipal commissioner and documents for the separation of the province from Bombay 
help tell the Karachi story. While for Aden, a committee which inquired into the condition of 
homelessness in the city in the early 1920s left behind a set of interviews with merchants who 
were operating out of Bombay. Those merchants were asked what they thought their 
responsibility was towards the growing problem of poor housing in Aden.
 While Bombay’s City Improvement Trust was dis-housing and rehousing its labouring 
and poor dwellers to restore its sanitary credit, in Karachi and Aden, the problem of poor housing 
did not find similar solutions. There was no Improvement Trust in these cities, and it was hard 
for local urban leaders to develop the kind of institutional framework which would bring in 
Imperial lines of credit on the scale that it did in Bombay. Rising classes of merchants were able 
to use these seaport connections to establish nodes of commerce, but they did so from these 
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locations as a way to escape any limitations on their commercial enterprises. This chapter 
demonstrates how the poor in each of these cities could be used as grounds upon which 
Bombay’s sub-imperial position was challenged and in so doing, effectively delayed the 
resolution of the poor housing problem. In Aden, the total abandonment of the urban poverty 
problem was visible, while in Karachi, a desire to “catch up” to Bombay’s stage of commercial 
advancement meant that leaders advocated infrastructure for more commercial opportunities 
which would connect Karachi to new hinterlands in its vicinity, not a restraining of commercial 
ambitions.
 The seventh and final chapter of the dissertation follows the problem of representing the 
poor and how the pressures to represent the poor created a political census on the origins of the 
modern city in India. It begins with the problem of establishing representatives for the urban 
poor in the late 19th century during census operations. Then it follows the movements of paupers 
and indigents across the empire from the turn of the century and the desire to make their 
“homes” responsible for them. As cities became conduits of intensifying human mobility, from 
which paupers and indigents travelled, the question of how to understand the city and its relation 
to poverty came to the fore. The Indian economists in particular cast the city as a secondary 
effect of changing social conditions in the countryside. The city was demoted in the nationalist 
economist’s imagination. When discussions of labour and especially Indian labour intersected 
with or interfered with the nation building exercises of the main nationalists, the question of 





The second origin myth of the history of Bombay is the tale of the Koli, a fisherfolk 
caste, who are purportedly the city’s indigenous inhabitants or adivasi (adi meaning “first” and 
vasi meaning “inhabitant”). If the Koli are indigenous, it is implied that the remainder of 
Bombay’s social milieu traces its origins to a foreign or outside source. The non-Koli peoples of 
Bombay are thus not local, not native to, and not from Bombay. In Karachi, another port city on 
the Western coast of the South Asian subcontinent, a similar origin tale begins a similarly 
authoritative urban history. Presumably it is the Mohonas, a caste community of local fishing 
peoples, who inaugurate the history of Karachi’s growth and development. The Mohonas can be 
counted on to ferry people and goods up and down the Indus river; they serve as local guides and 
provide urban lore to tourists and travelers.1 Both the Mohonas and the Koli are known as 
peoples of the sea by caste. They control the fishing and boating industries because of a supposed 
natural proclivity for the environs of the oceans and rivers, along which both Bombay and 
Karachi are nestled. 
The historiography of “colonial cities” in South Asia has avoided scrutinizing such 
authoritative accounts of these cities wherein primitive local communities are constructed as 
timelessly awaiting modernity’s arrival. In contrast, this chapter will demonstrate how the notion 
of indigeneity is itself constructed over time, historically, and specifically position the 
construction of urban indigeneity within a particular kind of story about colonial commercial 
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modernity. That story credits British arrival on India’s shores with the invention of capitalism 
and modern urbanism and discredits developments in India’s early modern period such that 
India’s history is seen to be divided into an India before Europe and an India after Europe. 
Engaging with questions of historiography, narrative production, the politics of indigeneity, and 
urban housing markets, this chapter shows how the Koli origin myth achieved the status of 
authoritative urban history in Bombay. It also shows how the story granted legitimacy to the 
emerging field of the market in housing. The construction of Koli settlements, called Koliwadas, 
in several neighborhoods throughout the city in the 19th and early 20th century, functioned to 
inscribe the authoritative history of the city into the urban landscape itself.
Not until the turn of the 20th century did anybody believe that the Koli were Bombay’s 
adivasi. We can delineate the creation of that “origin myth” of the Koli in Bombay, i.e. we can 
follow the histories created about Bombay City from the 16th to 19th centuries to locate the 
precise date of the creation of the now authoritative tale of Bombay City’s origins, which I 
demonstrate didn’t happen until 1901 CE. Additionally, by highlighting the role of the Koli 
themselves in the performance of this origin myth, we can see that the Koli served to perform a 
source of legitimacy which inadvertently served the aims of colonial expansion. The 
“indigenous” or “adivasi” were discursively constructed by the rubric of colonial expansion itself 
and once constructed became participants in the re-iteration and re-performance of their 
indigeneity. 
Having established this origin myth, the Koli tale served two important immediate 
functions while also granting legitimacy to the emerging field of the market in housing. First, it 
legitimized the transformation of the narrative of Bombay’s history into accordance with the 
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conceits of modern historiography, which posited a sharp rupture between the modern and pre-
modern, between capitalist organization and pre-capitalist organization, and between an India 
before Europe and an India after Europe. Second, it provided the Koli with a privileged legal 
status in the domain of housing such that the Koli could acquire land for housing in the city 
through a form of patronage with the colonial state. This granting of Koli housing and building 
of Koliwadas, or Koli colonies or neighborhoods, in Bombay, authorized both colonial statecraft 
and the perpetuation of the myth of Koli indigeneity. While the Koli acquired state-built housing 
called Koliwadas, now sometimes referred to as native shantytowns, the rest of Bombay’s 
inhabitants were resigned to become players in the emerging field of the housing market.  
Raising the issue of indigeneity and its opposite is fundamental to both the task of writing 
urban history and engaging critically with South Asian historiography which has often treated the 
major modern port cities of South Asia, such as Calcutta, Madras, Karachi and Bombay, as 
“colonial cities” before they were ever known as such. The notion that modern urbanism, 
capitalism, and a sphere of activity called economic as such  -analyzable and distinguishable in 
social life because of being free and separate from “cultural” activites-  are all foreign 
impositions has become a convention within the scholarly literature on “colonial cities.” It was 
for long, a mainstay of anthropological assumptions about Asia at large that capitalism was 
imposed on Asia from colonizing adventurers. Historians too, are implicated in that assumption. 
However, those conventions of thought which suggest that modern economic activity was 
imposed by British rule on the subcontinent make it very difficult to account for the multiplicity 
of lives, contests, exchanges, and accommodations which together have made urban South Asia. 
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The most straightforward consequence of the conventional view is offered by Louis Dumont in 
his infamous Homo Hierarchicus, when he says,
So far as India is concerned, a further fact, many of whose aspects are known and studied but 
which is often overlooked in itself, in its full generality and fundamental character, is that the 
British domination emancipated wealth in moveables and chattels by substituting for a 
political regime of the traditional type, a modern type of regime, one of whose fundamental 
tasks was to guarantee the security of property, a regime which, compared to the previous 
one, abdicated part of its power in favour of wealth. The transformation of land into a 
marketable commodity is only a part of this change. No doubt there is in India today a 
distinct sphere of activity which may properly be called economic, but it was the British 
government which made this possible.2 
In Dumont’s account the British deserved all the credit for having the ingenuity to create 
economic activity as such. Indeed, it is a further view, made most explicitly in nationalist 
literature, which because it seeks to discredit British ingenuity puts in its place British 
malfeasance, economic decay and depression as the hallmark of the colonial period. Common to 
both positions is the framing of port cities as the site of inauguration of the modern economy and 
colonial extraction because of British settlement and fortification on India’s shores. 
 It is worth challenging the notion that no such realm of activity called “economic” existed 
prior to the British involvement in Indian history. Doing so requires seeing the emergence of the 
“economy” as a product of cultural shifts in the way practices of social habitation, organization 
and competition for resources are read and framed within new rubrics. The construction of the 
notion of indigeneity at the turn of the 20th century is one such tool in the production of a 
“modern economy” which is to be understood as devoid of culture. The indigenous become 
marked as containing an excess of culture and indigenous communities and collectives embody 
in their practices of livelihood and survival a repository of that excess left over from the 
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transition to the modern; they become an installation of a past residue.3 Deploying indigeneity 
serves to reframe contemporary social practices as prior to modernity such that the construction 
of the Koli as the adivasi renders the culture of the Koli as one of local significance who are a 
prior artifact to the modern march of value-free economic practices. Economics as such deploys 
in its very own discourse the desire to overcome culture. Such a shift, besides making culture and 
economy separate, most importantly in the case of Bombay’s history serves to obscure the 
economic dynamism which existed prior to British rule because the indigenous Koli cannot be 
economic actors, but instead are a cultural reservoir of the past, enshrined in their pastness upon 
the landscape of the present.4 As installations of a kind, the Koli were of cultural interest to 
officials. These photographs with captions accompanied the documents of the Colaba 
Redevelopment Scheme, a neighborhood thought to be their natural home by the 20th century, 
which is discussed later in this chapter: 
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3 Nicholas B. Dirks, Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2001).
4 A similar argument about vernacular capitalisms as refracted and codified into a concept of the pre-
modern economy can be found in Ritu Birla, Stages of Capital: Law, Culture, and Market Governance in 
Late Colonial India (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009).
Fig. 1.1 Photograph of fisherman in Colaba. Source: Mirams, “Colaba Development (Eastern Section) 
Preliminary Report” Poona, ORW 1996 B6, 1916, available at British Library in London, United Kingdom.
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 For the British, the Koli story of indigeneity was used to modernize and “economize” 
housing practices within the city such that previous forms of economic activity could be written 
out of the historical narrative of Bombay’s origins. The origin myth constructed all non-Koli 
claims to land as illegitimate and other entitlements to housing could be ignored. For the Koli, 
their performance of indigeneity secured them rights in coastal land and basic housing amenities 
while neighborhoods were upgraded to become modern bourgeois urban settlements. Thus, in 
this chapter we will focus here on the intersections of the emerging British colonial state with 
Koli leaders as they together forged new practices of housing and managed the limited resource 
of land on Bombay’s islands.
 While both the British and the Koli participated in the sedimentation of the “origin 
myth,” they were no doubt unequal partners. The emerging market in housing and land was 
practically invisible to the Koli peoples; they may have understood that they would not  
participate in the market in housing, however they probably did not anticipate how market 
dynamics would eventually overtake their entitlements and render their ability to provide for 
themselves competitively obsolete. The British on the other hand secured for themselves a 
warrant to statecraft because of their ability to protect a legitimate claim by the Koli and their 
ability to protect and even enhance actors who sought participation in the market. Such actors 
increasingly sought out the colonial state to intervene in and secure their claims on housing and 
land.  
 By the 20th century, the market in housing was the determining force in most Bombay 
residents’ lives, except for the Koli. The Koli were legitimate political actors outside of the 
market with a special relation to the state. Others in the city were subject to the push and pull of 
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the market with regards to where they found housing on the island-city, however the Koli were 
allotted space in developing neighborhoods in order to reside by the sea and perform their native, 
customary, and traditional functions. This right to land by the sea was not always in place 
however, it took some time after the Koli origin myth was official truth for the Koli to gain 
coastal hamlets called “Koliwadas.” 
 The following sections of this chapter begin by discussing who the Koli are and how 
knowledge about the Koli has been constructed. The diversity of the Koli peoples across the 
subcontinent is juxtaposed to the singularity of the notion of their coastal indigeneity. Then I ask 
why it matters, i.e. why does it matter that the Koli are thought of as the indigenous inhabitants 
of Bombay? What kind of work does that do? To answer these questions I recover an important 
intervention in the historiography about India’s transition to modernity which revealed capitalist 
forms of intensifying labour and capital use prior to British arrival. That intervention deals with 
the problem of urbanization in an oblique way; it uses the notion of a “rurban nexus” across 
Eurasia to counter prevailing conceptions of India and Europe as wholly distinct prior to colonial 
rule. The intervention also shows how agrarian forms of accumulation were deeply integrated 
within urban forms of intensification. 
 Using such interventions form the historiography, I address and analyze some, peculiar 
on first inspection, records in Bombay’s 18th and early 19th century archive that document the 
agrarian settlement of Bombay’s Salsette islands which now only make sense if read within a 
“rurban” framework. (see Figure 1.2) Names of some of the neighborhoods in the city which 
survive to the present day betray this agrarian past. Neighborhoods exist which are called: 
khetwady (“khet” = cultivated field), fanaswady (“fanas” = jackfruit), and kakadwady (“kakad” = 
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cucumber) with “-wady” being a suffix meaning locality or neighborhood, the same suffix at the 
end of koliwada; these are some examples. I consider agrarian settlements and dispossessions, as 
well as the normal connections between town-based practices and agrarian practices. I draw out 
in particular practices in housing, and look at how a claim to housing was a nested entitlement 
within “rurban” communities where the mobility of producers and extractors was common. 
Then, I show how the origin myth about the Koli was made into the authoritative tale of 
Bombay’s history and how it served to exclude that prior agrarian and “rurban” history of 
Bombay. Finally, once the Koli origin story is established, we see the Koli functioning alone as 
petitioners and claimants of a thoroughly modern kind, i.e. interacting with the state-run and 
market-influenced dynamics of housing. 
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Fig. 1.2 Mixed agrarian and urban land use in early Bombay.
Source: Thomas Dickinsonʼs map of Bombay Island, redrawn from The Gazetteer of Bombay City and 
Island, as cited in Miriam Dossal, Theatre of Conflict, City of Hope, 2010.
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Encountering the Koli peoples 
As with other adivasi communities of South Asia, the Koli people’s precise history of 
collective identity formation is shrouded in a ritualized telling of the community’s past. Besides 
oral histories if they have been collected, the Koli appear very rarely in historical records. Thus 
historians return to the few sources which do reveal something from the premodern and modern 
periods. Interestingly, after the publication of Edwardes’ History of Bombay City and Island 
which he published in 1901 in order to accompany the census for that year,5 scholars were deeply  
influenced by Edwardes’ account and reiterated the Koli indigeneity story when writing about 
Bombay. The volume of literature which claims the Koli are indigenous in the 20th century 
forecloses an understanding of the diversity of the Koli peoples as well as the contingent manner 
in which knowledge about the Koli peoples has been made. 
 Most notorious are tour books and oral accounts by casual tour guides which repeat the 
basic tale of the Koli in Bombay: that the Koli was the first inhabitant and the only form of 
human life on the islands for several centuries. A Lonely Planet guidebook for India from 2003 
states, “The islands that now form Mumbai were first home to the Koli fisher folk as far back as 
the 2nd century BC; Koli shanties occupy parts of the city shoreline today.”6 A DK Eyewitness 
Travel Guide for India from 2002 explains the change of the city’s name from Bombay to 
Mumbai as follows: “The city has now reverted to its local name, Mumbai, from Mumba Devi, 
the eight armed goddess worshipped by the Koli fishermen who were the islands’ original 
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inhabitants.”7 Both of these statements, each occurring on the very first page of each guide 
book’s section on contemporary Mumbai, collapse the distance between the past and the present. 
The Lonely Planet’s narration is invested in demonstrating that the past has been enshrined in 
Bombay’s contemporary urban landscape as the past. Shanties are indicative of the primitive 
lifestyle expected of Koli fishermen and the shanties and are marked in this case not for their 
informality in housing or illegality but for their occupancy by the Koli community alone. The 
presence of the Koli shanties also suggests an uninterrupted progression from the 2nd century BC 
to contemporary Mumbai. The DK guidebook makes a similar leap suggesting that the recent 
name change from Bombay to Mumbai is not a signaling of the rise of exclusionary Hindu 
ideologues in the city, when in reality it was the ascendance of the Shiv Sena in Maharashtra 
through the 1990s which best explains the change of the name of the city.8 The guidebook 
instead discusses the change of name as a reversion to an original condition and thus honorific of 
local religious sentiment. The Kolis are made unhistorical, local, timeless exemplars of 
Bombay’s indigenous history, and their enshrinement in the urban landscape serve as a site of 
continuity between a deep past and the present.
 Amongst the few serious studies of the Koli it is acknowledged that the Koli are a diverse 
peoples engaging in settled agriculture, fishing, boat making, and are sometimes landowners, 
labourers, artisans, water carriers, watchmen, weavers of baskets, and even bandits. People 
calling themselves “Koli” can be found as far east as Orissa and as far west as Saurashtra, 
occupying the breadth of the central South Asian subcontinent. They are regarded for being 
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highly adapted to their ecological zones and thus take on local names in addition to being called 
“Koli.” In the post-independence period, they are sometimes given a legal scheduled status 
which garners them certain rights and resources while yet in other occasions they are placed just 
above the shudras, or untouchables and local political culture determines their ability to secure a 
livelihood. The variety of occupations they engage in results in varying names such as: Talpada 
Koli, Chuania Koli, Malhar Koli, Dhor Koli, Kolghas, Pandhare Koli, Dangar Koli, Bana Koli 
and several others, all signifying a caste name related to the type of work they do.9 However, 
there is much less reason to assume all these Koli are related to each other. There are strict 
marriage rules within the varying Koli communities indicating if and when a Koli from one 
group can intermarry with another. Most often they do not intermarry, indicating diversity, 
segregation and hierarchy within the broadly defined community. Most likely, it was the creation 
of a legally recognized identity in the late 19th and early 20th century which has led to an all-India 
social organization amongst the Koli which has garnered them privileges from the state.10
 Early ethnographers and historians in the nineteenth century knew the Koli were a 
diverse people, and they used “scientific” methods to understand the Kolis’ history, culture, and 
geography. Using early analytic tools such as the delineation of the history of linguistic families, 
or a simplified periodization of South Asian history into “Hindu,” “Muslim,” “Portuguese,” and 
“British,” or anthropological classifications of people on a spectrum between primitive and 
modern based on observations about lifestyle, the Koli peoples have had far more said about 
them than is warranted by their occasional appearance in historical records. 
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 The diversity of the Koli peoples was also known by the British, who suppressed “Koli 
outrages” in the 1830s and 1840s. In what was read as an attempt to restore the Peshwa in the 
Sahyadri ranges of the Thana and Ratnagiri districts, hill peoples calling themselves 
“Koli” raided and plundered villages and attacked forts. The Ratnagiri Gazetteer reports that, “…
the warlike Kolis were a terrible menace to British Rule.”11 This was seen as unlike general 
disturbances by hills-peoples, which the British encountered often, as did Mughal and regional 
authorities before them. For the British, the Koli uprising was experienced as a form of statecraft 
on behalf of the Peshwa. The British forcefully put down what were called revolts in 1839 and 
1844 by the Kolis. In this period the Koli was identified as the lawless element within society, 
and a menace to the rule of law. However, reform was seen as possible and the Koli, amongst 
other tribal communities, were eventually to be settled in an agrarian order on the Konkan coast.
 Yet in accounts after 1901, when Edwardes first said that the Koli were the indigenous 
inhabitants of Bombay, scholars maintained that the Kolis were the “aboriginal” inhabitants of 
the islands of Bombay.12 Sometimes the full story of their origins was given and in such cases the 
majority of citations lead back to Edwardes’ Gazetteers and his own history of the development 
of the city.
 In the Gazetteer of Bombay City and Island, first published in 1909, the chapter entitled 
“Population” begins with an assured statement on the first inhabitants of the city of Bombay. 
Edwardes, the author, claims that “It can be accepted without demur..” that the Kolis, of the Son-
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lineage were the aboriginal peoples of Bombay Islands and of Western India.13 Several pages 
describing the Kolis of Bombay begin with how they lived on the islands since “pre-historic 
ages,” occupying “rude hamlets” and engaging in agriculture, fishing, and boat-building. The 
term “Koli” and its potential etymological roots are addressed in the first footnote as follows:
The name Koli has been variously derived from Kola (a hog); Kul (a tribe), in the same way 
as Kunbi from Kutumb (a family); and from the MundarHoro or Koro (man). But as the word 
Koli does not seem to occur before the Musalman period, and is disliked by the tribe in 
Rajputana and Northern Gujarat, it may very likely be a corruption of the Turki word Kuleh 
(a slave). See DaCunha’s Origin of Bombay; Edwardes, Rise of Bombay; and the Imperial 
Gazetteer (Kolis).14
It is immediately clear that the term has multiple origins and that Edwardes isn’t clear about how 
the Koli peoples derive their name. 
 A more recent ethnography of the Koli peoples, from the year 1983, provides the 
following list of characteristics and historical facts gathered from a village study in Chotila, 
Gujarat: 
the term “Koli” is derived from the English word “coolie; Aryans may have applied the term 
relating to the Sanskrit “Kola” or hog as a form of contempt; “Kola” also means boat in 
Sanskrit and so the principally sea-faring peoples were called this; Kolis are descendents of 
either the fifth king of the lunar race (Yayati), or they are descendents of King Vena; the first 
historical occurrence of the Kolis is from the Koli Kingdom in the North Konkan which was 
recognized by the Bachaniani Kingdom in 1346 CE; the second historical reference is from 
1559 CE when the Portuguese attacked them but suffered losses to them later in 1583 CE; the 
British raised an army of Kolis in order to combat the Bhils, another hill tribe thought to be 
hereditary rivals; finally, in Nasik district the Kolis were classified under the “Criminal Tribes 
Act.15 
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The Kolis who were themselves interviewed in this study also claim kinship to some of the most 
famous anti-Brahmanical movements in the subcontinent’s history. They claim that the Lord 
Buddha was himself a Koli, that Valmiki, author of the Ramayana, was a Koli, that Samrat 
Chandragupta of the Maurya Kingdom was a Koli, that the chief senapati, or warrior of Shivaji 
named Taraji Malusare was a Koli, and that Kabir was a Koli. When asked how they achieved 
their now relatively low status, the Kolis claimed that an internal clash led to their present 
deterioration. The author of this study refers to this section as “legends and beliefs.”16 These Koli 
see themselves as descendants of great men, fallen now in the modern era. This is a common 
trope in oral caste genealogies. 
 While scholars have considered how indigeneity is performed and enacted by adivasi 
communities within politically charged contests over local resources and legal recognition, that 
the adivasi community was the original and first inhabitant of an area is difficult to circumvent 
or sustain.17 Furthermore, the motivation to either prove or disprove original status has 
immediate consequences in contemporary political struggles for land and resources in present 
day Mumbai. This is the case now as it was when the British first landed on the islands. Having 
been schooled in this ritualized retelling of Bombay’s history, it becomes difficult to pose the 
questions: Of what significance is it that a certain community inhabited the islands before any 
other? For whom does it matter? And most importantly here, what are the historical pasts of 
Bombay which are obscured through the ritualized tale? A primary concern here is that the 
multiple origins of the city’s peoples are disciplined into a unified linear tale through the making 
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of the Koli origin myth of Bombay. There are however, surely other purposes served in repeating 
the Koli’s status as “aboriginal” or “indigenous” again and again, even if the repetition of that 
origin myth trope has nothing to do with the topic of the subsequent history being provided.
 In the next section, I consider an intervention in the historiography of the subcontinent 
which had oblique implications for the study of modern urbanization. Using the insights of that 
intervention, I show that the origin myth of Bombay served to support a merchant theory of 
Bombay’s capitalists origins. It precluded the necessity of telling any other kind of story about 
how Bombay grew in size and population, how Bombay came to be urban and the pre-eminent 
commercial city in colonial India. Other questions about the Koli have to remain unresolved, 
especially those about when precisely the fishing communities began identifying themselves and 
organizing under the title “Koli” and how this collective identity formed in Bombay. Was it in 
response to British legalization of the identity or did it exist prior to or even in tandem with 
British efforts? Put in another way, did the British or the Koli of Bombay invent their collective 
identity? Not being able to answer the question about whether Koli performances of their own 
indigeneity are a result of modern knowledge or whether the Koli created that modern 
knowledge in response to changing pressures for resources and land, we can still consider how 
the Koli origin myth functions within Bombay’s history.
Agrarian Bombay and Ordinary Dispossession
 A strict division between the urban and rural in social life did not exist in early modern  
South Asia. Frank Perlin’s observations about the “rurban” economy18 in the transition are borne 
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out by the East India Company’s settlement in Bombay, where Company officials sought an 
increase in revenues through both agrarian and urban “improvements.” Bombay was not seen as 
a city until the latter 19th century, when it began to be called Urbs Prims in Indis.19 The 
sprawling metropolis did not take its more dense form until the 20th century. The making of the 
space of Bombay as an urban space with a type of urban logic to its social organization was a 
process of subordinating agrarian interests and organizations within the city’s boundaries, and 
this process continues to the present day. Yet the presence of this previous agrarian social life in 
Bombay’s own urban history has been entirely suppressed from the city’s history.  
Recovering Bombay’s agrarian past allows us to explore the multiple origins of 
Bombay’s development and recover the battles over land use which continued to influence 
Bombay’s growth and expansion. An account of Bombay’s growth must begin by placing the 
Koli peoples on par with others who were settlers on the islands and locate exactly when the Koli 
became relatively privileged inhabitants who were given housing and land while others were 
continuously dispossessed or became socially mobile and able to distinguish themselves within 
the islands through elite forms of housing. 
This section shows that the eventual privileging of the Kolis permitted a merchant and 
town-based story about capitalism’s foreign origins in the history of Bombay. This story of the 
foreign origin of capitalism in the subcontinent was especially championed by later nationalists 
and anti-colonial actors who resided in cities like Bombay. Furthermore, the Koli story, by 
ignoring Bombay’s immediate history and privileging Bombay’s ancient history substituted a 
deep past for an immediate past. The origin myth of Bombay posited the Koli story as the only 
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history of Bombay which mattered, and thus de-legitimized any other claims over land use in 
Bombay which may have been established in the preceding few decades or even prior century. 
This rendered dispossession of most early inhabitants “ordinary” or uneventful. 
Moreover, it endowed such dispossession with a teleological end such that the making of a 
capitalist city out of Bombay became a never-ending project, one that could be invoked again 
and again in order to intensify capitalist relations and accumulation by dispossession. The Kolis 
became the distributors of legitimacy to the successive governments over Bombay, not 
intentionally, but as subordinate participants in the making of an authoritative account of 
Bombay’s past.
The key structural change in the making of exclusively urban space out of a mixed  
agrarian space was a drop in the price of agrarian commodities. When food and the “raw 
materials” for clothing dropped in relation to housing and rental prices, the majority of petty and 
bourgeois capitalists sought out those investments which allowed them to profit from housing. In 
the historical documents, this is indicated by housing issues and the density of population 
becoming dominant tropes in the records. When it became more profitable for land owners to 
develop their land vertically and sell it to the growing population than to cultivate it for produce, 
the urban logic to spatial organization had dominated agrarian interests. The state’s participation 
in securing urban interests over agrarian ones, either through local forms of state in the 
Municipal Government or imperial forms of state based in Calcutta or London, was crucial in the 
triumph of the urban order. This change also resulted in changes in how the history of the city 
was told such that agrarian activities were excluded or presented as vestiges of the past. Before 
the triumph of the urban order however, in the early nineteenth century, the “improvements” 
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spoken of in records relating to Bombay Town and Island referred explicitly to agricultural 
improvements. 
A pronounced historical contrast is provided by an exploration of the agrarian forms of 
settlement and revenue collection on Bombay Islands. It allows us to understand how land led to 
mixed forms of capital and production, both agrarian and commercial, and that the division 
between agrarian peoples and urban peoples was not yet in place. (See Figure 1.2) When 
working with records for 18th and 19th century Bombay it isn’t clear what the boundary of the 
“city” is or how certain social practices transform into modern urban practices. One way to 
distinguish urban from rural could be based on the source from which wealth is derived. Landed 
forms of wealth are predecessors to future rural livelihoods while credit or commerce are 
predecessors to urban livelihoods, although amongst the elites in Bombay’s later development, 
people do participate in both. Agrarian means of production include tools for cultivation and 
harvest. Non-agrarian means include looms for weaving, building materials for housing, and 
instruments of money including credit and debt. In early nineteenth century Bombay, we see a 
constantly changing set of competing claims over how the land we now call Bombay should be 
used. Moreover, an exploration into agrarian Bombay recovers the histories of those obscured by 
the origin myth of Bombay City, namely that it was nothing more than a collection of fishing 
villages on top of  which a bustling city emerged. 
It can be seen through official letters and dispatches that the East India Company was one 
element in an already dynamic and evolving “rurban” nexus on the west coast of South Asia. In a 
series of letters exchanged between officials residing in Bombay to Government in Calcutta and 
London regarding the acquisition of Salsette, one of the islands on which Greater Bombay rests 
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(See Figure 1.2), we see a discussion on how the islands had the potential to make up the 
revenues the Company would have lost in maintaining the defense of Company officials residing 
there. The Company’s officials located in Calcutta discouraged the acquisition of Salsette Island 
by force, preferring instead a treaty with the Peshwa Ragobah. However, they were forced to 
leave the means of acquisition up to those in Company officers in Salsette because only local 
officials had the immediate benefit of knowing the current conditions. The island was eventually 
taken by force and then a treaty was signed.20 This shows how Company policy was fragmented 
across regions since local Company officials each had their own commercial ambitions. 
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Fig. 1.3 Map of port and island of Bombay with adjacent Islands, 1724
Source: S. M. Edwardes, Gazetteer of Bombay City and Island, 1909, v.1.
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Upon arrival on Salsette Island, officials immediately noted the potential for agrarian 
revenue:
The Island of Salsette, upon a mean computation, is capable of producing, as we are assured, 
twenty seven thousand Morahs of Batty provided there is no want of labourers to till and 
cultivate the extent of land, which it has been, in late years, liable to, from the oppression and 
exactions of the Portuguese Government, the gross proceeds of which, at the rate of 14 Rs. 
per Morah, (being the common price,) will amount to 378,000 Rs., or 47,250 £ Stg, exclusive 
of several sorts of fruits and grain produced in great abundance from the fertility of its soil, 
the profits whereon we may reasonably suppose would be sufficient to defray the expense of 
tillage and manuring the Batty-Grounds; and the Forts already built upon it, with a very small 
addition and proper repairs, would be sufficient to maintain a quiet possession against any 
attempts of any Enemies we might have occasion to dread.21 
We can see here that Company officials distinguished themselves from previous governments, 
the Portuguese in this case, because of their own perceived ability to actualize the full capability 
of the island’s soil. The only obstacle Company officials perceived was the potential that there 
would be a shortage of labourers to cultivate the land, otherwise their goal was to gain the full 
capability of agrarian revenue on the island. 
Policies and prospects for increased revenue were suggested from Bombay to the 
Calcutta Government, i.e. policy was created from the bottom up and conditions in Bombay had 
the capability of influencing overall Company policy in the subcontinent. Officials discussed the 
potential revenue of the islands if waste lands were appropriated and cultivated through the 
encouragement of settlers such as Cunbees (cultivators), merchants, and landholders. 
The rich Merchants and other Inhabitants of the neighbouring Governments, finding their 
objections cease, to a removal to narrow barren Island, like ours, would be invited to make 
Settlements under our Government, when we should once be in possession of the Island of 
Salsette, the Merchants of Surat, in particular, having often expressed such a disposition; and 
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such a situation would put us in a condition to be feared and respected by all our Neighbors, 
and greatly increase the credit of our Nation in these parts.22
Once the island was acquired, it was reported to Government in Calcutta on Dec. 30th, 1774. The 
Parsees of Surat were encouraged and sought for their capital, and several public notices were 
issued about encouragements for advantageous settlement conditions with regards to rent and 
lease structures in Salsette. Additionally, all duties on the trade in fish were abolished to remove 
the source of oppression on those people engaged in fishing.23 
Population growth was encouraged and waste lands were claimed through incentives. The 
product of the lands was made of great interest both to its leading inhabitants and Company 
officials. Revenues were collected in both cash and kind. White batty, coconut groves, other 
forms of rice cultivation, and occasionally and briefly sugar, tobacco, and indigo, were cultivated 
on the northern islands, including in “Dharavee,” the area that resulted in the second highest cash 
revenues in the year 1777, second to Mallar.24 This by no means suggests that the acquisition of 
Salsette was of greatest importance to the overall agrarian revenues of the Company, i.e. other 
parts of Western India were much more productive than Salsette. Indeed, being a coastal island, 
cultivators struggled with flooding, rising tides, and swampy conditions in various areas. 
Nonetheless, what is revealed here is that agrarian occupations were encouraged on the island, 
and the earliest settlers were in fact engaged in landed forms of wealth in their pursuit for 
livelihood and social status.
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Improvements on the land required the disassembling of older forms of securities and 
entitlements.25 The Company claimed that Portuguese forms of land tenure had left property 
residing in the hands of Jesuits, and these were dismantled by the Marathas, and thus through 
acquisition of the island they could be appropriated.26 These varied forms of dispossession, either 
by force or by changing the terms of settlement so as to encourage and discourage particular 
groups of people were justified rhetorically and ideologically by an economic end. Namely, it 
was because the Company was going to achieve the full productive and monetary potential of 
what they saw as a fertile island that they were benevolent rulers. This is what allowed them to 
distinguish themselves from older forms of dispossession, which must have happened when 
Akbar moved his capital from Agra to Lahore in the 16th century, or when Shah Jahan founded 
Shahjahanabad in the 17th century, or even earlier when Vijayanagar was founded in the 14th 
century. The East India Company succeeded rhetorically where other rulers had failed, or so they 
claimed, because of their attention to the economic potential of the lands.
Other changes initiated by the Company on Salsette included the following right in 1779: 
“to reserve in our hands all lands or villages whose leases might fall either by insolvency of the 
Farmers or other casualties in order to allot them upon easy terms to new settlers.”27 This 
decision came from local Bombay Company officials to the Government in Calcutta, and was 
followed by a brief period of relief of debt. Insolvency had become so widespread that when 
searching for the causes of debt, officials acknowledged that numerous villages had been over 
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assessed by themselves. Even the terms of assessment had been left to officials located in 
Salsette: 
The local knowledge you possess enables you to be better judges than we can possibly be, in 
what manner these lands should be let, whether annually, or for five or more years. Our 
opinion inclines rather to the latter mode; but we leave it to you to act herein in such manner 
as may best promote the interest of the Company, recommending it to you, in the strongest 
terms, to give such encouragement to the farmers as that their number may be increased, (for 
we understand that a great part of the Island is still uncultivated) and you are also to be very 
cautious how you distress them for outstanding balances incurred since the Island has been 
ceded to the Company, unless it appears to you very clearly that their circumstances are such 
that they can comply, without being distressed, with your demands.28
Land policy was constantly adjusted in the local setting in order to encourage population growth 
which was meant to increase the agrarian revenues of the island. The policy of letting out land in 
perpetuity was discouraged so as to avoid lands becoming “an incitement to needy adventures” 
which would “thereby place the tenants on the footing of Zamindars.”29 
 The Company even paid for several families transport from the hinterland to the islands. 
One account cites a request from a neighborhood where people requested financial assistance to 
transfer 50 families and their cattle, 208 persons in total to the islands as future cultivators. The 
request was heeded and this incident was praised because the families had fulfilled the 
expectations of them by becoming profitable cultivators. Many others cases like this would have 
been encouraged and carried out, however the Maratha Government at Poona took objection to 
this and the Company had to stop offering assistance to transfer cultivators.30 
 Officials met with both successes and failures in their attempts to increase revenue, and 
when they failed the persistent poverty of the cultivating classes was blamed. The cultivating 
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classes, it was argued, could never make capital investments in the land and were thus resigned 
to toil for minimal returns. As a solution, the capital of Parsees and landholders was sought to 
encourage land improvements. In a letter to Bombay in 1807, officials were told:
...we direct that you hold out such encouragements as may induce persons from Bombay and 
the adjacent County to settle at Salsette, by which means and under the Government of mild 
and equal laws, the settlers enjoying the benefit of protection of person and property, both the 
agriculture and commerce of the Island may be promoted, and we further direct you to revise 
the present Settlement for the Land Rents, and if it shall appear that the Land is over 
assessed; a new Settlement be concluded with the Proprietors or Renters on more moderate 
terms.31 [Italics mine]
The point here is that revenue was revenue, regardless of its agrarian or commercial origins. 
Improvements were meant to liberate the full potential of natural resources and thus Company 
officials saw themselves as liberators of an as of yet un-harnessed natural bounty. Everything 
from their revenue system to the settlement of the space was meant to liberate inhabitants from 
the previous and vicious social systems of exploitation exerted by native rulers which had, 
according to Company officials, only perpetuated poverty in the past.
 In such acts, no clear distinction was utilized between the city and country, agriculture 
and commerce, or indigenous or not. Both the inhabitants of Bombay and East India Company 
traders became enmeshed in the entire potential of the land to produce revenues. All revenues 
could and would ultimately be traced to their roots in the soil and how the land was utilized. If 
commerce was possible at all it was because of the intensification of agriculture, a project 
enhanced by the eventual acquisition of the island of Bombay’s immediate hinterland by 1818. 
(See Figure 1.3)
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Fig. 1.4 Map of territorial acquisitions of East India Company in India.
Source: Available in Mariam Dossal, Theatre of Conflict, City of Hope: Mumbai, 1660 to Present Times, 
New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2010.
 Most importantly, not once in any of these records does one hear of the Kolis as the 
indigenous inhabitants of the islands, and in fact, they were only rarely mentioned. Bhandaris, 
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the caste of toddy dealers and cultivators, Cunbees, the caste of cultivators, and various merchant  
farmers made homes for themselves along with Kolis on the islands. No community 
distinguished itself as relatively privileged nor were officials concerned with the ancient history 
of the islands or its deep origins.
 In the next section, I focus on the issue of housing through encounters over housing and 
land settlement in Bombay prior to 1900, when the Koli were not singled out as having any 
special claims over the land of Bombay. The Koli peoples were one amongst many inhabitants of 
Bombay who encountered the growing powers of the East India Company in conflicts over the 
regularizing of land use in Bombay. The Kolis’ contests with Company officials were like many 
others contests over land use at that time, and thus the following section provides historical 
contrast. It recovers a time unlike the present when the Kolis were not yet marked as indigenous. 
Through the Kolis’ encounters with forms of state power over housing, we can pursue how the 
Koli came to speak as Koli when the community was required to articulate with legal and 
economic institutions controlling the changing built environment.
Housing as a Nested Entitlement
 One can’t be sure exactly how older forms of rights to housing worked due to the paucity 
of sources on the subject. However, we can reconstruct trends based on the few sources 
available. In a history of land revenue in the Bombay Presidency written in 1892, in a chapter on 
Surat regarding the instructions issued by the Company in 1826 about leases and revenues in 
villages, one rule said about ryots, i.e., cultivators, that: “Ryots were to be at liberty to leave any 
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village, subject to the ordinary custom as to ownership of houses and lands being relinquished.”32 
Given this statement it seems that the right to be housed had to do with the ability to produce 
something by one’s work on the land. Once the latter failed, i.e. once the land could not be made 
productive, the cultivator had to give up the home along with the plot of land. Most importantly, 
housing was not a separate right. One wouldn’t expect to be permitted to stay in the house if one 
no longer cultivated the land.
 Thus housing must have been a nested entitlement, a part and parcel of being a 
productive member of the landlord’s domain.33 Housing was part of a collection of entitlements 
and one’s productivity entitled one to housing. The landlord was connected to the cultivator both 
within the social relations of housing and the social relations of labour. Eventually the question 
arose for the Company on whether the Government owned the property in houses or whether it 
was the tenants who owned the property in houses. According to the historian of the 1892 text, 
the “custom of the country” was that the Government in many villages which were not under 
direct state management upheld their rights in property. Thus it logically followed that the 
Company should hold the rights in the property of housing. However, the Company decided to 
depart from the custom of the country and instead relinquished its own proprietary claim. Upon 
learning of this, however, the Collector at Surat protested: 
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on the grounds that it would be useless to surrender the houses to the tenants for their 
creditors immediately to seize, and that it was well to have houses which could be given to 
immigrants from foreign territory. On this the issue of the proclamation was suspended.34 
Thus it was that Government maintained the ultimate right to the property in houses, and housing 
remained a nested right in lands under direct state control. The custom of the country was upheld 
with the Company acting as the Government.
 The Kolis were neither exceptional nor marked as having any special housing rights in 
this period. The Company began issuing rules for how land was to be used as early as the 
acquisition of Bombay. But in the late 18th century, a fear of an attack by the Marathas led them 
to secure Dongri Hill and thus exclude many of the native residents who lived there. Dongri Hill 
was seen as advantageous to Company interests because it was the highest point on the island. 
From there one could see enemies approaching, such as the Portuguese, Marathas, Sidis or any 
others who often exercised their coastal ambitions. When occupying Dongri Hill in Bombay, 
several petitions came forth contesting the terms of displacement and dispossession the Company 
officials enacted. In response to these petitions, all conflicts were resolved equally, i.e. with the 
same logic for each petitioner. 
The first encounter between the Koli peoples and the East India Company was 
documented in the form of a petition from them from the year 1763. The East India Company 
officials were enforcing regulations over the use of land in Bombay in order to secure space for 
themselves on Dongri Hill for the sake of their own defense. Numerous residents entered 
negotiations with the Company over compensation for their land and housing. Various terms of 
compensation were offered in this period when land was cleared and resettled. For example, 
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when vast oarts (an oart is often a coconut grove) were cleared, petitioners came forth requesting 
that they be compensated with oarts in return rather than their full value in cash. 35 The price of 
coconuts was rising, and thus the cash value Company officials were expecting to pay for 
clearing them were of a previous date and thus of a lesser value. Another type of compensation 
was to give land when land was taken. In a letter dated 29th January, 1770 an official wrote: 
Enclosed your Honour will receive account valuation of sundry houses within the town wall 
represented by Colonels Campbell and Keating as necessary to be removed. All such as are to 
the westward of the Bazar Gate, the principal engineer requests may accordingly at once be 
removed; the removal of those to the eastward may, he apprehends, be deferred till next 
season. Agreed that Rs. 9132-1-26, the value of the westward houses be made good to the 
proprietors and ground be allowed them on which to rebuild their houses.36
On the 13th April 1774 the issue of the petition from the Kolis was dealt with after the land 
paymaster had presented an estimate of the full value of the houses of the Kolis on Dongri Hill in 
comparison with the value of the area where they had been allotted to rebuild. The report noted:
 the former of these amounts to Rs. 11,241-0-4 and the other to Rs. 5616-3-67. As our 
treasury is so very low it is ordered that the houses be permitted to remain till we may be 
better enabled to discharge the amount of their valuation.37
The connecting link between these and many other such cases was the question of monetary 
value of the land. All demands were translated into a monetary value and equivalents were 
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sought between what residents wanted and what the Company could offer, with money as the 
medium. 
 Given that the Company could not monetarily compensate the Kolis, they were allowed 
to stay, but Koli peoples in other parts of the city were displaced for cash, just as other 
inhabitants were. In fact, even in 1831, when a local Delhi resident, Dilsookh Roy asked for 
rights to a plot in Delhi in order to provide a dharamshala for indigent travelers, the land value 
was checked before he received the rights to build the dharamshala. Once deemed low enough, 
i.e. the opportunity cost of using the land for something else, the dharamshala was permitted to 
be built.38 Such petitions revealed the parity of Koli negotiations with government officials over 
issues of land use and housing and most importantly, also show that their rights to housing were 
no different than anyone else’s as far as the government was concerned.
These forms of ordinary dispossession affected the Koli as well as others settled on the 
islands. The Koli likeness to other inhabitants of the islands reveals that it is only after 1901 C.E. 
that the Koli would acquire a separate legal standing in the city and become enshrined in 
historical memory. Before 1900 there was no notion of “indigeneity” as a legal category which 
could garner privileges. Through the nineteenth century the use of land was increasingly 
regulated by Company officials who needed to protect their investment in an area and ensure a 
hospitable environment for their trading operations.
 In the next section we look at the construction of the Koli origin myth and most 
importantly the effect the origin myth had on claims to housing in Bombay after 1901 C.E., 
when the myth was created. Prior to the construction of this tale, as we have seen in the 
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preceding sections, the Koli were like other petitioners who contested and accepted the terms of 
their rehousing by Company officials. Once their status was elevated by the performance of their 
indigeneity, both by officials in Government and members of the Koli community, the Koli 
garnered privileges in housing and became sources of legitimacy for market-based development 
projects in the neighborhoods of Bombay. 
Constructing the Koli Tale
The burden of constructing the Koli tale of indigeneity did not acquire importance until 
the 1880s when migration to Bombay Town and Island was exponential and uncontrollable. 
Several social factors contributed to the myth’s construction. By the late 19th century the British 
were retreating from most deferrals to “customary” entitlements of any kind; they saw 
themselves as serving the sovereignty of the market. The relatively new colonial state, which had 
only become formally in charge of all land, revenue, taxation, and distribution of resources in 
1858 found itself searching for sources of legitimacy. The diversity of Koli society had to be 
streamlined into a simple legible rubric without any of the confusion an acknowledgement of 
pluralism and diversity would entail. It was decided that in Bombay Town and Island, the Kolis 
were of the Son lineage and solely fisher folk. Fisher folk used the sea, thus Bombay’s Kolis 
were entitled to land by the sea. They were relegated to small coastal hamlets which the 
government provided even when municipal officials were clearing out entire neighborhoods for 
development and upgrading. Now, I’d like to review the construction of the Koli tale and then, in 
the next section, show how Kolis were provided housing amidst development schemes to build 
some of Bombay’s most famously bourgeois neighborhoods.
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It is remarkable that even Hindi and Marathi writers in the 19th century, those who had a 
lot at stake in constructing a story about Bombay’s origins and history, did not believe the Koli to 
be the sole inhabitants of Bombay Town and Island prior to British arrival. The telling of 
Bombay’s history was no neutral or objective scholarly endeavor. With the intense rise in 
population starting in the 1860’s, claims to diminishing resources depended on just such histories 
to prove which community had the right to land, access to water, the right to cultivate, or the 
right to commercial avenues for trade. 
In 1863 a Maharashtrian by the name of Govind Narayan wrote Mumbaichee Varnan, its 
recent translated edition calling this the first biography of Bombay in the Marathi language. 
Govind Narayan relied on theories about the history of language to determine who the 
“antecedents of the original settlers of Mumbai” were. He made several leaps of logic which are 
entirely untenable now, however, his account serves the purpose of demonstrating that in 1863, 
the Kolis who lived in Bombay were seen as a diverse and un-unified group, who were never 
thought of as “indigenous” or “adivasi.” 
However, it is important to consider the conditions of this text’s production. Mumbaichee 
Varnan is important in present-day Bombay because of its ability to lend credibility to the Shiv 
Sena’s allegation that Marathi speaking people are the true and original residents of Mumbai. 
The changing of the city’s name from Bombay to Mumbai in 1995 reflects the rise of the Shiv 
Sena as both a political and cultural vehicle for increased representation of Marathi speakers in 
the city.39 These facts have everything to do with the popularity of the current translation by 
Murali Ranganathan, and its billing in the publication as the “first Marathi biography of the city.” 
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Having met Ranganathan in London and conducted an informal interview over coffee in August 
of 2009, it was evident that Ranganathan chose to translate this text and make it newly available 
to the public because of the text’s ability to prove claims made by Maharashtrian exclusivists in 
contemporary Mumbai who are eager to “re-claim” Mumbai’s true Maharashtrian past. 
The text Mumbaichee Varnan uses ingenious tools of analysis to prove that Bombay’s 
earliest inhabitant were Hindu and Marathi speaking, the Koli are one of those people, but not 
the only ones. In short, Narayan claims the Kolis are Hindus. The Christians of Bombay are 
rendered originally Kolis and by implication originally Hindu as well. Narayan also establishes 
the necessity of Brahmans in order to defend Hinduism, so that Bombay becomes a place first 
consolidated by Maharashtrians who are the original inhabitants of Bombay. It is important to 
remember too that despite the privileging of the Marathi-speaking ethno-linguistic community of 
Bombay, the Koli do not function in Narayan’s account as the sole aboriginal or indigenous 
residents of Bombay. What is important for Narayan is that Marathi speaking peoples are the 
original inhabitants of Bombay.
Narayan develops a claim that Marathi speakers are descendants of the original 
communities of Bombay. Narayan writes that of the several types of Marathi spoken in Bombay, 
that of the Christians is unique and he suggests that those Christians must have spoken that type 
of Marathi even before they were converted to Christianity especially since there is not a single 
Portuguese word in their language. This also must mean that this language, spoken by the 
Christians of Mumbai, must have been the Lingua Franca on the island prior to the Portuguese 
arrival. Most importantly, any caste which speaks a language similar to that one today must be 
descendants of the original inhabitants. Narayan thus concludes that:
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Based on a study conducted on this premise, five castes emerge whose language can be 
linked to that of the Christians of Mumbai. An examination of the language of the ancient 
texts and fables of these castes also leads one to a similar conclusion, this being that they 
have been resident in the region of Mumbai since times immemorial, without any changes in 
their religious practices. The five castes are as follows: Koli, Bhongle Bhandari, Palshe Joshi, 
Pathare Prabhu, and Paanchkalashe – Vaadval – Sutar.40
From these statements we see that Narayan believed the Koli were one amongst several caste 
groups who had resided in Mumbai since “times immemorial.” While the Koli are cited as one 
ancient community, they are only one amongst several ancient caste communities. What’s most 
important for Narayan is that Marathi speakers of his contemporary Bombay, in 1863, are 
descendants of the original communities of Bombay.
 Another section which attempts to explain the arrival of later settlers in Mumbai is 
embedded in the notion that India’s history can be divided into “Hindu,” “Muslim,” and 
“Christian” periods. This religious periodization is faulty and has been criticized by numerous 
scholars who criticize the periodization as being complicit in a Hindutva model of the Indian 
nation state.41 Under such a periodization, the differences between religious communities are 
ignored, the contests for resources – often violent contests – are reduced to inter-religious 
warfare rather than political competitions which took place both between religious traditions and 
even between sects of the same religion. The Hindutva model of Indian history claims that 
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Hindus were the original inhabitants on the subcontinent, that Muslims and Christians are later 
converts, and thus advocates a “return” to the original ancient nation of Hindu India. Criticism of 
this model includes the history of the name “Hindu,” where it has been suggested that no sect 
referred to themselves as “Hindu” until called such by non-Hindu early modern conquerors, and 
the naming of Hinduism is itself mired in political history.42 Narayan’s early history of Mumbai 
casts later “Hindu” settlers on the islands as being necessary to save the Koli peoples from the 
threat of other religions. In Narayan’s account, the primitive religion of the Koli peoples is 
absorbed through the need for protection into a local form of Hinduism itself. Narayan cites a 
Sanskrit text to explain this:
The Walkeshwar Mahatmaya, a Sanskrit Purana describing the temple of Walkeshwar says 
that prior to the building of the Walkeshwar Temple, the Hindus were very much terrorized by 
the religious intolerance of Mubarak Badshah. This led to the arrival of Hindus of a very high 
caste in Mumbai. If the population had consisted only of Kolis, they would neither have 
striven to build the Temple nor would they have been able to recognize the threat to their 
religion.43 
The building of the temple at Walkeshwar, a still existing neighborhood of Bombay, is 
interpreted here as a necessary act meant to preserve the place of the now “low caste” Hindus, 
the Koli, from the terror of the intolerant Muslim, Mubarak Badshah. As Narayan says, the 
arrival of high caste Hindus was necessary to preserve the Koli peoples and make them 
“recognize the threat to their religion.” 
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 The problem of the presence of Christian Kolis is dispensed with by proclaiming the 
Christian Koli to be originally Hindu. Furthermore, by claiming other Christians as originally 
Koli because they speak a language similar to the Koli dialect, Christians in general are 
proclaimed as originally Hindu. All their spoken languages and dialects are analyzed as aspects 
of what is together the “Marathi language,” a language that is treated as an inert entity receiving 
change from the outside. 
Many of the Christians of Sashtee and Mumbai were originally Kolis and Bhandaris, and 
many of them retain their original surnames and languages. The key to establishing a 
connection between these five castes lies in their common language. While they speak the 
Marathi language, the Hindu and Christian Kolis have a distinctive enunciation, and use 
certain words, by which this dialect came to be known as the Koli language. Thus we 
understand that, since the earliest times, there were many Kolis in this island…. Amongst the 
four castes, there is very little difference in dialect and, in recent years, hardly any noticeable 
difference exists between the languages of the Palshe Joshis, Prabhus and Paanchkalashes. 
The possible reasons for this include the migration to Mumbai of Brahmins from the South 
and the Konkan, as well as the introduction of a pure form of the Marathi language through 
the publication of books by Elphinstone College. Many of the educated people abandoned the 
language of their castes to speak in this pure Marathi diction, with a view to increasing the 
prestige of their respective castes. These are the three main reasons for the sweeping changes 
in spoken Marathi.44
Narayan’s claims here about the Marathi language and the priority of the Hindu religion over 
other religions establishes an early ethno-linguistic history of a community. The publication of 
the translated edition of this history is indicative of the current politics of Hindu nationalism 
which is tactically adopted to varying regions and linguistic communities.
If we contrast Narayan’s Mumbaichee Varnan with the first official history of Bombay 
which spoke of the Koli as indigenous, we can see not only two different accounts of Bombay’s 
early history, but the similarities across histories of Bombay in that they have contemporary 
political functions which are served by the kind of history told. In 1901, S. M. Edwardes wrote 
the first history of Bombay which claimed the Koli to be the original inhabitant. Edwardes was 
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asked to write a history accounting for the growth of the population of Bombay and include it 
with the 1901 census of Bombay city. No census of the islands had been taken in 1891 and so 
this history was thought to compensate for the lack of information in the intervening decades. 
Edwardes’ history was published both in the preface to the Census of 1901 and as a separate 
publication on its own. It was the first which explicitly claimed a pure Koli caste of fishermen as 
the aboriginals of Bombay. 
Edwardes justified the Koli origin theory as a part and parcel of his justification of British 
presence and involvement in Bombay. With allusions to the foreign and merchant theory of 
capitalism, Edwardes claimed that merchants were emancipators who harnessed idle and natural 
wealth in the time of British rule alone to emancipate not only labour and production on Bombay 
island, but also to emancipate the Kolis from the tyranny of oppressors. The British saved the 
Koli and recognized the community’s elevated status just as they saved Bombay from becoming 
a series of islands that would have been nothing more than wastelands.
In his account, the Kolis were the first settlers of Bombay and linguistically traced their 
name “Koli” to a Dravidian root meaning agriculture. Edwardes thought this Dravidian root was 
the Koli people’s original language.45 Through the further authority of anthropometric techniques 
he “confirmed” that the Kolis were of a Dravidian type. The Kolis’ “natural sturdiness” had 
allowed him to survive “successive waves of invaders, who have almost threatened to engulf 
him,” and a bond between the Kolis and early Greek traders to the island was even speculated 
upon. Edwardes romanticized the Kolis’ natural abilities. The Kolis were pre-Brahmanical, 
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Brahmanism having “hid the truth of his lowly origin in a specious tale of descent from a Lunar 
Monarch.”46
Koli hamlets or hut settlements were identified all over the island, with special notice 
being given to the neighborhood “Kolaba” as being an early Koli village. The trade of the island 
and its population was narrated as minuscule all through the Portuguese period of Bombay’s 
history. One brief moment of doubt was revealed by Edwardes when he wrote that the population 
of Bombay had grown to 50,000 in the 17th century, which Edwardes believed deserved further 
inquiry. This vast population could have derailed Edwardes confidence in the notion that only 
under the British had the city grown so much, but he nonetheless insisted that the islands were 
never utilized to their full potential. Only the English had the great foresight to see all the 
productive potential on Bombay island, and in fulfilling their duty to emancipate commerce the 
British also emancipated the Kolis. Edwardes wrote:
Of minor arrangements for the benefit of the people, one may remark in particular the 
emancipation of the Kolis, and the refusal to grant a five years’ monopoly to the sellers of 
betel-leaf. “As we understand,” wrote the Directors in 1791, “that an old arbitrary power, 
which was established when the island belonged to the Portuguese, has been exercised in later 
times, and perhaps in some degree still exercised, against that most useful set of people, the 
fishermen, a certain number of them being obliged to sell fish in the Breach water, and to act 
as palanquin-bearers to some of the gentlemen in office, for the first of which duties they 
either receive no pay or scarce any and for the latter not near the wages customary, and that 
they experience other grievances which must not only subject their industry to imposition, but  
their persons to insult and oppression from the sepoys or others authorized to compel them to 
execute such duties, we direct that in case such grievances do still in any degree exist, they be 
on receipt of this letter entirely abolished and the fishermen released from all such servitude 
and left as free as the other inhabitants of the island.”47 
Freeing the Kolis from servitude was central to the construction of British legitimacy as was 
restoring them to their original status. According to Edwardes, the Kolis survived through 
various aggressors and immigrants to the island in unchanged form, but only now under the 
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English could they be emancipated. It was both the natural state of the Kolis which had to be 
preserved and freed from Brahmanical, Maratha, and Portuguese tyranny, and the natural 
productivity of the island which had to be recognized and unleashed.
 There were numerous demographic changes through the 1880s and 1890s on Bombay 
Island which would have necessitated the construction of such a myth of Koli indigeneity. 
Famines swept through most of South Asia in the 1870s, migrants to Bombay were sometimes 
stopped upon entry to the city because the city was being so overwhelmed with the population. 
The plague of 1896-97 also brought to the fore the problem of disease borne of overcrowding 
and density of population. The plague resulted in a massive shift of the population through 
voluntary relocation northwards on the island. The growth of Bombay overwhelmed not just 
rural migrants who found themselves lost within the dense entrails of neighborhoods such as 
Nagpada, Kamathipura, and the original Kumbharwada (before it was located in what is now 
Dharavi) but it overwhelmed city officials and the imperial state. 
Accounting for Bombay’s growth would have required a story of multiple origins, of 
intercourse between country and city, and of agrarian and commercial capitalism developing 
together. The Koli story avoided this messiness. Identifying origins in a deep past rather than an 
immediate past supported the Orientalist conception about India that it was an “ancient 
civilization,” and not a dynamic, evolving and historical subcontinent full of competing 
communities many of whom were participants in the transition to modernity.
 Furthermore, the Koli story identified a local noble savage. The Koli women took care of 
the business of the community, selling the fish and managing household finances. Therefore the 
women had an “advanced” social role unexpected of women in native communities. According 
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to official perception, there was an ease of work in relation to nature and a purity of ethos 
amongst the Koli which was not corrupted or rendered unproductive by a domineering 
Brahmanism, Mughal decadence, Maratha plunder, or Portuguese frivolity. Kolis were primitive, 
sure, but also superior in their authenticity. They had a special relation to the earth and its water; 
theirs was an unmediated relation to the natural productivity of the environment. In a subsequent 
history meant to account for the rise in population of Bombay, read before the “Indian Section of 
the Royal Anthropological Institute” on Oct. 25, 1925, Stephen Meredyth Edwardes provided the 
most fully developed of the above views. About the Koli, he said that:
Reverting now to the several periods into which this survey is divided, we may infer that the 
seven islands were inhabited in the Stone Age, from the fact that along the shore of Back Bay, 
the false harbour which divides Malabar Hill from Colaba, and in the Kolaba District on the 
opposite side of Bombay harbour, flint implements have been found, similar to those 
associated with the cavemen of Europe. The people, who fashioned and used these stone 
weapons, supported themselves perhaps by fishing in the land-locked habour and by hunting 
in the jungles of khair (acacia catechu) which once covered the face of the islands. The 
existence of a forest of these trees in prehistoric ages has been rendered credible by the 
discovery, during the excavation of the foundations of the modern Prince’s Dock, of a 
petrified khair forest, lying 32 feet below high-water mark, imbedded in a decayed traprock 
soil, and overlaid by the thick clay stratum, which forms the bottom of Bombay harbour. We 
know nothing of the origin and characteristics of these hunting and fishing clans of the Stone 
Age; but it is surmised by some authorities that they came from the south, migrating slowly 
along the coast and forming settlements here and there in the river bottoms. It is certain, 
however, that at some remote date they were ousted or absorbed by a tribe of aboriginal 
fisher-folk, the Kolis, who form today by far the oldest element of the Bombay Population...
    While the precise origin of the Bombay Kolis must remain conjectural, two facts 
concerning their contribution to the history of Bombay may be accepted as practically certain. 
The first is that in each of the seven islands, they formed rude settlements which still exist 
today. Those settlements are often mentioned in the letters and documents of the early period 
of British rule under the name of ‘Koliwadas’ or ‘Koli quarters,’ and were located close to the 
seashore, as it existed before the reclamations of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
Such a situation was obviously necessary for people whose primary occupation was, as it still 
is, sea-fishing. The principal Koliwadas are located in Colaba, Mandvi, Mazagon, Worli, 
Mahim and Sion; and although the general progress of the city and the acquisition of (3) 
wealth by the Kolis themselves have combined to rob these settlements of their former 
primitive appearance and characteristic, there can be little doubt that they represent the 
original location of the Koli hamlets in the seven islands. Mandvi Koliwada, for example, 
which I first visited twenty-three years ago, was composed of old houses, set down haphazard 
in a maze of narrow lanes, which once debouched directly on the foreshore of the harbour. 
Between the houses of the Kolis and the sea which has been their sustenance from time 
immemorial there now intervene the wide area of the Frere Reclamation and a section of the 
modern docks, constructed during the nineteenth century. Moreover, since the opening of the 
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present century the whole area has been the subject of an urban improvement scheme, which 
has laid out the old Koliwada on more modern and sanitary lines.48 
The Koli were characters in Bombay’s “pre-history,” having ousted or absorbed another tribe of 
fisherfolk who had settled on the river bottoms. Edwardes divided the history of the “City and 
Island of Bombay” into five periods and he said it was called the “city and island...so as to 
include both the business quarters and the once rural areas in the north of the Island.” He noted 
that during the first four periods there were seven islands and only in the last, “Their eventual 
union to form the modern Island of Bombay was effected during the final or British period...” 
Prior to this uniting of the seven islands, the population was restricted from crossing only at low 
tide. This unification and British efforts at reclamations were “potent factors in the growth of the 
occupied area and in the change from rural to urban.”
 According to the official British narrative, previous imperial forms had obscured the full 
productive potential of the earth’s bounty and the Kolis’ access to it. Company statecraft 
facilitated the realization of Bombay’s and the Koli’s full potential. Lands were classified as 
waste or fallow, i.e. brought into cultivation when not cultivated or in proper use. Company 
officials surveyed the land, made note of how it was used, produced records full of settlement 
patterns, productivity, irrigation, and patterns of cultivation which indicated the deviation from 
the achievement of this full potential. It is not the case that the Company officials were the first 
to do these things, but it was in their time that this narrative about themselves as the liberators of 
the Koli as indigenous became the authoritative account of Bombay’s history well into the 20th 
century. 
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 What happened once the Koli were seen as the indigenous inhabitants of Bombay? How 
did Edwardes’ account of Bombay’s origins and growth influence the way the city developed? In 
the next section I return to the issue of housing and look at the Kolis as privileged petitioners 
during the period of major urban renewal between 1900 and 1920. Through the period of the 
work of the City Improvement Trust (whose activities are pursued in much greater detail in 
chapter five) the Koli managed to become the only community in Bombay who could rightfully 
contest their dispossession in housing. While there were others who contested the terms of their 
compensation when city officials exercised eminent domain on their lands, the Koli were unique 
because of their ability to appeal to their primitive and adivasi status.
Enshrined Koliwadas, Koli Housing
The granting of indigenous status to the Koli had many consequences in the development 
of Bombay. Most importantly, it warranted the Koli as petitioners against official acquisitions of 
their land and property. Just as they had done in the 18th century when the East India Company 
was acquiring land for their own use, the Kolis continued to organize and appeal to officials 
whenever they faced the risk of being displaced. Only now, they could appeal to their indigenous 
status and appeal to the particular occupation which they were bound to by caste such that they 
could claim a special need to live by the sea. Two occasions in particular demonstrate the 
emergence of the Kolis as modern petitioners: first in 1904 when the City Improvement Trust 
had designs on their neighborhood as part of the “Mandvi-Koliwada Scheme” and second, in 
1919 when Colaba was being redeveloped as an upper class neighborhood.
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In 1904, just five years into the Trust’s creation, a plan was proposed to redevelop 
Mandvi-Koliwada in central Bombay. Doing so required that the Trust acquire land that the Kolis 
were resident on. The Kolis organized and submitted a petition to the Trust. The petition said that 
they had to live, “...within easy reach of the sea as our people have for generations past lived and 
worked in Koliwada.” If they weren’t allowed to do so, they claimed that they would have to 
disperse away from the community and live elsewhere which would be difficult because, “our 
industry already languishing, must collapse, and a population numbering over a thousand souls, 
go to ruin.” They argued that they weren’t opposed to moving provided they could be allotted 
new land, “...by which we may be kept together in New Koliwada, after the improvements are 
completed and space re-allotted for building purposes...[or]..be still kept together in a fresh 
colony along the seaside and more or less near the scene of our present labours.”49 The Koli used 
the notion of their essential identity as workers of the sea in order to make a case for land 
acquisition. They were assured that their request would be honored initially, however Trust 
officials later rescinded their views deciding that in this particular case, the Koli had no right to 
claim land in Mandvi-Koliwada since it was no longer near the sea.50
In 1919 an ambitious plan to redevelop Colaba (previously spelled “Kolaba”) into an 
upper and upper-middle class neighborhood was suggested. When writing the plans to redevelop 
the neighborhood the displacement of numerous inhabitants was described as “automatic.” By 
“automatic” it was meant that people naturally followed their jobs towards neighborhoods where 
they sought affordable residences within the confines of the housing market. In contrast to the 
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automatic displacement of many of Colaba’s residents, the Koli were singled out as peoples 
warranting specially allocated lands as the site of their fishing village.
Colaba was in the southern part of Bombay near the Fort area where booming businesses 
associated with overseas commerce brought local and foreign merchants into neighborhood 
associations. Colaba had first been divided into an Upper, Middle, and Lower Colaba in 1872 by 
the relatively new Municipal Commissioner’s office. Prior to this it was two islands between the 
waters of the harbor and Back Bay which were narrow and long. The channel of water between 
them was reclaimed to unite the two islands into Colaba.  In 1872, all of Colaba contained 
16,601 people who experienced the highest death rate from cholera in the entire city, it had no 
system of drainage or sewage and was entirely dependent on the manual labour of the 
halalkhors51 to clean the area. There had been an upgrading of materials used by scavengers, 
better carts and depots, which meant that fewer halalkhors (1118 in 1868 down to 875 in 1872) 
could be used to increase the daily average of nightsoil removed from the city by 55%.52 Upper 
Colaba was occupied by military and naval personnel, Middle Colaba was mostly private 
dwellings, and Lower Colaba, which itself was made up of the reclamations on the eastern and 
western edges of the island, contained “the thickly crowded and very insanitary village of 
Hamalwady...”53 Hamalwady 54 was called a “dirty village” and officials had wanted those 
inhabitants moved for the railway and also to protect the health of the European troops, but they 
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hadn’t succeeded. Steady growth along those same lines through the turn of the century led to a 
very crowded southern portion of Bombay. The vast majority of these people had to leave when 
Colaba was being redeveloped in 1919. The “slum” of Colaba had to be cleaned up by the 
Bombay Improvement Trust and the only people allotted land and exempted from the forces of 
the market were the Kolis.55
City officials decided to move the Cotton Green area to Sewri. In anticipation of that 
scheme, the following was the proposal for what to do with the cleared area along with 
approximately 1200 acres of land being acquired through reclamation in Colaba on Back Bay. 
Housing for all classes was an immediate necessity; the working, middle and upper classes were 
struggling to find adequate housing in the city that was in the vicinity of their work. Officials in 
charge of Colaba’s redevelopment advanced the argument that since the working classes would 
prefer to stay near their industries, which were being moved northwards, Colaba should be a 
middle and upper class neighborhood and not a working class neighborhood. Removal of the 
Cotton Green would automatically remove much that was unwanted about Colaba. Mirams, the 
Consulting Surveyor to the Government of Bombay, wrote the following in a report about the 
redevelopment of Colaba: 
In the same way the absence of the cotton green, will render the cotton go-downs as such no 
longer necessary. The boat basins will not be required and a great deal of the insanitary 
Colaba village will be automatically evacuated by the people who now find employment in 
industry in Colaba.56 
101
55 Mirams, “Colaba Development (Eastern Section) Preliminary Report” (Poona, ORW 1996 B6, 1916) 
available at British Library, London, United Kingdom.
56 Mirams, “Colaba Development (Eastern Section) Preliminary Report,” 3. 
Mirams noted that much of Colaba had been a “festering sore” and on several previous occasions 
the Municipality had wanted the Bombay City Improvement Trust to address its problems. 
 In a section entitled “Census,” the following demographic information was provided 
about Colaba: 8,736 people would be directly affected by the development scheme and of those, 
6,570 would automatically have no interest in remaining in Colaba. The need to provide 
accommodation to the labourers who would be “automatically” moved to Sewri, the site of the 
new Cotton Green, was deferred to the Port Trust of Bombay. (The question of who was 
responsible to house labourers was an important one during the operations of the Trust and this 
will be explored in later chapters.) Labourers were moved both physically and politically; the 
responsibility for their housing was transferred amongst commercial cooperative societies in 
Bombay. 
This was not the case with the Kolis of Bombay. With regards to the fishermen of Colaba, 
the report stated:
The only people for whom housing accommodation must be provided within the area of the 
scheme is the fishermen, and a suitable area of land has been set aside towards the south for a 
Fishing Village of approved design with an area sufficient for 100 tenements. There are only 
89 families of fishermen, numbering 400 persons. Ample provision has been made for the 
drying of nets, open spaces, etc. The intention is to make it a miniature model village and 
there need be no fear of its becoming a nuisance.57
Two detailed maps were provided with the report which showed the model village to be 
constructed. The most striking thing about the map was the juxtaposition of middle and upper 
class housing adjacent to the much more condensed Koli village. In total, 294.6 acres were going 
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to be developed with 360 building plots varying from roughly 1000 to 3000 sq. yards each. 
Mirams said that he intended to use the land to its most efficient end, through an “economic 
development” of the space. Wide roads, a water front garden, tennis courts, a concert hall with a 
café, a swimming bath, market, chauffeur’s quarters, motor garages, stables, and servants 
quarters indicated that Colaba was to become a place of leisure and recreation, with activities 
designed to cultivate the mind and body through the theatre and baths, for example. The design 
of the servants quarters made Mirams especially proud of his own innovation in planning, as they 
were located next to the stables and not next to the new residences. He wrote: 
To the west of the stables and immediately adjoining them, a site is provided for servants’ 
quarters. This is a new departure in Indian development, but it is hoped that owners of houses 
would be pleased to be free from the nuisance inevitably created by servants being located in 
close proximity to the main residences.58 
Colaba was being redeveloped to be an exclusive neighborhood: a certain type of person would 
live there in contrast to the other neighborhoods of Bombay. It was also exclusive from within, 
i.e. the classes of employers were to be kept distinct from the “nuisance” of having their 
domestic labourers in close proximity to themselves. 
In the final section of the report, the financial cost and estimated profits was provided. 
Mirams estimated that the scheme would cost Rs. 4,07,37,000, and by selling the building sites it  
would recover, at an average of Rs. 50-75/sq. yard, a total of approximately Rs. 5,30,30,400. The 
net profit of 1 Crore and 23 Lakhs (Rs. 1,22,93,400) was anticipated without the use of any 
credit to purchase the materials.59 Thus, it was not only developers who would benefit from 
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building Colaba into an exclusive neighborhood, but the Municipality and Improvement Trust 
would monetarily benefit as well.  
Providing the Kolis with housing in Colaba exemplified their unusual relation to the 
Municipal Corporation and City Improvement Trust, both of which were run by some of the most 
prominent landlords and industrialists in the city. Honoring the Kolis’ right to land had ironically 
provided the growing cadre of city officials the legitimacy to grant land developers access to 
resources. The Koli story established a link between contemporary officials and Bombay’s “past” 
and served as proof that officials were honoring a tradition. The story thus relegated any other 
types of claims to housing and land in the city to the domain of the market. The rise of the origin 
myth, the Koli indigeneity history of Bombay signified the total breakdown of any other claims 
to rights over the land, which now had to operate only in the realm of the market.
The Kolis of Bombay were singularly thought of as fisher folk. The previous ambiguity 
of the varying occupations which the Koli could engage in, such as settled agriculture, no longer 
applied. Since they did not work on the land and only worked on the sea, their presence was not 
a threat to liberal conceptions of private property. In Colaba and in Mandvi, the Koli emerged as 
indigenous petitioners whose rights to land and housing in the city had to be honored. 
Conclusion: Contesting Bombay’s Origins
Upon establishment of the Koli origin myth in 1901 C.E., the Koli tale could serve the 
local purpose of managing dispossession, the regional purpose of politicizing an ethno-linguistic 
identity as the sole arbiter of Bombay’s history, the national purpose of “re”-constructing the 
Hindu nation, and the global purpose of lending credibility to a merchant theory of capitalism’s 
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origins on the city-islands. The Kolis’ sole right to the housing in Bombay rendered all other 
forms of dispossession ordinary, an everyday occurrence enacted by the apolitical, amoral, non-
cultural, and rational operation of the market. The Kolis, in contrast to the neutral market, were 
the site of culture, the only site of an excessive culture which neither could they shake free from 
nor did anyone want them to. Their habitations served to maintain the “cultural past” of 
Bombay’s history which warranted the rational and culture-free march of the economy in the 
distribution of housing, land, and property in the rest of the city and for everyone else. If 
technology, industry, and the rule of property was going to cast itself as the future, it would need 
to enshrine all other forms of life as residues of the past. As a recent scholar has said of the 
reclamations which led to the fantastic seascape of Marine Drive in Bombay: “Only the 
ramshackle huts of the Koli fishing community break up the solid continuity of the industrial 
mastery of the sea.”60
Consulting extant sources and histories of Bombay from the Portuguese and early 
Company period which cite deeds and grants, one cannot find corroboration for the story of 
Bombay as a small and inconsequential fishing village. This chapter has demonstrated that the 
story of the Kolis of Bombay did not achieve the status of the “origin tale of Bombay” until 
1901, when the story was derived from more ambiguous versions of it which circulated a few 
decades earlier. Upon consulting the records prior to 1901, one finds that the Kolis or fisher folk 
were not treated as if they were the only native inhabitants of the city-islands. Only long after 
many others had settled on the collection of islands called in total “Bombay,” did the Kolis 
achieve the status of the indigenous inhabitants of the islands. Those early settlers were as varied 
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as any socially diverse collection of peoples which could be found throughout South Asia 
historically. The inhabitants of the island were influenced by and themselves influenced the ebb 
and flow of waves of migrations, settlements, ascensions to power, and conflicts of interest 
which marked the subcontinent’s history. Bombay was neither detached from the subcontinent’s 
immediate and preceding historical developments nor was it an isolated enclave in which the 
Kolis alone could lay claim.
Furthermore, the story of the rise of Bombay as a modern port city is a story of a 
particular type of transformation of agrarian and market space. It made the city seem as if it was 
produced ex nihilo, from scratch, and even this served a purpose. In addition to tracing how 
claiming indigenous rights produced a collective Koli identity and people and how indigeneity 
was performed once it was established as a legal right, this chapter also traced what honoring 
those rights did for modern imperial statecraft where merchant capitalism came to be privileged 
over early modern commercial relations and set the context in which future battles over land 
would take place in the urban context. 
The Koli story, once invented, supported a merchant based theory of capitalism’s origins 
rather than an industrious, agrarian, or commercial revolution. This theory credited mostly 
foreign merchant’s activities with the major changes which led to Bombay’s growth. It argued 
that merchants who resided in towns which were networked with each other across seas were the 
liberating force of the inherent capitalist potential within South Asian society, and indeed within 
human nature. The narratives of the “colonial port cities” of South Asia as being nothing more 
than mere fishing villages were thus severed from the subcontinent’s larger history. Capitalists 
arrived by sea and provided the liberating force so that the subcontinent’s capitalist potential 
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could be set in motion. Bombay was henceforth cast as a desolate enclave where it was found 
that a social life consisting of a near primitive relationship between man and nature existed in a 
location both physically and developmentally distant from South Asian imperial heartlands who 
had no control over the coasts. Thus early modern forms of sovereignty, social organization, 
commercial dynamism, and capitalist progress were denied in South Asia’s urban past.
The British saw themselves as the agents of the subcontinent’s modern history and thus 
pursued the question of Bombay’s origins. The colonial story of Bombay would begin with 
isolated and centuries-old fishing communities living on the island until merchant communities 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were able to achieve the potential of the islands due to 
Company fiat. The Company merchants along with initially Parsis in this case, but eventually 
Khojas, Memons, Katchis, Bohras, Banias, settled in the town due to British initiatives. These 
merchant communities financed mills, facilitated commerce, extracted surplus from the 
hinterland, shipped it across seas, and effectively increased demand for goods, services, and 
labour, which were only now organized into more productive relations through the arrival of 
machines and industry. 
By the twentieth century nationalists saw Bombay as a “colonial city.” Bombay’s history 
was thought to mirror and reflect the narrative of colonialism itself. A colonial modernity was 
first, the narration of capitalist success which served to congratulate merchant’s activities 
because of whom an entire cadre of supporting actors migrated to the city in search of work, each 
one along with the merchants freeing themselves from the shackles of agrarian bondage which 
characterized their predecessor’s lives in the hinterland; and second, through a brutal form of 
high imperialism, capitalist potential was thwarted, and un-development, the wide scale 
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persistence of poverty, un-built urban environments, and un-harnessed productive potential 
remained in colonialism’s wake. National independence would embrace development to set the 
city back on its proper modernizing path. Throughout the political shift in power and 
governance, to be urban was to be free, to be in the country was to be un-free. In the city free 
labour, free capital, free migrants collectively dwelled, inhabiting the space of capitalist 
modernity’s victory: the city. The city like modernity itself, was the sign of the new and novel, 
marking a distinct break with the past. No element of the city’s immediate past was seen to 
contribute to the city’s future.
What this chapter has done instead is to locate the growing power of the East India 
Company on the islands as a part and parcel of an already existing “rurban” nexus in which 
urban functions could be found in country villages and rural towns, and agrarian functions too 
were encouraged by the Company in the developing of Bombay. The East India Company 
officials, along with native merchants, cultivators, Koli peoples, and petty tradesmen settled on 
the island through encouragements in both agrarian and commercial ventures. No distinction was 
made between city and country in this period. Through this early settlement, this chapter focused 
on early contests over rights to housing where customary claims to shelter existed alongside 
modern economic claims, neither of which distinguished the Koli peoples as having any 
extraordinary right to housing. Dispossession was made ordinary and a “natural” or unavoidable 
step on the way to settlements on the islands. 
This chapter has also traced the way in which the Koli myth obscured the multiple origins 
of Bombay’s history. The Koli origin myth supported a merchant based theory of capitalism’s 
origins as foreign since the Company officials can be cast as arriving on a tabula rasa, on 
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uninhabited islands. Bolstered by the nationalist imagination, it lent credence to the notion that 
capitalism arrived on the subcontinent from the outside, as a foreign imposition which either 
needed to be removed or set back on track through local and national development. In Koli-
inhabited Bombay, no grand fish farms or farms of any kind were ever formed; i.e. no one 
organized the activities of others or farmed out revenues from the sale of products, no great 
overlord emerged from the fishing community’s ranks or any other community’s ranks to 
exemplify the social stratification indicative of advanced societies. Instead a community of 
people who made use of the bounty of the sea were narrated in the authoritative account of 
Bombay’s history as singularly fixed across time. 
In contrast to these prevailing stereotypes, we’ve seen the ambiguity and imprecision 
prevalent in the 19th century about who the Koli are and what they do, and how they are one 
community amongst early settlers in Bombay and treated equal to them. The practice of modern 
indigeneity is a type of knowledge making which substitutes the knowledge of a deep and distant 
history in place of an immediate history. The origin myth of Bombay depended on a notion of the 
Koli peoples as unhistorical, primitive, and as dependents on the state for distribution of 
resources such as land for housing, and protected spaces of commerce for their goods. Only after 
the turn of the century were the Koli given special rights to housing on the islands, and it was 
after this moment that a ritualized retelling of the origin story served the purpose of constructing 
the merchant based history of Bombay such that no other groups could make claims to housing 
and land other than the Koli peoples. 
There are several areas of Bombay famous for their Koliwada, or Koli settlements within 
the city. These serve both as tourist cites for visitors to the city as well as a way to write the 
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authoritative history of the city into the landscape itself. Traveling throughout the city, one can 
encounter a Koliwada, or “Koli settlement” in Dharavi, Sion, and Mahim amongst other places. 
One can procure “native” crafts, fabrics, and buying fish from the Koli peoples. In the most 
recent attempt to upgrade and relocate Dharavi’s residents between 2005-9, it is the Koli 
community of Dharavi who have taken the lead in organizing resistance and negotiation of the 
terms of this attempted dispossession. They have argued that they have lived there for at least 
450 years, and supposedly possess British documents to prove it.61 While that may be true, 
writing against this singular history is the task of the next chapter, where we will explore the 
many communities and forms of social life which together built Bombay in the 19th century. 
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This chapter follows illustrations of mobility from contiguous regions surrounding the 
city of Bombay, changes in relations of production and exchange, and urban settlement practices 
to paint a picture of the diversity of migratory trajectories, social connections, and commercial 
circumstances which made Bombay. It shows that experiences of mobility preceded the phase of 
rapid urbanization in the city of Bombay so that rather than seeing the growing city as absorbing 
rural migrants, we need to understand that already mobile migrants brought the city into their 
routes of circulation. In addition to spatial mobility, social mobility also produced the city of 
Bombay as an effect of dynamism in Western India. This was the case in Early Modern Asian 
history just as it was in India’s 19th century development. Chaudhuri and Frank have discussed 
the history of this mobility, and Chaudhuri is most direct when he says,
An expanding and flexible labour force able to switch occupations between agriculture and 
industry was to be found both in China and India...Asian history is full of examples revealing 
the constant movements and migrations of craftsmen from one locality to another in search of 
better opportunities...Migration and movements provided common remedy against natural 
disasters, political oppression, and shrinking economic opportunities...at a time of 
commercial depressions, the unemployed industrial worker turned to agricultural work such 
as helping with the harvest in order to earn a wage.1 
Official discourse was unable to render the migrating and flexible labor pool legible or legitimate 
because urban officials saw the city as an isolated social zone burdened by its own urban social 
problems, most notably, the problems of overcrowding and disease.
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The emergence of the urban housing problem is the subject of the next chapter, but here I 
contextualize the “urban housing problem” within a longer temporality of mobility, and the 
experiences of the circular migrants. Reading city-country connections together functions here as 
a methodological strategy to limit the influence of official city documents on our understanding 
of Bombay’s everyday inhabitants. There isn’t a single argument, i.e., it isn’t the case that I can 
make a linear narrative about the dynamics of rural to urban migration or the forms of housing 
which migrants built and resided in. Instead, I try to approach as nearly as possible the diversity 
of lived experiences of acts of mobility and inequality. Accounting for Bombay’s growth through 
the 19th century requires just such a story of multiple origins, of interlinkages between country 
and city, and of agrarian and commercial capitalism developing together. We can think of an 
urban peasantry and a rural proletariat together and developing in tandem as people move across 
physical spaces and change social positions. The Koli origin myth avoided this messiness of 
multiple origins, as we saw in the first chapter. Instead, in this chapter we explore the diversity of 
practices which made up urban life through the decades. 
There are major trends which will frame the following discussion. First, a variety of 
“shocks” to the region, such as the American civil war in the 1860s, the famines of the 1870s and 
1880s, or the creation of new buyers in urban housing in the early 1900s,2 all created periods of 
intense urban population growth and increased urban mobility. Second, as the first decades of the 
20th century progressed, most especially in the first three decades of the early 20th century, 
migrants and residents of Bombay became less legible as legitimate urban subjects. This was due 
not just to market forces, but increasing desires on the part of officials to homogenize the 
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practices of the everyday, surveil and monitor the lives of the urban inhabitants, and control the 
use of the city’s resources. Accordingly, a range of habitation practices emerged in the city which 
both reflected and produced changes in family life, occupational opportunities, and new 
networks of community. By looking at the long 19th century, we will see the growth of the city 
of Bombay as produced by and as an effect of the expanding domains of mobility of rural 
inhabitants and their practices of accommodation to such official changes rather than a result of 
urban encroachment on rural life. Particular areas within the Konkan, Karnatak, Thane, and 
Kolaba will be highlighted to show how the city was brought into those domains of mobility and 
spheres of activity of everyday migrants and workers.
 We will focus on two periods of rapid change in the productive and commercial economy 
in this chapter alone: the cotton boom due to the civil war in America in the 1860s and the 
famines across Western and Southern India in the 1870s and 1880s. On first inspection, these two 
events should have had opposite effects on the lives of peasant migrants. The cotton boom  
stimulated the economy by increasing the demand for cotton production while the famine was a 
depressed period in the economy when the supply of grains was limited. However, both caused 
increases in prices by working on opposite ends of the exchange relation: the cotton boom 
increased demand while the famine reduced supply. The cotton boom could have followed 
liberalist predictions of political economy which said that everybody’s standard of living should 
rise with such a stimulus, but the results were predictably uneven. The increase in demand 
resulted in a “weak expansion” in the agrarian Deccan with more optimal growth in more 
responsive cotton districts, such as the Khandesh. The famine resulted in a shortage in supply 
and coming on the heels of the cotton boom and subsequent crash, only further depressed the 
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cultivator’s access to a regular livelihood. Both events worked to exacerbate inequality but in 
different ways.
 The question of how to categorize the activities of accommodation and assimilation 
which everyday people – peasants, migrants, workers – undertook in response to the changes of 
the 18th and 19th centuries has driven some of the most contentious debates in South Asian 
historiography. Describing pre-colonial modes of production and the changes wrought by the 
transition to capitalism and empire have divided scholars in fierce debates.3 Such debates can be 
thought of as divided between those who see the changes of the 18th and 19th century as only 
effecting the relations of exchange and those who see it as having an effect on the structure and 
thus mode of production. Did increased commodification and new market opportunities for 
products and labor have a structural effect on the social relations which produced new 
commodities, or did production proceed as it had done before, but now at a higher rate and with 
new carriers who worked longer distances? The question can be put in another way: how are we 
to understand the articulation of the “petty” workers’ and migrants’ lives into the relations of  
capital, did they merely participate in a greater quantity of exchange or was their social position 
embedded in a new form of articulation between producers, capitalists, and commercial men? 
 Urban officials who documented and managed Bombay through the 19th century could 
easily see and document the exchange relations which made Bombay a great commercial capital 
of Empire. But they were unable to see the changes in the relations of production which were 
spanning across the city and into the country interiors. Officials regularly deplored housing 
conditions in the city, complaining that rooms were crammed with people sleeping on makeshift 
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cots in verandahs or wherever else they could find a place to sleep. Officials documented 
migrants who found temporary work in the city on railways or elsewhere because of “shocks” to 
the system such as the cotton boom, famine, and other such events. They saw such workers as 
responding to changes in the exchanges of commodities, not as responding to changes in the 
production of commodities themselves. 
 For many urban labourers well into the mid-twentieth century, attachment to rural land 
increased as a result of increasing labour opportunities in the city, not decreased. Competitive 
pressures were a product of urban jobs, but the low returns on a family’s labour, the descending 
wage as a result of more competition in the labour market, increased the need for land in the 
country as a secure insurance for a family’s social reproduction and even served as an investment 
for those who were able to earn spare money from their labour. Thus, competition in city and 
country increased simultaneously as the demand for jobs and land grew in tandem. The 
demographic growth of Western India too played no small part in this matter.4 Nonetheless, city 
officials constructed these mobile lives as dependent on exchange networks alone and 
underplayed or often didn’t notice the changes in the relations of production which were causing 
the mobility. 
 This limited view or bias in understanding migrants lives is what I refer to as an “urban 
gaze” which was particularly strong in cities such as Bombay but also extended to a kind of 
commercial gaze when officials observed colonial India’s interiors. Urban observers including 
city officials, native elites, industrialists, and capitalists who spent the majority of their time in 
the city, either within the entrails of industrial neighborhoods or on the docks and ports, 
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depended on labour to accomplish their commercial goals. It was primarily the commercial goals 
of the imperial project that undergirded the guiding principles of colonial rule and law. They 
were often frustrated by the limited reliability of the labour pool and yet stood to gain by 
increasing competition in the labour markets. Debates amongst officials hinged on whether 
peasants and migrants were responsive to markets. Market responsiveness indicated 
interconnectedness and that Indian social life could be transformed, that forms of bondage 
between laborers and landlords could be broken. However, practices of housing seemed to 
confirm that bondage still existed, that migrants were continuously dependent on the social 
capital of their employers to acquire residences in the city. This was not a severe problem until 
plague broke out at the end of century, but even before then it raised concerns.
 This limited urban gaze made inequity in housing seem like a series of personal choices 
or a product of migrants not being true urban dwellers, i.e. not being free laborers but rather 
bonded to the same social networks that brought them into the city. Housing wasn’t read as a part  
of a market itself and thus a result endemic to the very changes some officials were themselves 
advocating for across the city and country. The legibility of housing is the subject of the next 
chapter, but here it is important to remember that housing appeared to officials like a series of 
choices based on village of origin, connections to landlords and employers, and sentiments 
informed by customs and preferences. The rest of this chapter contextualizes and situates the 
problem of overcrowding within the changes of the 19th century which drove the patterns of 
circular mobility within Western India, thus correcting for the limited urban gaze of officials and 
urban capitalists. Had the urban gaze been overcome, then increased competitive pressures 
across city and country, firmly embedded in markets of labour and commodities, would have 
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been seen as the cause of the slum problem during the plague. Housing would be seen as an 
operative market of its own, obviously connected to the competitive pressures of other 
commercial markets.
 Routes of mobility influenced Bombay’s interiors prior to the cotton boom. While 
officials and native elites had been developing a limited urban gaze to consider the population’s 
dense settlement patterns in the southern parts of the city, processes which escaped them were 
occurring in the northern parts and beyond Bombay’s city limits, into the Konkan, Karnatak, 
Thane, Kolaba, and even further into Gujarat and Rajputana. These processes included the 
making of masses of people who utilized their labour wherever it would take them and who were 
losing land due to both policies which sought greater output from cultivation and forms of 
indebtedness which they depended on to earn their way and meet those expectations of 
cultivation. 
 The density within Bombay was due to that mobility. Of the entire population in the city 
in 1881, only 27.76% of the population was born in Bombay, less than the 31.13% born in 
Bombay in 1872. Migration accounted for the majority of the population: 16.32% were from 
Ratnagiri, 8.92% from Poona, 5.87% from Satara, and 5.86% from Cutch.5 Just from these four 
regions, which were the highest of all sending regions, came more than one-third of Bombay’s 
inhabitants. In 1881, when an outbreak of cholera added to the city’s troubles, it was thought to 
have been brought about by this mobility, especially by those from Ratnagiri. Fifty percent of 
those affected by cholera were from Ratnagiri, which officials thought was attributable to the 
“indigent condition of those attacked - the majority being poor, mostly a poor class of labourer- 
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and defective sanitary conditions under which they live...” Of those 50% Ratnagiri-born 
residents who became affected by Cholera, more than three-fourths died. In 1872, there were 
56,879 people in Bombay born in Ratnagiri, while in 1881 there were 126,190 people in Bombay 
who were born in Ratnagiri.6
 The people who migrated to Bombay were embedded in a “chain of operations”7 
extending from the peasantry in Bombay’s hinterlands, into the city, outwards to ports across the 
Ocean, to the City of London, and beyond into Africa, Middle East, and Americas. At each step 
of the way, changes in one location affected everyone from the smallest producer to the largest 
landholder, and all the merchants and transactors in between, but it didn’t affect them equally. 
 The monetary loans which village moneylenders gave to cultivators, ryots, were for the 
cultivators, a temporary source of livelihood. Such loans may have worked to keep cultivators 
tied to moneylenders and landlords, but seen from the point of view of the cultivator and debtor, 
the advances on their production in anticipation of the upcoming harvest functioned as a wage. 
Officials only saw in such relations increased forms of bondage and tenancy between usurers/
moneylenders and farmers. Distress sales of land were cast as results of too much debt or 
exorbitant rates of interest which had no checks in the official government. There is no doubt that 
interest rates were too high. Private moneylenders could get away with exorbitant rates when 
there was no oversight, regulation or limits to the desperation felt by cultivators. Thus for the last 
few years of the 19th century, the British Crown was trying to stabilize the lending rate and 
monopolize and centralize banking. This not only proved difficult but it also resulted in a 
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fundamental misreading of the status of seasonal migrants within the social systems engendered 
by enhanced penetration of capitalist relations into society.
 Seasonal migrants were not awaiting urban industry to rescue them from forms of 
bondage. While there may have been periods of higher wages for mill work as opposed to casual 
labouring throughout the city, we have no evidence of how much construction workers8 made or 
how much petty tradesmen profited from their minor trades. At least up until the 1910s, mill 
work did not necessarily mean greater job security nor did it mean freedom from relations of 
patronage or bondage. Working at a machine or with one’s own hands amounted to similar 
choices between opportunities and constraints. There couldn't have been any industrial 
manufacturing machine, no matter how massive or magical in its ability to transform a simple 
product into something more complex, that would have impressed the circular migrant enough to 
make him or her (most migrants were actually male) exclusively subservient to it, or make him 
or her abandon his options of mobility between cities and countries. Nor could the migrant ever 
have faith that a machine alone would increase the standard of living. Market forces had 
capacities well beyond mechanization's promises, such that mechanization in Bombay did not 
privilege industrial workers over their nonindustrial counterparts at the turn of the century. As far 
as the most dependent migrant was concerned, his livelihood was already in the form of a wage, 
and he paid it all almost in entirety to his employer, often the same person in the countryside as 
in the city. He didn't need the wage form to experience his freedom; he was exercising his 
freedom in a competitive labour market in his very migration to the city. Harvest season called 
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him to his village while manufacturing or the commercial season called him to his home in the 
city. In the village, he shared his dwelling space with his extended family, a large network of kin 
relations including his wife, children, parents, etc.; in the city, he shared his dwelling with fellow 
urban labourers who used their status as sojourners to enhance their income as much as they 
could.
 Throughout, there was differentiation amongst the peasantry, merchants, and 
moneylenders which created mobile communities not only across town and country but across 
the social ladder such that switching occupations was common amongst the stratifying classes. 
Merchants were often usurers as well and cultivators could themselves become moneylenders.9 
As one scholar of the 19th century in Western India says, “...there was scarcely a ‘merchant’ who 
could not be classified as a ‘moneylender’, and vice versa.”10 Peasants were internally 
differentiating into a big and small peasantry who were either dependent on loans for production 
or were semi-wage labourers who hired out their labour power and may or may not have incurred 
debt or bondage to work the land.11
 Usury and indebtedness were common features of the production process; small peasants 
often took advances in order to buy the materials necessary for cultivation. Banaji has argued 
that indebtedness “functioned as a wage,” and moreover, that the advances were not simply the 
buying of a commodity in advance of its production but should instead be seen as input of capital 
in money form into the production process.12 Thus through forms of a wage in debt, producers 
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were dependent on outputs of capital from merchants and moneylenders.
 We find optimizing peasants13 in Western India who were mobile and were internally 
differentiating and stratifying through opportunities and losses. The phrase “optimizing peasant” 
doesn’t have to indicate success in climbing the social ladder however, many took the most 
optimal choices between a series of bad options while others chose poorly. Precisely these 
divergent outcomes led to the differentiation of the large and small peasantry throughout the 19th 
century. Some found opportunities where they arrived and yet others found themselves 
stigmatized as they took up new occupations. For example, when officials noted that increases in 
the lowest castes accounted for much of the increase in population between 1872 and 1881, this 
could not be accounted for by social reproduction and migration of low caste communities alone. 
Dheds and Mhars were twice as numerous in 1881 as in 1872, and Chamars, leather workers, 
increased three-fold.14 It is hard to imagine that such an increase in low caste population did not 
index the creation of new identities amongst occasionally downwardly mobile migrant 
communities. Those who took up the occupation of working leather in the city could come to be 
called Chamars for example.15 It also isn’t clear what the status of different caste groups was. 
The census writer for the 1911 census of the city of Bombay, when accounting for the growth of 
the certain outcaste communities, said:
The Mahars, Holiyas or Dheds, who represent the untouchables under names which vary 
according to the locality from which they come, are third on the list with 58,000. They fall 
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into two classes, the Surati Dheds who earn a living as butlers and hamals to the European 
community and those from the Deccan who work as mill-hands. Both of these classes are 
rising superior to the position to which they have been relegated by the Code of Manu. They 
have increased 11,000 or 23% and are in addition materially prosperous.16
Spatial and social mobility, downwards and upwards, seemed to be the rule at least prior to the 
first world war. Such mobility drove the construction of the city of Bombay.
Rural Mobility and Commercialization
 The city of Bombay sits nestled amidst a lush, fertile area on the Western coast of the 
Indian subcontinent known as the Konkan coast. The Konkan, along with the Karnatak, Ghats, 
Gujarat, and other dynamic regions on the Western Indian subcontinent are a part of the history 
of the city of Bombay as the city is a part of those regional histories. Suspending the claims of 
the authoritative history of Bombay City as an exogenous port is necessary in recovering the 
empirical dynamic that led to urbanization and the eventual housing of everyday people in what 
were called “slums” in the long run. The history of the settlement of the city must focus on the 
history of the peoples and follow their lives wherever it takes them. Everyday mobility, 
opportunism, strategies, successes, and failures all contribute to the stratified human settlements 
within the city’s boundaries. 
 Across the Bombay Presidency and throughout the long 19th century a vast diversity of 
rural conditions provided contexts for periods of intense agrarian dynamism. Local conditions 
varied so no generalization can be made about all of Western India. Except for that the rise in 
cash cropping and the increased access to distant markets created competitive pressures for 
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everyone, whether directly involved in the commercialization process or not. Numerous scholars 
have studied this period and the commercialization of agriculture, changes in social relations of 
production and commerce, and the articulation of local economies with global forces. However, 
connecting the city to the country through mobile migrants has been difficult.
 Relying on urban records of Bombay means that we don’t pick up the story until the 
1860s at the earliest, when rural cultivators begin a period of circular migration between their 
villages and the city, and when the first exclusively urban records of Bombay are kept. The 
Municipal Commissioner’s office in Bombay kept annual records beginning in 1868 and all-
India census taking began with the 1864 census which included the first census of “Bombay 
Town and Island.” If as scholars we use only the urban records, we develop a biased view of the 
temporality of circular migrants lives. We are led to assume that mobility driven by landlessness 
and leading to urbanization must have begun in the 1860s. However, this is not true, mobility 
was a feature of peasant life as was landlessness before the 1860s. Nonetheless, things changed 
in the latter half of the 19th century in seemingly irreversible ways. It is important to situate 
emergence of the city within its larger spatial and temporal contexts.
 In the 19th century and earlier, the “Konkan” referred to relatively flat area between the 
Sahyadri mountain range, also known as the Western Ghats, and the Arabian sea. Thus it was the 
coastal plain which received the first rainfall of the summer monsoon. Between June and 
October, as the southeasterly winds hit the mountains first, heavy rains drenched the fertile soil 
providing annual fertility. In the 19th century, irrigation techniques included man-made, small 
and temporary dams thrown across streams on hills by industrious cultivators during the 
monsoon to source the flow of water. Rice was commonly grown on moist ground while on 
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higher ground local coarse millets such as ragi, nachni, or nagli occupied cultivators as they 
secured themselves sustenance and livelihood. Besides during the monsoons, the climate was dry  
and so the soil was rarely cultivated again for a second winter harvest as was the case in other 
parts of India, except in Kanara which was occasionally able to export groundnut and vegetables 
from the winter harvest. Along the coast of the sea itself, palm trees, mango groves, and plantain 
orchards made some landholders particularly wealthy while commercial fishing too thrived to 
provide another source of livelihood. 
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  Fig. 2.1 The Bombay Presidency with divisions in 1909. 
Source: Imperial Gazetteer of 1909.
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 Even when the “town and island of Bombay” was excluded from demographic accounts 
of the Konkan, the Konkan region still maintained the highest density of population in the entire 
Bombay Presidency through the turn of the 20th century. This dense population clustered itself 
into numerous small towns containing ten to twenty thousand inhabitants each, and smaller 
communities spaced themselves out over cultivatable areas. The coasts were the most dense 
areas, having 1200 to 1350 people per square mile; three times the number of people could live 
on the coast as opposed to the inland towns and villages, which supported about 400 to 450 
people per square mile.17 The landscape of the Konkan region exemplified a contiguous territory 
of urban and rural regions as well as a social continuum between townsmen and countryfolk 
tightly knit into social relations of production and exchange. Konkani cultivators were dependent 
on the rains for summer work and even when the rains came, they were prone to seek second 
forms of livelihood in non-harvest seasons, most especially in the second half of the 19th 
century. This proclivity towards supplementary work drove them into Bombay and Bombay’s 
industries depended on its many and expanding “hinterlands” as sources of capital and labour. 
The city’s emergence as a modern and populous node of human activity cannot be understood 
without understanding the changes within such contiguous regions.
 The Karnatak was situated southwards beyond the Konkan, bordered on its north by the 
Krishna river and, like the Konkan, surrounded by the Arabian sea to its West traversing the 
Western Ghats. The Karnatak can be thought of as three distinct eco-zones which run parallel to 
the north-south running Sahyadri mountain range: the “Mallad,” the “Transition,” and the 
“Desh.” The Mallad was the eastern most part abutting the sea. It was always plagued by 
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malaria, sitting deep in water logged areas from heavy monsoons which provided both abundant 
rice along with illness. The plague which hit Bombay in 1896 was particularly pronounced here. 
The Transition area between the coast and the plains grew rice along with pulses and millets and 
was able to support a slightly higher population density than the Mallad, concentrated to three 
large towns, Hubli, Belgaum, and Dharwar. If those towns were removed from the enumeration, 
then the Transition and Mallad were roughly the same in population density, about 320 persons 
to the square mile or slightly less on the coast. Then came the healthy plains of the Desh famous 
for its black soil. The railway ran through the Transition region because of its higher population 
and the railways themselves resulted in the intensifying the population density even higher. 
 Two other regions were directly contiguous to Bombay city. Thana to the north and 
Kolaba to the south. Thana had several towns with a density of 860 people per square mile while 
a plateau just below the Western Ghats had 461 people per square mile. The plateau and hills 
were well drained so people didn’t succumb to malaria. Later Kolaba and Thana remained only 
as names of the southern most and northern most parts of Bombay city itself, however in the 19th 
century, they were larger agricultural areas which included portions of the growing city. 
 The phenomenal growth of cities like Bombay in the 19th century was dependent on the 
dynamics of these adjacent regions. People on the move made the city of Bombay the most dense 
city across the British Empire; it was because of the connections that people made with regions 
beyond the formal city that life in the city was possible. In the city’s vicinities, products of all 
kinds were produced into more complex commodities by a hierarchy of labourers who required 
tools, capital, information, and ideas to sell end products to merchants and creditors. Over time 
Bombay became the main port city in Western India for shipping items across the oceans into 
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South East Asia, the South China Sea ports, the Middle East, Western Europe, and beyond into 
the new world. Those who sought immediate access to the waterways, waterways which earned 
merchants’ profits and coolies’ livelihoods, would relocate to Bombay so as to maintain control 
over their commercial ventures and meet new people who provided the social capital necessary 
to engage and create new opportunities. As the markets in things like fruit, grain, and cotton 
generalized, many found themselves in disadvantaged situations where their prior efforts could 
no longer earn them enough to buy the basic necessities of social reproduction. Thus they were 
compelled to enter the vast chains of operations developing between London, Aden, Bombay, 
and Ratnagiri for example, amongst other places. Some entered such chains of operations with 
hopes of rising up the social ladder while others were merely maintaining their social positions. 
Yet many, instead, experienced downward mobility and bare sustenance as their reward.
 In the Konkan, the district called Ratnagiri lay exactly on the coast, today in the 
Southwestern part of Maharashtra. Ratnagiri and Kolaba were the main sending regions to 
Bombay city. Ratnagiri migrants were also well represented in Karachi. Many from Ratnagiri 
were lascars or sailors who sent remittances home. Officials thought of the Konkan post offices 
as bustling money centers because of these remittances. Others were wage earners who joined 
mills and offices and either settled in Bombay or migrated circularly and seasonally.18 
 Prior to the 1850s producers in the Deccan experienced a period of constant crisis and a 
prolonged depression. Even in the years of good harvest, since there were no railways or assured 
pathways to reach distant markets, a good harvest season would mean that local markets were 
glutted with the product. Thus prices would fall and cultivators would be stuck with the problem 
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of plenty. They neither went hungry nor did they experience windfall profits in such 
circumstances. In Ahmednagar between the years 1821-1847, every two years there was a poor 
harvest while other years were unusually good. Regardless of the outcome, the monetary value of 
the assessment of the land been worked out by East India Company collectors prior to the new 
prices. Therefore, even in years of good harvest, prices would fall and the ryots had much more 
grain taken from their stores. From 1822 onwards, there was a longterm trend of downward 
prices in general which furthered the prolonged crisis amongst the ryots.19 Upon each annual 
harvest, ryots had to sell their goods in the local market, recover the cash value, and pay some 
fixed portion of it to local revenue collectors. Thus if prices fluctuated upwards then the ryot 
needed a smaller harvest to maintain his right to land, but if prices fluctuated downwards then 
more cash crops would have be sold off in order to meet the terms of the assessment. 
 Officials wanted evidence of market responsiveness. They wanted to see that cultivators 
were moving beyond subsistence and beyond acts of basic social reproduction. Officials wanted 
to see that they were achieving the full value of their land and that cultivators were themselves 
fully productive as market actors. After the 1850s more land was brought into cultivation and 
transport systems were created such that Ahmednagar came out of this period of prolonged 
depression and crisis.20 The years 1852-53 were called the “turning of the tide” by a British 
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official, G. Wingate.21 Market responsiveness was a sign that Company policy was working, but 
the results were expectedly uneven. Some cultivators responded to the rise in price of cotton 
through the 19th century by shifting cultivation from local grains to cotton while others 
continued producing local grains to feed the growing population in the city of Bombay. 
Khandesh district was a cotton producer and so as cotton demand steadily increased throughout 
the 19th century, Khandesh became a wealthy district, although even there the results were 
uneven. G. Wingate said of Khandesh that, “The peasantry are becoming comparatively wealthy, 
independent, and enterprising.”22 
 It is important not to focus exclusively on international trade but also see how regional 
markets changed cultivators’ lives. Prior to the American civil war of 1864 and the resultant 
cotton boom in Bombay’s economy, there were connections across the oceans due to the market 
in cotton: 
Well before the cotton boom, every poor cotton harvest in America, e.g. in 1836, 1838, 1845, 
1846, 1849, had revived and stimulated the interest of British capitalists in an Indian cotton 
supply. After 1848, the Manchester Chamber of Commerce began a systematic and concerted 
campaign to secure Government interest in supply from India. ... By 1861 the programme 
[sic] of the Cotton Supply Association included as its major objectives the conversion of land 
into a commodity, the establishment of effectual courts of law with the power to enforce 
contracts, and massive State expenditure in public works that would link the cotton districts 
to the port of Bombay.23 
Whereas cotton connected areas across oceans, regional dynamics in various grains connected 
the port of Bombay city to inland cultivators. Thus, even the districts which weren’t producing 
cotton were responsive to market demands. These included Poona, Sholapur, Satara and parts of 
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large urban centers including Bombay and Poona.24 Regional overland flows were just as 
important as flows across oceans in the commercialization of Western India. 
 Money formed the connecting link between these flows; it connected burgeoning small 
and large towns with the countryside and with distant ports and those distant countrysides. 
Before the cotton boom of the 1860s, markets was having an effect on the average cultivator’s 
life throughout Western India. By the end of the 19th century, approximately one-half of 
Khandesh’s acreage was devoted to commercial crops but Khandesh was on the high end of 
commercialization. Nasik had one-third of its region devoted to commercial cultivation.  In the 
Deccan as a whole, about one-quarter to one-third of the cultivated soil was used for distant 
markets, either regional or global.25 
 The railway expansion and improvement of roads in the latter half of the 19th century,  
mainly from Bombay outwards, led to price convergences across regions even if they started out 
unevenly. Especially through the cotton boom of the 1860s to the famine of the 1870s, prices 
converged across local markets much more intensely. As a result, small villages grew to bigger 
towns throughout the Deccan because they became commercial entrepôts of their own 
connecting Bombay city’s major ports to the agrarian heartlands of Western India. As a scholar 
of this region writes, 
The population of such towns and villages - Kharda, Vambhori, Karad, Tasgaon, Sowda, 
Faizpur, Lasalgaon, etc. - would tend to vary between 5,000 and 10,000 persons, and their 
‘mercantile’ sector to account generally for anywhere between four and ten percent of these 
populations. It is these smaller centres that mediated the local, inter-district and external trade 
of the Deccan. The monied capitals, whose intervention in this trade was absolutely decisive 
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resided mainly in such centres, connecting links between the larger capitals of the major local 
wholesale market and the taluka peasantry.26
These “monied capitals” formed nodes linking producers and consumers across regions. The 
rising population density of the city of Bombay was only one part of a widening trend as 
cultivators became small merchants of their own. The differentiation of the peasantry led to such 
monied capitals across the whole region. 
 It was in this moneyed nexus and commercial context which extended well beyond the 
city’s boundaries that urban officials developed and utilized an urban gaze to describe the 
conditions within the city of Bombay, as limited as that gaze was. They were unable to see that a 
commercial revolution in agrarian commodities was the cause of Bombay’s growth and that the 
penetration of markets meant that the already mobile peasantry would eventually bring the city 
into its orbits and routes of mobility and migration. The cotton boom of the 1860s and the famine 
of the 1870s caused major changes to Bombay’s urban life; in both periods the city experienced 
large influxes of population.
Cotton Boom of 1860s
 What was perceived as overcrowding and too much density in the city of Bombay from 
the mid-19th century to the early 20th century was in fact experienced by the cohabiting dwellers 
as the actualization of new opportunities, a strategy for survival, or a voluntary and even 
ingenious practice of thrift geared towards social mobility. For some people this ingenuity 
worked to raise their status in society, garnering them new opportunities for the future. While yet 
for others practices of thrift turned into perpetual states of abjection such that they were 
132
26 Ibid., 1379-80.
continuously excluded from the widening spheres of commercial life centered on Bombay.  Even 
though over time their worlds became smaller and smaller, the period beginning in the 1860s 
began a period of intense circular migration throughout the Bombay Presidency and beyond 
between cities, small towns, and diverse agrarian landscapes. “Optimizing peasants,” the apt 
phrase coined by Anand Yang in his study of Northeast India in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, negotiated their ambitions for climbing the social ladder.27  
 How can we distinguish between these two dissonant experiences? On the one hand, 
officials who wrote the documents about the city, everyone from health officers to census takers 
to workers for the Municipality, upon entering buildings and rooms found numerous people 
huddled together into tight spaces sharing kitchens or outhouses and claiming any spot of ground 
to sleep on overnight. Dr. Leith, the sanitation officer who reported on the state of overcrowding 
in the city in the census of 1864 said, 
“In a lane 9ft. wide ‘the houses on each side were of two or of three floors, and the various 
rooms were densely peopled, and the floors of the verandahs were fully occupied, while to 
eke out the accommodation in some of the verandahs there were charpaee or cots slung up 
and screened with old matting to form a second tier of sleeping places for labourers that were 
employed in the day time at the Railway terminus or elsewhere.”28 
Dr. Leith did not refer to these places as homes but rather “sleeping places.” That name was apt 
as people, often working age men, just used the location to sleep at night. There were no 
domestic activities associated with the places. It wasn’t a place to retreat from the external world, 
it wasn’t a place where one raised children or kept a family, nor was it a place of privacy, 
removed from the public sphere. But the name “sleeping places” also belied official attitudes 
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towards the native migrants’ lack of settled lifestyles. Officials had an anxiety about where to 
place people, how to classify them, how to account for and manage the intense mobility of the 
labouring classes, and this was expressed as a worry over the overcrowding in houses. It wasn’t 
that there were too many people in the city, rather there weren’t enough houses to create an 
acceptable person-to-house ratio. The use of the verb “eke” expressed that anxiety.
 The rise in price of cotton upon the onset of the American civil war precipitated dramatic 
changes in the city and country. The commercialization of crops in Bombay’s interiors meant that  
more and more people entered markets of exchange in labour and goods, it also meant that the 
number of moneylenders operative in speculation tactics across the region increased. Expansion 
of cultivation in the agrarian economy was what Sumit Guha has called a “weak expansion,” 
largely due to stagnant wages and the increased role of moneylenders, themselves a growing 
group:
Another feature of the boom years was the large increase in the number of 
moneylenders....The civil war boom ‘poured money into the country to seek investment ... 
[and] raised to an extravagant pitch the value of agricultural securities’. In the Hubli taluka of 
Dharwar ‘Rs. 100 per acre was given for planted cotton fields by dealers backed by 
speculators from Bombay.’29 
Even in the Khandesh district, the otherwise prosperous cotton district, officials noted that 
cultivators had not gained from the rise in cotton prices, only native merchants and 
moneylenders had.30 
 It was a boom time urban economy too, but the total drama of the cotton boom has to be 
placed in longer contexts. The British demand for cotton steadily increased between 1820 and 
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1850 and until the civil war, the American south provided most of that supply. By the 1850s 
India had carved out its share, providing 20% of the British demand in cotton. Upon the civil 
war’s onset, India provided 46%, but once the civil war ended America returned to supplying 
54% and India’s share reduced to 25% for English industry.31 This boom and bust of India’s 
cotton fortunes created particular social conditions within the city of Bombay. Only some portion 
of these people were able to benefit from the gains made. 
 The creation of a “second tier of sleeping places” which alarmed Dr. Leith was in fact a 
result of a very pertinent and apt calculation on the part of the inhabitants. Mobile cultivators 
were in the city to work for a season. Some had done this every year while others were 
newcomers to the routes of mobility, taking advantage of a period of intense growth in Bombay’s 
cotton industries. This work was going to supplement their livelihood for the year. They had left 
their families in the villages from which they came and they spent the vast majority of their 
waking days working in either the numerous small offices throughout the city, as porters or 
coolies, as domestic help, as railway workers or millhands, or as petty vendors of foodstuffs and 
other everyday articles. They would be taking their earnings back to their village homes in order 
to add to their family’s income for the season. Thus, the more they could save the better off they 
would be. There was no need to spend more on housing than absolutely necessary and since they 
were out of the house all day, all they needed was a place to sleep at night. 
 Social benefits too, could be gained from the decision to sling up many charpaee, four-
legged cots, in single rooms. Cohabiting created networks of information and community, 
information which could be used to find the best-compensating opportunities for work and a 
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community which could be deployed to send and receive messages from families in rural 
communities. People from the same village tended to cohabit in the same urban dwelling spaces, 
making urban neighborhoods with communities from common places of origin.32 There would 
have been no reason to live in isolated or even less dense rooms as doing so would have 
excluded the inhabitant from the necessary information to stake out a livelihood. In fact, less 
dense housing would have been a disadvantage for workers. 
 Census writers on the city had limited access to the circular migrants’ lives seeing them 
exclusively in their capacity in the city. In the city, they were documented as petty movers of 
goods and their labour became the necessary condition to intensifying the circulation of 
commodities such as cottons and grains. Their subjectivity or agency was relegated to the 
capacity to respond and react to bursts of economic activity stimulated by events elsewhere. The 
Indian cotton boom of the 1860s in response to the American civil war was one such stimulus 
which propelled cultivators and coolies into reactive action. That “second tier of sleeping places” 
which Dr. Leith spoke of was at best a crude technological apparatus by which everyday people 
appropriated the momentary gains of the cotton business’ boom into their lives.
 Anxiety over mobility and the desire to have a sedentary population on the part of 
officials colored the way these urban resident’s lives were read. The migrants were thought of as 
undomesticated in every sense of the word. The migrant community was mostly masculine, 
didn’t make homes in Bombay, didn’t raise and support families, nor did they shed rural forms of 
kinship in their associations and become anonymous and thus “urbane” in their dispositions. 
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These issues led to officials thinking of Bombay as a city without homes, as a place of temporary 
sojourn which had not yet been settled. 
 The enumeration of this unsettled urban population was so important that the Municipal 
Commissioner ordered a trial census in 1868.33 The native population, from whom the stock of 
enumerators would be drawn, needed to be trained and accustomed to the process of census 
taking and had to learn the boundaries within their neighborhoods. The Commissioner also 
renumbered all the houses in Bombay city, dividing the area into “beats” to which both the 
Police and Municipal officials were assigned. However, he soon learned that the income for the 
Municipal office was too low to adopt his ambitious scheme. The town was divided into beats, 
however the renumbering of houses had to be removed from the plan.34 The superintendent from 
the previous census was placed in charge of the census and compensated at the rate of Rs. 12,000 
for the entire census for the city. 
 Census operations in the city contributed to the making of an urban gaze in which 
objective and even quantitative measures could stand in for a holistic understanding of social life 
within the space. Having printed an English, Marathi, and Gujarati set of directions for the 
census forms was an acknowledgement of the diversity present in the city,35 but this didn’t 
indicate an awareness of the various ways in which migrants made their lives. This census was 
more detailed than the last, but from the changes made to this one, it was clear officials were 
most interested in what we might now call the urban landscape, or the use of the land than in 
actually achieving some intimate knowledge of the nature of the inhabitants. 
137
33 COBC, 1872, 2.
34 COBC, 1872, 3.
35 COBC, 1872, 4.
 The newer census collected information for sanitary purposes. It included the number of 
streets in the city, the population quantity in them, the number of houses in each street, and the 
number of gardens themselves divided into decorative or agricultural kinds. They also 
distinguished housing types by the type of roof on each house; these were divided into tiles, 
thatch, metal or terrace. They also provided the number of floors per house and from where each 
got its water. 
 Everyone involved were being taught the urban gaze. Enumerating life in the city was a 
project undertaken by officials and natives who were trained to take their own census reports. 
One police sepoy was assigned to each of the 689 “beats” which were marked in the city by 
marking the nearest house to a boundary. Each sepoy was carefully trained and developed a great 
knowledge of their own beat and its boundaries. A permanent enumerator familiarized himself 
with his beat, distributed the forms, and was duly employed for 10 days prior to the day of the 
census. These men were paid Rs. 1 per day and if possible, employed in the beat in which they 
resided. Detailed instructions were also provided for the operation of the census which specified 
what enumerators were to do on the day of the census and what kind of information they were 
going to collect.36 Each beat would be divided into two districts on the day of the census and an 
assistant enumerator assigned to one of the districts. The head of each house was to be the one to 
answer the questions pertaining to the decrease or increase of the size of each family and 
household so that only proper families, those with one male head of the household, could 
adequately participate in the census. 
 The homeless population required other measures for its enumeration; specific 
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instructions were provided for the population who were “houseless.”37 Enumerators were to wait 
until after 8pm and count those houseless persons found wandering the streets or residing in 
dharamshalas, resting houses, within the beat in which they are found. Enumerators were given 
blank census forms in anticipation of such findings. The idea was to get a snapshot on the night 
of the census of the make up of the local population. Only if someone was traveling out of their 
house for the one night of the census were they to be included in the forms, otherwise those 
family members departed to other locations at the time of the census would not be included in 
the city population, they would be counted where they were visiting. This was the point of 
having the census be on one day throughout the British Indian Empire. 
 A battakee was beat around town with to announce the census to the population. Also, 
public papers announced it, native language notices were also distributed, and native gentlemen 
of all classes were recruited to dispel fears about the census, ships were also called back in to 
dock on the day of the census. The Government Gazette of Feb 17th instructed that all offices 
were to be closed from the 20th to the 22nd, and 109 Municipal employees were put into census 
duties. A total of 1,479 people were engaged in conducting the census on the last 3 days. census 
writers noted “the great order everywhere” as “remarkable,” noting that people 
“seemed anxious to assist the Sirkar, and came forward voluntarily to deliver up their 
Householders’ Schedules. Not the slightest opposition was offered to any person engaged in 
taking the census by any one, and the work was completed for the night in some districts by 
9pm, in all by 10pm, when the houses were closed.”38
This may have been the only census in which opposition wasn’t felt in the city. Later censuses 
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would be more fraught with resistance. 
 The quantitative assessment of the city’s population was useful in comparing it with 
London or Calcutta. On average, each beat had 43.09 houses, including inhabited outhouses, in 
which 170.47 families consisting of 901.96 persons resided. In a section called “the Population” 
the actual numbers of people and classifications of the population were offered.39 The total 
population was 644,405 people, which was a reduction of 172,157 people. There had been a 21% 
decrease in the city’s population from 1864 to 1872. This was reflective of the boom and bust of 
the cotton economy. Greater than average decreases in population were attributable to Bhatias, 
non-Brahman Hindus and “Negro-Africans” fleeing the city the most. Less than average 
decreases in population were attributable to Chinese, Europeans/Americans/Australians, Jews, 
Parsis, Muslims, Hindu Outcastes by which was meant Hindu Low Castes, and Brahmans 
remaining in the city. Basically, some combination of labourers and merchants left the city most 
noticeably.
  Even after the decline upon the completion of the Civil War in America however, 
Bombay was still one and a half times as populous as Calcutta, which had 447,600 people, and 
even more populous than Madras which had 397,552 people.40 Bombay was the second largest 
city in the British Empire, behind only London which had between 2 and 3 million people.41 
Census writers had nothing but praise for the fast growing city, writing: 
...from the intelligence, loyalty, and enterprise of its inhabitants, from the manifest 
advantages of its magnificent harbor, from its proximity to Europe, from its noble public 
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buildings, which we owe to the forethought and determination of our late Governor, Sir 
Bartle Frere, and from its salubrity of climate, this great City is fast becoming fitted to 
assume its proper place as the Capital of India.42
There were particular qualities to the city with regards to its demographic patterns that made it 
remarkable for officials. The overwhelmingly inhabitants and particular forms of land use set it 
apart from London as early as the latter half of the 19th century.
Gender
 Bombay was a masculine city and would remain this way for a long time. More than 62% 
of the population were males and less than 38% female. The male to female ratio had narrowed 
since 1864 but still favored male migrants. One explanation was that the Harbour population 
consisting of dockworkers, coolies, fueling servicemen, assistants to merchants of all kinds, and 
shipmen, were overwhelmingly male. Bombay always had a separate section of the “Harbour” 
population, i.e. those people on vessels either working for the Royal Navy, Bombay Marine and 
commercial operations called “merchant steamers” or what were called “native craft, such as 
khotias, patimars, bugloes, and puraos.” There were 1,254 vessels in this latter category in which 
there were 11,827 male and 31 females. Half of the harbour population was in this “native craft” 
category which was almost entirely male; in 1871, there were 22,860 males and 93 females 
present. Not even half a percent of the total harbour population were female. 
 But if one removed the Harbour population from the total city census the ratio of male to 
female narrowed to 154 males for every 100 females, instead of the 163 males to every 100 
females. The absence of women indicated that men had left their families behind in search of 
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work and that women did not experience the city as a place to live. Census officials doubted 
whether certain communities had concealed the number of women in their families, but it wasn’t 
clear why they would have done this.43 Using mortuary tables and ratio of male deaths to female 
deaths, census writers calculated that there should have been 48,000 more females but that 
census takers were being lied to about the number of women in a household. This is difficult to 
verify but it probably says more about official paranoia. All of this created anxiety amongst 
officials because they could neither explain the lopsided gendered demographic of Bombay’s 
dwellers nor were they being “let in” on the actual dynamics of family life. 
 It was especially difficult after the famines of the 1870s to ascertain the status of women 
as the families were very timid about giving out such information. People had the option of 
leaving out the names of the females but just providing the number of how many there were in 
each household. Women of upper castes were especially hesitant to state their occupations even 
if it was a legitimate occupation. Working at all indicated impoverished conditions and out of the 
fear of the stigma of necessity, perhaps entire households were embarrassed to admit when 
“their” women worked. Being reduced to being a labourer was likely to have been a source of 
shame for some families.44
 The migrating population between city and country was thus called the “fluctuating 
element of which our community is composed” and it warranted the need for another census 
during the monsoon as well as during the winter.45 To guess the true population of the city 
officials felt they should derive the average of the two rates and get the mean population for the 
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year. This was to reduce the errors in guessing the true population of the city and provide a more 
objective measure. The fluctuating population couldn’t be understood without a holistic picture 
of the way in which Bombay was integrated into rural life but that perspective of the migrants 
was unavailable to city and census officials. Instead a mere average would have to suffice to 
satisfy the urban gaze which was mainly concerned to know the number of people using the 
urban land per year. 
 Deploying gendered views of a home in opposition to a place of work allowed officials to 
read the males in the city as proof that the city was not becoming a home. The ratio of male to 
female in each community became an indication of the level of permanence of each community 
in the city. Women’s migration would have been indicative of the creation of homes of 
permanent residence, family life within the city, and forms of social reproduction spanning a 
lifetime beyond the working age. But neither was that Bombay’s reality nor did such a gendered 
view of the “home” convey the reality of circular migrants lives. 
 The highest ratio of men to women were amongst the Chinese at 883.87 men to every 
100 women and Buddhists and Jains, at 413.27 men to every 100 women, while the lowest was 
amongst Parsis, Jews, and Eurasians, spanning between 106-110 men for every 100 women. 
Parsis, Jews, and Eurasians made up the major merchant communities and the Parsis in particular 
had been living in Bombay since the 18th century in large palatial mansions, so it was not 
surprising that their gender statistics indicated their permanence in the city. Everyone else was 
somewhere in between the average, which in Bombay was 163.35 men to every 100 women. The 
male to female ratio was much smaller among those born in the city. 31% of Bombay’s 
inhabitants were born in the city and it was expected that as this number grew the city was 
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becoming more permanent, and a fixed feature of the social landscape of Western India.46 
 Census writers noted this male-female ratio as being the exact opposite of what was in 
England, mostly attributed to men being “on the Continent, in the Colonies, or in foreign lands.” 
Thus, in England in the census of 1871, women outnumbered men, there being 94,900 men for 
every 100K women. This was an important difference in the way the urban gaze developed.
 The types of jobs in the city were also counted revealling differences across gender and 
age groups. Men outnumbered women in attaining work in the city. Occupations were divided 
into seven classes: professional, domestic, commercial, agricultural & pastoral, industrial, 
indefinite, and miscellaneous. The most striking thing about this classification is that 80% of 
women were occupied as “miscellaneous” and this was the category surpassing all others.47 The 
most likely explanation for this is not that women started working in the 1870s or 80s, but that 
they had been working all along, only now men were pulled out of “miscellaneous” jobs into 
other jobs as the city came to offer such opportunities. 51.04% of the total population belonged 
to the “miscellaneous” category, of which 62.75% were females, and 51.97% were children. 
Further analysis revealed that almost half (40.82%) of the females classified as miscellaneous 
were children. Children made up more than half (70.77) of the men classified as miscellaneous. 
Descriptions of what types of jobs count in each class were provided. Selling fish was done 
mostly by women, corroborating the notion that the Koli peoples had women doing the majority 
of the commercial work in the fishing industry. Finally, due to the increase in building activity in 
the decade, the numbers of wood and timber merchants increased.48
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 The age distribution of Bombay’s residents also said a lot about the dynamics of the city 
and the kind of urban gaze which was developing. Approximately 9.4 % of Bombay’s inhabitants 
were children whom officials had a particular interest in since children were seen as most 
vulnerable to insanitary conditions of the city. 26.23% of Bombay was made up of people 
between ages 20 & 30 and in this category men were twice as populous as women. This was the 
peak working age. This gap between men and women at this age grew with the next census, men 
outnumbering women by 133.6%. Once this peak working age has passed however, the ratio of 
men to women narrowed such that after age 70, women actually outnumbered men in the city by 
8 more women than men out of every 100 of the population. 
 A very interesting table was provided which compared the age distribution of the 
population in England versus Bombay, and it also singled out the Parsis and Jews of Bombay to 
show that they were more like the population of England. In general, the table confirmed what 
was known, that in Bombay, those of working age exceeded the rest of the population to a 
greater degree than in England, indicating once again that Bombay was less of a home. It would 
have been more useful, however, to compare those numbers with that of London rather than 
England as a whole to see whether urbanization was in fact “temporary” by these standards in all 
major cities.49 
 Thus, as Louis Wirth’s was developing the notion asserted in his famous “Urbanism as a 
Way of Life” which spoke of cities as permanent spaces,50 the dominance of men in colonial 
cities such as Bombay made them seem like transitory entities, born of bouts of economic growth 
in certain periods which were temporary and fleeting and not indicative of structural 
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transformations of social life in Western India. This is exactly what the census writer said:
Bombay must therefore be considered as a place of only temporary sojourn to a majority of 
its inhabitants, who are attracted to it from its position as a great emporium of trade and as the 
gate of India from the West, but who in a very large proportion do not bring their wives and 
families with them.51 
The census writers themselves thought of the absence of women as a sign that the city was 
impermanent. Episodes of intense growth, such as that of the civil war in America cast Bombay 
as a place responding to changes elsewhere and its migrants as being pushed and pulled by 
conditions in the United States or Europe. There is no doubt this was true, migrants did respond 
to changes elsewhere, but their responses should have been indicative of their integration into 
world markets, these weren’t signs that Bombay was left out or behind.
 In hindsight we know that the city was not temporary and the city would long outlive 
economic growth periods. Migrants too, however, must have experienced their time in the city as 
temporary given that they didn’t move their whole families into the city, and maintained families 
in their villages. But it is possible too that villages were no more homes than urban dwellings. 
Migrants had to have maintained the vast social networks that would have been needed to 
conduct their lives seasonally both in the city and in the country. They would have had to 
maintain ties to landed people in the country, continue forms of servitude, relations of 
indebtedness and bondage which would keep them employed and taken care of. They would 
have to have bonds of trust such that they could leave families behind. Furthermore, it is likely 
that women were kept in charge of households and household based economies, so that women 
actually had more familial power in the rural spaces and likely made collective decisions to send 
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the working age men of their families into the city to supplement incomes and secure adequate 
livelihoods for their families. 
 The polarity between temporary and permanent settlements is very important to 
understanding the development of the discourse of urban modernity, which eventually comes to 
distinguish central cities from peripheral cities. Louis Wirth was not alone in his conception of 
cities as permanent spaces. The mobility between the city and surrounding villages always 
perplexed census writers. People couldn’t decide whether seasonal migrants should be counted in 
the city census or in the village censuses, and how to account for their mobility. This also made it  
hard to classify people as urban inhabitants or sojourners. This mobility also assisted in forming 
the view in the official’s minds that India was a place of villages and not of cities. People seemed 
to be fundamentally or essentially from such and such village, and only temporarily residing in 
the city. An extreme expression of this view was accomplished by citing a Horace poem in the 
1872 census which expressed the writer’s notion that agricultural work on ancestral land was 
primitive, pristine, and pure, and thus villagers were happier than their urban counterparts. Such 
romantic views of rural life were a part of the urban gaze.
 In the winters an influx of people from villages in the Deccan, Kutch, Kathiawar, Colaba, 
Ratnagiri, Malwan, Goa and the Coast come to the city in search of work. Both warehouses and 
the wharves of the city had plenty of work to offer during the winter season. Just before the 
monsoon the seasonal migrants returned to their villages to cultivate the land. This mobility and 
migration was the reality of social life all across Western India. 
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Land Use
 Land use was the main concern of officials and this concern drove their data collection 
efforts both in urban and rural contexts. Even the language of estimation, the kinds of tenures 
used to distribute lands, and the tools for and concerns over population density showed how the 
same indicators were being used to assess the population across city and country. Especially to 
calculate the density of the population of Bombay, officials required estimating the area which 
was always in flux due to ongoing reclamations of the sea. In the 1864 census the area had been 
18.62 square miles, but now the area was said to be above 22 sq. miles due to reclamations. This 
was the way in which more space was being carved out even though it wasn’t necessary in the 
1860s. There was plenty of land just north of Bombay, in the “rural and suburban” districts, 
which could have been used but the need to live near the ports created incentives to reclaim land 
in the southern parts of the island. Interestingly, the land was also divided up into what kind of 
land tenure existed throughout Bombay & Colaba Islands. “Old Salt and New Salt Batty 
Ground” made up most of the land, second was Government grounds, and third was land under 
“Pension and Tax.” Following this was “Sundry items such as roads, tanks, waste lands, and 
reclamations.” Government Tocca and Foras Land was then next, followed by Quit and Ground 
Rent, then Inam tenures, and then Government resumed land. A separate table showed that 
43,48,918 square yards was under reclamation, equalling 898.5 acres or more than 43 lakh 
square yards. Various companies were involved in the reclamation projects, whose names were 
also provided.52 The companies who reclaimed land made money in the process, receiving 
exclusive contracts to make inhabitable land on coastal zones. They no doubt employed 
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numerous labourers and steady hands in the process, only further increasing the demand for 
labour in the city. 
 Overcrowding within Bombay was a constant concern of officials who provided 
numerical data comparing both person to an acre and persons to a housing unit. These were then 
compared to equivalent numbers for London and England. For our purposes, the important 
comparison is between London and Bombay. London had 41.69 persons to an acre while 
Bombay had 52.14 persons to an acre. So even though London’s population was greater than 
Bombay’s, Bombay was already more densely inhabited. While this difference was not 
overwhelming, what concerned officials was not this average of persons to an acre, but the 
particular localities which had grown to such an extent that those particular densities were ten 
times the average. For example, in the “B Division” of Bombay island there were 522.55 persons 
to an acre, while in the “C Division” there were 357.21 persons to an acre. This was further 
broken down into sections where for example, in Chuckla there were 763.19 persons to an acre, 
and in Kumbarwada there were 634.19 persons to an acre. To provide an image of the stark 
contrast in density in Bombay itself, consider that in Chuckla, the densest part of Bombay just 
ahead of Kumbarwada, there was 6.34 sq yds for each person while in the Southern part of the 
Fort, the main commercial and government district, there were 219.73 sq yds for each person. 
The merchant communities were more likely to settle in the Fort area, including wealthy 
capitalists and industrialists who lived close to British operations. In Kumbharwada and Chuckla 
in contrast, were where the large populations of the city’s labourers resided.
 Both in London and in Bombay the numbers would have been different if the census was 
taken during the day time. Both cities also had an unequal distribution of population, with people 
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collecting in certain locales of the cities while leaving others sparsely populated. In the 1870s, 
Parell and Mahalaxmi were considered suburban districts, and they had only 9.74 and 7.75 
persons to an acre respectively. 
 This revealed that urban settlement, just like human settlement in general, had a social 
component and was not driven by natural abundance of land alone. So open land was not 
necessarily best for human habitation, it meant that people would not reduce their densely 
crowded conditions without other reasons for doing so.53 This was an aspect of human settlement 
that officials didn’t understand, it was a notion totally excluded from the urban gaze. People 
chose to live where they were close to work, close to people they knew, or in places that seemed 
familiar because of stories they had heard about the location, not because they wanted the most 
land for themselves. Access to work was more important than the maximizing of land.
 Labourers and workers crowded themselves together in the neighborhood “Dongree” to 
save on rent and then once they had enough they moved out throughout the city. Census writers 
were reminded of Scotland by these conditions and quoted the Scotland report of 1861: 
what has been said of Scotland may with equal truth be applied to Bombay, that 
families instead of living on earth in pure air with the sky over their dwellings, in many 
instances prefer lying stratum over stratum in flats opening into a common staircase, ‘a 
continuation of the street’ as it has been called, which receives the organic emanations of the 
families on each floor.54
That housing was often a continuation of the street indicated the failure of “the street” to come 
into focus as a public space distinct from the private residences or shops. The line between living 
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in and interacting with the city was not easily distinguishable from each other. It is interesting 
that this was said of both Scotland and of Bombay, both suppliers of labour within the vast chain 
of operations which made up the British Empire. This was importantly not said of England. 
England’s census of 1871 provided a history of persons to a house as follows: in 1811 there were 
5.45 p/h, and density in housing actually reduced steadily and slowly down to 4.98 persons per 
house in 1871. In London there were 7.8 persons to a house while in 1871 there were 7.78 
persons to a house. 
  In London and throughout England, the density of people occupying houses actually 
remained at approximately the same density throughout this period, while in Bombay it was 
steadily increasing. Furthermore, officials were concerned more with this type of 
“overcrowding,” i.e. many people residing in one dwelling space. Thus officials construed the 
problem as one of there being too few houses in Bombay. Either building activity was much less 
in Bombay than in London or people preferred to live in joint families and joint networks, 
whereas in London they didn’t. Officials confused their anxieties about overcrowding on land 
and overcrowding in housing with their general cultural anxieties about the native population. 
There was the question of the burden on limited natural resources and fear of disease, but there 
were also cultural anxieties about difference which were mapped on to their descriptions of 
Bombay’s housing conditions. They once even said that from “a sanitary point of view the City 
requires a new Town to be built to prevent this excessive over-crowding.”55 
 In the concluding remarks of the census report it was said that any error was probably an 
underestimation of the population, not an overestimation.56 For future census reports, it was 
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suggested that the police be involved and leaders from the varying native communities be 
brought into the workings of the census so as to ease the feelings and prejudices of the native 
population about the census. Such efforts would extend the urban gaze to new sections of the 
urban population, generalizing the assumptions of such quantitative methods of understanding 
city life.
 The social mileu in which the natural disaster of the droughts of the 1870s occurred 
exacerbated and left unmitigated any scarcity which resulted from the failed rains. Already 
expanding cultivation prior to the famines had meant low quality lands were brought into 
cultivation by declining quality of cattle, “so that output would not have increased as much as 
cultivated area, which increased only somewhat faster than the population.”57 Moneylenders 
increased their hold over producers who were often short term borrowers, taking advances to buy 
the supplies to cultivate the land as they waited for the monsoons to arrive. Owing their 
landholding patrons varying sums, producers would borrow in advance of harvest expecting to 
recover these advances when the rains came. When the rains failed, neither patrons nor 
moneylenders could be kept from increasing their hold over the producers lives.58 This increased 
hold ranged from more burdensome bonds of tenancy or entire dispossession. Both those 
dispossessed and tied through intense bondage to patrons and moneylenders migrated to the city 
in search of work and relief from starvation. 
 Once in the city, migrants were subject to the intense competition for work, housing, and 
new forms of urban patronage and work. Unfortunately, the timing of this mass urban migration 
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in the 1870s coincided with the post Civil War slump in the industrial economy in Bombay City. 
Thus, competition was not only stiff, but global demand for cotton was being met by the 
reinvigorated American producers. The 1860s witnessed the quick boom and bust in the cotton 
industry out of Bombay city but the correction to the market was worse than the stimulus. 
Widespread speculation in response to the boom raised private profits temporarily but as in any 
crisis, also caused such inflated and speculative values and so much overproduction that 
ultimately the excess supply led to a glut and monetary crash; the Bank of Bombay in 1866 
collapsed.59 It was in this context that the famines occurred.
Hunger and Famine
 The census of 1881 came on the heels of what may have been the worst famine in 
Western India’s history. The famines of the 1870s, most pronounced between 1877 - 1879, 
depopulated much of the rural landscape. There were both natural and social causes to the 
famines and the early development aims of the colonial state put peasants in particularly 
vulnerable positions.60 The rains did fail in many key producing regions resulting in a lower 
supply of grains causing hoarding and the raising of prices amongst all consuming communities. 
An Indian Famine Commission was set up to investigate the causes and results of the famine and 
to provide insight as to how such a famine could be prevented in the future. In 1880 they found 
that:
  at the root of much of the poverty of the people of India and of the risks to which they are 
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exposed in seasons of scarcity lies the unfortunate circumstance that agriculture forms almost 
the sole occupation of the mass of population, and that no remedy for present evils can be 
complete which does not include the introduction of a diversity of occupations, through 
which the surplus population may be drawn from agricultural pursuits and led to find the 
means of subsistence in manufactures or some such employment.61
In short, de-ruralization would be the prevention of future famines. The notion of the “surplus 
population” was in line with prevailing drives towards enhancing productivity and efficiency in 
the agrarian economy which rendered many people redundant. 
 It also revealed the way in which hunger itself could not become the subject of analysis in 
the official mind influenced by Smith, Locke, Malthus and Mill.62 Instead, hungry people were 
the excess part of a mass of population which had to be managed and their surplus status had to 
be absorbed into productive labour. The evaluation of the famine commission was at odds with 
prevailing policy in Imperial India which saw the country as essentially agrarian, rural, and a 
collection of village republics.63 
 The evaluation was also revelatory of the new kinds of continuities which would 
intensify between city and country over the next 50 years, at least until the depression of 
1928-33. Between August 15h and Sept. 30th alone, in a mere 6 weeks alone, 36,000 people had 
entered the city.64 The prior decade was a boom time economy, this decade revealed the frail 
nature of that growth. In either case the expectation amongst the cultivating and producing 
classes across city and country was that they belonged or could make due equally in both even as 
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their social status declined across the way.
 Rural producers became circular labourers migrating back and forth between town and 
country to keep up with the pace of growth and the dynamics of change through these decades. 
The famine which precipitated the Famine Commission’s creation was both a result of such 
changes of the 19th century and it also worked to exacerbate those changes. Under the rubric of 
free trade, both city and country were bound more tightly than ever before, even as ideologies of 
essential distinction arose to separate the two. Links between producers, moneylenders, and 
merchants, were tightened as usury and forms of debt bondage thrived. The bonds between social 
classes across the rurban spectrum were enhanced.  
 Between the 1864 and 1872 census the population of the city declined and this was a 
correction to a temporary cotton boom. Between 1872 and 1881, in contrast, the population of 
the city grew immensely due to famine and masses of people entering the city. This caused not 
only fear amongst the migrants, but alarm amongst officials who saw swarms of people coming 
into the city with very few lodging places available. When asked why they were coming, 
migrants replied, “pote bhurnya sate,” basically, “to fill my stomach.”65 Many migrants came in 
through the northern most part of the islands in Sion across the Sion causeway, where an official 
witnessed the inflow of people and reported on it. His vivid description is below: 
 I went to Sion yesterday to inspect some of the immigrants into this city from the famine 
districts. On my way out opposite the North entrance to Government House, Parell, I met a 
party of 15 people, 8 of whom were children. They had come from Phulton, Sattara zilla; they 
had originally left their village 18 in number, but 3 had fallen ill on the way and had been left 
in Tannah; they said they had been 15 days on the road. They knew no one in Bombay nor 
one portion of the City from another, and beyond that they were going to Bombay -- ‘pot 
burnea sate,’ as they said - they had no more definite idea of their destitution or what they 
would do when they got to Bombay. One of the children appeared about 2 months old, the 
other a little older was trying to suck, but neither its mother nor the mother of the other child 
had any milk; they said their milk had stopped owing to want of food. Two of the other 
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children were nothing but skin and bone. The only property they had was a small basket, in 
which they carried their smallest child. They had supported themselves on charity by the way. 
They appeared to have been respectable people of the cultivator class.
   I came to the Sion Causeway and found 178 people - 73 men, 64 women and 41 children - 
who had come over the Causeway during the night and in the morning. I inspected them all 
carefully, and one by one. None of them were so ill as to be unable to walk, but they were all 
weak and worn and very fatigued. Some were very emaciated, and of the whole number not 
one was fit for any work. The children were as a rule much emaciated, and the strongest of 
them had large pot bellies and painfully pinched features. By half past two 257 more 
immigrants had passed over the Causeway and were collected for my inspection. From half 
past two till 4:30 - 111 more had come, and more were still coming along the Causeway when 
I left at 5 o’clock. Out of the 546 people I saw during the day only twelve were strong and 
healthy and fit for work; all the others were weak, and if not absolutely so ill as to be unable 
to walk, were merging into illness and disease. Some of the children and a few of the men 
had fever.
   I saw some women who had come by themselves bringing their children with them, their 
husbands having deserted them. In one case a girl and two children had come from Weidis 
near Mahableshwar. Some of the immigrants had been as many as 17 days travelling before 
they came to Bombay. They were very frightened at being stopped at Sion, as the only hope 
they had was of getting to Bombay, where they believed they were sure of food. There were 
only two professional beggars amongst them all. They seemed with a few exceptions to be of 
the cultivator class; they received the utmost gratefulness any little assistance given them, but  
the neither begged nor asked for it. Looking to their miserable, hungry condition I was 
somewhat astonished at the amount of self-respect they displayed. From the heat and fatigue 
of their journey they were intensely thirsty, the only water they could get to drink was from 
the foul tank by the roadside, but they lapped it up most eagerly. A Vehar stand-pipe near the 
Causeway is a public want. 
  The tide of immigration towards this City unless stopped will very soon place in the greatest  
jeopardy the health of the whole community. Since the 15th instant, 7,302 paupers have 
passed into the city: the admission of these famished people exposes the public health to the 
greatest peril. The health and safety of the whole community is endangered by their presence, 
and it is impossible not to view the prospect with the greatest alarm. They are now weak and 
feeble, and if their constitutions have not been undermined by the fatigue and suffering of a 
long journey on foot through an unknown country; that their condition in this city will soon 
become worse and worse is perfectly certain, that many of them will soon succumb to fever 
or cholera is almost equally certain, and if in this crowded city they will not taint the health of 
the whole community and produce a pestilence all our experience will be at fault. There is 
only one way by which the crisis may be averted - by forcibly preventing any more paupers 
entering the city, and if necessary, sending all the destitute that have already found their way 
into the city out of it.66 
This official made it very clear these people were cultivators and not beggars. They were self-
respecting members of communities who had been driven by hunger to look for relief and who, 
as a rule, took pride in their work. In coming to the city, the cultivators were expecting perhaps 
official mercy: grain stores opened up to them, social institutions of poor relief like temples and 
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mosques, or charitable organizations to provide simple meals. What they found was not nearly 
adequate. 
 There were some relief works set up across Western India. In Poona in 1876 just amidst 
the famine, it was found that half of the 50,000 working on relief sites were “holders or 
underholders of land.” In Khandesh and Berar, land cultivation areas were still expanding so 
migrating cultivators could find opportunities there. Thus, only 22 percent of those living 
through relief works set up by the state were cultivators.67 Cultivators and those left in want 
during the period of famine pushed to survive wherever opportunities might take them, either to 
other sites of cultivation or to the city for other kinds of work. Compensation for agriculture was 
on the decline though and this incentivized the urban rush, causing mostly cultivators to abandon 
their fields for other forms of occupation in the city.  
 Upon arriving in the city, some were able to find temporary camps which were put up by 
city officials for housing the migrants. In this effort city and village district officials worked 
together recognizing the continuities across regions. The Municipal Corporation allotted Rs. 
10,000 of its money towards temporary housing camps at the Flats, called the Refugees’ camp. It 
was in operation from March 30th, 1877 to May 29th, 1877 and admitted 1,566 people of whom 
105 died. In addition to the Municipal Corporation’s contribution, the Deccan and Khandesh 
Famine Relief Committees added Rs. 3,000. Private initiatives were also incorporated. Mr. 
Toolajee Fukirjee, a Bombay city resident, donated grain and clothing of his own. Mr. Dadabhoy 
Nusserwanjee and Mr. Nagoo Syajee loaned the wood for the construction of temporary sheds 
and served as contractors for the Municipal Corporation. They charged the corporation only the 
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cost of putting the sheds up and taking them down. The construction of temporary sheds and not 
the allocation of resources for permanent housing indicated to the famished peasants that they 
were to return home and were not welcome in the city on a permanent basis. Through such 
efforts the Municipal Corporation was able to spend less than one-quarter of its Rs. 10,000 
towards these relief efforts.68 The major sentiment amongst the officials was alarm about public 
health and this motivated the temporary relief efforts. 
 The grain market existed beyond specific locales. Thus, even as enough food was 
available to feed the famished population, the prices were so high that locals were priced out of 
the very food they had produced and it needed to be shipped across the seas where it would 
garner a higher income for grain dealers higher up on the social ladder than the producers. All 
this revealed that the logic of the market trumped any previous logic of reciprocity and mutual 
exchange and benefits.69
 The famine intensified connections between city and country through human mobility 
and money relations. It produced grave affects on the rural and urban population and intensified 
old paths of mobility between urban and rural locations as well as created new ones. Because of 
the famine not only did land producers come into the city for work, but in a rare instance of 
female migration, they also brought entire families including wives and children. Moneylenders 
of big and small loans benefitted too from the bouts of crises. In attempts to produce capitalist 
farmers out of the cultivating classes and landlords, smallholders were often blamed for being 
“thriftless.” During times of necessity, either the land had to be sold off or the cattle. 
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Smallholders were prone most to indebtedness or total loss. An official remarked, 
It is obvious that where there is peasant-proprietary, though the stimulus to individual 
exertion is considerable...the individual capital cannot be great and misfortunes 
comparatively small will throw even a thrifty and industrious person into the hands of the 
moneylenders for temporary loans.70
Even the thriftiest could do nothing in such circumstances. Having become landholders through 
the system of ryotwari, alienation of those possessions became the only way to survive.
 Nonetheless, Bombay was seen to be “progressing” even after the famine. The city was 
growing both in its internal organization and capacity to house people and provide livelihoods 
and it was growing in stature from the perspective of “world commerce.” Imperial agendas 
needed Bombay to become a reliable hub and node of commerce from the subcontinent 
westwards. Upon a visit to the city, her Majesty the Queen said, “I have watched with pleasure 
the progress of the great city of Bombay and its advance, not only in material prosperity, but also 
in education and in matters tending to the improved health and comfort of the people.”71
 The famine caused also methodological changes in the census. Officials’ alarm over 
increased overcrowding led them to become unabashedly ambitious in what they wanted to know 
about this new urban population. But they were met with difficulty because the new migrants 
were deeply suspicious of officials, clearly having heard stories of hunger and disease befalling 
fellow migrants. While previous census takers before 1881 had remarked on the cooperation of 
the native population, these census takers remarked on the trepidation, hesitation, and fear 
looming within the communities. Not only were people skeptical of the census, but they doubted 
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the good will of the officials as well. Some went out of their way to avoid being counted, leaving 
town on the night of the census, not reporting how many women were in the household, and with 
regards to the homeless there were reports of people wandering around from neighborhood to 
neighborhood for the entire night just to avoid being counted. Policing of the few roads into the 
city was common. There were so many entering the city in 1877 that the need was felt to at least 
count the numbers. People were stationed along the road to enter the city and between Aug 15 - 
Sept 30, in those 45 days alone, 36,258 destitute entered the city.72
 For the first time too, the population was asked to identify a “mother tongue,” an official 
and collective acknowledgement that Bombay’s inhabitants were diverse, a truly heterogenous 
population.73 Although the schedules were in English, Gujarati, and Marathi, there wasn’t one in 
Urdu with the Nastaliq script and this created a problem in gaining the cooperation amongst 
Muslims.74 Census writers wrote, “In a city, where to the largest section of the population family 
life is the sacred unit of organization, the grouping of the population in families is of great 
importance to be known.” They also provided a column for the name of the head householder 
and wanted to understand the organization of family life within the city.
  The suspicion and fear amongst the local population made it much more difficult to 
conduct this census. Representatives of each community were brought into the Municipal office 
and meetings were held to generate good feelings and a sense of collective effort amongst 
disparate groups. Officials also tried to ask locals why they were reticent of the census taking 
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efforts. Some people said that they thought a census indicated the coming of some great natural 
disaster. Others suspected it was a means to recruit labour and a means “to recruit forces beyond 
the Indian frontier.” Fears were rampant that even the women would be forced into work.75 
 A few days before the census some 20,000 Muslims were going to leave Bombay to make 
the pilgrimage of Bhawa Mulung Saheb, and so Muslims were undercounted in this census. A 
meeting of Ulama and prominent Muslims was used to help the situation and encourage 
Anjumans (assemblies) to inform their community about how the census functioned and garner 
their cooperation. There was an “Ishtihar” published by the Municipal Commissioner which was 
to be read after Friday prayers. Census officials even attended important meetings of some 
Anjumans and acquired assurance that they would get full cooperation. All these efforts were 
successful, the attitude amongst the Muslim community was reportedly changed. The official 
said, “I have no hesitation in stating that this change of attitude and the successful enumeration 
of Muslimin [sic] was due to the influence and help of the prominent Muslimin who attended the 
meeting in the Municipal Office.” Muslim leaders came forth offering their help in insuring 
community cooperation.76 The counting of the population, describing of housing conditions, and 
evaluation of domestic lifestyles was slowly being trained into wider and wider spheres of the 
population, extending the urban gaze even further. 
 Amongst the Hindus, the labouring classes in particular were singled out as being most 
uncooperative. Just as with the Muslims, a meeting of influential Hindus was held in the 
Municipal Office on the 31st of January. A Mr. Javerilal Umashankar Yajnik suggested 
convening this meeting to explain the purposes of the census to the public. An public meeting 
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was held in Madhav Bagh where Mr. Varjivandas Madhavdas presided as chairman over the 
meeting; four to five thousand people attended the meeting. Some of the false notions about the 
purpose of the census which had to be dispelled were that it was for additional taxation. 
Inhabitants were also suspicious over being asked how many males and females there were in 
each household, and who were married, unmarried, or widows. People seemed suspicious about 
being asked about their family life. Officials explained that the census was for public good; it 
was designed to understand the social and economic condition of the people and the changes 
therein. The information from it would be used for schools, hospitals, sanitation, “and in a period 
of famine for increased supplies of food-grain...” Throughout India, the census was taken on the 
same day, on Feb. 17th, and each person would be marked for where they are on that night. They 
were also informed that domestic servants were counted on the form of their employer, called a 
“master” in the report, regardless of whether the servant slept in the house or outside of it. The 
upper castes often had horoscopes with them so they knew their age whereas the lower classes 
did not know their age precisely.77 Other prominent Hindus included Rao Bahadur Gopalrav Hari 
Deshmukh, Mr. Raghunath Narayen Khote, Mr. Goculdas Jugmohandas, and Mr. Gangadas 
Kishordas. Mr. Rao Vishvanath offered suggestions to the British officials about how to speak of 
the advantages of the census, and overall the meeting was a success in assuaging the fears of the 
community.78 
 The Parsi community was not uncooperative in the first place but a similar procedure was 
used with this community because they were so influential throughout Bombay. High ranking 
members of the community were made to explain the causes, procedures, and need for 
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cooperation for the upcoming census within the community. A Mr. Nowrozjee Furdonjee 
suggested that the Parsi priests be employed to explain to the lower classes what the purposes of 
the census were. Some Parsi leaders included Mr. Nanabhai Byramjee and Mr. Kaikhushroo N. 
Kabrajee, who suggested that the Gujarati instructions for the census be reprinted with some 
alterations. Lectures were given by honorable “Dustoors” of the community including one by 
Dustoor Jamaspjee Minocheherjee which the British official census taker attended.79 
 Even enumerators of low caste were recruited in order to properly count the low castes. 
Counting the homeless or “houseless” as they were called was more careful this time.80 The 
census writer reported of his experience on the night of the 17th and morning of the 18th of 
February: 
I spent the greater part of the night in watching the enumeration of the houseless. It was a sad 
night – bands of timid, fear-stricken vagrants – crouching and shivering – caught and brought 
together to be counted, the officers of Police seated at tables questioning each homeless one 
by faint candlelight, and the questioning had to be patient and gentle, to soothe frightened 
minds to speak.81 
The number of homeless on the streets of Bombay surely must have increased through the 1870s 
and no doubt the suspicion amongst the homeless greatest towards officials in office. There were 
expected places where a homeless person could find shelter and perhaps even food, usually 
religious resting houses for the wandering, called musafirkhana, or sarai which were inns. 
Census officials had warned authorities of mosques, temples, and resting houses where the 
homeless had to be counted and included in the census. Thus authorities in these places were told 
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to keep the homeless within their institutions on the night of the census and after 10pm that night 
the homeless were very carefully counted. 
 What does all this enlisting of high ranking and representative members of various 
communities tell us about the city and urban life? It says that assessments on the quality of urban 
life which were becoming quantitative and streamlining towards notions of what is a “good 
house” or an appropriately sized household were being deployed by and trained into elite 
members across communities. Together, the representative members were taking it upon 
themselves to manage their space, their environs and their neighborhoods. Leaders of various 
collective communities were developing lateral connections with each other to evaluate, 
enumerate, assess, manage, and discuss the varieties of lifestyles amongst their communities. 
They were developing a collective sense of themselves as a single community each with vertical 
linkages to communities under them.
 Besides the homeless, there were other challenges to this census. Kamateepoora was 
already known as an area inhabited by “dangerous classes.”82 The northern portion of the city, 
from Tardeo to Parell, was thought to have “elements of difficult enumeration.” Those wanting to 
avoid being counted resorted to all sorts of tactics generally to evade the census officer: 
Some timid strangers devised a scheme for evading the census-officers; they imagined that by 
walking round the streets all night they could escape enumeration, but they were caught by 
watchful enumerators and confessed their plot. We had been prepared for plots, and special 
care was taken to examine all met in the streets, although some had to be given chase to.83 
Such evaders of the official’s efforts were especially concerning for this census as the population 
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had grown so intensely through the famine.
 In total, 773,196 people were counted in all in the 1881 census. This was an almost 20% 
(19.98%) increase since Feb of 1872, and was largely attributable to immigration, 17.8% of the 
increase being due to immigrants.84 Although as usual, male immigration outnumbered female 
immigration, males made up 60% of the city population, most immigrating to the city after the 
age of 9 to work. When comparing the proportion of males to every hundred females, the highest 
male ratio of immigrants were from the farthest places. So those coming from Rajputana and 
Marwar immigrated at roughly 800 men for every 100 women. Next was from Gujarat, Daman, 
Diu, and Goa, from where approximately 225 to 235 men immigrated to Bombay for every 100 
women. Next was Kathiawar and Surat which was in the 170s for every 100 women. In the near 
vicinity, Ratnagiri, Satara, Thana, and Kolaba were the highest of the near vicinity at about 
150-170 for every 100 women.85 Thus those who lived closest had women relocate to Bombay 
for work too.
 The females proportion was increasing  in significant ways. Especially those of working 
age found themselves moving for work just like everybody else. An official, comparing 
Bombay’s female population after the famine to London’s and Calcutta’s, noted: “I find, for 
instance, that the proportion of females under 20 years of age to the total population of females is 
greater than even in London by 8.3% and 16% greater than in Calcutta.”86 Younger women, prior 
to marriage, made up more of the working classes in Bombay than in the other cities. The 
population of elderly in the city was always low, “The falling off in the population at advanced 
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periods of life is an indication of the migratory elements and nature of the population.” Parsees 
were most equal across genders, there being 108 men for every 100 women. There were only 2 
communities in which women outnumbered men: Kanara and Telinga Brahmins.87
 The neighborhood known as 2nd Nagpada was the densest, having 15.8 families to a 
house or 67.8 people per house. Sion in the north was the least dense, having 2.6 families to a 
house. The average across the city was 5.1 families per house.88 Parsees and Eurasians were the 
most likely to have infants in their household in Bombay, indicating they had few rural 
connections and had made Bombay a home. The number of families per house was calculated by 
removing the number of homeless and dividing the number of occupied buildings by total housed 
population. Bombay was exceptionally dense, more dense than London even though its 
population was smaller, census writers noting that, “The minimum of house population by 
districts of sections as called in Bombay is apparently higher than the maximum in London.”89 
  In the 1881 census of the city, density was once again compared with London. The area 
of the island of Bombay was 22 sq. miles, 4 sq. miles more than in 1872 which were attributed to 
reclamations. The population density amounted to roughly 10 more people per acre than in 1872. 
Compared to London, Bombay’s density was described as “fearfully more intense” such that 
even the most dense section of London was less populated than the 12 most densely populated 
sections of Bombay. London’s population density average was 49 persons per acre, while the 
same measurement was 52 persons per acre in Bombay. The real difference between London and 
Bombay was in the most dense areas, which in London was 222 per acre while in Bombay it was 
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759 per acre.90 We can conclude from these numbers that inequality was already vastly 
exaggerated in Bombay compared to London. The averages between London and Bombay were 
much closer (49 vs. 52 persons per acre) because of the yet sparsely populated rural parts on the 
northern parts of the island. These suburban districts were referred to as “rural” and included  
Parell, Seoree, Sion, and Worli, but they had all grown in density since 1872.91 Removing these 
sections, the “urban” sections had 99 persons to an acre, which was greater than London and 
Calcutta, Calcutta having 208 persons per acre as a maximum and an average of 33 persons per 
acre. Thus, density was greatest in Bombay throughout the British Empire even though London 
was by far the largest city. 
Urban Mobility: Function of the wage
 Bombay had become more dense than any other city across the Empire. London’s 
absolute population far exceeded Bombay’s by World War I. London had 7 million people in 
Greater London of which 4.5 million people lived in Inner London. Bombay had just under 1 
million. Yet, Bombay’s inhabitants lived crowded into a small island, and those crowded 
inhabitants were only able to gain the attention of the official and urban gaze if they resided in 
the southernmost part of the islands. There were a regular stream of paupers and migrants who 
wandered the southern neighborhoods and were stigmatized. In 1889, the chair of a standing 
committee for the Municipality, Dosabhai Framji, reported that, 
For a great part of the year, the city was infested by a crowd of paupers, mostly sturdy 
vagrants from Kathiawar and Guzerat, who refused honest work that was offered to them, 
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and, as beggars, were a source of nuisance and danger to the health of the city. They were 
ultimately induced to depart, and it is hoped that measures will be devised to protect Bombay 
from a recurrence of this infliction.92 
Meanwhile, other settlements were forming further north which escaped official view. Only 
when people started thinking about expanding the city northwards were other communities 
noticed.
 To relieve the overcrowding, attempts were made at suburbanization by developing 
northern Salsette. A report submitted in 1909 about this development revealed those northern 
human settlements already had thus far been occupied organically. 
Briefly stated we may say that the immigrant population of Salsette has clung to the main 
roads within a mile of the various railway stations on the two lines of rail. Homogenous 
colonies of various castes and creeds have sprung up at the different points linked up by rail 
with Bombay.93 
While all prior census reports and annual Municipal commissioner reports had focused on the 
southern portions of the island, varying communities made use of swampy and forested lands 
northwards, enduring bouts of malaria and lack of infrastructure to stake out a place to live near 
the opportunities of the city. Most lived within a mile or two of the rail line being able to come 
into the city for work. Yet others who lived up north were agriculturalists who created rice flats, 
using northern Bombay’s land for cultivation. The report went on to say that:
Ghatkopar itself has been colonized by Kacchi Bhatias and the area selected by them has 
already been very closely developed. New Kurla has unfortunately sprung up under the 
influence of the railway on a narrow strip of land surrounded by mud flats and creeks, and its 
168
92 “Review by the Standing Committee for City of Bombay for the year 1888-89” included in MCRCOB, 
1889, iv.
93 “Report on the possibilities of development of Salsette as residential area,” 1909, 2.
two factories provide all the population this ill-built little township can hold. If funds can be 
made available some redistribution of population may be possible, but any increase near the 
present station should be strongly discouraged. In both these places the chief function of any 
planning which may be possible will be to open up congested areas and facilitate sanitation.94
Other areas too had already been occupied as little “colonies” including Malad, Ville Parla, and 
Santa Cruz. These latter places were set to be sites for the expansion of the railways which would 
have required relocating some of the settlers.95
 Development of these places would require public expenditure. To install water and 
sewage pipes needed the ability to pump water, such that it could traversed hilly terrain. Creating 
pathways for transportation would require rail lines or other forms of communication between 
these new locations and central Bombay. Those areas which were too difficult to develop or 
financially untenable were recommended to be given up by Government, who had rights to all 
the land, to private enterprise:
Besides forest land and khajan or mud flats, there is no Government unoccupied land here or 
indeed practically anywhere in Salsette. The function of Government, I submit, should be 
restricted to encouragement and control of any building enterprise that may be projected in 
this area. Subject to such restrictions as may be necessary to secure light and air for future 
bungalows, Government would, I suggest, be well advised to lease their land cheap to any 
capitalist or body of capitalists who produced a well considered scheme for private 
development of these spurs as a residential area.96
By 1909 the City Improvement Trust was already formed,97 and its experience in using 
government monies to develop neighborhoods was already being criticized. Thus, the demand 
here to have private initiative in northern Bombay/Salsette was part of a wider trend.
 There were obstacles for private developers, though, a major obstacle being the 
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acquisition of large enough plots of land for development. As was the case whenever a buyer of 
land would emerge, those who held the even the smallest plots would hold on to their land the 
longest, trying their best to wait out the market for the higher prices which would come at the 
end of the acquisitions. The shape and size of the land acquired was a problem, i.e. trying to 
stake out a big enough parcel for suburbanization projects required forethought and the kinds of 
town planning ventures which had not yet been implemented. The writer for the Salsette report 
complained that:
Control over building has at length been secured in some of the khoti villages such as Ville 
Parla and Malad, but these notified areas have been formed too late and much land has been 
occupied by bungalows placed haphazard on any curiously shaped piece of agricultural land 
that could be bought...It is of course impossible at present for a prospective builder to buy a 
reasonably shaped block in all cases. Practically he can only do so from a large landowner or 
from a speculator in land who has acquired a large area cheap and makes what profit he can 
on its resale.98 
The problem was that Bombay was being settled by those of limited means on small plots of land 
which could not easily be converted to a larger scale. Most people continued to live in what were 
by official accounts, cramped quarters, in the southern parts of the city. What explained these 
practices? 
 While officials and native elites had been developing a limited urban gaze to consider the 
populations dense settlement patterns in the southern parts of the city, processes which escaped 
them were occurring in the northern parts and beyond Bombay’s city limits. People utilized their 
labour wherever it would take them. They were losing land due to policies which sought greater 
output in exchange for indebtedness. The people who migrated to Bombay were embedded in a 
“chain of operations”99 extending from the peasantry in Bombay’s hinterlands and outwards to 
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ports across the oceans. Each step of the way, changes in one location affected everyone from the 
smallest producer to the largest landholder, and all the merchants in between, but it didn’t affect 
them equally. Seasonal migrants were not awaiting urban industry to rescue them from forms of 
bondage. Market forces had capacities well beyond mechanization's promises, such that 
mechanization in Bombay did not privilege industrial workers over their nonindustrial 
counterparts at the turn of the century. As far as the migrant was concerned, his livelihood was 
already in the form of a wage, and he paid it all almost in entirety to his employer, often the same 
person in the countryside as in the city. He didn't need the wage form to earn his freedom, he was 
exercising his freedom, in a competitive labour market, in his very migration to the city. Harvest 
season called him to his village while manufacturing or commercial season called him to his 
home in the city. In the village, he shared his dwelling space with his extended family, a large 
network of kin relations including his wife, children, parents, etc. in the city, he shared his 
dwelling with fellow free labourers who used their status as sojourners to enhance their income 
as much as they could. Optimizing peasants were upwardly and downwardly mobile and were 
internally differentiating and stratifying through opportunities and losses. 
Conclusion
Suspending the claims of the authoritative history of Bombay City as an exogenous port 
is crucial to recovering the empirical dynamic that led to urbanization and the eventual housing 
of everyday people in what are called “slums” in the long run. This chapter has traced the 
historical trajectory of the rural-urban continuum rather than treating each realm as already 
empirically distinct. We’ve explored the mobility of enterprising peasants, the dynamics of 
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commercialization, changes in relations of exchange and production, and the way in which 
indebtedness could function as a limiting factor and a kind of wage, leading to downward and 
upward mobility for rural-urban migrants. Opportunities and forms of accommodation drove the 
settlement of the city in the 19th and early 20th century. Hunger too played no small part in the 
motivation to move. All these things in total resulted in Bombay having the highest density of all 
cities across the British Empire.
These conditions created new forms of dependency across social hierarchies which also 
influenced the way the city was settled. Landlords and peasants both utilized rural-urban paths of 
mobility and built and occupied various forms of housing in the city. Social bonds between 
landlords and peasants facilitated each other’s mobility and social status both in the country and 
the city. In the next chapter, we will look at the variety of tenancy relations which created bonds 
between capitalists and labourers in the housing of Bombay. Communities continued to move 
together between city and country seasonally, and a pervasive social continuum between cities 




 Travelers to India and successive statesmen through the centuries have marveled on the 
diversity of housing conditions within the subcontinent. Comments on the housing conditions of 
locals, which are in official records and early ethnographers’ accounts, attest to the perceived 
difference between “civilized” statesmen and an unruly society, or “cosmopolitan” travelers and 
“indigenous” natives. That is to say, the domestic practices and habitations of people have often 
been a marker of rank and status within society.1 Housing connotes a set of material practices 
which create mechanisms of social inclusion and exclusion amongst dynamic and stratifying 
communities. 
 The terms upon which that rank is established changes according to the ethos of the time. 
For example, in India’s early modern courtly cultures of the Mughal period, housing reflected 
and produced circles of proximity to the Mughal king and his retinue. The capital city was an 
“imperial mansion” in which the sovereign and his retinue lived. Often, surrounding mansions or 
elite mohallas, i.e. elite residential quarters, there existed small, straw-thatched, mud huts where 
members of a “household” resided including small traders, craftsmen, soldiers and others. 
Stephen Blake, a scholar of imperial Shahjahanabad says, 
As the population increased these small dwellings gobbled up much of the open space in the 
city and encroached on lanes and thoroughfares....The inhabitants of these huts suffered 
periodic disaster. In the hot season fires regularly swept through the city, jumping from one 
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1 Even the Ratnagiri District Gazetteer from 1962 begins its section on “The People” with a subsection 
called “Houses” where the opening line is, “The types of houses built in the district vary with the locality 
and the stage of development and culture of the community to which the inhabitant belongs.” See 
Government of Maharashtra, Maharashtra State Gazetteers, 
http://www.maharashtra.gov.in/english/gazetteer/RATNAGIRI/people_houses.html. 
tinder dry roof to the next - in 1662, 60 thousand people were killed in three separate fires. 
During the monsoon rains the mud walls tended to weaken and collapse.2 
When the Mughal kingdom declined through the 18th century, aristocrats and statesmen tried to 
continue their hold on their rank and status in society by maintaining their homes and the rules of 
who could live near them. Housing continued to be a “nested entitlement,” an entitlement 
connected to the rights to other goods and services like the right to cultivate the soil or be part of 
a royal retinue, but that entitlement’s terms terms were changing, as we saw in the first chapter. 
 We can infer that the problems of human crowding and the instability of temporary and 
unstable dwellings preceded the 19th century as we see from the description of Shahjahanabad 
above. However, urban crowding and housing took on new and more intensified meanings 
because of the great demographic transition of the 19th century when both the rate and the 
growth of the population increased exponentially. This demographic change combined with 
changing foundations of legitimacy for governments such that the way or mode in which housing 
became legible changed. The field of housing, and all that entailed including cultural and social 
articulations, was transformed by the numerous opportunities engendered by expanding markets. 
In the 18th and 19th centuries, the capital city of Delhi declined in population and commercial 
cities on the coasts became new centers of power. By the 19th century, officials were concerned 
with accounting for and maximizing the use of land because of the prevailing commercial logic 
which focused on optimal productivity, improvements, and greatest use of natural resources. 
Housing’s legibility became embedded in new discursive registers by the late 19th century.
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observer, who commented on what they saw in the Mughal capital, Shahjahanabad, to construct his 
account of the cityʼs landscape. See Stephen P. Blake, Shahjahanabad: The Sovereign City in Mughal 
India, 1639-1739 (Cambridge, England; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 44-49. 
 One way to assess the human impact on the land was through the enumeration of housing 
density and type. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Bombay’s population density was the 
highest across the British Empire, thus land use was most intense in Bombay and it consistently 
alarmed observers. Officials referred to Bombay as “fearfully more intense” such that even the 
densest section of London was less populated than the 12 most densely populated sections of 
Bombay as early as 1881.3 This made housing a central concern of urban officials’ observations. 
However, if thought about at all, housing was seen from the consumption point of view,  
especially prior to the plague. Housing appeared to officials like a series of choices based on 
village of origin, connections to landlords and employers, and things like customs and 
preferences. These were surely important factors in the construction of the field of housing in 
Bombay, but all of these factors were also embedded in and articulated with market dynamics 
which had local, regional, and global dimensions.
 This chapter is a cultural history of the housing market or, put in another way, an account 
of the culture of the housing market in Bombay city, between 1864-1900.4 The central and 
overarching question is how to understand the culture of housing production and exchange in 
Bombay in the late 19th century. The main point to be illustrated here is that Bombay’s first 
generation of slums, those tenement units in the center of the city in areas like First and Second 
Nagpada, Agripada, and Kumbharwada, which housed those who settled in the city between 
1860-1900 and were the first targets of the Improvement Trust’s schemes, were not the 
shantytowns which later exemplified Bombay’s housing problem. Rather, these were vertically 
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4 This notion is inspired by a set of essays in Thomas L. Haskell, and Richard F. Teichgraeber, The 
Culture of the Market: Historical Essays (Cambridge England; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1996).
built structures comparable to other classes of housing units throughout Bombay. I want to 
illustrate and argue that the housing market was already, by the end of the 19th century, a site of 
advanced organization in which labouring poor and socially mobile migrants were able to be 
responsive to changing demand and supply in units of housing, materials, labour, and industry 
which drove the demand to construct housing. Poor housing and its meanings were a product of 
social relations embedded in market dynamics.5 Prior to the plague, there were specific meanings 
tied to the social location of actors, their rank and status within society, and how their rank 
provided them access to forms of capital within the markets of goods, labour, capital, and 
housing. People were able to use these resources to negotiate and produce the intensifying social 
relations which characterized the city.
 By the turn of the century and in the period before the formation of the Improvement 
Trust, housing is best understood as a complex commodity. Housing combined the dynamics of 
other component markets in materials and labour. It was also both a sign of social stratification 
and itself productive of that stratification. Housing could serve as a form of social and cultural 
distinction.6 Settlers in neighborhoods were able to solidify and enhance bonds of reciprocation 
and were also capable of forming new terms of reciprocity through cohabitation in the city. The 
attribution of significance to a housing type based on the materials used to construct it, the type 
of tenurial arrangement of its inhabitants, or access to public goods such as water, sewage lines, 
electricity, or roadways was established later, well after the period under study here. In this 
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Beacon Press, 1944, 1957, 2001).
6 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste (Boston, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1987).
period however, we can see officials beginning to document those concerns but they do not 
determinedly form the set of of traits meant to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate housing, 
or rich housing from poor. The only distinguishing feature is the number of people per unit of 
housing, or crowding and density. Thus, this period is worth recovering as a lost historical 
moment in which the habitation practices of the urban labouring poor was formed from the stock 
substances of the city, literally in terms of building materials such as bricks, pipes, wood, roofing 
stock, etc., and this period is analytically useful in showing us how habitation practices went 
from being unmarked to marked in new ways. The Improvement Trust’s housing reform projects, 
begun in 1898, focused on the most densely inhabited tenements throughout the city and served 
to mark them as “slums.” Those units were targeted for demolitions and their inhabitants were 
forced into resettlements or removed from the market. That project, which is discussed in the 
next chapter, occurred because of elite interests who were dependent on the city as a venue for 
world trade, not because there was something endemic to the housing type itself which indicated 
its rank amongst housing types in the city. 
 Officials’ observations of housing density in Bombay, as accurate as it was in assessing 
land use, was nonetheless incomplete. Officials misunderstood at worse and underestimated at 
best the extent to which numerous transactions determined the ability to acquire housing in the 
city and also served to limit and constrain one’s choices. Officials also underestimated the urban 
migrant’s cultural and capital resources. 
 Building housing on diminishing and scarce parcels of land in urban contexts required 
highly organized and coordinated acts of human effort. The success of that effort depended on an 
individual’s access to information which provided insight into general patterns and trends such as 
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the neighborhood’s or building’s monetary values, its proximity to places of work or its 
proximity to human networks who could find work. There was a tendency to want to live as 
close to sources of income as possible which was an obvious desire for migrants but alarming for 
officials. The health officer, T.S. Weir, wrote to the then acting municipal commissioner of the 
city of Bombay in 1886, “The reality to be understood is, that 37 percent of the population live 
on 3 1/2 percent of the surface of the Island...”7 For people like T.S. Weir who were focused on 
sanitation, the proclivity to density was a sign that urban residents didn’t know what was best for 
them. Building housing also required access to resources and information about the various 
inputs necessary to build a house such as materials and labour. By the end of the 19th century, in 
the contexts of demographic changes which had led to the first phase of urbanization of the 
world’s population, Bombay was the home to a densely built environment in which the migrating 
and labouring classes of the city played a major role in the construction of that density, not out of 
ignorance but because they were creators of that world transformation and aware of the 
limitations and opportunities it presented to them. 
 For several decades prior to the concerns of sanitation, the house tax was the only reason 
officials cared at all about housing. The field of housing had developed from the ground up and 
the government’s role in mediating the development of housing was deeply influenced by the 
collection of the house tax by the Municipality and their dependence on that stream of income. 
Once the British Government made the house tax their main source of revenue in Bombay City, 
there was a need for a census of the City which was not as much a census of people but a census 
of housing conditions and the built environment. The value of the collectible house tax was 
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adjusted based on the materiality of housing forms. The materials used and the size of the 
dwelling were both variables in the calculation of the assessment. So there was a push from city 
officials for the improvement of housing to higher quality standards. Importantly, however, 
officials had little power to influence the production of housing. Nonetheless, the rhetorical 
pressure to produce better housing was justified on economic terms; it was calculated that in the 
long run it saved money for the government to provide incentives and means for the inhabitants 
to build high quality housing from the outset rather than have to continuously remedy and 
rebuild deteriorating housing. Other than this there was no official investment in housing.
 This chapter follows the development of housing from the ground up and foregrounds the 
industriousness of Bombay’s migrants and labourers in building the city. The first section, 
“Markets from Below,” shows the average migrants’ integration within larger markets in land, 
labour, housing, commodities, and consumption practices which were centered on Bombay. It 
shows how government officials and imperial concerns and interests had a limited influence in 
the first few decades of Bombay’s growth. The second section, “Quantifying Housing” uses 
numerical data from city census reports to situate housing patterns in the neighborhoods of 
Bombay within broader trends and patterns; it also illustrates officials’ attempts at keeping up 
with people-made housing. The chapter ends with the outbreak of plague, which is when an 
already occurring process, the making of housing’s meanings and integration into interconnected 
markets, was heightened and came to demand official intervention. The plague’s subsequent 
influence on urban life, urban housing and the formation of political consensus in the city is the 
subject of the next chapter. 
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Markets from Below
 It must be remembered that urban housing and all its problems by the end of the 19th 
century was an effect of a slow but steady transformation of the islands of Bombay from agrarian 
land-use patterns to urban ones. The urbanization trend can be seen in the earliest annual surveys 
of the island-city in the late 1860s. Upon the establishment of the Municipal Commissioner’s 
office in Bombay, one of the first tasks were annual surveys of the entire island by Major 
Laughton. Nine surveyors were employed in what was called the “Old Town” in areas like the 
Market, Mandvie, and twelve surveyors worked to survey “the country around Wudalla, part of 
Naigaum, Parell, Chinchpoogly, Sewree, and the Flats near Worlee.” They found that more than 
a half of the surveyed acreage was what we would today refer to as agrarian. Of a total of 2,855 
acres, 847 acres of rice land were found (as opposed to 1,038 acres from the year before), 872 
acres of garden land (as opposed to 898 from the year before) which “consists of estates, 
surrounded by high walls, containing within them pucka-built houses, fruit and flower gardens, 
dense plantations of mangoe and cocoanut trees...”8 (italics mine). 
 The steady replacement of agricultural lands with multi-unit housing structures was the 
consequence of new demands by a growing population and the likely calculation on the part of 
landholders that tenants were more profitable than the sale of rice, mangos, or coconuts. Major 
Laughton’s use of the word “pucka” (literally meaning “cooked” or made of permanent 
materials)9 to refer to the houses on garden lands was also important. The word “pucka” occurred 
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9 In current discussions of housing in Indian cities, pukka housing is opposed to kaccha, the former 
meaning cooked while the latter means raw. Pukka housing indicates the presence of concrete or the use 
of permanent building materials. Contemporary Bombay and other Indian cities are full of kacchii bastis, 
literally neighborhoods of “raw dwellings” which indicate impermanent shantytowns and slum settlements.
very rarely in the urban records from the 19th century but when it did occur it suggested that the 
words, “pucka” and “kaccha” may have been used by locals to distinguish forms of housing even 
before officials started evaluating the legitimacy of a built structure based on the kinds of 
materials used. In this case, it also suggested that the owner of a garden was prone to build a 
permanent house. By 1911, only 20,000 persons counted in the city census of a population 
nearing one million people were agriculturalists, of which almost four thousand were dairy 
farmers.10 Northern “suburban and rural” areas of the city of Bombay showed some of the 
highest percentages of population growth since 1872. For example, Warlee increased by 792%, 
Sewree by 327.5%, Parel by 230.17%. For a point of reference, consider that southern Bombay, 
the area including Lower Colaba, only increased its population by 48.49% between 1872 and 
1911.11 Southern Bombay’s growth was more exemplary of the city in total whose population 
increased by 52% in those four decades. The northern sections had corresponding increases in 
quantities of housing.
 The definition of what constituted a “house” changed with every census. Census writers 
asked, “And here we are met at the outset with the same question that has perplexed statists in 
Europe - What is a House?” Census reports from other cities were circulated across the empire 
and so Bombay’s officials frequently consulted the London reports. They observed that the 
Digest of London’s Census of 1871 said a house should be considered: “all the space contained 
within the external and party walls of a building, and not treat a room or story of a building as a 
separate house, although one or other might be separately owned or occupied.”12 Thus houses 
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divided from within and amongst occupants did not qualify as multiple houses in the 1872 
census. However, this changed later.
 The discursive use of London throughout the assessment of Bombay in these decades 
served to justify different solutions to the problems of density, poverty, and spatial disorder, but 
the comparison also depended on a kind of parity. Both Bombay and London were commercial 
capitals of their respective regions and the functioning of the pathways within and between the 
two cities were central to sustaining business. At the most basic level, London was the city which 
officials in the city of Bombay must have been most familiar with. Population statistics and the 
demographic growth of London must have circulated amongst census officials more readily than 
other kinds of information about other cities so that the comparison with other cities could not be 
readily made. However, the ease of access to information is not the most satisfying answer as to 
why officials compared Bombay to London. On several occasions, a comparison could justify 
differential tactics of urban management. If London and Bombay were different, then solutions 
to urban problems or the encouragement and management of growth in Bombay could be 
different. But when there were different solutions proposed, it wasn’t always clear what the 
precise difference was which justified different solutions. On just one occasion when an official 
said that the English Poor Laws could not be applied in India, no reason was given. Perhaps it 
was that Bombay was “fearfully more dense” which meant that the Poor Laws would be 
ineffective. Across cities, officials were beginning to fear the growth of the “masses,” and unique 
solutions were sought for each city’s unique problems.
 Numerous types of housing styles were included as legitimate forms of housing in the 
city reports. Huts with barely completed floors or roofs were also included in the census reports: 
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“A house will therefore represent in Bombay...the Jowlie hut, under the eaves of which one can 
with difficulty stoop down to find the entrance into the one miserable mud floor cabin…”13  
There were also the chawls or native tenements located in the northern parts of the city. These 
were distant from the Fort area and the southern portions of the island where British officials and 
elite natives tended to dwell and conduct business. One particularly overcrowded example was 
“No. 1” on Parell Road, in which 122 families lived, totaling 466 persons to “one house.”14
 Even visitors from Calcutta marveled on Bombay’s prominence as a commercial city and 
housing was no small sign of the city’s vibrancy. Rajendralala Mitra, remembered as one of the 
few “native” orientalists of Bengali origin, gave a lecture called “The Parsis of Bombay” at a 
meeting of the Bethune Society in Calcutta on February 26th, 1880. In the very first few 
sentences of the lecture he said of Bombay that, “Its houses are the most magnificent; there is no 
other part of India where so many rich and lofty mansions can be seen together; but they are all 
roofed with tiles of the kind called in Bengal khaprael, which the officer in charge of the last 
Census of Calcutta took as the most prominent characteristic of huts.”15 Clearly, there was a 
difference of opinion as to how to classify houses based on the material used for roofing. While 
the census officer thought Bombay’s mansion’s roofs characteristic of a style of huts in Calcutta, 
Mitra himself thought the mansions very grandiose and didn’t seem to agree with the Census 
writer’s classification. What was a magnificent mansion for one observer was demoted to a kind 
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of hut for another. The common use of the same material in making the roof made them less 
easily discernible from each other.
 The type of roof of each dwelling space served as one of the earliest methods of 
classification of houses. Houses could have several types of roofs: tiles, thatch, metal or terraced. 
Each city census from 1864 onwards divided and counted houses according to which kind of 
roof they had, but officials couldn’t necessarily attach a consistent meaning to these distinctions. 
Certain types of roofs could be condemned or well regarded but most descriptions were just 
descriptions. The kinds of roofs indicated instead differential access to materials on the part of 
the people constructing those houses and also the degree of permanence of its inhabitants. There 
was a steady decline in thatched roofs from 1864 to 1881, dropping from 6,676 buildings to 
3,735, and then to 2,169.16 In spite of the large migration into the city during the famine, 
temporary housing was not built. Instead, people overcrowded with relatives into rooms and 
some building activity was able to keep pace with the growing demand for housing. 
“Camateepura” had the highest number of tenements. This indicated that human effort and 
organization from within society was happening in spite of the state’s lack of attention to housing 
patterns or types, i.e. even though there were no building bye-laws, people were building 
upwards and crowding in from within tenements. Koombarwada was the most crowded section 
of the city, having the highest number of people per tenement.
 No style of housing was condemned or rendered illegitimate as a rule, even when the 
definition of a house changed with each census. Through the changing definitions of a house, i.e. 
from that space enclosed between four outer walls in 1871 to individual tenements in 1881, and 
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the whole building under one divided roof with any kind of roof and made up of any kind of 
material all throughout in 1891-1911, what was legitimate housing was very broad. In fact, there 
is nowhere in these reports an account of illegitimate forms of housing. Up until 1911, huts were 
perfectly legitimate forms of housing and even well regarded because they didn’t tend to indicate 
overcrowding. The report said, “The largest number of houses are to be found in the northern 
sections. Warli, Mahim and Sion, but many of these are huts and do not indicate 
overcrowding.”17 The northern section was becoming more populated starting in the 20th century 
with many huts, and this is the section that produced the infamous shacks of Dharavi by the 21st 
century.
 Housing was an important source of revenue for the Municipal Commissioner’s office 
through the institution of a “House Tax” which was decided based on an assessment of the value 
of the house. This information was not readily available and census takers, even if they wanted to 
group the houses according to value in order to see who bears the House Tax burden more 
heavily, couldn’t get such information. Record keeping was not very thorough or reliable with 
regard to housing values.
 The legal type of property ownership or tenure had little to do with the enumeration of 
housing or the collection of the house tax. The form of tenure, either ownership, tenancy, or 
under-tenancy, did not count as a significant distinguishing feature of types of housing nor did it 
allow officials to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate housing. This must have indicated that 
the method used to enumerate the housing brought individual people forward who said “I own 
this house,” but that person not only sub-divided and parceled out their property through some 
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form of tenure, but that dividing and parceling out the property was capable of extending 
infinitely through chains of people. Ownership of property did not always indicate control over 
its parts. It became very common for the owner of the property to have no awareness of who 
occupied his building since he had given the right to find occupants out to someone who would 
find inhabitants. That person too could successively find more inhabitants and under-tenants. 
Basically, from the point of view of “under-tenants,” their “house” was a right to occupy a unit 
on terms of exchange with the person whom they had negotiated with, without a necessary claim 
on the structure’s legal status. The highest city official would have a very hard time sorting these 
chains of occupancies out from each other and finding individual owners to hold responsible for 
the taxes and for sanitation. People could generate legitimate housing status’ amongst themselves 
by assigning units or rooms to other people in exchange for money or work. The official 
bureaucracy was not needed to recognize these appointments, except when it came into dispute.
 With regards to infrastructure required to upkeep a house, such as plumbing, lighting, 
roadways into the building, and sanitation such as removal of night-soil and other waste, 
negotiations between people determined the availability of these. Officials sought to manage, 
upgrade, and amend what private persons accomplished on their own, but they were regularly 
torn between the desire to manage the sanitation of private areas and the need to ignore it due to 
budgetary constraints. For example, when it came to scavenging of refuse, newspapers were 
reporting on the insufficient scavenging in 1872. The health officer complained to the Municipal 
office that not enough people were employed for scavenging and it was estimated that 10,000 
less tons of garbage had been picked up in 1872 than in 1868. But the Municipal officer 
responded by distinguishing the degree of cleanliness of public versus private streets. He said,
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Remarks have recently been made in the newspapers on the imperfect manner in which 
scavenging has been carried out of late. I go a god deal more about these parts of the city 
which are not commonly visited by Europeans, than most people, and I must say that, as 
regards the scavenging of public streets, there is very little indeed to complain of. It is 
impossible to find any accumulation of garbage. Of course we cannot keep up men enough to 
enable all the streets and lanes to be cleaned by 8 am; and people who go about in the 
morning, and see that a street has not yet been cleaned, are apt to fancy that it will not be 
cleaned at all. The real point in which our scavengering falls short is, as the Health Officer 
points out (p. 22), in the cleaning of the numerous lanes, gullies, courts, and by-ways which 
are private, i.e., which are not vested in the Corporation, and which the Municipality is not 
legally bound to clean.18
He strongly suggested that the Municipal office be given the funds to clean the private streets 
and was aware that there would be too much cost. One suggestion he made was to increase the 
“halalkhor tax,” discussed below, to make up this cost. Thus, whenever it was financially 
feasible, new streets would be incorporated into the Municipal office’s areas of responsibility.
 Night-soil was removed by a caste of “recyclers” named halalkhors, meaning those for 
whom everything is halal and thus consumable.19 They had hereditary rights to their occupation 
within certain neighborhoods, locales, and streets. The city provided night-soil depositories in 
response to complaints or other kinds of demands to organize night-soil collection. An “halalkhor 
tax” also functioned in complex and changing ways. Often occupants paid the tax to the city to 
have night-soil removed; that money was used to reimburse the halalkhors themselves by city 
officials. Yet in other circumstances where the city officials had less influence, private 
homeowners made their own arrangements with the halalkhors in the vicinity to have their 
buildings cleaned. The question of the halalkhor tax was always a topic of discussion for 
Municipal officials who often regretted their dependence on this caste community for the 
sanitation of the city. Several halalkhor strikes, especially during the time of the plague, made 
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that dependence most visible. These strikes were also a response to attempts at achieving greater 
labour efficiencies by the city officials, who sought with each passing year to have a greater 
volume of night-soil collected through the employment of fewer and fewer halalkhors. The 
hereditary right to their occupation was interpolating with the concerns of the markets in labour 
and this created moments of conflict.20
 Official involvement in the issue amounted to a management tactic after private 
arrangements had been made. Officials could merely augment or slightly amend the terms of 
private sanitation efforts. For example, the carts used for the removal of night-soil were 
originally made of wood and themselves became highly insanitary, nuisances which would 
process through the streets through the night. As early as 1867, the Municipal office became 
involved in providing upgraded night-soil carts for the halalkhors to use. They sanctioned 75 
new iron carts with approval through a budget meeting at the finance committee. Iron carts were 
provided which cost the officials money, but the expenditure was justified on the grounds that the 
iron carts could hold double the volume of refuse and make multiple trips since they did not 
retain the stench. After some time, a lid was designed and provided to the night-soil carriers. The 
Municipal Commissioner said about the new carts, 
It is not too much to say that while these carts have doubled the working power of the 
Halalcore Brigade, and abolished those hideous nocturnal processions, and the necessity for 
the collected soil to stand fermenting all day at the depots, they will repay their cost in a 
single year by actual saving in the item of bullocks and drivers.21 
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Through such small measures, the city officials attempted to constrain, manage, and mitigate the 
mostly private initiatives which made up the substance of urban social life. 
 Lighting, plumbing, and roadways functioned in similar ways, with private enterprise 
first and then public management later. Throughout the late 19th century, private peoples 
extended roads into new building sites as they became necessary. They provided lighting and 
plumbing of their own accord as well. Official involvement was minimal and often focused only 
on the densest, southern parts of the city where officials resided and where the shipping 
industries were dependent on such infrastructure. Whenever overcrowding was noticed as a 
problem in the southern parts, a health officer or city official may have commented on the need 
for “communications” and roadways which would encourage people to settle farther from the 
commercial center of the city. In some such circumstances, major roadways were built such as 
north-south or east-west thoroughfares. Additionally, a slow and steady process of widening 
already existing roads in order to enhance ventilation and mobility across the city meant that 
some property owners were regularly displaced or moved back. However, these were few 
compared to the numerous and imperfect private initiatives, often roadways which were unkempt 
and hard to traverse or didn’t drain properly. Most roadways, too, were never experienced as 
“government” property but rather for use by the people. In 1884, officials involved in the paving 
of footpaths complained that, 
One of the chief difficulties that the Municipality has to deal with is the never-ending 
encroachment which beginning with a plank, a box, or a stool advances to a semi-attached 
bench, which again is insidiously converted into an ‘otla,’ first temporary, then permanent, 
and this becomes (unless detected in time) the boundary line of the future wall of the house.22
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This was the way many residential areas got started: through steady colonizations of land by 
everyday, mobile people in some form or the other. Petty shopkeepers used a similar procedure 
for settlement into the city. In 1886, the Municipal Commissioner noticed, “the very serious 
encroachments on the sides of road and foot-paths which is everywhere going on from 
shopkeepers and house occupiers being allowed to project stalls, &c., over the road way...”23 He 
used this complaint to ask for consideration that executive powers be instated which would allow 
the city to remove such users of the streets. 
 Municipal budget meetings were the site for all Haussman-like ambitions to be 
extinguished. Official expenditure could only be justified on “large works of permanent benefit 
to the city” rather than small scale projects because each had to be justified to the current 
generation of rate-payers.24 In 1872 there was a complaint that there was no system of sewerage 
or drainage at all in the neighborhood of Colaba, and due to its housing of European troops it 
was attended to early: 
I believe Engineers are of opinion that this district must be provided with its own system of 
sewerage and drainage, independently of the general scheme for the remainder of the City. As 
the interests of Government are so largely concerned in the maintenance of health among the 
European troops stationed in Upper Colaba.25 
To have access to water, communities and neighborhoods could receive public “house 
connections” into buildings once officials decided it was important enough and financially 
feasible. In 1886, such house connections were provided for Kamathipura, the red-light district, 
for “sullage.” There was regrettable delay in completing this project due to “an abnormally large 
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percentage of breakage” of the pipes while being transported from England, for which 
contractors were held liable.26 Lighting too was extended on a case by case basis. Amenities such 
as these were provided occasionally for a portion of a neighborhood or for a subdivided multi-
unit housing structure on a seemingly ad hoc basis, depending on who could garner the attentions 
of official concerns.
 There was at least one overt episode, prior to the plague, in which officials tried to exert 
an influence in the process of the production of housing. Housing was embedded in market 
relations beyond mere consumption. The production process provided jobs to migrant workers, 
who were needed to make the materials such as wood and bricks, and construct the dwellings 
themselves. Whenever there was a boom in the city’s economy, people flooded the city and the 
demand for housing grew. Supply responded to the demand and was able to provide work to 
some of the migrants. This market in the production of dwellings followed the logic of all 
markets, i.e. it behaved just like any other market would. Namely, over the decades the 
generalization of the market resulted in a decline in the cost of inputs such as labour and 
materials. This change alone allowed officials to make a minor intervention. The actors who 
produced housing were beyond official control and officials were keen to keep things this way. 
Officials did not want government to become a permanent player in the market but rather to 
make a simple interference which they thought would have long lasting effects and enhance the 
market’s ability to function optimally; they did not want government to challenge it or become 
the competitor of private interests. 
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26 MCRCOB, 1885-1886, 33. I am not sure why pipes were brought in from England and whether there 
was ever a discussion on the inefficiency of such a practice. I also donʼt know whether other kinds of 
pipes were made locally and whether these were imported for a special reason. It would also be 
interesting to know how long this importing of pipes lasted for or when sullage pipes began to be 
manufactured in Bombay itself. 
 The official complaint was that the native style of building construction didn’t produce 
structures which would last long. The average life of a native building was 40 years while many 
didn’t even make it past 20 years of age. Officials suspected that the bricks used by natives in 
their construction projects were of an inferior quality. They described the native buildings, both 
shops and homes, as being made of jungle-teak which was used for the main structure of the 
building. Spaces between the wood were filled with whichever bricks were sold in the open 
market. Better quality bricks would not require the jungle-teak structure, because they could 
withstand the air, moisture, and the weight of the structure. Instead, due to using poor quality 
bricks, the native buildings succumbed to “wet-rot” because the teak gave in to environmental 
pressures. In contrast, the quality of brick made by the Municipality itself, rather than that made 
by private brick makers, was of higher quality, and could now, because of the decline of the cost 
of labour and coal required to make those bricks, be offered into the larger market. They were 
able to justify their interference based on their desire to make local buildings last longer, but they 
were keen not to interfere in the market on a permanent basis. Their hope was that native brick 
makers would be enterprising enough to learn how to make the higher quality bricks once 
introduced to them and eventually the Municipality’s brick production process could stop. The 
ultimate goal was for the Municipality to itself buy higher quality bricks on the open market. IN 
1877, the Municipal Commissioner of Bombay said, “The style of building known as the native 
principle would then be entirely abandoned, and that known as the European principle adopted in 
its place.”27 The market was thus being used here to effect a permanent shift in the building 
quality of construction projects throughout the city. Furthermore, poor quality buildings were 
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being indexed as being of a “native” type while higher quality buildings were being indexed as 
of a “European” type. 
 A monetary calculation justified this simple intervention. Supposedly 450 buildings were 
built annually until the late 1870s at a cost of Rs. 4000 to Rs. 5000 each. Officials guessed that 
constructing a building in the “European style” with the higher quality bricks would cost the 
same or just slightly more, perhaps Rs. 100 more each, and that such a building would last twice 
as long, about 80 years in total. Thus, “The adoption of the former method would therefore 
reduce house rents without lessening the value of house property.”28 This must have meant that 
house rents were calculated based on the value of the building over the length of time it was 
expected to be functional. In the long run and according to the hypothetical computation, the use 
of European style bricks would be a cost saving measure.
 The municipality owned a machine in the neighborhood of Panwell which made the 
European quality bricks. The author of this report believed native brick-makers could make 
similar, or just slightly inferior, quality bricks without the initial outlay of expenditure on the 
same machine at other sites of brick production. He said, 
There is no necessity to use machinery such as we have at Panwell. Bricks little inferior in 
quality could be made by hand, if the same precautions are adopted as by the Municipality to 
properly mould, press, and burn them, in accordance with the practice followed in Europe.29 
Furthermore, the monetary cost of the manual labour of the brick-makers wouldn’t be obstructive 
since the labour market had already brought labour costs down. Thus, doing without machinery 
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could be monetarily justified because the market involved in the production of housing prior to 
this report being written had already brought down the input costs:
The price of the bricks originally made at Panwell by the Municipality was Rs. 35 per 1,000. 
The reason why I am enabled to make such a large reduction in their cost is on account of the 
price now paid for coal and labour, and the reduction I have made in the working 
establishment. The price of coal was formerly Rs. 48 per ton; it is now Rs. 18. The rates paid 
for labourers was formerly 6 to 8 annas per day; it is now from 3 to 4 annas. The engine and 
machinery are in thorough working order, and no outlay is required for repairs before 
utilizing them. There is a quantity of clay on our ground sufficient to last for several years.30
Already by 1877, the price of coal had decreased by a third and the cost of labour halved. No 
doubt, the influx of people both from the cotton boom of the 1860s and the famines of the 1870s 
had created competition in the labour supply such that labourers could now command less for 
their work. The same story was true for the coal market, although it was more prone to adjust to 
global flows than regional ones. 
 Housing occupied a strange role in the mind of officials. Moments like these showed they 
had all they needed to understand that there was a market to the production of housing, and yet, 
housing was consistently thought of from the consumption point of view, if thought about at all, 
especially prior the plague. Housing appeared to officials like a series of choices based on village 
of origin, connections to landlords and employers, and things like customs and preferences. 
These were surely important factors in the construction of the field of housing in Bombay, but all 
of these factors were also embedded in market dynamics which had local, regional, and global 
dimensions. The government didn’t interfere in such markets at all until the plague, after which 
the status of housing, especially poor housing, changed.
 Officially, and “on the books,” were a body of Municipal Acts which were meant to 
function as a set of regulatory by-laws for the city. They provided the Municipal office formal 
 194
30 MCRCOB, 1877, 9.
jurisdiction over the organization of space. Municipal officers could limit the boundaries of 
buildings sites, authorize details of building structures, set guidelines for infrastructure like 
lighting and sewage, and apportion space amongst private actors. Trying to find evidence of a 
Municipal Act being put into practice though is difficult for the scholar dependent on municipal 
records. Most often, officials complained about either the inadequacy of the Municipal Acts, 
warranting their augmentation with some updated measures, or they complained about their 
enforcement. In 1885, the Surgeon, D.C. Davidson of the Indian Medical Service for the Bombay 
Municipality, wrote to the Municipal Commissioner of the city that:
The Municipal Act, as it at present exists, is so defective as to afford little or no protection to 
the public against the erection of most insanitary dwelling-houses, which are directly 
injurious and dangerous to the health and lives of people, who are compelled by 
circumstances to occupy them, and are potent factors in bringing about and augmenting 
epidemics which give rise to much misery and expense, and by causing the imposition of 
quarantine seriously interfere with trade.31
Outbreaks of cholera and other diseases resulted in regular occurrences of epidemics in the city 
and these were blamed on the uncleanliness of the city and its inhabitants. The health officer felt 
himself particularly burdened by his job. Later and in the same report, he said, “The Health 
Officer is in the position of the London Policeman, who has orders to make the street Arabs 
“move on,” but has received no instructions from the Municipal authorities as to where they are 
to go.”32 Regulating building structures was also ineffective through the use of by-laws in the 
Municipal Acts. The same officer recounted with considerable frustration the following 
incidences:
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Plans for almost every description of insanitary buildings are submitted....A man intends to 
rebuild his house, in the rear of which ten or twelve feet of open space had been left for 
ventilation. On submitting plans he is perhaps called upon by the Municipality to set back his 
house ten feet. What is the consequence? He does not diminish the size of the house and still 
leave an open space in the rear of ten feet; he literally sets his house back ten feet, and then 
builds on the open space which had originally been left for ventilation, thus shutting out light 
and air from the rear portion of his dwelling, and rendering the back rooms dark, 
unwholesome dens, into which light and pure air never enter....The most perfect 
drainage...etc. will not effect public health if house sanitation is so woefully neglected as it is 
in Bombay in present time. A privy is occasionally built inside a house and overhanging a 
well; on another occasion a similar structure is built within three feet of a well of drinking 
water, and a drain is constructed to carry sewage within a foot and a half of the same well; a 
privy is built or rebuilt underneath inhabited rooms; and yet, notwithstanding the self-evident 
danger to the public health arising from this and that, such arrangements are opposed to the 
most rudimentary principles of sanitation, so accustomed have people in Bombay become to 
them that I have been gravely informed by otherwise fairly intelligent men that such 
contrivances are ‘unobjectionable.’ In such cases it is hopeless to argue and useless to make 
comments...any intelligent man ought to be able to comprehend and understand how his own 
health and life and the health of his fellow-citizen may be sacrificed to a disregard of the first 
principles of house sanitation.33
The health officer was bemoaning the limitations of official power and the influence of other 
motivations besides “the health of a fellow citizen” in the construction of dwelling units and their 
necessary sanitation. While money was being spent by the Municipal office on “sanitary 
improvements” such as the widening of roads, street drainage, etc., the fact remained that 
housing was being constructed by private citizens without any regard to the sanitation of the city 
at all. Thus, the municipality’s work on utilities and spatial widening was being undermined by 
market practices in housing just as it was proceeding. Inadequate by-laws and the lack of their 
enforcement were blamed. The problem was the cost of each; both the costs of municipal 
sanitation in public spaces were too high and there was no financial motivation for private 
persons to follow sanitary principles. A prior report from 1870 was cited; Dr. Hewlett, when 
speaking of respiratory and other illnesses borne of unsanitary urban conditions, said, 
How can it be otherwise in a city where, in that portion where the masses live, every square 
yard is of fabulous value, and where there exist no laws to regulate the height of houses and 
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width of streets, or space between the adjacent buildings, and where the internal arrangements 
are not under any control; where, for the sake of greed, owners of property run up ranges of 
buildings, divided into as many compartments as possible... 
He gave as an example a building on “Dewjee Dongria Street” which was 11 feet wide, with a 
depth of 70 feet, separated from a house opposite it by a “sweepers’ gully” 3 feet broad.34 
Buildings were constructed as large as possible and subdivided into as many “compartments” as 
possible, in order to accommodate the most number of people at minimum cost. “Greed” is what 
this health officer used to describe that proclivity. The homeowner in question was unable to 
value the health of his fellow-citizens more than the money he could make by letting out as many  
units in his building as possible. 
 Although the health officer thought the lack of concern for fellow citizens was a problem 
of the average Bombay homeowner in particular, the fact was that based on financial motivation 
alone, nowhere, in no city, had house sanitation and thus a disease-free city been made without 
public intervention. It took public funds, financial incentives for private builders, or severe 
penalties that would be enforced, for the collective life of market activity to evince a concern for 
public sanitation and community well being.35 The health officer in Bombay who was 
complaining about housing sanitation along with other issues was asking for such interventions. 
Concerned about the supply of milk in the city, he said that all cattle stables within the city of 
Bombay should be controlled by the Municipality. The city should thus clean each stable but 
somehow transfer that expense to the owners of the stables. Furthermore, he observed that all 
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35 See especially Daniel Rodgers, “The Self-Owned City,” in his Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a 
Progressive Age (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998). See also Susan 
D. Pennybacker, A Vision for London, 1889-1914: Labour, Everyday Life and the Lcc Experiment 
(London; New York: Routledge, 1995).
large towns in England had some form of medical care which was delivered into the homes of 
the residents, including the poor, called the Union Medical system. This didn’t exist in Bombay 
and so people either made their way to a dispensary or died at home. He said, “...I think, right, 
both in the interests of the public health as well as from motives of humanity, that the 
Corporation should organize some system by which the benefit of medical science may be made 
available in the homes of the poor.”36 His advice was ineffectual.
 This fact, that government intervention was necessary to create a truly public citizenry, in 
the literal sense of that term, functioned as a limit to colonial rule. The British government was 
waiting for native leaders to organize such systems amongst themselves. The government would 
sit back and assess and judge whether the natives were financially and morally ready to start such 
programs, and then provide minimal resources in terms of legislative or financial support for 
such ventures. Native leaders would hear complaints like the health officers’ and wait for the 
British government to start such programs as they had heard existed in England. While everyone 
waited for everyone else to take the initiatives, the production and consumption of housing 
continued from the ground up. Besides the relatively minimal interventions in supplies of water, 
roadways, lighting or other amenities, urban officials were enlisted in the more scientific process 
of counting, assessing, and understanding the degree of land use in the city, in order to gain an 
accurate portrait of housing conditions in the city. This quantitative knowledge was presumably 
necessary before more widespread interventions could be designed. There was as of yet, much to 
be learned about native urban life.
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Quantifying Housing
 The first city census was in 1864 and thus it is those figures which must serve as a 
baseline for understanding Bombay’s growth. Following the city census reports and just using 
the numbers provided without any corrections due to the changing definitions of housing, the 
following chart is a summary of the major measurements in the five decades prior to the first 
world war:
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Fig. 3.1 Distribution of Bombayʼs population by housing and acreage in the city.
Source: Numerical information collected from five census reports. The blank spaces indicate a lack of 
information in the reports themselves. Between reports, criterion for measurement changed quite a bit 
and sometimes not even the same data were provided across reports.
Although in 1864 the average density per housing unit was 30.5 people per house, this average 
was far from some of the densest areas, such as in Dongree, where it was 83.57 people per house. 
The range of housing density across Bombay’s neighborhoods shows how concentrated urban 
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life was in parts of Bombay. The number of housing units, even with changing definitions, 
always increased. 
 It is still worth emphasizing that each census was conducted with a new set of concerns 
and a new set of criterion for measurement. While these changes in criterion attest to the way in 
which housing was culturally constructed and always changing, it is hard then to make broad 
generalizations or discern patterns. For example, in the 1872 Census, a distinction was made 
between the 23,882 tenements and 5,809 inhabited outhouses. It wasn’t clear what an outhouse 
was and census writers themselves disagreed on these definitions. The census official said,
Opinions as to the distinction between a house and an outhouse would differ; enumerators in 
different portions of the city might hold different opinions as to what constituted a house, and 
what an outhouse, and even in regard to the definition of a “house” there was room for a 
perverse difference of opinion and interpretation; there could, however, be little room for 
misunderstanding as to the number of stories or floors in a building, and as to whether a 
building was inhabited or uninhabited: therefore it is possible that the number of houses by 
floors at each enumeration afford the most accurate data for ascertaining and contrasting the 
dwelling accommodation of the population at each period.37 
Given the differences in opinion in classifying buildings overall, but floors could easily be 
counted and thus they could agree to that. One thing was clearl though, people could be found 
sleeping in outhouses. 
 As another example, the multi-family building or the tenement, prior to 1881, counted as 
one house. If it seems that the number of houses increased drastically from 1864 to 1881, one 
must correct for the fact that what counted as a house also changed. In 1881, each individual unit 
within a tenement building counted as a house. Due to the overcrowding created by the rural 
influx into the city from the famine, the “tenement” was introduced into the vocabulary of the 
city census which meant an individuated unit within a building. This was justified as a “census 
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conception” of a house whereas the house of the previous census was pertinent to the assessment 
register, that is the taxing body.38 The counting of houses and people had to accommodate the 
habitations and practices of those being counted in order to get a more accurate and useful view 
of city life. After using the previous definition of a house, that space enclosed between four 
external walls, officials stated that: 
...at a later stage a further definition was considered necessary with a view to ascertain more 
fully the collocation of the population; this definition was necessarily arbitrary, but still it was 
capable of practical application and easily understood; a house – or, as I shall speak of it 
hereafter, with a view to distinguish the house of the first definition, - “a tenement” – was 
defined to be “a building used for any purpose, or a dwelling-place of one or more families, 
with tenants, occupants or servants having a separate entrance from a public road or 
thoroughfare or yard or open space.39 
Separate entrances were separately numbered so that individual tenements could be counted as 
separate homes. This was different both from what was occurring in England and the definition 
used in Bombay in 1872 where one building was one house. Thus the sheer quantity of houses 
being increased in this Census may reflect that more units are being counted not just that more 
units were built.
 Regardless of how houses were counted through the entire second half of the 19th 
century, it is likely the case that crowding was more of a problem than the quantitative analyses 
of the census reports tell us. People were likely to under-report how many people slept in a single 
unit and officials were likely to over-count units which probably shouldn’t have counted as an 
individuated unit. Officials likely missed units entirely in their surveys. The alarm expressed by 
census officials in their reports when they walked into houses and encountered overcrowding 
first hand tells us more about the extent and state of poor housing in Bombay in this period than 
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the quantitative figures, even if that is what we have to work with. Additionally, one house, i.e. 
one unit, could have been and often was a multi-family unit. Bombay was full of multi-story 
homes, a unique feature of the city. An official noted the verticality of Bombay’s building 
structures when he said: “Of 23,751 buildings in Calcutta, only 6% have more than 2 stories 
against 33.5% in Bombay (and the buildings in Bombay having more than 2 stories are 3% 
greater than in 1872)” 40  Many such houses were completely unvisited and unseen by the official 
gaze. When officials expressed alarm over the state of crowding in Bombay upon the outbreak of 
disease, they were often shocked that Bombay’s population had grown, piled on top of each 
other, without anyone noticing until a disease broke out. In fact, it just happened to be the first 
time officials noticed and meant to do something about it. 
 Inequality in housing is one of the best measures we have for social inequality within the 
urban society. The most obvious measure of social inequality when it comes to housing would 
have been the relative cost of living, which is the percentage of income spent on housing for 
different classes. What would be most useful is the cost of living over the five decades, but in 
determining that we encounter the problem of inconsistent and incomplete information. Some 
census reports provide that kind of information while others don’t. Also the costs used depend on 
housing assessments conducted by Municipal officers for the purposes of collecting taxes, and 
the problems encountered in that process were numerous and thus the data was unreliable. Even 
when the cost of housing is provided, they are the products of guesses and observations by 
census workers who can’t access all the information. These houses ranged from a value of Rs. 80 
annually or slightly under that up to Rs. 1000 annually and upwards.41 
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 Thus, we must rely on inequality in space and housing density which are provided below. 
In the 1872 Census, the following table was provided which divided the population density by 
neighborhoods. The average was 52.14 persons per acre and the numbers below show the 
deviation from the mean.42 Some similar numbers were provided in 1881 for the areas of greatest 
population increase called the “rural and suburban” districts, Parell, Sewree, and Sion.43















Bombay Average 52.14 52.52
Fig. 3.2 Neighborhood population density.
Source: Census of City and Island of Bombay, 1872, 1881. Blank spaces indicate unavailable data.
While the above table (Table 2) showed population density per acre of land, population density 
per housing unit also showed similar inequities across neighborhoods, and changes over time. 
For example, in Dongree, one of the densest neighborhoods in the 1860s and 1870s, the housing 
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density was double, if not more, that of the average in the city. Yet, as the cotton boom and bust 
progressed, the housing density more than halfed in Dongree, whereas in the city as a whole it 
became two-thirds the original amount.  






Fig. 3.3 Dongreeʼs housing density.
Source: Compiled by author.
 The data about Dongree suggests that while those residing in Dongree were probably 
some of the least well-off residents of Bombay through the cotton boom and bust, their housing 
conditions were also the most elastic, i.e. responsive to the changing dynamics of the markets in 
cotton, land, housing, and labour. For many imperial observers,44 urban officials, and later 
development economists, elasticity is an excellent measure of degree of integration into markets, 
and yet this measure has not been used to assess the lower and mobile classes’ integration into 
market conditions. 
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Banaji, “Capitalist Domination and the Small Peasantry,” 1377.
 By 1881, the city’s neighborhoods had continued to grow and transform in uneven ways. 
The following table shows the neighborhoods of Bombay with the six highest housing densities 
in the city: 







Fig. 3.4 Neighborhoods of Bombay with the highest housing density in 1881.
Source: Compiled by author from Census of Bombay City, 1881, 35.
Although the average housing density was not provided for that year, we can remember that in 
1872, the housing density averaged around 21 people per house. Dongree was no longer one of 
the densest neighborhoods in 1881. 2nd Nagpada was the densest and it would remain so for 
decades to come and also later become the first large scale project of the Improvement Trust in 
its first “scheme.” 
 The number of floors per building also increased by about 25% and census takers voiced 
concern that there was no regulation over this or requirements for open spaces around buildings. 
Most six story buildings were found in Fort North, while the majority of one-story buildings 
were in Sion, which was called the “section of groups of villages.”45 As discussed earlier, 
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Bombay’s multi-story buildings distinguished it from Calcutta as well, where two-story buildings 
were more common.
 Such changes in density per housing unit were indicative of the viability of the production 
and consumption of housing to be responsive to other market changes. It also indicated the the 
intense mobility of the majority of Bombay’s population. The decrease in housing density 
between 1864 and 1872, for example, indicated that people were able to move outwards, space 
themselves out more, and thus must have had the money to afford more space for themselves. It 
also indicated that the housing construction sector, of which we have very little information, 
responded quickly to demand.46 When there wasn’t a disease, a market crash, or some 
extraordinary factor, the production of tenement buildings kept up with the need for housing 
quite well. Migrants were industrious, joining construction operations and keeping up with the 
demand for housing. The native tenement buildings increased in number and therefore 
accommodated the migrating and reproducing population. This was not always fast enough to 
accommodate people at the same rate per house, so crowding within “houses” fluctuated.  For 
example, between 1864 and 1872, the population decreased by 172,157 persons but the number 
of tenements went up from 23,882 to 25,664.47 This temporarily decreased the overcrowding, but 
that was quickly compensated for through the 1870s and 1880s when famine and other factors 
contributed to the urbanization trend.  
 Tenements, individuated units within buildings, were built from the inside out. It was 
inhabitants and landlords who constructed more and more walls within units to divide and sub-
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divide housing as the need for accommodation grew. Any building could much more easily have 
its number of units multiplied from the inside rather than add space on the outside. Thus units 
became smaller and smaller. Kamatheepura, the section infamous for its questionable 
commercial character, the red-light districts, had the highest number of tenements, 5099 in that 
neighborhood alone out of a total of 73,033 tenements in all of Bombay.48 Thus Kamateepoora 
(the spelling changed often, sometimes being spelled, “Camateepura”) was very well developed 
by this time. The residents must have been an enterprising sort who were able to both produce 
and consume housing according to their needs. The buildings divided into tenements in such a 
great number indicated intense human effort and organization from within the mobile population. 
There must have been a hierarchy of occupants within the neighborhood of Kamatheepura, with 
profit seeking landlords and indebted tenants combining to form the density which officials 
observed and maligned. 
 The “chall” (chawl) too was included too for the first time in 1881, although it was not 
specifically defined. It was clearly the local word for a multi-unit building which could be used 
as a dwelling place or a workplace but it isn’t clear in the reports what distinguishes a chall from 
another type of tenement. Out of a total of 28,315 houses or “tenements,” 4,139 were “challs,” 
i.e. they were that class of tenements called “challs.”49
 In counting houses in 1901 during the years of containing the plague, the definition of a 
house changed again. This time, not the space within the four external walls, nor the multifamily 
tenement determined quantity of housing, rather a “separate house was held to mean a building 
under one undivided roof.” Subsidiary roofs, which connected servants’ quarters to the main 
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roof, rendered the whole roof one roof. This change in definition made comparison of number of 
houses with previous years impossible. While individual units within one large building counted 
as a house prior to 1901, now the shared roof rendered the whole building one housing unit. A 
sketch of a “one-floor chal,” a prevalent structure throughout Bombay, was also provided to 
show how a previous 7 unit structure was now considered only one house. (See Figure 1)
                     
   A        B   C     D           E   F        G
Fig. 3.5 One story chawl.
Source: This drawing was provided in the Census of Bombay City report of 1901 as an example 
of one-story chawl.
In the prior census, “A” through “G” would have been seven different houses, in this they were 
considered one house. This made temporal comparisons once again futile. Whereas in 1891, 
officials found 56,959 occupied houses, in 1901 they found 30,125.50 
 The definition of house as meaning a building under one roof was at odds with the way 
people experienced their dwelling space, often referring to a single unit within the building as 
their house:
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The illiterate tenant or owner of room A or D or G, calls that room his ‘house’ or ‘ghar’; and 
we believe that this view of the “house” was adopted by the census authorities of 1891, and 
that a separate census number was affixed to each of those separate rooms. But, according to 
the arrangements in 1901, the whole building containing those seven rooms was looked upon 
as one separate house, and was marked with one house number: while the seven rooms were 
regarded merely as tenements in that one building.51
Thus, the number of houses between 1891 and 1901 couldn’t have shown the accurate increase 
brought about by human efforts at building and subdividing buildings, especially as must have 
been needed to accommodate their growing numbers.
 Northern sections of the city, especially Mahim, Worli and Sion, had the largest number 
of houses. However, there was no overcrowding problem because a good portion of them were 
“scattered huts.”52 This showed that the style of housing didn’t matter, officials were merely 
concerned with density of housing on an acre of land. Scattered huts were not considered 
illegitimate forms of housing. The City Improvement Trust’s targets were overcrowded areas 
from which disease was thought to spread. There was no demand to have housing made of 
permanent materials. The huts were not marked as illegitimate in anyway because they were well 
spaced out, and this was true throughout the Trust’s operations.53 The tendency amongst the 
population was to relocate northwards where more open space could be had, and they could 
potentially escape the plague. 
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 This was suburbanization by the people, not through city policy.54  Officials said, “If 
plague leads to suburbanization it will have had one good result. So long as a city refuses 
inoculation its only safety lies in evacuation.”55 As in London, suburbanization was not 
encouraged or enforced by the Municipality. Officials weren’t developing land on the outskirts of 
the city, people were fleeing there because of the gravity of the plague and they were doing so of 
their own accord. The government had little influence over the patterns of urban settlement until 
the Trust was formed.
 The most built up areas were Chakla, Kumbharwada, Kamathipura, the Market, Khara 
Talao, Bhuleshwar, and 2nd Nagpada. Growth of housing corresponded with the growth of 
population.56 Incoming populations had increased the structural accommodation for themselves, 
not needing official support. By the 1911 Census, the City Improvement Trust’s work was well 
underway. Thus the fewest number of houses were found in 1st Nagpada, the site of the Trust’s 
first “scheme.” The Trust had pulled down many buildings. Officials didn’t regret the change in 
housing availability in Nagpada because they knew it would be temporary, and they referred to 
the buildings which were pulled down as “insanitary rookies.”57
 The link between poverty and housing was known, however, but not much was made of 
it. In the year 1901, 80% of the total tenement population lived in one-room tenements, and the 
average number of people in the one-room tenements was between 4 and 5 people. It was noted, 
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“These facts point very clearly to the high cost of living in the city and the poverty of the 
majority of Bombay residents.”58
 The overcrowding in Bombay became worse between the famines of the 1870s and the 
plague of 1896-7. After the plague, however, many escaped sickness and death by leaving the 
city, most likely temporarily. The plague resulted in total density of cities like Bombay, Calcutta, 
and London becoming more comparable, as depicted in Table 5 below. The total density for the 
island decreased from 57.7 in 1891 to 51.47, more like London, which had 56 people per acre 
and Calcutta, which had 54 per acre.59  
 The plague caused many houses to be uninhabited. In some areas up to one-third of all 
houses were empty. The greatest exodus from the plague happened in Wards C and D.60 While 
this did create temporary relief in the demand for housing, housing was no less of a concern for 
officials after the plague. The inability to contain and manage the plague made housing reform a 
key priority for officials, who believed more radical measures had to be taken to stop the spread 
of disease, and to prevent such an outbreak from ever taking over the city again. 
 Temporary housing camps sprung up by those wishing to leave the dangers of illness but 
not having homes in the “interior” to return to. Temporary camps also emerged in the Northern 
parts of the city at Mahim, Dadar, Sion as well as more sparsely throughout the city.61 Watching 
neighbors die or become infirm created a general state of panic throughout which led people to 
alter their housing conditions very quickly. Those who could leave did, and those who couldn’t 
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stayed or fled to the temporary camps. In the Market, Fanaswadi, Girgaum, Chowpatty, 
Walkeshwar and Mahalaxmi, anywhere from one-fifth to one-third of houses was found 
uninhabited due to the plague exodus. The main areas from which people fled the plague were 
Fort North, Market, Dhobi Talao, Bhuleshwar, Girgaum and Chowpatty.62
 Three main groups of people did not flee the plague. One were the Muslims who did not 
leave the city during the plague. Officials referred to places like Kharatalao, Chakla, Umarkhadi, 
and 2nd Nagpada as “Mahommedan areas” and estimated that the six sections of greatest density 
in 1901, the Muslim population of four of them averages between 62-67% of the total, and in the 
other two, Kumbharwada and Kamathipura, they are a close second after the Hindus. 
 The most likely explanation for why the Muslims of Bombay didn’t flee the plague in the 
way Hindus did is because the Muslims didn’t have homes in the interior to return to. The 
earliest butchers in the city were Muslims, and in the 1860s there was a “Beef Butchers and 
Mutton Butchers strike” because the officials were attempting to move their market into a new 
location which the butchers were objecting to due to anticipated loss of business.63 This was also 
true for some of the labouring and working classes, some of whom fled to the northern parts of 
town while other stayed put. The only other community to have homes solely in Bombay and 
nowhere else were the Parsis, who left Gujarat’s cities through the 18th and 19th centuries and 
settled in Bombay. Even the middle and poorer classes of Parsis, who lived in Fort North and 
Dhobi Talao, didn’t flee the plague, having lived there for two centuries and also representing the 
community with the highest percentage of its population born in Bombay.64 
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 Therefore we can assume that if the measurement of when Bombay becomes a “home” is 
when people stop migrating circularly and using the city as a place of temporary sojourn, but 
rather see it as a place of permanent residence, then Bombay becomes a home first for Muslims, 
the labouring and working classes, and the Parsis. The remainder of the urban population seems 
to maintain connections to locations elsewhere throughout the 19th and early 20th century.
 Another indicator of “home making” in Bombay was when migrant communities also 
included women. In 1901, officials noted that the proportion of females is highest in Dongri, then 
Kamathipura, and then 2nd Nagpada, all working class neighborhoods with Kamathipura 
particularly infamous for its sex workers. The lowest proportions of females were in Upper 
Colaba, the Esplanade, and South Fort, namely the sites of merchant communities’ settlement, 
and they had nearly half the proportion of females as those areas with the highest.65 Thus, 
labourers were more likely to have complete families in the city than the capitalists.
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Fig. 3.6 City of Bombay
Source: William Meyer, Imperial Gazetteer of India, Atlas, 1909.
 Compared to London, the number of buildings per square acre was very high throughout 
the five decades. London’s densest section had 22 buildings per acre, while the densest area in 
Bombay in 1881, Kharatalao, had 35 houses to an acre. Even though there were fewer buildings 
in Bombay than in London, the buildings were more closely built together. In terms of 
population density too, the most dense section of London had 222 persons per acre, which was 
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still less dense than the 12 most densely populated sections of Bombay. The most densely 










Bombay 35 759 51.47
London 22 222 56
Calcutta 54
Fig. 3.7 Greatest Density of Bombay and London compared.
Source: Compiled by author.
Bombay’s average of buildings per acre was 2 buildings to every acre which was thought to be a 
low figure since the city had recently grown and there was a “rural character still of its suburban 
districts.” In the six most crowded sections there were 24 houses to an acre, but in five suburban 
districts there were .59 houses to an acre. Bombay’s land use patterns, density of people, and 
general overcrowding was worse than London’s even though London had a much larger 
population overall.
! Comparisons like the one to Calcutta’s two story homes or the density of English towns 
were made on occasion within Bombay’s census reports. Housing density in Bombay easily 
surpassed housing density in English towns, where between 1811 and 1871 the number of people 
to a house increased from 5.45 to 7.78 persons to a house. English towns and Bombay appeared 
worlds apart from those numbers alone, but there wasn’t a clear explanation as to why. Neither 
was this a case of Europe opposed to Asia, nor North Atlantic political economy versus Indian 
Ocean political economy. Officials observed astutely:
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Indeed, what has been said of Scotland may with equal truth be applied to Bombay, that 
“families instead of living on earth in pure air with the sky over their dwellings, in many 
instances prefer lying stratum over stratum in flats opening into a common staircase, ‘a 
continuation of the street’ as it has been called, which receives the organic emanations of the 
families on each floor.” (Vide Census Report, 1861.)66 
The “preference” of families was marshaled here as the explanation for difference, a preference 
that made Bombay seem more like Scotland. They chose to live in continuity with the street and 
in proximity to other families, not choosing to separate themselves off from street life or the 
“organic emanations” of other people. 
Conclusion
 This chapter has followed the development of housing from the ground up and 
foregrounded the industriousness of Bombay’s migrants and labourers in building the city. As 
late as the 1860s, this process included the steady replacement of agrarian lands with housing 
and buildings. This chapter has explored the culture of housing and the unstable meanings of 
housing in the city of Bombay between 1864-1900. Although officials saw housing mainly from 
a consumption point of view based on simple proclivities to live in certain ways, we have seen 
above that housing is best understood as a complex commodity. Housing combined the dynamics 
of other component markets in materials and labour, and it was an elastic form, responding well 
to changes in other component markets. It was also both a sign of social stratification and itself 
productive of that stratification. Settlers in neighborhoods were able to solidify and enhance 
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bonds of reciprocation and were also capable of forming new terms of engagement through 
cohabitation in the city. Such social relations were a part of the culture of the housing market.
 The process began from below with migrants settling in the city, occupying lands, and 
building varying housing styles. Officials did not create clear correspondences between housing 
types and their legitimacy. They struggled to define what a “house” or “home” meant and the 
definition changed with every census. As units became subdivided from within to accommodate 
more people and divide families from each other, it became more difficult to keep track of what 
counted as a single house. The housing style didn’t matter. The only noteworthy feature for 
officials was the density which was only occasionally true during periods of illness. Bombay’s 
socially and spatially mobile population, the working classes and the poor, tended to reside in 
vertically built structures comparable to other classes of housing units throughout Bombay. The 
housing market was a site of advanced organization in which labouring, poor, and socially 
mobile migrants were able to be responsive to changing demand and supply in units of housing, 
materials, labour, and industry which drove the need to construct housing. 
 By the end of the 19th century, in the contexts of demographic changes which had led to 
the first phase of urbanization of the world’s population, Bombay was the home to a densely 
built environment in which the migrating and labouring classes of the city played a major role in 
the construction of that density. They moved into and out of the city as a way to make 
opportunities for themselves and as a way to negotiate their changing worlds. They moved not 
out of ignorance of the changes around them but because they read those changes and responded 
to them as best they could and built housing in the city with an eye to maintaining their own 
social reproduction and mobility. They were creators of that world transformation and negotiated 
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the limitations and opportunities it presented them. In the next chapter, we turn to the role of the 




 The outbreak of the global plague at the end of the nineteenth century, beginning in 1896, 
centered on port cities and inland nodes of human mobility and commerce. In response to the 
plague, there emerged reform projects focused on solving the problem of poor housing through 
the eradication or sanitation of urban slums. Broad measures were considered which sought to 
reorganize urban space in ways that lent itself to surveillance, monitoring, and intervention. 
Accompanying this was the consolidation of new authorities to the moneyed classes within the 
city. Knowledge about each city was crucial to enacting these transformations. Bombay’s city 
census had constructed a kind of knowledge about housing in the city, living conditions, and 
family life which could, at times like these, serve as a tool for slum demolitions and more 
intimate interventions in the making of housing. 
 The moneyed classes were the most vocal dependents on the health of city, without which 
their fortunes would dwindle. Thus, they sought to sanitize their urban environments. They 
started to see housing as a cause of the poor health of the city rather than see housing as an effect 
of inequalities endemic to urban life, free markets, or industrialization. In addition to those who 
sought more state intervention to protect the population from plague, e.g., local leaders, 
businessmen, and even rising nationalists, numerous others fled authorities in droves. Two 
hundred thousand people fled Bombay during the plague, and clashes between residents and 
authorities made these few years increasingly violent. 
 The overt conflict between residents and officials has influenced the historiography on 
the plague in Bombay. Scholars cite moments such as the condemning and destruction of the 
slums of Bombay during the plague as evidence of an insurmountable gap between the 
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colonizers and the colonized. Such scholars see these moments as exemplary of colonial 
imposition and intervention in native society and its social forms. Such interpretations require 
repeating the very justifications given by local leaders and officials who managed the spread of 
illness in these heightened times, and who, not coincidentally, wrote the records we have to rely 
on. What this chapter shows instead, is that the urban housing issue, which motivated 
displacement and rehousing of the urban poor in every major city of the world, was not just a 
product of racial divisions in society, but was itself productive of race and class itself. 
Furthermore, such a production had a very local context in which a cadre of urban reformers 
were made elite caretakers of the health of the city. Conflict over the anti-plague measures 
resulted in new consensuses across communities that intervention was needed in the arena of 
poor housing. 
 This consensus was formed in numerous ways. First, there was the question of who 
would represent the interests of the poor. Employers and elites of particular religious or ethnic 
communities were elevated to the status of representers of the poor. Second, housing itself was a 
commodity with its own production process requiring inputs of materials and labour. Officials 
and elites sought to intervene in that process. Third, poor housing was recognized as creating 
social relations amongst the labouring and working classes such that controlling the forms of 
habitation could become one tool for the disciplining of labour. By inciting or encouraging 
competition, complacency, or loyalty and allegiance to landlords and employers, many of whom 
were often one and the same person, social bonds across classes could be used to engineer social 
and labour controls.
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 Thus, city elites and government officials gained support for intervening in poor housing 
where they previously had no support before. A consensus formed around the demand to cleanse 
the city of the poor and the poor’s habitation practices were the main target. Since the entire city 
was suffering commercially, they were able to justify imposing their own meanings of housing 
onto an otherwise dynamic field. They distinguished between good and bad housing, whereas 
prior to the plague multiple voices defined housing in multiple ways. A “slum” came to indicate 
homes in which many people dwelled together or in which there was relatively little ventilation, 
lighting, or means to dispose of waste. It was also the name given to less profitable housing from 
the point of view of municipal taxation. “Slums” had the ability to reduce the commercial 
viability of the city; they were the overcrowded or dirty quarters, which were especially 
troubling if they were located in the center of the city, or near the elite quarters in South Bombay. 
Because the “sanitary credit” of the city had declined, merchants too found themselves aligned 
with official interests. The outbreak of plague was the catalyst for government officials, for the 
first time, to successfully interfere in the housing market in Bombay and they could do so 
because they were able to create a consensus around the problem of poor housing. 
 The creation of a consensus amongst Bombay’s various societies served to make a new 
urban elite who justified the notions that poor housing had to be interfered in and that a Trust had 
to be formed. What started as a conflict between the people who were avoiding, fleeing, and 
sabotaging sanitation officers efforts and those invested in urban sanitation ended with 
concessions across conflicting interests among the elites of commercial communities. The notion 
was agreed on that the projects of slum clearances, poor housing sanitation reforms, and 
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displacements and re-housings of unsanitary dwellers were the only way to restore the city’s 
status as a world port.
 Nonetheless, some tension remained as a conflict between merchants and government or 
city officials, which will be explored in later chapters. For local merchants and commercial 
elites, slums were profitable because they kept the costs of social reproduction low for the 
labouring classes. Decades later in Bombay and in Bombay’s peripheries, merchants and officials 
would disagree on the need for intervention in housing and the plague. The Trust’s activities 
proved to be a temporary moment of agreement between the two groups. Where commercial 
elites and merchants could get away with not supporting interventions in poor housing, they did 
so, keeping their labour costs low. This was especially possible in other major cities of the 
Bombay Presidency like Karachi and Aden which served as Bombay’s peripheries, and even 
within some unofficial parts of Bombay itself. The financial schemes set forth by the 
Government to finance the City Improvement Trust of Bombay were able to keep moneyed 
interests invested in poor housing in Bombay city, but the financial schemes weren’t broadly 
applicable.
Immobility of Capital and Mobility of Disease
 Plague broke out in port cities across the world in the last decade of the 19th century. The 
disease spread across East Asia in Hong Kong and Canton as early as 1894, and Bombay in 1896 
and 1897, continuing onwards to infect port cities across the Middle East, sub-Saharan and North 
Africa, old world and new. The scale of the disease was so immense, in port cities alone, that it 
brought to the fore the problems created by increased mobility through the 19th century and 
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became the condition within which pressures to permanently settle populations was heightened. 
The mobility of people was causing the immobility of capital. The global dynamics of the plague 
mapped on to the paths of world commerce and created what was called a decline in the 
“sanitary credit” of the city of Bombay. Business stagnated, investors retreated, transactions 
decreased, and foreign firms exited Bombay. 
 The effect of this could be felt by everyone, on every rung of the social ladder. Merchants 
experienced a decline in the mere quantity of transactions their businesses were involved in. 
Migrant and settled labourers found themselves losing jobs and thus leaving the city; those who 
chose to stay found themselves bargaining their wages even lower in the more competitive 
labour market. In addition, the entire social climate in Bombay was changed by the plague. The 
state, by which I mean anyone acting in official interests, sought more control and penetration 
into society while society became more suspicious of those acting on behalf of the state. 
Conflicts over housing were central to those changes, but it is also important to understand the 
plague’s dynamics on the city as a whole.
 The quantity of human devastation due to illness and death were enormously different 
across each city and the devastation was importantly never confined to cities. By the beginning 
of the 20th century, rural deaths surpassed urban ones in India and India had the highest 
mortality of all countries. In a span of 25 years starting in 1896, India’s mortality due to plague 
outnumbered the rest of the world combined four times over clearly indicating, amongst other 
things, that India’s population was highly mobile. India’s mortality was approximately 12 million 
people, whereas in the rest of the world combined the mortality was 3 million people.1
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 Port cities and urban centers provided nodes from where the spread of contagion could be 
halted by reducing human mobility, and the plague alarmed officials into doing just that 
throughout the world. Besides commercial mobility, the pilgrimage to Mecca was singled out 
and stigmatized Muslims as spreaders of the plague, and as a threat to Europe. Yet, even the 
religious pilgrimage turned into an opportunity to blame local commercial actors. In the Bombay 
Gazette of Feb. 21, 1898, it was reported that the British Medical Journal wrote:
The importance of Mecca as a ... disseminator of cholera, by means of Mohammedan 
pilgrims, by whom it is visited annually, is thoroughly understood, and it is not surprising that  
all European Governments, including Turkey, should hold strong views regarding the possible 
danger of plague being spread to Europe by pilgrims proceeding to Mecca from infected 
areas in India.... Jeddah, was last year an infected port... This is a subject of importance for 
those concerned not only with the pilgrimage from India, but from every part of the 
Mohammedan world. It is reported that Russia has decided to maintain the prohibition of 
Mohammedan pilgrimages from Russian territory for the current year; and it would seem that 
this is an example which other Governments - European, African, and Asiatic - would do well 
to follow.
The British Crown, especially after 1857, had resolved to practice non-interference in matters of 
native religion, at least in theory. The plague, however, and the suspicion it aroused about 
mobility changed that: 
In January and February, 1897, plague in Bombay was increasing by leaps and bounds....It 
needed no little moral courage to depart from the traditions of non-interference with religious 
customs by which the Indian Government has been guided so long.
This religious interference could now be justified since there was a commercial venture tied to 
the pilgrimage. The report continued, “It is believed that the plague was introduced by 
Hadramaut and Yemen merchants who trade with the pilgrims at Mecca.” Thus, the British 
Government of India constructed the radical position of halting all pilgrimages to Mecca from 
Bombay:
Government of India has treated the Bombay Presidency as infected country isolating it from 
other parts of India. No person resident permanently or temporarily in the Bombay 
Presidency is to be permitted to embark from any port in India with the object of making a 
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pilgrimage to Mecca....The ports which are open to pilgrims are limited to Karachi in Scinde 
and Chittagong in the lower provinces of Bengal. Opinions are likely to differ as to the 
advisability of using Karachi, so recently the scene of an epidemic, as a port of embarkation. 
We should have thought it wiser to have given it a wide berth.2
Drastic measures were taken to stop the people’s mobility but yet many escaped surveillance 
which frustrated officials. 
 Local conditions of urban habitation also had to be changed. Indeed, the plague was one 
of the major motivating factors in propelling urban renewal movements from calm and 
calculated projects of minimal government interference into states of heightened frenzy in cities 
as far as San Francisco, London, and Bombay.3 
 In Bombay in particular, it can be argued that the urban poor became subjects of state and 
official concern first as ill-housed in overcrowded and diseased quarters, and unkempt in 
customary forms of habitation, not as economically disadvantaged residents or even citizens. 
Even aspiring national leaders had concerns for the health of their people. Whereas in London 
the Cross Act, Dwelling Acts, and Poor Houses were institutional recognitions of market 
failures4 in housing prior to the outbreak of plague, in Bombay it was only once the contagion 
was released, and when disease became an impediment to imperial trade, that state officials 
decided they had to intervene in the lifestyles of the urban poor. Kamathipura, the neighborhood 
of high density, vertically built, with a large proportion of women, provided an example for how 
unclean Bombay had become. The Municipal Commissioner wrote:
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I take one district in Kamathipura. Seventy percent of the buildings in this district are more or 
less unfit for human occupation from imperfect ventilation, and until Dec 1896 the effects of 
the imperfect ventilation and darkness were intensified by dampness caused through the 
position of the water pipes generally at the back of the last of the rooms. Most of the 
buildings consist of double rooms separated by a narrow passage. Some passages were so 
narrow that it was difficult to walk down them. On both sides of the passages are rooms. At 
the back of the rooms is a little open space wide enough to allow one to easily turn. On one 
side of this space was a water-pipe - on the other side a privy. All the clothes of the house are 
washed in this little space. The pavement is cemented and sometimes paved roughly, and is 
always wet from the dripping of water or from the washing of clothes. The walls of the outer 
rooms are splashed and wet. Except the front rooms, which often have no openings other than 
the door ways and the back rooms which open on to this little space, with the privy at one 
side and the water pipe on the other, the rooms have no means of ventilation. The entire 
rooms are in darkness and sometimes have a water pipe inside them. Dwellings of this kind 
depress the vital powers.5
This kind of description was driven by prevailing notions of public health, namely, that light and 
ventilation served as antidotes to disease. Narrow passages didn’t let air through which meant 
damp conditions couldn’t be dried out. Light too, if it couldn’t enter a home, couldn’t dry out and 
sanitize a space. Kamathipura’s residents had lived like this for years if not for decades prior to 
the plague, dividing and subdividing units, constructing connecting passageways, using the space 
as a home from which to find work in the city, and even turning their homes into places of work. 
The district’s infamy as the “red-light” district and the numerous women in the area attested to 
that. But it was not alone in being marked as “unfit for human habitation,” although it had 70% 
of dwellings in that single district alone marked in such a way. That number was rather high, but 
there were other areas as well which were stigmatized.
 Internal housing conditions were a new focus of official concern. Prior to the plague, the 
case could be made that broad drainage schemes, waterways, and connecting roadways were 
important for the city’s health. Now, there was a doubt as to how effective that was. Officials 
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who visited the insides of these homes questioned the effectivity of a broad drainage scheme 
outside a building if the insides could not be cleaned.
...let us enter a building in Khara Talao inspected by His Excellency the Governor. There is a 
ground floor and a room over it. The length of the ground floor room is 111 feet and the width 
18 1/2 feet. There is no means of ventilation on either side. In fact the room is a passage with 
a door in front between closed walls. We counted in this room 19 men, 21 women, and 17 
children. What a life? What can anything done outside this room do for the people in their 
misery inside.6
These descriptions served to justify a more intimate intervention; it was the insides of the houses 
that would have to be changed. Such descriptions served to further justify visits like this from 
officials who could enter homes at will to inspect, manage, judge, and regulate. Such 
descriptions paved the way to justify removing the right to build housing from the ground up at 
all, regulations and standards would have to be met. A growing demand was emerging to regulate 
housing itself rather than just resolving to merely amend external communications outside of 
houses. Housing conditions were being cast as a primary cause for problems within the city.
 Urban centers and their status as nodes of human mobility meant that much of official 
attention was turned towards the state of human habitation within the bustling entrails of the city. 
In Bombay, the residents huddled together in dense and squalid ways, several families to a unit, 
within dense buildings and neighborhoods built over the several decades prior to the plague. 
Then, the plague prompted a mass exodus of both Indians and Europeans alike. Officials left 
when they heard of those amongst them succumbing to the illness. They began to fear for their 
own lives and thus asked leave from the imperial bureaucracy for permission to return to 
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England. Those Indians who could returned to their villages hoping to seek refuge from the 
disease and far from the city, while those who couldn’t migrated a few kilometers northwards to 
sparsely populated neighborhoods like Sion where marshlands became sites of temporary 
accommodation. Those left in the city became embroiled in the give and take of suspicion and 
fear, inhabitants fearing the sanitation officials and sanitation officials suspected inhabitants of 
harboring contagion.
 The fear was about sick bodies and diseased bodies on the move. It wasn’t that the sickest 
of all were the poor, but that the labouring and urban poor’s mobility served as the greatest threat 
against the containment of disease, from whomever and wherever it came. Thus, the labouring 
poor were thoroughly stigmatized by the onset of plague. By seeking mobility away from the 
plague they were criticized as being ignorant, presumably not realizing that by moving they were 
spreading disease. Mobility was causing the plague itself it was argued. Forms of temporary 
settlement had meant people didn’t invest in building clean and suitable accommodations for 
themselves, instead people crowded together exposing themselves to public health risks. The 
increasing mobility of labouring bodies and capital, a welcome sign of advancing liberal 
imperialism, would be the cause of its own undoing if Bombay’s housing wasn’t remedied. Both 
British officials and Indian leaders observed this fact. They both sought to return the mobility 
now halted by plague and criticized the mobility itself. 
 No one could be blamed for believing in or being attached to the commercial stature of 
Bombay. Capital, labour, investments, and every form of business suffered during these years. 
Some two hundred thousand people fled the city during the plague.7 Ward C and D had the 
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highest number of totally abandoned houses.8 Whereas just prior to the outbreak, Bombay had 
been the center of India’s cotton production. Over 70,000 workers worked in the industry, and 
cotton industry workers made up 10% of the total population.9 The goods which travelled on 
ships out of Bombay onwards led exchanges with other world cities and the ships themselves 
were becoming threatening to the people. As one scholar has noted: “It was frightening that not 
only cholera but also the dreaded Black Death could make its way on British ships from India, 
through the British-controlled Suez Canal, and into Europe’s Mediterranean or Atlantic Ports.” 
Supposedly an American doctor, a physician on the staff at Johns Hopkins University who 
visited Pune during the plague, reported that his experience “left him, ‘with an indelible 
impression of dreadful nightmare’ similar to what he imagined physicians felt in the fourteenth 
century.”10 The British were faced with the threat of embargoes against Indian goods and thus 
quarantined ships at Indian port cities, isolated potentially sick people, and took greater control 
over people’s mobility. In 1897, they passed the Epidemic Diseases Act, which satisfied many 
international trading partners.11 The ultimate driving force for the overtly beneficent gesture of a 
willingness to endure debt was the belief that restoring Bombay’s role in the networks of trade at 
the turn of the 20th century was so great that they could justify expenditures.
 Thus, many vested interests, both British and Indian, had to restore the sanitary state of 
Bombay in order to restore commerce. The mobility of people had caused the immobility of 
capital. The global context of plague mapped onto the routes of capital and labour flows. What 
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was called a decline in the “sanitary credit” of Bombay meant that business declined, investors 
retreated, transactions stagnated, and foreign firms exited Bombay. The effect of this was a 
decline in business, job losses, and the reduction of the population of Bombay. Restoring these 
required drastic measures which many inhabitants were unwilling to endure.
Affect of State - Society relations
 The plague heightened both latent tensions between state officials and certain members of 
society in India and created new anxieties amongst the city’s inhabitants. The entire affect in 
Bombay was changed by the plague. The state sought more control and penetration into society 
while vocal members of Bombay’s various societies became more suspicious of those acting on 
behalf of the state. It made sense then, in such a context, that people would seek their own 
housing rather than live in state run shelters. So people were on the run, literally running away 
from checkpoints at shipping ports, railway stations, hospitals, and throughout the city. They 
sought refuge not in good housing but from sanitation officials, medical workers, the police, and 
even other sick people, many of whom could not unfortunately be identified until it was too late. 
At the same time, city officials, both old ones who had worked in the Municipal Commissioner’s 
office, and new ones who would be placed in the City Improvement Trust, were scheming and 
plotting ways to take full control of the city’s housing problem. 
 Stories were offered of native residents becoming aimless wanderers or purposeful 
fugitives. One account made a resident’s mobility seem almost like insanity, as if mental illness 
were a result of the disease:
The following is a case that escaped from Bombay on the 11th of October, an account of 
which will be interesting. A labourer by name P. T., caste Wani Waswul, was living on the 
north side of Musjid Bridge near the Police chowkey and working in a godown at Colaba. In 
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the afternoon of the 11th October, he felt feverish and afterwards noticed a swelling on the 
right foot, and became anxious to leave Bombay, and sent a telegram to a brother in Dhulia 
that he was coming to him. He left Bombay on the night of the 11th. On the morning of the 
12th he arrived at Chalisgaon station. There he hired a tonga and on the way became very ill, 
but he now noticed that a bubo had appeared in the right groin, and, according to the account 
given by himself to the doctor at Dhulia, before his death, he was so terrified at the sight of 
the bubo that he fainted away. He reached Dhulia that evening, and died in hospital on the 
14th of Bubonic Plague. This case illustrates the extraordinary desire to go somewhere or 
wander anywhere, that came over people suffering from Bubonic Plague.12
Also suggested by the account given above, presumably a first hand account from the ill man to a 
doctor, is that the sight of potential illness in himself, seeing the “bubo” on his right groin, was 
so terrifying that he fainted. People had become not only afraid of illness, but everything illness 
meant. Bearing witness to one’s own body succumbing to illness signified not just personal 
disease, but intense interference from city officials and all the loss of autonomy that would 
necessarily entail. The official said, 
The desire to wander - the delirium of the disease - is very strange and pathetic. A patient, 
with a temperature of over 100 degrees, suddenly becomes influenced by his desire to 
wander. He leaves house, and if he is wealthy, he drives to a Railway station and tries to 
proceed to some place, and he cannot tell you why. I noticed this desire to wander in all 
classes, and it often precedes high fever and delirium.13 
The wandering was noticed for wealthy and poor, Europeans and natives, and even people who 
once transported by ambulances, were found to have jumped out on the journey, just to avoid 
quarantines and treatments.14
 People had a motive to keep their illness and disease from the officials. One official 
reported that they were told no one was in a room in Kamathipura when they visited. They stood 
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outside the home and heard a moan, upon which they opened the door. They found a woman 
inside with a fever.15 In another house in the same neighborhood, they found a very ill man 
locked up in a room. Apparently he had been locked in there by a relative or friend who had gone 
away the night before, presumably to protect him from officials while he was away.16 Yet another 
instance involved the case of a “mad woman” from a chawl in Mandvi, who had no one to take 
care of her. When removed to the hospital by plague officials, she purportedly recovered.17 The 
majority of official narrations of such encounters included their noticing that the room of the ill 
inhabitant was completely dark. 
 People were so petrified of officials interference in their health that they sometimes 
threatened to kill themselves rather than see a loved one removed to a hospital. The following 
account is worth reproducing here:
On one occasion in Kamathipura an incident, at once hilarious and pitiful, occurred. A boy, a 
Hindoo, had been living in a Parsi family; he contracted the disease. He was in a house near 
the entrance and on the way to one of our stables. We made the usual arrangements for the 
removal of the boy. The family in which he lived were much attached to him. As soon as the 
Health Department Inspector told the family that the boy would be removed to the hospital, 
the Parsi ladies objected and exclaimed they would not permit the boy to be removed; and 
before the lad could be removed, 13 Parsi ladies surrounded the bed, and with knives in their 
hands shouted that they would kill themselves if the boy was removed. The affair was 
telephoned to me in office. The Assistant Health Officer and I directed the Police to be sent 
for, and the Officers of Police came. By this time a large crowd had collected, the street was 
full of people, and the streets converging were thronged with great crowds. The crowds were 
kept back from the house, but the Police and the Health Department had formidable 
opponents in 13 Parsi ladies, who threatened to take their lives if the boy was removed. It was 
now past dark and we decided to wait till next morning, and next morning when I came to see 
the boy he was dying. He died while I was in the room. This is an instance of opposition met 
with, yet the boy was a Hindoo and the family were Parsis.18 
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As formidable a force as thirteen Parsi ladies threatening to kill themselves undoubtedly was, 
this was not even the most extreme case. Such episodes would not serve any official well in 
making the case for keeping his job. Officials struggled with such outbursts most especially from 
elderly women. Elderly women seemed, for whatever reason, to be totally against official efforts 
at halting the spread of disease, they appeared in the records as insurmountable obstacles: “On 
another occasion we were followed through the streets by an old woman with her hands up who 
called down curses on our infamous duties.”19
 Mistakes were also liable to occur, sometimes ill people being mistaken for healthy while 
at other times perfectly healthy people being mistaken for ill. Closing the gap on such mistakes 
was important to the legitimacy of public health:
Here is what I saw one morning in the street behind the Municipal stables and running past 
the end of the chawl occupied by Municipal sweepers. The Municipal ambulance carriage 
was standing in the street. In a verandah lay a boy, unconscious, and apparently dying. As I 
came up he was being lifted into the ambulance. By the door of the ambulance stood one 
man, and two men lifted the boy into the ambulance. Before he was placed inside and before 
the hands that were joined underneath in lifting him had parted, he suddenly sat up, jumped 
on to the ground and ran away up a narrow gully. We followed him and caught him in a 
passage, and to our surprise found he was not ill from plague. Apparently he was liable to fits 
of unconsciousness in one of which he had fallen on the verandah and been caught by us.20
These kinds of mistakes created tensions between those trying to stop the disease from spreading 
and those trying to avoid falling in to official hands. It undermined the notion that plague 
officials were acting with discretion and for a public good. It also cast officials as unable to know 
the population, that they couldn’t even make out when people were healthy or ill and distinguish 
between those who needed help and those who didn’t.
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 There was also the first case of a European becoming ill on the 12th of November in the 
Fort area. The European was referred to as a “Mr. S” who had gone to Poona for a short period 
and had also “moved about the slums of this city...and may have contracted the disease.”21 The 
Fort area was thought to be the most alarming site of plague given the large European and 
merchant population there. An entire large chawl in Fort where 800 people resided was said to be 
infected.22 The official said that, “The desire of the people, when ill, to go somewhere, and 
especially to their country home, even when their homes were far away, was very remarkable. 
The same disposition I noticed in Europeans, when ill.”23 
 No area of the city seemed spared from the illness. Accounts were offered as exemplary 
of conditions in neighborhoods such as Nagpada, Khetwadi, Kamathipura, Khara Talao, 
Umarkhadi, Dhobi talao, Bhuleshwar, Middle Colaba, Chuckla, Marine Lines, Dongri Road, 
Mody Bay Bunder, Byculla, Andheri, Bandora, Mahalakshmi Fort, Worli, in huts in Narelwady, 
Upper Colaba, near the huts occupied by scavengers in Upper Mahim, Mazagaon, amongst the 
Kolis in Upper Mahim, and at the Lunatic Asylum in the far south of the city.24 Dead rats were 
also signs that rodents were the cause of the spread, and some residents, knowing this, took it 
upon themselves to acquire permissions to settle lands farther north owned by the Municipality 
in order to live in sheds. A request from such a resident said, “As some dead rats are found in the 
house I am living in, and as I am afraid that it is infected with the plague, I want to vacate it 
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temporarily and live in some sheds.”25 This request from a resident also showed that temporary 
sheds were less likely to be infected and allowed people to get away from diseased buildings 
without too much financial investment in their housing. Municipal lands required permission to 
occupy, and permission to live in sheds could be granted.
 Officials concluded that natives were not willingly sacrificing enough for the sake of the 
city. There was too much resistance, they felt, to interferences in their lives which were meant for 
their own good. A plague official remarked:
The people here had no conception of the sacrifices willingly made in European cities for the 
prevention and suppression of infectious diseases. Even in a free country like America, and in 
the city of Boston, I find the following regulations in respect of the isolation of children 
suffering from infectious diseases adopted: - 2. Every parent or guardian of any child or ward 
infected with small pox, scarlet fever, diptheria, or membranous croup shall immediately 
cause such child or ward to be conveyed to some isolated place or room approved by the 
Board of Health26 
There should have been a willful giving up of one’s personal desires for the greater good as was 
the case in Europe, and even in “a free country like America.” Instead, riots and revolts against 
official agendas of quarantines, solitary confinement, demobilization, and forms of medical and 
bodily violation added to the frenzy brewing as illness spread recklessly across the subcontinent. 
Hospitals were seen as suspicious, they were where one went to die and what was worse, the sick 
were made to die in isolation. That women’s bodies were exposed to the official gaze was 
particularly unnerving. Pandita Ramabai commented: 
The poor Purdah women who would never think of uncovering even their faces before 
strangers, had to submit to the most repulsive and humiliating treatment by male doctors, and 
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had at that time to be exposed to public gaze...They did not even so much as put a screen 
between the women patients and male visitors.27 
The suggestion was that Indians didn’t have a sense of public or common good and that unlike in 
Europe or America, Indians could not see how their unwillingness to cooperate could endanger 
those around them. Or even if they could see, they didn’t care. The primary concern was to avoid 
falling into a plague official’s hands.
 A confrontational incident allows us to see how housing played a role in the management 
of labour.  One particular incident involved a Bombay mill being overtaken by workers when 
approximately one thousand workers demanded that the patients inside be released.28 Another 
case of mill workers involved an attack on a hospital:
On the 20th of October, 500 mill-hands assembled on the road outside the Arthur Road 
Hospital and threatened to wreck the building and carry off the patients. On the 29th, some 
900 or 1,000 mill hands collected and rushed into the compound of the Hospital and threw 
stones at the building chasing the staff into the offices and inside the hospital. Even some of 
the patients were struck by the missiles and all were greatly terrified. The news of the 
disturbance was at once telephoned to the Police who promptly appeared on the scene. In this 
disturbance one of the ambulance vans was smashed, and the roof of the hospital damaged.29
Regarding this incident, the official distinguished mill hands from scavengers. The mill workers 
were a class of labourers more easily managed due to their living in worker housing and so could 
be isolated:
The mill hands were a source of much anxiety. Yet they had been very considerably dealt 
with. Whenever a case had occurred in mill buildings occupied by mill-hands, or in other 
buildings, so long as it was fairly isolated, it was left alone. We had also agreed that if the 
mill hands gave information of cases and isolated them, they would not be removed to 
hospital. The mill hands could more easily than even the halalkhores and scavengers be 
segregated in their own buildings, and besides the Managers of the mills had erected huts on 
open ground for their workmen.30
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The managers of the mills had erected “huts on open ground for their workmen” which meant 
that the mill-hands could be kept separate from other workers and could be monitored since they 
lived basically at their place of work. Worker housing for these mill hands meant huts on open 
ground, proving once again that building housing with impermanent structures was not just a 
migrant worker tactic, but also a tactic of capitalists, imperial managers, and official bureaucrats.
 The halalkhors and other scavengers, were another story. The officials, in fact the entire 
city, were gravely dependent on the class of scavengers for cleaning the city, without whom, the 
health of the city was doomed. But the scavengers threatened to leave the city and were stopped 
by officials blocking their means of transport:
They spoke of leaving the city, saying that if the “setts and sahebs” left, they would also 
require a change of air. A little later they tried to leave the city, and we had in despair to 
appeal to the Agents of the Railway Companies and the Agents of the Railway Companies 
and the Agents of Shepherd’s Line of Steamers to refuse tickets to all scavengers and 
halalkhores. It is not necessary, even if it were wise, to dwell long over all the difficulties that 
beset us, but great peril had been avoided by prudence. I will only add that the men were 
watched without flagging by the Sirdar Abdul Ali under the instructions of the Commissioner 
of Police, Mr. Vincent, and that they did not baffle the skill nor evade the vigilance of the 
Police.31
This forceful blocking of the scavengers movement aroused the sympathy of many people. The 
Commissioner of Police warned the Municipality that riots were about to break out if something 
was not done. People were not going to put up with being forcibly removed to hospitals and 
other measures. The Municipal Commissioner pleaded that without those measures and the 
maintaining of the halalkhors in the city, the city would be ruined. An official notice was issued 
on the 30th of October, 1896.
That announcement saved the city. Had it not been issued and had a riot occurred, all business 
would have ceased; the people, including all the scavengers, halalkhores and drivers of the 
Health Department would have surged out of the city in a panic-stricken mass, uncontrollable 
in their frenzy and flight, carrying pestilence to the towns and villages around Bombay. 
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Bombay would have been ruined, and every town and village close to Bombay overtaken by 
the calamity. The stricken crowds of people flying from the city would have been so vast that 
no force could have controlled them; at the same time portions of the town might have been 
fired and plundered, and total ruin might have come on the city.32
The Halalkhors held, particularly up until the 1890s, a near monopoly on the sanitation of the 
city. The city was dependent on them and they had thus engaged in strikes and bargaining tactics 
to secure and enhance their positions. 
 Officials also issued a notice saying that no one would be removed to Arthur Road 
Hospital without a certificate from a qualified medical officer. Such decisions were public 
relations measures meant to calm anti-sanitation sentiments down. Officials were not being 
trusted with the care of the sick and officials had to regain the trust of the inhabitants if they were 
going to stop the disease from spreading. Another incident involved a group of Muslims who 
reacted with hostility when they were asked to isolate an infected 12 year old girl. Fearing that 
she could not be protected from medical observation, riots broke out in Bombay in March of 
1898. Hospitals were attacked as well as other buildings.33 On Falkland Road, a crowd stoned an 
ambulance. Soldiers were brought in to quell the anger:
One of my first duties in March was to go down to Falkland Road, as it had been telephoned 
to us that a large crowd had collected and stoned the ambulance van. On the way I sent 
Assistant Surgeon Pettigrew to bring up a detachment of soldiers from the Northbrook 
Garden. I found a very large crowd in the street, every land being filled, and the soldiers had 
to drive the crowd back.34 
Many such ambulance vans were reported damaged. While in the country during the famines, 
price rises, and starvation episodes, rioters destroyed account ledgers, in the city, ambulance 
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vans, hospitals, and plague officials suffered the anger of the people.35 Complaining of police 
having to be constantly called in, disturbances having to be settled at every occasion, and the 
need to rescue those employed for the sake of sanitation the official said:
Fortunately, the hostility was not directed against the men on conservancy duty; it was 
directed against the men removing the sick and those engaged in treating buildings. But a 
more dangerous feeling arose through the sympathy between the scavengers and halalkhores 
and the mass of the population: aversion to hospital, that is aversion to medical treatment and 
not to the building, aroused a common sympathy and intense feeling in the masses.36 
The sympathy by the natives against the officials was most worrisome for officials as it 
threatened to undermine their efforts even in places where they still had people’s trust. The most 
infamous protest against British authority in particular was in Pune, where the British head of 
plague controls in the Bombay Presidency, Walter Rand, was killed by two brothers belonging to 
the Chitpavan Brahmin caste. This was an important moment in the beginnings of Indian 
Nationalism and had a particularly Maharastrian undertone to it in Pune. It also showed the way 
in which the conflict over official interference in public health was widening a gap between the 
state and society, and new voices could emerge who would give new meaning to state 
interference. Officials were cast as the enemy of the people’s health and dignity.37
 Divisions between landlords and tenants too, punctuated sanitation efforts. When asked 
why they didn’t have their houses and buildings cleaned, residents claimed that the landlord 
should be responsible: 
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In the large buildings in Mandvi the tenants would not employ people to clean down the 
passages and spaces outside the rooms, as they said it was the duty of the landlords. They 
maintained that the landlords should do it, and we could not find the landlords.38
It only added to the frustration that no one could find the landlords. The development of tenancy 
relations had been from the ground up, as we saw in the third chapter, such that divisions within 
buildings and units were made amongst inhabitants and sub-leasors and sub-lessees. Owners and 
landlords were far from the scene. There wasn’t even an effective law to hold landlords 
accountable for the housing conditions they were providing. Temporary measures were 
established allowing officials to forcibly remove the ill to hospitals, break into houses for 
inspection, and forcibly quarantine people or buildings to prevent the spread of contagion.39
 Evaluations of housing styles, their condemnation, removal, and reconstruction may have 
been indicative of the progress of a “civilization” from an official point of view. This could have 
correlated with measures of material prosperity and relative advancement of a society towards 
progress which was expected to be the natural outcome of embracing the conditions of the new 
global commerce set by capitalists all across empire. For local residents however, absentee 
landlordism, and a desire to not take on more expenditures than necessary were simpler, 
immediate, and more viable explanations geared towards managing a personal budget. Some 
officials insisted on their world view and often spoke of customs and traditions which they 
believed prevented the making of more clean housing:
To show what strange customs prevail, I need only refer to the defence put forward in the 
Police Court in a case where cows were kept on the ground-floor of a dwelling. The plea 
urged was that the cows were kept for religious purposes, the ladies of the household having 
to worship them in the morning. I believe the plea was true....In September, a large number of 
Bunniahs living in Mandvi went in procession to the sea and thus showed themselves willing 
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to do everything to appease the gods; but at the same time they did little to cleanse the 
overcrowded houses or chawls.40
While that was the official view of local housing conditions, locals had their equally extreme 
explanations for official places of sanitation. In response to the temporary measures and extent of 
force used throughout the city, residents petitioned the Municipal office against such measures. 
While we don’t have the petitions themselves, municipal officials reported that in the petitions:
It was stated that the hospitals were places of torture and places intended to provide material 
for experiments. The Officers of the Health Department were charged with a brutal pleasure 
in dragging the sick from their homes and in killing them, and it was stated that our 
Sovereign Lady the Queen had demanded 500 livers of the people of Bombay to appease the 
wrath aroused at the insult offered to her statue. Men have said to me, ‘You think we are like 
mad dogs, and you want to kill us, as if we were.’41
Appeasing wraths because of insults to statues was not simply a false understanding of the 
gravity of the plague, it was in response to a very real fear. The people knew just how bad 
disease was. Many lost loved ones and struggled to maintain their own sense of normalcy during 
this period. One criterion of normalcy was the desire to remain with friends and loved ones while 
receiving treatment. Another petition from a group of influential citizens stated,
...that hospital life being unknown amongst the people, the patient himself was most averse to 
being removed and deprived of the care and comforts he could count on in his family, and his 
removal was looked on, both by himself and his attendants, as certain death. In this petition it 
is stated that, if the regulations continued to be enforced a much larger number of inhabitants 
would fly from Bombay. The petitioners demanded that the regulations should be carried out 
by all municipal subordinates with care, judgment, and tact; that friends and relatives did not 
like to part with their sick nor see them taken to hospital “recklessly”; that “house measures” 
should not be entrusted to young and raw European and Eurasian lads; otherwise there would 
be more discontent and panic, and so on.42
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People were threatening to leave the city and many were doing so. They were aware of how 
dependent on them the city was and they wanted to be have a voice in the course of treatment 
and sanitation, to have a say in it.
 Nonetheless, the general logic could prevail at least for officials that if a city’s housing 
was unsightly then the society could not progress and benefit from the new state of world trade. 
The poor of every city hit by plague in the late 19th century, and there were very few cities 
spared, were recast as unclean, insanitary, and dirty objects of governance. Race had everything 
to do with it, but what race meant was constructed anew through the management of the plague 
through local housing projects which together achieved global proportions. 
 “Natives” often turned on each other, trying to save themselves from illness by 
demanding intervention in other’s lives. Aged men, from whom officials expected “sage 
counsel,” became afraid, and the fear itself spread like a contagion:
Many fled from their own fears, and in flying frightened others. Some who might have been 
expected to be calm, if they did not remain silent, kept calling to others to fly and save 
themselves. They wantonly called on the Health Officer to burn down districts as if I had not 
chemicals to do, with not less certainty, what fire does.43
In each place, the habitations of the the infirm, the poor, or the stigmatized, could be cast in 
opposition to superior qualities, occasionally associated with the natural condition of an 
advanced society.
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From Conflict to Consensus
 The slums had to be eradicated in Bombay and in every city where plague hit. This 
seemed to be the one and only idea about what could be done for the urban poor and the housing 
conditions. If there was any resistance to this notion, it had to contained and be brought into 
agreement with the official view. To solve the problem of resistance to this measure, local leaders 
were sought. A committee of representatives of different communities was created on the 11th of 
December, 1896. It included, “Balchandra Krishna Bhatvadekar, K N Kabraji, Ismael Jan 
Mahomed, OV Muller, A D Mody, NN Katrak, and about 90 more people consisting of Parsees, 
Mahomedans, Hindoos, and Europeans,” all of whom sought the sanitation of the city. They 
issued a notice called “How to Avoid the Plague” which suggested cleaning the crowded parts of 
the city.44
 The work that the City Improvement Trust would take up more systematically was begun 
before its official formation. The Commissioner reported:
From the beginning the greatest attention was paid to the disinfection of houses and to the 
segregation of the poor. I believed from the first that the room where the patient lay was the 
place from which the disease might spread. There were, therefore, two principles kept in view 
to the treatment or disinfection of the rooms of the building and isolation of the patient. We 
never had to adopt the system carried out in Hongkong of walling round an infected area.45 
Thus, the task of forming a consensus had been accomplished. A consensus was created that the 
city, and the housing of the poor in particular, required major intervention. Even Bal Gangadhar 
Tilak, the otherwise extremist voice of the emerging anti-colonial movement who as a matter of 
course, radically opposed the entire edifice of colonial government, in this case advocated the 
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closing of slums rather than their cleansing.46 An attempt to rid the city of disease was made by 
using large quantities of carbolic acid to flush drains, sewers, pipes, warehouses, and shops.47 
Prior to the establishment of the City Improvement Trust in 1897, several hundred slum-
dwellings were destroyed, as a part of what the scholar David Arnold has called a period of 
“comically thorough campaign of urban cleansing.”48 This only added to the fear amongst the 
population, and shows how the issue of housing was central to it.
 Given that everyone agreed slums could not remain as the form of housing for the urban 
poor, the only question that remained was where the poor were to go? How should they acquire 
compensatory housing once the slums were cleared? Who would assume responsibility for the 
urban poor? The state? The market? Landlords? Employers? Whose job was it to house the urban 
poor in sanitary conditions? These were the main questions which drove the urban renewal 
project in Bombay. 
 The City Improvement Trust was formed mainly to remove unclean housing. The 
founding document stated, 
In the early part of 1897, consequent on the outbreak of plague, the Government of Bombay 
took into their serious consideration the question of a comprehensive scheme for the 
improvement of the City of Bombay, more especially in respect to the better ventilation of the 
densely inhabited parts, the removal of insanitary dwellings, and the prevention of 
overcrowding.49
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Plague was the impetus for the ambitious measures the Trust would undertake. Their goal was 
not only to improve the current conditions but also lay the groundwork to prevent overcrowding 
from happening in the future.
 Thus the plague created the conditions for the pursuit of widespread consensus across the 
colonial divide in colonial India’s greatest commercial city. The formation of the Bombay City 
Improvement Trust was introduced by the Government of Bombay in 1897. City leaders had to 
restore what they called the “sanitary credit” of Bombay to lure the capital which had fled the 
city. This would be done by: “making new streets, opening out crowded localities, reclaiming 
lands from the sea to provide room for the expansion of the City, and the construction of sanitary 
dwellings for the poor.”50 With 14 people on the Board of Trustees, a combination of elite Indian 
and colonial officials together made up the core group of men who embarked on the project to 
reform the way in which Bombay’s inhabitants lived, and they didn’t hide the fact that an explicit 
goal was the restoring of the movement of capital within their city.
 To be clear, Bombay’s building of poor housing and sanitary improvements within the 
city did not occur solely out of a concern with how the poor were living. Poor housing was built 
for various reasons cited by different people, but two particular motivations stand out. One, it 
was thought that cleaning up the city by re-dwelling the poor would restore the sanitary credit of 
the city which would return the capital that had fled with business’ mass exodus from the city. 
Second, some voiced a genuine concern for the lives of the poor and justified building housing 
on those grounds alone. These two different motivations, very often located in different people, 
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combined to create the momentum necessary to embark on the wide-scale housing project the 
City Improvement Trust wanted to initiate.
 The plague brought the urban poor into the hands of the urban rich. Rather than see the 
plague and its attempted remedies as a “clash of medical cultures”51 or the reason to adopt 
“draconian measures,”52 the plague was crucial in forming new relations of housing production 
which distinguished the rich from poor and made space for a politics of benevolence, 
paternalism, and protection and subsequent use of the labouring poor within the domain of the 
free market in housing. That is to say, the changes in affect due to the plague were not only in 
terms of colonizer versus colonized, British versus Indian, modern medicine versus native 
medical knowledge systems, or a simple racial binary between colonizer and colonized, the 
changes had everything to do with how capital was to be managed in the city. The plague had 
served as a hinge point, dividing the fluidity of housing’s meanings and production before the 
plague from a period after the plague in which official and elite notions of housing became 
dominant. Ambiguous and changing notions of what constituted a proper house, the kinds of 
notions which had allowed migrants to create opportunities for themselves and define housing 
for themselves, gave way to housing reform projects which sought singular definitions. 
 The Muncipal Commissioner admitted of the importance of trade when he was defending 
his measures against the petitions by people threatening to leave the city:
Had at any time matters been pushed to extremities, there infallibly have been a general 
exodus of the halalkhores, scavengers, labourers and cartmen, and in the general panic the 
dock and mill-hands would also have fled the city, putting an end to the last remnant of trade, 
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and completing the ruin of Bombay. The Plague would have been carried throughout the 
Presidency where there was no organization capable of controlling the movements of the 
fugitives.53 
The relations of capital cut across racial boundaries, across systems of medical knowledge, and 
needed all social classes present to make Bombay a commercial center. That dependence on all 
social classes was crucial in forming the kind of political consensus necessary across racial lines 
to enact the interventions in poor housing. Then, housing became a primary cause of urban 
illness and the site of public and collective concern which justified official interference and a 
new legal and financial mechanism designed to reconstruct poor housing and become the poor’s 
permanent landlord. 
 Within the purview of the Trust, the official division between good housing and bad 
housing became dominant and elites monopolized power over the meaning of housing. Housing 
became reflective of elite concerns and the elite became the sole determiners of how poor and 
working class housing in particular was read and made legible. In 1898, thoughts like the 
following were ignored by those in power: 
The fact is, the poor classes in Bombay will not tolerate interference beyond a certain 
amount. The economic conditions that oppress them are so rigorous that they will defy 
interference when it proceeds beyond a certain stage. The weight of opposition is so great that 
it resists and repels the pressure of authority. The authorities are few, the people are many. 
The real matter is this: if overcrowding is to be diminished, not only dwellings but relief for 
the poor must be given, and much higher wages. The construction or improvement of 
buildings is but the first step in relief. All relief is now voluntary, and generous as the relief in 
each community is, it is only to help the healthy who can seek it....There are over 100,000 
people in Bombay who sleep on the floor and on the outside of buildings! Imagine the effect 
of this state.54 
Even though there was an attempt here to make the wage a concomitant concern with housing, 
such utterances were rare. Those who had power in the city were not interested in insuring a 
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wage but merely cleaning the city up so that trade could continue. The drive to reform housing 
and improve the sanitary condition of dwellings was the main activity, even if there remained 
disagreement and naysayers who doubted the effectivity of such measures:
When a locality has been improved, what is to be done about the improvement of the state of 
the people? This in time will be asked. I wrote last year on this subject: “The city may give 
water and keep the ways of the city clean, and do all else that is sanitary, but it cannot give 
clothes nor food to all the destitute, nor a bed to each one of the 100,000 or more who sleep 
on the damp ground.” Take the most sanitary buildings in Bombay and allow the poor classes 
to enter it, and in a few weeks they will make it as insanitary as the most insanitary area. So 
that, therefore, the improvement of dwellings and localities is but the first step and easiest 
step.55
The health officer who spoke these words seemed to be suggesting that the people themselves 
had to be reformed, not the housing. The poor classes themselves had to be changed. Such a view 
was one option; some believed that the people made the housing while others though that 
housing conditions made the people. That debate was not yet decided. Another thing this health 
officer suggested was the opening up of communication to “Dharavee” in the northern suburbs to 
relieve the pressure on the population in the south:
Other areas in the suburbs should be prepared for population by communications being 
opened to them and through them. In some of these portions the only buildings are huts, 
nestling amongst mango trees, or hidden in garden foliage. More than one-fourth of the island 
is sparsely populated and large portions unoccupied; to this area roads must be constructed. I 
attach great importance to a railway proposed to be run by the Port Trustees from the harbour, 
N.-E. and N.-W., across the island. The tramway ought to be extended to the north, and a 
roadway ought to be constructed on either side of the Tulsi pipe line from Dadar right north. 
All the roads in the suburbs should be widened before buildings are erected on the sides of 
them. This would open a large area right up the centre of the valley to the sea estuary at 
Dharavee.56
These were the combined measures which would drive plans for major restructuring of the city. 
Refashioning urban space though was the main object of the Trust and the elite city figures who 
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made up its board. Along with the Municipal Commissioner’s new members, people such as Mr. 
Bhalchandra K. Bhatawadekar and Mr. Ibrahim Rahimtoola, ran the efforts of the Trust.
 The formation of the City Improvement Trust served to remove poor housing from the 
market, the Trust offered to become the poor’s permanent landlord, a paternalistic position they 
welcomed due to all the gains to be had from it. The removal of poor housing from the market 
was an implicit recognition that a market in housing had already developed and that the market 
had failed to provide suitable, adequate, and sanitary housing for the poor and labouring classes. 
Poor housing was a technical market failure, thus it would require government intervention to 
meet basic sanitation and housing standards. The removal of housing from the market didn’t 
mean that officials wouldn’t collect a housing tax. The housing tax was still collected through 
landlords or Trust officials, which meant that the Government stood to benefit from the removal 
of poor housing from the market. In fact, the removal had the potential to regularize an income 
stream for tax collectors.
 While these interventions began just before the formation of the City Improvement Trust, 
as we saw above, they were grandiosely carried out under the auspices of the Trust. Most 
especially by bringing instruments of finance into the renewal project of the city, the Trust 
accomplished something new. It legitimated the moneyed interests gains and holds over the city’s 
development. Perhaps ironically, this was done so most especially through the creation of poor 
housing in Bombay which was fully funded by the state. It is to those moneyed relations and 
their management of the market failure in poor housing in the city that we turn next.
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Conclusion
 This chapter has explored the way in which the outbreak of plague at the end of the 19th 
century transformed the question of poor housing into a public concern. Reform projects focused 
on solving the problem of poor housing through the eradication or sanitation of urban slums 
appealed to moneyed interests in the city who were the most vocal dependents on the health of 
the city. Descriptions of housing served to justify more intimate interferences in people’s 
domestic lives. It wasn’t that the poor caused the plague; it was that mobility caused plague. The 
solution was that people should stop moving so that capital could continue its circulation. All 
classes throughout the city tried to escape quarantines, isolations, and remedies proposed to stop 
the spread of disease. However, broad measures were instituted which sought to construct the 
organization of urban space in ways that lent itself to surveillance, monitoring, and intervention. 
The pilgrimage to Mecca was temporarily halted out of concern for the spread of disease. 
Housing came to be seen as a cause of the poor health of the city rather than being an effect of 
inequalities endemic to urban life, free markets, or industrialization. Concerns over the state of 
poor housing was itself productive of distinctions within the urban populace itself, such that a 
new cadre of urban reformers were made elite caretakers of the health of the city. 
 Differentiation within society took on racial and class-based overtones, and labour 
housing was a strategy of mitigating opposition to the status quo. Worker housing for mill hands 
included huts on open ground constructed by mill owners, proving once again that building 
housing with impermanent structures was not just a migrant worker tactic but also a tactic of 
capitalists. These huts served to isolate mill workers from other workers so that any agitations 
would not be generalized and thus remain ultimately ineffective. Scavengers were particularly 
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important during the plague, having much control over the public health of the city. Their 
management was not as easy as the mill hands, though, since they did not live in an isolated 
location, but were spread out throughout the city connected to their own “setts and sahebs.” 
Divisions between landlords and tenants, too, punctuated sanitation efforts. Absentee landlords 
could not be held accountable for cleaning up buildings and providing basic sanitation in 
dwelling spaces, and residents were keen to defer responsibility to these invisible men. 
Occasionally, officials blamed the residents’ customs for unsanitary housing conditions by citing 
a few instances in which they couldn’t get residents to comply with sanitation suggestions. 
 The conflict over official interference in public health was widening a gap between the 
state and society, and new voices could emerge who would give new meaning to the episodes of 
state interference. The gap created between state and society allowed the formation of an empty 
political space such that competition over what was to be a debate over the “care for the poor” 
would later form the substance of politics. The plague measures had served to undermine the 
legitimacy of public health and the legitimacy of officials. But the crisis of legitimacy was 
managed by the creation of a consensus amongst a new urban elite that poor housing had to be 
remedied. 
 The plague moved state and society relations from conflict to consensus. The relations of 
capital cut across racial boundaries, and systems of medical knowledge, and needed all social 
classes present to make Bombay a commercial center. That dependence on all social classes was 
crucial in forming the kind of political consensus across racial lines that was necessary to enact 
the interventions in poor housing. Housing became understood as a primary cause of urban 
illness and the site of public and collective concern which justified both official interference and 
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a new legal and financial mechanism designed to reconstruct poor housing and make itself the 
poor’s permanent landlord. Through the creation of a legal and financial mechanism in the City 
Improvement Trust, the plague brought the urban poor into the hands of the urban rich. The 
consensus formed during the plague was an important condition for the City Improvement 
Trust’s activities, into which we shall inquire in the next chapter.
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Chapter Five: 
Managing a Market Failure, Financing the Public Chawl
 This chapter is about the building of poor housing by the City Improvement Trust and 
Bombay Municipality, their explicit attempts at removing poor housing from the domain of the 
market —an acknowledgement of poor housing as a market failure— and the eventual 
abandonment of that removal. As moneyed interests came to have greater influence in the city of 
Bombay, the aims of housing the poor were divided between two concerns: first, that of 
maintaining and enhancing the structural conditions which perpetuated market-based growth in 
housing, and second, that of removing housing from the market to remedy the problems of 
sanitation in the city. The tension between these two positions drove the Trust’s institutional 
history, and its embedded location in market forces beyond its control eventually made the Trust 
financially unfeasible. This chapter explores what drove the sustenance of a project to house the 
poor even though it came at a financial loss to the Trust by scrutinizing the motivations of those 
who built the housing and financed it, as well as the motivations of all those who supported and 
opposed the project. The chapter follows the imbrications of the moneyed nexus and argues that 
moneyed men elevated their positions and tightened and extended their bonds by the scheme to 
finance the Trust’s operations. 
 Most importantly, I offer a new way of reading the institutional location of the Trust and 
suggest that the Trust is best understood when it is seen as a particular kind of financial 
instrument, whose capacities to finance the purchase of land and housing in the city were used by  
the imperial government, employers, and moneyed elites who ran the Trust. Paternalism towards 
the labouring poor combined with concerns over the mobility of capital through the city to form 
the Trust. While Bombay had the most international banks in all of India, the largest gold market 
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in Asia, and the largest silver market in India,1 it has been argued that the colonial location of the 
city meant that access to financing and resources for business growth were limited, which is why, 
for example, employers didn’t invest as heavily in building worker housing.2 While this is true, 
we will see below that there were attempts to solve the problem of low resources for housing 
investment through the financial capacities of the Trust. 
 Elite moneyed interests sought to gain from the management of the market failure in poor 
housing in the city, and those gains were able to justify what were losses for the Trust itself. In 
the very first pages of the meeting notes of the City Improvement Trust from 1898 it was written 
that properties were to “develop to the fullest extent and as rapidly as possible their revenue 
producing powers.” It further stated that, “Surveys, etc., for providing better housing for the 
working classes, that being a matter of great urgency, [are] second only in importance to the 
measures to be taken to develop the revenue resources.”3 Thus one of the justifications for 
making the Trust, according to the Board of the City Improvement Trust on its founding, was that 
property was a source of revenue and thus it should be able to fulfill its revenue producing 
potential. The secondary reason was to provide better housing conditions such that dwellings 
would not become crowded locales of contagion. 
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 The emergence of the City Improvement Trust’s poor housing project in Bombay was one 
instantiation of a worldwide trend at the turn of the twentieth century. In Bombay, the problem of 
housing the urban poor with a housing project included governmental backed financing. Between 
1880 and 1920, numerous experiments in urban renewal and housing reform projects socially 
elevated a whole new cadre of urban reformers and observers who with their new power created 
new kinds of knowledge about what cities had been and what they should become. Housing was 
a central issue for these thinkers, but most treated housing as an effect of markets in land, labour, 
capital, or commodities, not as a site which was productive of new relations.  
 A scholar of New York City’s housing market in the early nineteenth century has been 
right to point to the housing market’s capability to produce power through control over greater 
revenues and tightening links in a growing cash nexus. About housing in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, she says, 
For not the least problem with conventional interpretations of the ‘industrialization’ of 
nineteenth-century cities is the tendency to treat housing as a derivative cultural ‘sphere’ or 
arena of ‘consumption’ that merely reflected rather than helped construct the new material 
social relations of capitalist society.4 
This tendency was particularly true amongst Bombay’s urban observers, officials and native 
elites alike, who never thought of the field of housing as embedded in the logic of market 
dynamics. Thus, when they sought to remedy the problem of poor housing by financing the Trust 
endlessly, they sorely underestimated the impact the Trust itself would have as a market player.5 
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 Bombay was a “world city,” which meant that it depended on particular flows beyond its 
purview for its functioning as a viable space for capital and capitalists to collect and enhance 
their portfolios. The retreat of capital due to the plague was detrimental to its local functioning. 
Leaders both in favor of and opposed to the formation of the Trust were aware of the 
consequences of not solving the sanitary issues in their city. The stated goals and ambitions of 
the City Improvement Trust were so great that at the Legislative Council Proceeding of 1898, 
Mr. W. C. Hughes said, 
I was recently asked if this was only a paper scheme, or does it really mean business. Being 
as it is no mere paper but one of very real intentions, it has been impressed upon me that no 
time should be lost in making a start with the improvements, as I am told such a step would 
go a long way to increase confidence on the part at least of foreign traders.6 
Likewise, Mr. Balachandra Krishna, a proponent of city improvement, echoed, 
If it [Bill for city improvement] succeeds in its object its benefits will be derived not only by 
the city but by the Presidency; and even the country at large. In fact, if the ideal is fully 
realized its good effects will reach in a manner the whole civilized world. As a great trade 
centre Bombay can claim kinship with the whole world….7 
There was agreement that something had to be done to clean up the city, and the Trust’s goals 
were generous and necessary. Yet, there was also disagreement. The sources of their 
disagreement will be discussed later in this chapter.
 It is worth noting that this discussion doesn’t include records of demands from the 
disadvantaged or ill-housed people to upgrade housing or to receive entitlements from the 
government. While riots and revolts did break out during the searches associated with the anti-
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plague operations and there were the Deccan revolts of 1877 during the famine, there seems to 
be no evidence of the people in the city demanding better housing. The people who lived in the 
squalid and overcrowded buildings came to occupy the position of objects of the housing 
initiative; they were seen as standing in the way of a sanitized urban landscape which was crucial 
and necessary to Bombay’s commercial trade with the world. It was the will of those in positions 
of power which triumphed in the building of housing. They did this both on behalf of the poor 
and for their own gain. Reshaping the urban landscape was a priority most especially for those 
who experienced losses to their financial and commercial enterprises and wanted to re-stake their 
claim to the world of commerce. The Port Trust and Chamber of Commerce joined with the City 
Improvement Trust and the Government of India to restore business to plague-struck Bombay.
 The Bombay Improvement Trust housed and rehoused a total of 9,928 people of the 
“poorer and working classes” in 30 chawls between the years 1898 and 1908, i.e., in the first ten 
years alone, and displaced even more people. By the end of its existence, before it was joined 
with the municipal office in 1933, it had housed a total of 44,900 adults and spent Rs. 148.27 
lakh on its projects. They estimated that they spent Rs. 330 per housed adult.8 The total cost of 
the Trust’s activities always exceeded its revenues. In the initial decade of activity the Trust spent 
Rs. 21,37,364, and collected rent of Rs. 2/4 to Rs. 3/6 per room, making Rs. 1,01,797 annually in 
revenue. They estimated the “capital cost per adult accommodated at Rs. 215.”9 
 The Trust was thus obviously losing money on the housing of the working classes, 
something it had anticipated and accepted as a condition of its function. In subsequent years, 
they continued to build housing for the working classes, but the financial losses started weighing 
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on the institution and critics from both within and without pointed to its mismanagement of 
money, failure to achieve its lofty goals, and inability to sustain itself financially. The Trust was 
ultimately amalgamated into the Municipal Corporation after the depression of the early 1930s, 
putting an end to the ambitious intentions of its founders. 
 The slums of Bombay made an impression upon everyone who visited them, and bringing 
up the experience was an assured way to achieve consensus for any plan for intervention in the 
city’s housing affairs even during debates and disagreements. Everyone from census writers to 
concerned or frustrated urban inhabitants had used vivid descriptions of slum life to achieve 
varying goals in the past, and the motion to pass the Bill which would form the City 
Improvement Trust was no less one such moment. Lord Sandhurst, accompanied on one such 
visit by Mr. Balachandra Krishna and Mr. Dharamsi, had visited slums in Bombay and this made 
a major impression on his zeal for the Trust’s activities. In his final closing remarks at the 
Legislative Council Proceedings of 1898, Sandhurst said, 
The re-housing of the poorer classes is one of the most important and attractive provisions of 
the Bill. I do not wish to refer too often to my visit to the slums with two honourable 
members, one of whom is alas no more. But when I visited those slums they reminded me 
most graphically of the stories that one used to read a few years ago regarding the dens and 
cellars in London; where the poorest classes of the great metropolis herded together; where 
those who had to live by the sweat of their brows had to drag out a miserable existence. We 
do hope that by these particular provisions of the Bill we shall conduce to a higher state of 
civilization and of greater vigour on the part of these people who contribute so much to the 
material wealth of this city. These people deserve our sympathy and assistance. We desire to 
place them in better houses, so that not only will it let the sun into their houses but into their 
hearts and into their very existence, and thus terminate the sad state of things amongst them 
which at present cannot but be one of unhappiness, combined with toil. My honourable 
colleagues, the times are troublous in Bombay, and the cloud hangs yet heavily over the 
whole of us in whatever position we may find ourselves placed. But I do believe that a 
brighter future must be in hand, and that the most efficacious way of bringing it about, is on 
the lines which I have endeavoured imperfectly to explain. With the confident hope and 
earnest belief that what I say is true I ask you to give a first reading to the Bill.10
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His words brought together the temporal and spatial framework in which Bombay’s slums were 
seen. For observers such as Sandhurst, the slums were not unlike London’s slums which had 
achieved notoriety all throughout the 19th century and continued to remain at the forefront of all 
urban officials’ minds at the turn of the century. Municipal officials and census writers circulated 
their reports on urban life throughout the Empire and read analyses of demographic growth and 
especially urban problems all throughout the British Empire. 
 Slum life had a lateral comparability on a scale of human progress, applicable only in 
those parts of the world where progress towards civilization had been deemed possible. Working 
classes in each such city were awaiting the benevolence of their local patrons to upgrade their 
housing and improve their living conditions. The local patrons were only all too happy to do so, 
partaking of the opportunity to demonstrate and enact the expected outcomes of what should 
have been the result of decades of intensified commerce, which according to imperial officials, 
they had inaugurated. Economic growth should have created just this possibility, the possibility 
for everyone to improve and raise their standard of living. It was not due to his generosity of 
vision that Sandhurst saw the working classes of Bombay as contributing to the “great material 
wealth of this city” who thus deserved an official Bill to improve their living conditions. His 
notion that the Bill would make it so that “we shall conduce to a higher state of civilization” was 
in line with prevailing notions about Indian society at large, namely that the society had once 
been a great civilization which had now fallen. Upgrading slums into more sanitary housing was 
a step in restoring that state. 
 City leaders praised magnanimous imperial visionaries as they worked together to 
rehouse the poor. Balachandra Krishna and a late Mr. Dharamsi accompanied Lord Sandhurst on 
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his tour of the slums. Plague conditions and overcrowding of labourers made an impression on 
all visitors and motivated reform. Mr. Dharamsi, however, succumbed to the plague himself, 
dying before the meeting to present the Bill. On his behalf, Krishna spoke of the “beneficent 
measure” of the Bill, which would always be remembered: 
The plague will leave behind it many regretful memories, but there will be one bright spot on 
which the people will love to dwell; and when all the present misfortunes and hardships are 
forgotten as events of a remote past, the City Improvement Act will be cherished as a 
blessing, and will leave Lord Sandhurst’s name eternally associated with it.11
Assault on Urban Self Government
 The City Improvement Trust (CIT hereafter) was formed to remedy the sanitation 
problems in the city which harbored the plague. Through the improvement of overcrowded and 
insanitary housing conditions it was believed that the commercial status of the city would be 
restored. The only engagement with housing conditions had come through the Municipal 
Commissioner’s office before the plague. Now, the colonial Government of India was inserting 
itself within local urban affairs resulting in the enlistment of numerous actors in the projects of 
slum clearances and poor housing reform. Criticisms of the financing of the CIT’s  work were 
based on the notion that the Government was giving the CIT full reign to take money from the 
Bombay Municipality. Prior to this moment, the Bombay Municipality operated like -and its 
officials believed themselves to be- a semi-autonomous institution apart from the British 
Crown’s authorities. The municipal corporation had local power. The introduction of the CIT 
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reversed that, it was the institutional site through which the Government reinserted itself into 
local urban affairs.
 The formation of the City Improvement Trust in 1898 began with a debate in the 
Legislative Council. Upon discussion of the formation of the Trust, the “Bill No. 1 of 1898: A 
Bill for the Improvement of the City of Bombay and to Provide Space for its Future Expansion” 
was introduced by the President of the Assembly, Lord Sandhurst, who acknowledged that it was 
unusual for the President to introduce a bill, but assured the members present that this was a 
“most unusual occasion and my action need not be considered a precedent…”12 Several key 
people were present. Both Indians and Englishmen had taken it upon themselves to be the 
caretakers of the city and placed themselves in a rather paternalistic role, seeking to care for the 
poorest of their fast growing city. It is important to remember that this meeting was conducted at 
the onset of the plague in the city. The meeting had been delayed for legislative reasons and 
because the illness had struck even members of the Council. Lord Sandhurst remarked, 
There is, however, a compensating advantage in the delay, because it has enabled my 
colleague, the Honourable Mr. P. M. Mehta, to be amongst us again, and I only utter the voice 
of the Council when I say we are glad to see him amongst us restored to health and strength.13 
The timeliness of the formation of the CIT couldn’t be contested, Bombay’s conditions needed 
intervening in and only ambitious and drastic measures could restore the city’s sanitary credit.
 The disease was the most important impetus for the bill’s introduction, but India’s 
particular conditions demanded “a bold and comprehensive scheme for the improvement and 
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extension of the city of Bombay…”14 Lord Sandhurst didn’t miss the opportunity to stress the 
point that disease in a country such as India, mired as it was in customs and traditions, required 
the most immediate attention. He said, 
We dwell in a city which for density of population in a given area exceeds that of our great 
cities in the West, notably London. We have this city filled, nay crammed with people of 
various nationalities, creeds and castes, with their ancient customs and habits and beliefs, 
which make it extremely difficult to deal with them under circumstances of such an epidemic 
as the plague.15 
Lord Sandhurst vocalized some of the unique characteristics of Bombay which would require 
forms of intervention well above and beyond simple improvements in urban living conditions. 
These included the excessive diversity of the city of Bombay, the caste system, and the numerous 
religious practices, customs and beliefs which must have seemed strange to official observers.
  Simpler solutions to the problems of urban sanitation had been proposed such as 
demanding death registration and creating building codes and bye-laws which would have to be 
enforced, but Sandhurst argued that such administrative changes would not permanently improve 
the condition of the city. The main goal of the Trust would be to ventilate crowded areas and 
restore the activity of building on sound principles. Prior to proposing the bill, officials had 
consulted the reports of the Bombay Extension Committee of 1887, the English Housing of the 
Working Classes Act of 1890, and the Bombay Port Trust Act of 1879.16 Comparisons to the 
issue of housing England’s working classes were made repeatedly throughout the meeting of the 
Legislative Council.
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 For many, the Trust’s endeavors in Bombay were an opportunity to imagine Bombay’s 
future. Sandhurst spoke of needing to find permanent solutions which “strike at the root of the 
evil,” not just in localities where disease has struck in the past but in anticipation of the future 
needs of the city.17 Lord Sandhurst, speaking on behalf of the colonial Government of India, 
wanted to anticipate the future growth of the city. He would accomplish this by creating new 
powers to make new streets, widen thoroughfares, acquire houses which had been “condemned 
under section 178 of the Municipal Act as unfit for human habitation,” build poor housing, buy 
land, reclaim foreshores, and house the police.18 Diseases such as the plague were to never halt 
commerce in the city again in the way it had in 1897 and 1898. Mr. Hughes, speaking on behalf 
of the Port Trustees, said that the Port Trustees had unanimously approved of the Bill and “fully 
appreciated the value of the concessions Government propose making to the new Trust.” 
Apparently they were so excited about the scope of the Bill that they wanted assurance it was not 
just “a paper scheme, or does it really mean business.”19 Yet other critics, such as Balachandra 
Krishna, who otherwise resented the financial contribution to the new body which the Municipal 
Corporation would have to make, still conceded that “the future well-being and prosperity of the 
city depend upon its sanitary credit, and it is the bounded duty of both the Government and the 
Corporation to establish it with the utmost expedition.”20
 Most of the conflict at the meeting was about the creation of a new institutional body, the 
City Improvement Trust, to carry out projects which many members of the Bombay’s Municipal 
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Corporation felt impinged on their authority within the affairs of the city. Moreover, the 
Municipal Corporation was being asked to fund many of the Trust’s projects. The Municipal 
Corporation had felt itself relatively autonomous up until this point, running their own 
assessments and expenditures of the city’s properties, managing the conduits of waterways 
through the city, and expanding on local forms of sanitation through the management of the 
halalkhors throughout the city. Thus, members of the Corporation felt the creation of a City 
Improvement Trust was a condemnation of their prior work. They worried that a new committee 
would undermine the Municipal Corporation’s authority and legitimacy in the city, and on 
practical terms, that the projects each initiated might be at odds with one another. A certain Mr. 
Daji Abaji Khare spoke first against the creation of the new body, assuring everyone at the outset 
that he didn’t oppose the goals of city improvement. He said, “The whole city must congratulate 
your Excellency’s Government upon having the interest of the city at heart and having set in 
motion the wheels for the improvement of the city.” However, his reservations had to do with 
what he perceived as the lack of effort and imagination on the part of government to enable an 
already existing city body, the Municipal Corporation, to accomplish these goals. He thought the 
justifications for making a new body were “not sufficiently convincing.” He even offered 
solutions to some of the main reasons cited against entrusting the task of city improvement to the 
Municipality, namely that it didn’t have enough money, the legal powers, or the staff necessary 
for the projects. Mr. Khare said, 
All these defects can surely be remedied by this Council. You can give them adequate 
statutory powers, and then the Corporation can obtain the necessary funds and the powers. I 
quite admit that the Corporation as a whole will not be able to carry on the work; but they can 
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easily appoint a subordinate committee and engage a special agency and a special staff for 
carrying on the work.21 
Mr. Khare reminded everyone that he approved in principle of the need to improve the city but 
merely disagreed with the means. Lord Sandhurst was aware of these feelings and had tried to 
assure the critics, 
Amongst the criticisms that I have studied I have seen the idea put forward that the aim and 
the intention of the Government of Bombay was to belittle the Corporation, to cripple its 
powers and to reduce it in the estimation of the public. Well, now, I can assure those 
honourable members who combine membership of the Corporation with membership of this 
Council, that nothing is further from the minds of Gov’t than this idea which has been put 
forward as representing this view.22 
Still, many were not convinced. The particular means proposed for the financing of the Trust 
only assured the Municipal Corporation members that the scheme was not in their best interest.
 The Municipal Corporation had a simple proposal to avoid the problem of their reduced 
authority in the city: they suggested that at least half of the members of the City Improvement 
Trust should be appointed by the Corporation. The autonomy of the Muncipal Corporation was 
fully challenged at this point, their proposal being rejected on the grounds that neither did the 
Corporation represent Bombay’s interests alone nor should Bombay be only the concern of 
Bombay officials. Lord Sandhurst argued that the Chamber of Commerce and the Port Trustees 
also had vested interests in Bombay’s trade and commerce. Furthermore, he argued that, 
We have further had to remember that the interests which are deeply concerned in the welfare 
of the city are widespread, embracing not only the whole Presidency but other parts of India, 
of which it is a trading centre, and we have, with the sanction of the Government of India and 
Secretary of State, recognized this in undertaking to hand over to the Trust on very favourable 
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terms Government land valued at nearly Rs. 57 lakhs, and reclamation rights valued at Rs. 29 
lakhs, the usufruct of which represents the contribution made by the general tax-payer to the 
cost of this great enterprise.23 
It became clear then that the right to control land within the city, and the potential to generate 
revenues from that control, was a major point of contention for all parties involved. The 
government had intervened and appropriated land on behalf of a newly formed body it created, 
and not surprisingly, sentiments among Municipal Corporation leaders were defensive. 
Furthermore, Lord Sandhurst decided that the members on the City Improvement Trust board 
would number 13 trustees in total selected as follows. Six trustees would be elected of which 
four of these would come from the Municipal Corporation, Government of India would appoint 
three trustees and the Chairman, and there would be 3 ex-officio: the Municipal Commissioner, 
military interests which would be represented by one seat going to the General Commanding 
Bombay District officer, and the Collector.24
 The spirit of reciprocity and sense of care for its inhabitants motivated the Trust to set out 
to expand the city for future use through the prevention of disease within its growing boundaries. 
Much of the language of leaders of this time was greatly benevolent, even paternalistic. The 
Trust proposed to use both new powers and old to accomplish its goal of caring for the city. 
Section 178 of the previously instituted Municipal Act allowed the “acquisition of houses 
condemned…as unfit for human habitation”25 which the Trust intended to complement by 
constructing dwellings for the poorer classes. Lord Sandhurst announced, “In all cases where the 
operations of the Board displace any considerable part of the population it will have to provide 
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elsewhere for the housing of the people so displaced.”26 There was no intention to merely take 
housing from people even if condemned as “UHH,” i.e. unfit for human habitation. The idea was 
to properly house Bombay’s residents. The spirit was self avowedly one of liberalism. Speaking 
of the reclamation project to be undertaken by the Trust, Lord Sandhurst said, 
...I think it will be admitted that the spirit in which the project has been conceived in this as in 
all other respects is one of extreme liberality. I can, indeed, assure the Council that feeling the 
greatest sympathy for the citizens in the difficult task before them, it has been my earnest 
desire to afford them the largest possible measure of assistance…27
Benevolence, care for the poor, paternalism, and a liberality of spirit were combining to create 
the rehousing projects of Bombay.
 The legislative body proposed new powers to acquire new lands for the building of 
compensatory housing for those who would be displaced by slum clearances. This gravely 
altered the rights of current landholders and property holders in Bombay. The only law available 
by which a government body could acquire land until this point was the Land Acquisition Act of 
1894 which required that owners of any property which a government body had an interest in 
were to be given notification of their property’s impending seizure and thirty days to either 
approve or object to the transfer. After this point, upon the Government officially announcing its 
intention to acquire the property for a public purpose, owners were to have another fifteen days 
to present a case. Under the new scheme by the City Improvement Trust, however, this was 
going to be reduced in half to seven days. Compensation to property owners was also going to be 
reduced, most especially in cases where the building was deemed “UHH,” when landlords would 
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only be given the value of the land plus the materials minus the cost of demolition.28 All of this 
was inspired by the English Act for the Housing of the Working Classes of 1890.
Financing the Trust
 Criticisms of the financing of the CIT’s work were based on the notion that the 
government was giving the CIT full reign to take money from the Bombay Municipality. The 
creation of the new Trust challenged the notion that the Municipal Corporation was the “sole 
depository of the function of self-government.”29 Power was genuinely experienced as devolved 
to the local level. The introduction of the CIT reversed that. This reinsertion of high imperial 
power within the local institution occurred through new forms of finance and business and 
commercial interests were no small influence in the making of public housing. Before the Bill to 
form the CIT had been introduced in the Legislative Council, Lord Sandhurst had already 
suggested it to the Chamber of Commerce one year prior, in February of 1897.30 
 The formation of the City Improvement Trust has previously been studied with an eye to 
whether it was a success or failure. Most scholars exploit the gap between the Trust’s stated 
objectives and its eventual accomplishments, noting that many more people were unhoused, 
made homeless, and impoverished by the Trust’s operations because the Trust couldn’t gain hold 
of its finances.31 Overpaying for land in the city, and overcompensating homeowners when 
building thoroughfares and highways meant that the Trust ran out of money often and quickly, 
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and in the process dragged the Municipal Corporation into debt with it. Instead of following this 
gap between stated objectives and subsequent accomplishments, the remainder of this chapter 
analyzes the Trust as a financial instrument connected to land in the city, and focuses on the 
enlistment of new actors with new financial roles through the institution of the Trust in the city. 
A major result of the creation of the City Improvement Trust was the enlistment of new people 
into concern about the city as a place of commerce. Such new people included the city’s rate 
payers, financiers, lenders, debtors, industrial leaders, those commercial interests concerned with 
sanitary credit, and those civilians invested in the reputation, livability, and world-prominence of 
their city. 
 What may have been unique to the colonial condition of the Trust’s formation and 
actions, was that the Trust’s operations as imagined by the government officials, needed to secure 
legitimacy in the eyes of a native “foreign population.” Thus, native leaders were sought who 
could be “representatives” of the populace. These leaders were propertied men who resisted as 
much as they could when their property was going to be acquired by the Trust. When they 
couldn’t resist they demanded greater compensation for their property. Two schemes in 
particular, the “valuation by a hypothetical building scheme” and the subsequent “plotting 
scheme” allowed property holders to gain more money than what their property was worth based 
on its potential to earn money in the future. 
 Such schemes led to a speculation frenzy in the housing and land market in Bombay, such 
that real estate values surged between 1904 through 1907, pricing out more and more labouring 
urban dwellers from adequate housing. This also meant that the Trust was paying out more than 
it could afford, since it was backed by Government. Labour too was represented through 
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capitalists, often their employers such as the Mill Owners Association. Thus, the racial line 
which divided colonizer from colonized did not prevent the formation of financial instruments in 
property, or limit the logic or rule of property. The division between colonizer and colonized 
enhanced it through the creation of an institutional body with a limitless capacity to create 
demand for housing in the city. Financiers were central to creating that demand and urban land 
and housing became a financial tool which enhanced the influence of such moneyed interests.
Raising capital was a constant issue throughout the Trust’s operations, and the 
Government anticipated this at the outset of the Trust’s formation. The debate about the Trust’s 
formation, even once people agreed that the separate body should be formed, still hinged on the 
Municipal Corporation’s financial contribution to assist the Trust’s operations. The colonial 
Government of India came up with elaborate schemes which would both allow the Trust to raise 
capital and simultaneously keep debt off of the Government’s ledger. Capital was often raised 
through loans either in the “open market” or through Government. Future indebtedness was not 
something anyone within the Trust or the Government anticipated, although the leaders of the 
Municipal Corporation were critical and vocal for just this reason. Balachandra Krishna said that 
the “already crippled state of municipal finances is apt to land us in hopeless insolvency” if the 
Corporation undertook the work, thus he supported the creation of a separate body to improve 
the city.32 Eager to not have the task of improving the city delayed by the financial problems of 
the Municipal Corporation, he agreed to have it performed under a different institutional body. 
He like everyone else, of course, believed that, “Bombay is the gate of the trade of India. It has 
business connections with the whole world. The ravages of the plague have shaken its sanitary 
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credit and have brought untold losses.”33 Still, he criticized the financial schemes undertaken to 
fund the project. 
 One example of this will suffice to show the ingenuity within the ranks of official power 
for raising the necessary capital to finance its ambitious schemes. According to the Government, 
housing the police force within Bombay was necessary because: “the continued existence of 
Bombay as a civilized community depends upon the discipline and efficiency of its conservancy 
staff and of its police.”34 Lord Sandhurst proposed means by which the money to house the 
police would be raised. His belief was that the Trust should take a loan to pay for the 
construction of the police quarters. The building, once constructed, would be leased to the 
government at a rate of rent such that within the term of the lease the entire loan could be paid 
off, including the principal and interest. At this point, the government would take over the 
buildings. The question could have been asked, why didn’t the government just take its own loan 
and house the police? What was to be gained by having the Trust, an as of yet nonexistent body, 
finance the purchase? Such questions raised doubts about the government’s intentions, but for 
Municipal Corporation leaders, it made them doubt their own expected contribution to the Trust’s 
finances. The government would end up owning the land for police accommodation in the end, 
they just weren’t purchasing it at the outset. 
 In other words, the government was, through the institution of the Trust, financing its 
own purchase of land to accommodate the police force they wanted to house in Bombay. It was 
also accomplishing this goal by not having any debt on its own ledger. By way of assurance to 
the future Trust members and the Corporation members present at the meeting, Lord Sandhurst 
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said, “It will be seen that this is equivalent to Government guaranteeing the interest on the loan 
and undertaking to buy the buildings from the Board at their prime cost on the expiry of the 
lease.”35 He also assured them that the Government would bear the cost of repairs and taxes, and 
that no liability would be borne by the Trust. The majority of loans which the Trust would by 
necessity have to raise were to be public loans, and the security for those loans was to be 
provided by giving secured property to the Trust and reclamation rights near Colaba, and west of 
the island between Worli Fort and Malabar Point, against which they could borrow money. 
  The complicated nature of the Government’s proposition to finance the Trust, of which 
the police accommodations scheme was one example, raised suspicions. It was argued that the 
question of police housing was an “Imperial question” which hadn’t been properly 
communicated to the Municipal Corporation, who now were expected to contribute to housing 
the police through their contributions to the Trust. The entire financial structure raised concerns. 
Balachandra Krishna said, 
The financial provisions of the Bill call for closer scrutiny and attention. I have consulted 
several financial experts as well as experienced lawyers in regard to their clear meaning, and 
I am constrained to remark that they agree with me in thinking that the clauses are framed in 
a somewhat complicated and ambiguous manner and require to be made more lucid and 
intelligible.36 
The technocratic nature of financing urban improvements served to both alienate and enlist new 
actors in Bombay’s improvement. 
 A logic of real estate development provided a guiding logic to the Trust’s activities. The 
revenue motive drove all the actions of the City Improvement Trust, or at least constrained them 
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visibly in the records they left behind. It is hard to know whether the second reason, a genuine 
concern for the housing conditions of the working poor, was only stated by officials to subsume 
other motives that they may have had at the time, within the logic of revenue production for the 
Trust. Trust officials justified beginning the scheme in Gowalia tank because of it “being likely 
to bring early profit to the resources of the Trust.”37 As any developer knows, the initial problem 
of cash flow has to be dealt with by building units with potential for immediate sale first so that 
assets can be later secured. Under this logic, “it was considered that the right policy was to 
postpone for a time the determination of petty projects in various quarters…”38
  A major scheme was also undertaken in the neighborhood of First Nagpada. Located at 
the center of the city, First Nagpada had been for decades the densest section of Bombay. Since 
this was such a large area where there were many plague cases, officials thought it worthwhile to 
initiate the “First Nagpada Improvement Scheme.” The population in First Nagpada was mostly 
labourers, and just over 11,000 people were planned to be rehoused under this scheme. There 
was no distinction between types of labour, both factory workers and domestic workers were 
called the labouring classes. The mortality rate in First Nagpada had increased one and one half 
times since the onset of plague.39 The Trust would purchase all the properties in the area and 
redevelop them at their will. 
 The financial calculus was always provided in the working of the Trust, but it did not 
always suggest profitably. The first four schemes were First Nagpada, redevelopment of 
properties and construction of new streets in Ward C, the creation of a very long road traversing 
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Wards B, C, and D for ventilation and mobility within the city, and roads in Ward D. These 
together were estimated to cost Rs. 182 Lakhs (1 Lakh is 100,000). Not including the projected 
increase in value over the years of the Trust’s operations, it was estimated that the Trust would 
recoup Rs. 115 Lakhs, and thus remain with a net liability of Rs. 67 Lakhs. This condition of 
being in debt, and in the red as far as the Trust’s ledger was concerned was both anticipated and 
criticized by the officials in the Bombay Municipality. The “sanitary credit” of the city was 
immensely important, however, both for the British Government who promised to secure the 
Trust’s debt believing it would one day recuperate the losses, and for those working in the City 
Improvement Trust.
 There was also going to be a required annual contribution from the Municipal 
Corporation.40 The question of the rate-payers of Bombay and their contributions and risks in the 
planned enterprises of the Trust created divisions between the Government who spoke on behalf 
of the Trust and the Municipal Corporation officials who purported to speak on behalf of 
residents of Bombay. The Government of India was proposing to guarantee the financial 
operations of the Trust, through the requirement that the Municipal Corporation contribute 
annually to the Trust’s funds by means of increased taxation. Critics called this a “bludgeon 
clause.” The critics’ argument was that the Trust should be forced to stand on its own two feet 
just as other institutional bodies within the city had been asked to do. They should balance their 
own ledger, avoid undertaking projects for which they cannot pay, and pay the price for costly 
projects which either don’t come to fruition or don’t achieve anticipated revenues meant to 
compensate for the initial outlay in cost. A guarantee would, in effect, only encourage financial 
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irresponsibility, shortsightedness due to lofty ambition, and worst of all, immediate insolvency. 
The members of the Municipal Corporation were particularly prone to voice such criticism 
because they were going to be required to provide a regular financial contribution to the Trust to 
carry out its work. 
 Lord Sandhurst, however, defended the guarantee on two main grounds: first, that it 
would allow the Trust to borrow money at a lower interest rate since Government backing would 
enable confidence in lenders, and second, that the guarantee would allow the Trust to raise funds 
prior to generating revenue. The rate of interest saved was estimated to be a quarter to half a 
percentage.41 The Government proposed to mandate that the interest on any loans taken out by 
the Trust ought to be the first charge on their revenues, and the Government also reserved a right 
to step in and increase taxation in case the Trust was about to default. 
 Balachandra Krishna was worried about the steady escalation in the contribution from the 
Municipal Corporation which would be required over the coming years of the Trust’s operations. 
The fixed rate for the Municipal Corporation to contribute to the Trust, justified because the 
Corporation too would benefit from the activities of the Trust, was fixed at two percent of the 
total rateable value of properties in the city, including buildings and privately owned land. 
Krishna worried that the future properties, those which the Trust would build, were also being 
subjected to a halakhore tax, the money to pay the caste community of sweepers and cleaners, as 
well as the cost of maintenance of sanitation and structure of new buildings. Thus, the 
Corporation would face new costs besides the two percent required of them which he felt was not  
clearly laid out for the Corporation to anticipate. Until the plague, the Corporation had almost 
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always had reserves in its budget with which they could have made their first payment, due on 
the April 1, 1900. The plague, however, had cost a lot of money to contain and surveil and thus 
the Municipal Corporation had no reserves left to make its first payment. Krishna’s solution was 
simple. He suggested a strict two percent ceiling and the promise of nothing more.42
 It was in these ways that the government wanted to insure that the lenders would be 
willing to finance the City Improvement Trust’s operations. When protests against the demands 
on rate-payers were raised, Lord Sandhurst poignantly reminded those present at the proceedings 
that compared to similar cases in England, “the power of the rate-payers of the great cities of 
India to lend their credit to promote improvements in the shape of productive works in which the 
inhabitants are vitally interested is as yet almost wholly undeveloped and that much out [sic] to 
be done here.”43 Thus, a major result of the creation of the City Improvement Trust, would be the 
enlistment of new people such as the city’s rate payers, financiers, lenders, debtors, industrial 
leaders, those commercial interests concerned with sanitary credit, and those civilians invested in 
the reputation, livability, and world-prominence of their city. The colonial Government of India 
inserted itself within local urban affairs previously thought to be a depository of self-
government, resulting in the enlistment of such numerous actors in the projects of slum 
clearances and poor housing reform. 
Market Failures for the Labouring Poor
 Balachandra Krishna ultimately conceded that the Municipal Corporation alone could 
never have borne the financial burdens of the Trust’s ambitious urban reorganization plans, thus 
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the Trust’s formation had to be accepted. He did continue to object to the terms of the 
Corporation’s required contribution, however: 
The financial responsibility, moreover, will be almost insupportable for the Corporation. As 
the Bill is now framed the Corporation is indeed to act as treasurer to the Trust, and is in the 
last resort responsible for the Trust’s liabilities; but in view of the Trust being an independent 
body, Government have made certain concessions which, I apprehend, they might not have 
made if the work was to be undertaken by the Corporation itself. Government have offered: 
(1) plots of valuable land free of charge for the first ten years and at a very low charge 
thereafter for a further period of 89 years; (2) free use of reclamation rights for the first 
twenty years after reclamation and at a low charge for 79 years thereafter: and (3) the power 
to debit to capital account such provision for interest and sinking fund as cannot be obtained 
from income.44
These three measures, essentially free land, free reclamation rights, and free money, underscored 
the immense liberty under which the Trust was to operate. Its expenditures and rights to act 
within the city were practically limitless. Market constraints which would have affected any 
other type of market player, be it public or private, would have surely limited the success of any 
plan, no matter how well-meaning. For the Trust, however, it was to have practically unlimited 
financial resources for itself. 
 Housing the poor, sanitizing the city, and putting an end to the detrimental plague seemed 
to need just such an unlimited budget. Enlisting private enterprise to solve the problems of the 
plagued city were just out of the question. Private dwelling companies were nowhere in the 
conversations or debates regarding the Trust’s operations. Housing would have to come at a cost 
to the Trust, ratepayers, and all those foregoing the chance to house the poor at a profit. Krishna’s 
words regarding this anticipated financial loss are worth quoting at length:
Under the first head the principal item would be building sanitary dwellings for the poor. This 
is a necessary and useful measure but of a doubtful financial success. That the poor mill-
hands and servant classes need better ventilated and better situated houses cannot be gainsaid. 
At the same time their income is so uncertain and scanty that it is questionable whether they 
will have the means of taking such improved but costly tenements as the Trust might 
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endeavour to supply. The wisdom of the Trust will be sorely tried in suiting sanitary 
requirements to the capacity of the payers. European experience will hardly serve as a safe 
guide here. Several English organizations, such as Lord Shaftsbury’s Co., the Artizan’s 
Dwelling Co., the Improved Industrial Dwelling Co., the Peabody Buildings, have proved 
successful as remunerative concerns. But the English working classes are a homogenous 
community getting higher wages and accustomed to a higher standard of living than their 
Indian brethren. [italics mine] The Indian mill-hand refuses, I am told, to occupy a room 
supplied by his employer at Rs. 2 a month. His earning is scanty, his habits are often 
intemperate and he is in a chronic state of indebtedness. He, moreover, is not educated 
enough to appreciate the blessings of hygiene. The buildings howsoever unpretentious will be 
more costly than the present workman’s chawls. The could not, therefore, supply letting 
quarters at the rates the workmen are at present accustomed to pay. In providing these 
buildings the Trust will have to be content with improved health and reduced mortality as the 
only return for their investment.45
The anticipated financial loss was going to be tolerated because of the Indian working classes’ 
“intemperate habits” and generally uneducated nature. Furthermore, the wages of the Indian 
labourers were already lower than their counterparts in England, thus private dwelling companies 
could never be induced to house the poor in Bombay as they had in London.46 
 The City Improvement Trust was therefore designed by Government legislation to act as 
a particular kind of public body. It was going to become the poor and labouring classes’ landlord 
through the building of public housing without the aid of private dwelling companies. It would 
become a player in the private market in housing inadvertently, without any concessions to 
private companies interests or gains but rather as a player like them. In attempting to solve the 
problem of maintaining sanitation in a city where numerous wage earners and casual labourers 
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could not afford upgrades to their own housing or didn’t have a rational interest in pursuing such 
a goal because they saw themselves as temporary migrants to the city in search of seasonal work, 
the Trust functioned to bring the public good of housing the poor into a privatized sphere of 
market exchanges. The Trust had a role in the legislative and financial fields, i.e. it was the 
means by which the Government reinserted itself into local urban affairs, financed the purchase 
of land, and advanced its role as custodian of world trade. The Trust had a role too in the field of 
the housing market, i.e. it was a privileged buyer with a capacity to create demand in housing 
and land without any limitations on its access to resources such as money and financing to make 
those purchases. 
 It was this dual position of the Trust, as both public and private entity, which would 
eventually lead to its own unravelling, i.e. the actions of the Trust would result in changes in the 
market which would render it an ultimate failure in housing the poor and limit its institutional 
life. Its social location in both the market and in government meant that people from both those 
fields would be able to influence and guide the Trust’s development, often they guided it in 
directions at odds with themselves.
 The poor and labouring classes who were to be housed and were the subjects of these 
debates about the Trust’s inception did not represent themselves. The Government of India and 
Bombay City officials relied on the representation of the population through its propertied and 
moneyed people as well as employers of the labourers. Krishna’s dissatisfaction with 
representation on the proposed Trust scheme led to him suggesting even greater representation 
by capitalists. When speaking of Bombay as the “Manchester of the East,” because between sixty  
to seventy-thousand people worked in the mills, he suggested that the Mill Owners Association 
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be granted representation on the Trust board. He made his case by reminding the group that the 
mill industry brought four lakhs of rupees to the Municipal accounts and that they had “paid up 
capital of about 10 crores rupees.” They mill owners, he argued, also had special interests, 
...as employers of labour...The mill-owners’ representative will be a valuable acquisition to 
the new Trust, for through him the Trust will be in direct touch with the mill-owning opinion. 
He would be able to give practical advice when the question of providing workmen’s 
buildings and chawls will come up for consideration before the Board, and the public will 
have more confidence in this part of the scheme if they knew that men in touch with the 
labouring classes and possessing a practical acquaintance with their requirements and 
resources are being consulted with regard to them.47 
Krishna was so convinced that it was through employers that the labourers could speak, and that 
through the employers, the Trust would be in “direct touch” with their special interests. Thus 
labour didn’t represent itself on the Trust but was spoken for through employers.
 The labouring poor were not the only objects of the Trust’s initiatives. Wealthy property 
owners too had tremendous influence over the operations of the Trust and stood to benefit the 
Trust itself through their own interests. Mutual benefits were to be had by rehousing the poor. 
Some areas of reclamation were being criticized for their proposed role in housing the upper and 
middle classes. The attention was being diverted away from the labouring poor, it was argued. In 
defense, Balachandra Krishna said about the proposed right to reclaim land which was to be 
granted to the new Trust that, 
It is also thought that reclaimed land will supply sites for the wealthy and not for the poor. 
But it is to be noted that reclamation is meant here as a source of revenue to the Trust. It is 
further to be undertaken before the land previously acquired is disposed of at profitable rates. 
Past experience is not entirely against reclamation. The Back Bay scheme no doubt failed, but 
that failure was due to various special causes. The Port Trust reclamations have on the other 
hand proved successful and may furnish valuable guidance to the new Trust. Reclaimed lands 
will give building sites for the wealthy alone; but if the congestion of the crowded localities 
can be thereby reduced, that will not be an end to be despised.48
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Reclamations of foreshore had been undertaken on numerous occasions by the Municipal 
Corporation, some schemes became notorious as ill-conceived projects such as the Back Bay 
reclamation scheme. The new land proposed to be brought into the field of housing and urban 
development by reclamations was promised to ease congestion in the city, providing more space 
for housing, port sites, and businesses for everyone. Krishna spoke of the mutual benefits when 
defending the right to reclaim lands for a wealthy neighborhood, that the benefit would be felt by 
the poor as well. The revenues from the reclamation would also benefit the Trust, something no 
doubt that the Municipal Corporation would have liked to keep for itself. 
Money against Chawls
 In such conditions, the Trust was bound to drive the housing market into a speculative 
frenzy. If the activities of the Trust were to progress, land and buildings within the city had to be 
acquired to be redeveloped. However, this proved either impossible or possible only at a very 
high cost and after considerable delay. Every step of the way and in almost every case in which 
the Trust wanted to acquire property, they were forestalled and delayed by legal and logistical 
efforts on the part of the current owners. This made their work very difficult and led to their 
adjusting of their goals in line with what could realistically be accomplished.
 Previous discussions of the Trust’s operations in Bombay have sought to judge whether 
the Trust was a failure or a success in terms of housing units made for the poor, i.e. did it succeed 
in increasing the amount of sanitary housing available to the labouring poor of Bombay? Instead 
of judging the outcomes solely for the overt aims of the Trust, we can see that the Trust 
unwillingly functioned to advance the logic of private property’s development. It did so through 
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the institutionalization of what was marked as “native” resistance on behalf of “natives” to its 
efforts by property owners throughout Bombay. The Trust’s initial aims of willingly accepting 
the financial burden of housing the poor was an acknowledgement that the market couldn’t serve 
the needs of the poorest in the city, but it also underestimated market motives so much that the 
resistance to its intended acquisitions of properties for adequate poor housing drove property 
values up. Its paternalism unwittingly fueled a real estate bubble. That the Trust failed to provide 
enough housing was due not to a lack of will but because of the influence of money and 
financing in its operations.  
 How did the Trust secure the logic of urban property as a site of financing and moneyed 
interests? There were the practical and overt and visible drivers set at the outset of its formation. 
That the Trust had government backed loans which were guaranteed made it a lucrative scheme 
for lenders. The Trust became a buyer in the market of housing with no limitations to its work. 
There was no motivation to keep the cost of acquisitions down. There were also the inadvertent 
effects of imperial and urban leaders failing to understand exactly how money operated as an 
already-existing driving factor in the contests within Bombay over rights to build the city, even 
in building those parts of the city which officials deemed uninhabitable. The importance of the 
rule of property for the residents of Bombay was underestimated by all officials. Frustrated at 
times with the slow acquisition of properties, the Trust officials described in great detail in their 
reports to Government when they wrote:
To commence with, there was considerable difficulty in procuring the establishment 
necessary for making reliable valuations and establishing their figures in the face of 
extravagant demands made by the owners with the assistance of experts. Experience shows 
that in the initial stages of such work, nearly every case will be contested and the best 
available legal talent will be employed on behalf of the owners. The smallness of the holding 
was also a very troublesome factor; in a great majority of cases the properties stood on about 
100 square yards of land and there was as much trouble and delay caused by taking up each 
such property as in the acquisition of very much larger and more valuable property. The 
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multiplication of legal proceedings necessary before any large scheme can be carried through 
is therefore a serious matter and one that cannot be avoided. Having obtained the necessary 
establishment and procured every possible detail relating to either site or structure of each 
property to be acquired, the actual work of acquisition is commenced by serving a notice on 
the owner to appear at the Collector’s Court with his title deeds and other documents. On the 
expiry of the notice it was not unusual for a representative of the owner to appear and state 
that the owner had left for his up-country residence owing to the prevalence of plague and to 
ask for a postponement of several months until the owner could appear. When the owner did 
eventually appear it was often without documents to establish his claim to the property and 
further adjournments had to be granted, first for the production of title deeds, then possibly 
for the establishment of sharers’ and mortgagees’ claims, and lastly for time to allow his 
surveyor to prepare and submit a valuation of the property. Several months having elapsed 
and the preliminary documents having at last been submitted to the court, the case is ready for 
hearing by the Collector. At this point fresh difficulties were encountered: first there was no 
established system of valuation, and for precisely similar properties one owner claimed on his 
rental, another on the assumed value of the site and structure, another on what he had paid for 
the property, and so on, namely, each on the basis thought likely to give the largest award. 
Every detail in the valuation prepared by the Trustees’ Officers was contested, and evidence 
was produced to show results favorable to the owners. This caused much delay and constant 
postponements were the rule rather than the exception.49 
As we can see from this complaint, several obstacles combined to frustrate Trust officials. At 
minimum, and to buy time, officials were delayed by documents assessing the value of a 
property being hidden or produced at the appropriate time to gain the highest compensation 
possible for the owners. Numerous “experts” and “legal talent” were in great demand by 
residents who sought their representation on behalf of their property’s value. Just within years of 
forming the Trust,’ their stated intentions alone were increasing the demand of such talent, 
raising the social status of all kinds of property experts in the city. Rather than limit the effect of 
market dynamics in the city’s housing supply, the Trust’s operations were intensifying the market 
in housing, enlisting whole cadres of real estate experts, property-valuation professionals, and 
speculators to build the inflationary dynamic.  
 A major issue in the acquisition of properties was the small size of many of the holdings, 
and small holders were more likely to contest an acquisition. For the Trust to acquire a large 
enough plot to build on, contiguous property owners had to be compensated before acquiring 
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land large enough to build the thoroughfare or building that the Trust intended to. Information 
compiled in 1909, exactly upon a decade’s work by the Trust, verified that small property owners 
were much more likely to resist and delay the Trust’s acquisitions. There were 33 cases which 
were “settled amicably” representing a total of 314,869 square yards at a cost of Rs. 31,56,082 to 
the Trust. In contrast, there were 252 cases “fought out” representing 234,180 square yards at a 
cost of Rs. 11,21,079 to the Trust. This showed that urban smallholders, were more likely to fight 
a case, since there were eight times more cases but only two-thirds of the square yards 
represented by those cases fought out. The cost too was just one-third for those cases fought out. 
Thus, battles over acquisitions were more likely over small plots rather than large ones.50 Those 
going to court over the city’s property acquisitions were owners of small properties and it is this 
group of people who overwhelmingly brought in servicemen, legal experts, and property experts 
and officials to fight make their cases against the Trust.
 Even the rental market was affected by anticipated renumeration from the Trust. In 
anticipation of higher compensation and to secure it, landlords charged higher rents or sold 
tenurial rights at higher prices. This was a reversal of previous practices when landlords used to 
offer lower official rents to evade taxes. If they could show lower values earned from their 
property, they could pay lower rates to municipal assessors. Raising rents now, these higher 
earnings could be used to show Trust officials, who would one day knock on the landlord’s 
doors, that their property earned a high revenue therefore warranting the garnering of greater 
compensation. Thus, more labourers and seasonal migrants were priced out of housing making 
choices to enter more dense flat-shares. Where there may have been six men to a room before the 
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Trust’s formation, that number increased from 1898 through the beginning decades of the 
twentieth century, not in spite of the Trust’s efforts, but because of it. 
 Compensation was often determined based on averages of prior revenue from the 
property. If revenue didn’t prove to be a good measure then owners could be compensated based 
on value of land and materials of building, which could be reused and were conceived of as fixed 
assets the Trust would gain, minus the cost of demolition and transport of materials from the site: 
  compensation = (land value + materials) - (demolition costs + transport)
If the building was condemned or unfit for human habitation, then the owner could not be 
compensated for the building but only the land, so as not to reward delinquent landlords who had 
likely rendered building materials unusable through neglect. 
 Those who couldn’t secure highest compensation based on previous revenues found new 
and ingenious ways to influence the Trust into providing higher compensation. A tribunal of 
appeals heard cases where the owner and city officials were in dispute about the value of the 
property to be acquired. Some landowners who didn’t have buildings on their land but rather 
one-story casual units which were constructed as if to be non-permanent,51 protested that they 
shouldn’t be compensated according to net revenues because the hutments didn’t garner much 
rent. They said their land was worth much more than the rent. Upon appeal of this method of 
valuation, the tribunal decided to admit a “valuation by a hypothetical building scheme.” This 
meant that rather than compensating based on achieved past revenues, the land should be 
compensated based on what rents could be acquired if the land were fully developed.52 
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 This resulted in a whole new set of experts and property professionals who could now 
draw up elaborate plans which would have brought in exorbitant rents. The Trust dutifully, 
backed by government and the enforced participation of the Municipal Corporation, paid out the 
elaborate compensation. This means of assessing rightful compensation meant that surveyors 
who assessed future revenues were “bringing in paper schemes for the erection of magnificent 
buildings upon sites which were already often fully developed according to the requirements of 
the neighbourhood and claiming an altogether fictitious value for the land on this basis.” People 
were being compensated for “the profit of a future development that might or might not be 
realized.”53 Speculation had become not just about the future value of a commodity, but was 
realizable in the present. The limitless supply of financing available to the Trust made paying the 
anticipated and inflated values possible. 
 The Trust eventually came to doubt this scheme, but did no better when in its place it 
adopted a “plotting scheme” method of value assessment. This method involved, “laying out a 
piece of land of this nature (on paper only) in building sites, providing for roads and passages 
and ascertaining what each plot would fetch if sold for building purposes by comparison with 
other sales of more or less similar plots of land in the neighborhood.” This too resulted in the 
Trust paying out “...very large sums of public money to which the Trust believe that the 
claimants have no right at all.”54 Surveyors and lawyers along with property owners and 
landholders managed to provide elaborate paper schemes and garner inflated compensation. 
Drawings and plans had become hot commodities through the Trust’s operations. 
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 It seemed the Trust and Government officials who designed it to solve the problem of 
insanitary dwellings in Bombay had underestimated the ingenuity of propertied and moneyed 
peoples to continually secure and even elevate their status in society. What had been severely 
underestimated was the native Bombay landholder’s and landlord’s sense of their property 
entitlements. The rule of property was already secured in Bombay prior to the Trust’s formations 
and the Trust worked to inadvertently enhance it.
Abandonment of Poor Housing
 By 1909, when the Trust looked back on its first decade of activity, it had removed 
14,613 tenements and built 6,111 tenements.55 Clearly, more people were dis-housed by the 
Trust’s activities than were rehoused. In the 1911 census on the city, it was found that three-
fourths of the city’s population resided in one room tenements.56 The overcrowding and housing 
problem had only gotten worse, and Trust officials as well as its numerous critics were aware of 
this problem. The institution of the Trust had its own learning curve, adjusting its methods as it 
learned what did and didn’t work. Moreover, it became very influenced by the need to exist on a 
sound commercial footing, i.e. bring in revenues to pay for its projects. Yet another issue, was the 
way in which moneyed concerns sought refuge in growing parts of the city outside of the Trust’s 
domain, where they could build more freely, away from the constraints of the Trust’s more 
stringent building by-laws. The chairman of the Trust said after the first world war, that:
Unaccustomed to such strict building regulations and to such close supervision and sanitary 
control as the Trust’s staff exercise both before and after the completion of buildings, and 
preferring freehold to leasehold tenure, builders and investors ... fought shy of the Trust’s 
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plots and preferred to invest money received from the Trust in compensation for their old 
properties in building on sites just outside the Trust’s estate, especially where they could take 
advantage of new open spaces created by the Trust for purposes of ventilation, and too often, 
in consequence of the weakness of the Municipal building by-laws, such investments have 
resulted in the formation of what will ultimately be recognized as modern slums.57
Orr was insightful and astute, the modern slum was created from the bottom up, by people eking 
out livelihoods in relations of exchange and production outside of official purview. Isolating the 
question of housing, as the Trust had done to remedy the problem, was an exercise in futility. So 
many other factors contributed to the rational choices people made about how they were to live. 
After the first decade of activity, the Trust increasingly housed the wealthy, arguing that those 
schemes were more commercially sound. Officials also argued that middle and upper class 
housing schemes had a useful and indirect influence on the conditions of the labouring poor, 
easing congestion in many neighborhoods. This was not true though, numerous labouring poor 
persons had merely lost their homes through the demolition drives.58
 There was a constant tension through the first two decades of the twentieth century, 
between the Trust’s desire to intervene in the market in housing on behalf of the labouring poor 
and its desire to encourage private enterprise in housing schemes. On the one hand was the 
awareness that poor housing was a market failure and on the other were the interests of the 
commercial elite whose fortunes were dependent on the private market in housing. As early as 
1901, the chairman of the Trust had suggested encouraging private men’s capacities to house the 
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poor since it would free up the Trust’s treasury, however there were always reservations too 
about these suggestions.59 
 Housing labourers could have, in theory, been done by employers and companies, but 
wartime market forces and the threat of worker strikes prevented this. In 1903, the Millowners 
Association requested that the Trust build housing for its labourers in exchange for the 
association paying the rent for the property so that they could house their workers. This was a 
kind of mortgaging scheme for the Millowners Association, who wanted to become owners of 
the property by 1940, thus using the Trust to finance the production and acquisition of worker’s 
chawls. The proposal was denied however in the Legislative Council, and the Trust argued that it 
would only build housing for those displaced by the Trust’s activities, it was not going to build 
housing for other labourers who had otherwise no interaction with the Trust. In 1913, a scheme 
called the “Poorer classes accommodation scheme” was passed, which gave the Trust the legal 
resources to work with employers to build labourers’ housing in almost the exact same terms as 
had originally been proposed by the mill owners association, except the term was 28 years and 
not 37 years. Only one mill participated by then, the wartime economy had made the prospect of 
building poor housing much more dubious. Not only were materials more expensive, but the risk 
of housing workers all in the same building was becoming threatening with the rise of labour 
organization. There was a “fear of combinations facilitating strikes.”60 Poor housing, rather than 
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being removed from the market, if kept in the market itself, turned out to be a good form of 
labour control. 
 By 1919, it was reported that 892,000 of Bombay’s 1.2 million people lived in single 
rooms. A combination of elite moneyed interests, and the maintenance of the ambiguity on 
whether private enterprise or public intervention could solve the problem of poor housing had 
rendered the Trust an official failure. As one scholar has observed, “Significantly, the most 
effective resistance emanated from propertied Indians who were able to subvert the very legal 
and bureaucratic mechanisms by means of which the Trust sought to alter the urban built 
environment.”61 
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Fig. 5.1 Map of Island of Bombay showing the work carried out by the City Improvement Trust 
between 1898-1933.
Source: Available in Sharada Dwivedi, Rahul Mehrotra, and Umaima Mulla-Feroze, Bombay: 
The Cities Within. Bombay: India Book House, 1995.
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 The Trust survived, even if barely, the wartime economy, however the depression of 
1929-30 could not be overcome. In 1932, the Trust reported that, “All the members of the Trust 
staff voluntarily accepted an emergency cut in their salaries ranging from 5% for persons 
drawing Rs. 100 and over to 10% for persons drawing over Rs. 700. A saving of about Rs. 
20,000 was thereby effected.”62 In addition, upon the amalgamation with the Bombay Municipal 
Corporation, the Trust had a debt of Rs. 90 lakhs on its ledger. Faced with bank crises, the Trust 
sold off Rs. 50 lakhs of that debt to private investors and repaid the rest in 1932. Private parties 
offered loans, one in particular of Rs. 10 lakhs at the rate of 5%, which was less than the normal 
7.5% raised prior. Private money markets took up what banks couldn’t do anymore. It was a 
“great inconvenience as in times of panic the Banks were not willing to advance money to the 
Trust.”63
 Also in 1932, a bill for the “amalgamation of the Trust with the Bombay Municipality” 
was introduced in the Legislative Council, and the combination was successful. The Trust’s 
tenure was over, as was any possibility that a public effort to solve the problem of poor housing 
could be imagined. The rise of nationalist sentiment by this point meant that the problems of the 
poor were increasingly blamed on the colonizers, and not the problems of rational markets. That 
poor housing was a market failure was forgotten, or at least put on hold until the problem of self-
sovereignty could be resolved. 
 In that same year, the Trust report included a detailed map of the city of Bombay with 
amazing details showing the demarcation of Trust lands, those which were currently being 
demarcated because of encroachments-not necessarily poor encroachments but rather of any kind 
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due to the persistent ambiguity on where Trust lands began and where they ended. The map also 
plotted out areas where certain schemes were in effect. This was one of the earliest forms of 
evidence that Dharavi was once a “Trust acquired estate” because of scheme that was due to take 
place. There were also “Government lands vested in Trust for 99 years,” such as the areas known 
as the Race Course, Willingdon Park, Marine Line Maidan, and Cooperage. Parts of the map 
were marked with the letters “SH” which indicated semi-permanent huts, which were in several 
locations throughout the island. Notably, there was not a single occurrence of “SH” in Dharavi. 
One of the schemes undertaken that year was to fill in low-lying lands in Dharavi, as requested 
by the Municipal Health Department, most likely due to mosquitoes.64 
Conclusion
 This chapter has focused on the moneyed relations which drove the project to rehouse the 
labouring and urban poor of Bombay through the City Improvement Trust, mainly between 1898 
and 1920. It has shown how contradictory desires to both provide clean housing and enhance 
values in terms of urban investments led to the consolidation of the moneyed elites in Bombay 
and the eventual unravelling of an otherwise ambitious poor housing scheme. Tension between 
the already existing Municipal Corporation and the new City Improvement Trust played out as 
each tried to claim and abandon responsibility for housing the labouring classes. The Trust was 
seen as an assault on the principle of urban self-government. Ultimately through the decades of 
Trust activities, more people were dis-housed than rehoused, only serving to exacerbate the poor 
housing problem. Nonetheless, important things were accomplished through the Trust’s efforts, 
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namely, the status of the moneyed classes was elevated to caretakers of the city, and their power 
was consolidated. 
 I have argued that the Trust, in addition to being a particular kind of urban conglomerate, 
should also be seen as a means of institutionalizing new financial instruments of government 
lines of credit towards the building of poor housing and the making of new buyers in the domain 
of the housing market. Seeing the Trust as a financial instrument has allowed us to see that it 
became a buyer of unlimited resources, causing a real estate boom as amidst its paternalistic 
activities. Landlords eagerly sought out compensation from the Trust, even being rewarded for 
plots of land in which they had nothing but a set of drawings on what could have been built 
there. Such financial mismanagement and eagerness to recompense landlords eventually led to 
the Trust’s financial failures. While initially the Trust was consciously willing to bear 
tremendous costs to clean the city, to rehouse the poor, and to restore the sanitary credit of the 
city, those costs undermined its efforts. Leaders within it advocated for the removal of poor 
housing from the domain of the market and believed that they alone would be suited to be the 
landlords of the labouring classes. However, that goal was at odds with the desire to maintain the 
support of landlords within the city.
 Later, the depressions of the 1930s made the financial initiatives of the Trust 
unsustainable, and the CIT was eventually amalgamated into the Municipal Corporation in the 
early 1930s. For those awaiting reforms and the chance at self rule, understandings and 
knowledge about the place of poverty within the urban economy was presented as a national 
problem. The problem of urban poverty came to be seen as one native leaders alone could 
address. For the labouring and poor urban dwellers, they were left to the whims of the market, a 
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familiar condition for those seeking housing in the ever-growing city. Boundary-making and the 
urban poverty problem is discussed in the next two chapters. 
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Chapter Six: 
Karachi & Aden, Bombay’s Peripheries
 Port cities across the Arabian sea of the Indian Ocean, as far as Aden and Karachi, were 
contained within the Bombay Presidency’s administrative rubric. Commonalities in the cities’ 
development combined with differences in administrative priorities to make these cities 
comparable with each other. Shipping was the main form of communication between these port 
towns. By the beginning of the 20th century, these growing cities started to produce urban 
leaders who believed their city was being used solely as a seat of power for those located 
elsewhere, particularly in Bombay. While Bombay’s City Improvement Trust was dis-housing 
and rehousing its labouring and poor dwellers to restore its “sanitary credit,” in Karachi and 
Aden the problem of poor housing did not find similar solutions. There was no Improvement 
Trust in these cities and it was hard for local urban leaders to develop the kind of institutional 
framework which would bring in Imperial lines of credit on the scale that it did in Bombay. 
Rising classes of merchants were able to use these seaport connections to establish nodes of 
commerce between the three cities, but in Karachi and Aden, they did so as a way to escape any 
limitations and regulations on their commercial enterprises. 
 Seeing Bombay from the outside, from the perspective of Karachi and Aden, this chapter 
demonstrates how the poor in each of these cities could be used as grounds upon which 
Bombay’s sub-imperial position was challenged and, in so doing, effectively delayed the 
resolution of the poor housing problem. This subsumption and delaying of the urban poverty 
problem was most visible in Bombay’s “peripheries,” in Karachi and Aden, where urban elites 
absolved themselves of solving the poor housing problem by appealing to the assumption, in 
Karachi’s case, that it had not modernized as much as Bombay, and in Aden’s case, that Aden’s 
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poor were not the responsibility of the Indian capitalist. While the process of urbanization had 
resulted in slums in all major cities across the Bombay Presidency, including in Bombay, Karachi 
and Aden, a particular engagement with the temporality of capitalist development sustained 
notions of regional distinction. These regional distinctions lent credibility to autonomy 
movements which eventually removed Bombay as the seat of power over these cities, but it also 
productively delayed the problems of the urban poor. In Aden, the total abandonment of the 
urban poverty problem was visible, while in Karachi, a desire to “catch up” to Bombay’s stage of 
commercial advancement meant that leaders advocated infrastructure for more commercial 
opportunities, not a restraining of commercial ambitions.
 Karachi’s merchants resisted both Bombay and the construction of an exogenous origin 
story, emphasizing a long history of maritime commerce. While Karachi could be accessed over 
land, the most common form of transportation between Karachi and Bombay was by sea, making 
the route much shorter. Karachi’s merchants experienced their centuries-long history of trade and 
commerce as evidence of their right to commercial prominence, autonomy, and wealth on their 
own terms. Although they understood Karachi to be a new city, they didn’t believe a port or 
oceanic trade was new to them. They deployed Sindh’s long history of port towns and wanted to 
restore and revive their prior prominence which had dwindled because of their attachment and 
dependence on governance from Bombay. While Bombay’s precolonial history was understood 
by native locals as being insular and cut off from the rest of the world until the colonial 
imposition, i.e. many of Bombay’s leaders accepted the colonial narrative, Karachi’s precolonial 
history was understood as already connected to other world ports. That the British misunderstood 
Sindh’s commercial past had to be corrected.
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 Aden, in contrast, was a fueling station en route to further ports. The most prominent 
merchants had established corporate centers across the cities of Bombay, Karachi and Aden. 
Some merchants used Karachi as their main hub while others used Bombay. In either case, Aden 
was a common stopping point for all ships headed west; it was necessary for refueling, a 
logistical necessity which required a lot of manual labour to carry coal back and forth from 
depositories to the ships. The demand for labour led many migrants to Aden in search of work. 
 In both Karachi and Aden, the poor housing problem was no less an issue than it was in 
Bombay; however, solutions to the problem were hard to come by due to these cities perceived 
subsidiary role to Bombay. Challenging that subsidiary role contributed to the Sindh autonomy 
movement in Karachi, which had as one of its crucial components, municipal self-governance for 
the city of Karachi. The issue of housing for the labouring poor was thoroughly sidelined by the 
interests of Bombay’s merchants and those merchants in Karachi who wanted to “catch up.” 
Aden fared even worse, basically turning into a labour colony for Western India’s shipping 
industries. 
 Thus, as anti-imperial movements and regionalist aspirations grew in the early 20th 
century, it wasn’t only those in Bombay who were were observant and critical of forms of 
extractive sovereignty. Cities beyond Bombay started to see Bombay as an instrument of 
imperial power and thus an obstacle to their own modern progress; they thus cast Bombay as a 
monopolizer of colonial capital and contested its right to authority over them. 
Karachi: Commercial Competition
 Sindh was the farthest province of the Bombay presidency from the capital city, Bombay, 
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and had a centuries-long history of port towns rising and falling as commercial adventurers from 
both outside and inside the region tried to secure their fortunes. Well established credit and 
merchant networks used these ports to transact across Central Asia, the Middle East, East Africa, 
and the Indian subcontinent well through the early modern period. After they were annexed to 
Bombay in the mid-nineteenth century, the desire to gain some autonomy from Bombay was felt 
for quite some time in Karachi even before the nationalist and sub-nationalist movements of the 
1910s and 20s. 
 While Karachi may have felt like a totally new and modern port, Sindh had a long history 
of oceanic trade and social networks of commerce based in port towns preceded the rise of 
Karachi’s merchants. The kind of history that was constructed for the city of Bombay in which 
the British were given all the credit for the opening up of commercial opportunities, as we saw in 
the first chapter, was similarly at play amongst Karachi’s historians. Alexander Baillie published 
Kurrachee: Past, Present and Future in 1890. He reviewed the harbour and port’s history prior 
to discussing the British period. He said of the port’s pre-British past that,
It is obvious that the princes of Sind had no ocean-shipping interests: that they attached but 
little value to imports and exports, except in so far as they might tend to increase their 
revenues, and add to their personal comforts, and consequently they lent very slight 
encouragement to the opening up of seaports, and gave no assistance towards their 
advancement, but rather opposed their creation and development.1
The British propaganda campaign about their sole efforts at modernization demanded that 
Sindh’s previous rulers be cast as extractive, self-concerned, feudal overlords with no interest in 
the well being of Sindh’s merchants. British intervention was necessary to utilize the potential 
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for commerce:
But when the disturbed condition of the country demanded the intervention of the British 
Government, the desirability of having a seaport was at once recognized by the Government 
of India, at that time the Honourable East India Company, and the advantages offered by the 
harbour of Kurrachee were fully appreciated. In a short time the foreign trade that sprung up 
attracted native traders from the interior, and European merchants from Bombay. Money was 
granted for harbour improvements, barracks were built, roads were made, and banks and 
other institutions were established.2
British modernization efforts, including infrastructure for trade such as roads, harbors, banks, 
and money transformed this practically ignored potentiality from a “miserable native fortress into 
a civil town of considerable size.” When Sindh was annexed by the British in 1839, the 
population of Karachi was a mere 8,000 to 14,000 inhabitants. Thirty years later it was thought 
to be 50,000 people. The value of trade in 1843 was estimated at Rs. 1,200,000. After just two 
years, it was estimated to have tripled, then in 1865 it was Rs. 46,500,000, and in 1885 it was Rs. 
90,000,000. Baillie said of this growth that:
Such a rapid increase in population and trade is not uncommon in the United States, and other 
parts of the American continent, or even in Australia, but it would be remarkable in Europe, 
and is unparalleled in India.3
Sindh and its harbour was cast as a frontier of human settlement, like the settler colonies of the 
British Empire. The story being created was that the coast of Sindh were entirely isolated from 
world trade until the British arrived.
 However, unlike observers of Bombay, Karachi’s merchants remembered a different past 
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than the story the British were telling. They experienced their long history of trade and 
commerce as evidence of their right to commercial prominence, autonomy, and wealth on their 
own terms. Although they understood Karachi to be a new city, they didn’t believe a port or 
oceanic trade was new to them. They were aware of Sindh’s long history of port towns and 
wanted to restore and revive their prior prominence which had dwindled in their attachment and 
dependence on governance from Bombay. That the British misunderstood Sindh’s commercial 
past had to be corrected. 
 Understanding Sindh’s early modern history is important to countering official imperial 
history about Karachi and its trade. As early as the 15th and 16th century, the Portuguese had 
attempted to set up monopolistic trading routes down the western coast of South Asia, starting 
north by the Indus river, and moving southwards down the peninsular coast. Their role in the port 
city of Thatta was basically to be one of several intermediary groups in an already established 
nexus. Sindhi cloth traveled from Thatta down the river to Lahori bander and then across the 
Arabian sea up the strait of Hormuz. Thatta was a center of trade and courtly activity well before 
the Portuguese, being ruled by the Sumras and then the Sammas, a Sunni dynasty with 
allegiances to both Delhi and the Central Asian Mongols. This competition between Delhi and 
Central Asia for Sindh’s allegiance drove much of the battles within Sindh itself. When the 
Portuguese successfully acquired Hormuz, the Sammas controlled all of lower Sindh, and Thatta 
was the capital.4 Thus the profit from the trade of Sindhi textiles, through the collection of trade 
tariffs, went to the Sammas. Hormuz was an entrepot-state at this time on the island of Jarun, and 
Portuguese acquired it in 1515. Records from customs revenues kept by the Portuguese for the 
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1540’s at Hormuz show that one-third of revenue came from Gujarat, another third from Persia 
itself, another ten percent from Sindh, and the remainder from Basra and the Portuguese 
themselves. Thus Sindh was a very connected region. However, much contest over the port of 
Lahori Bander reveals that this area was seen as potentially more profitable due to its exclusive 
landed connections into central asia. The possibility of two routes connecting Hormuz and 
Thatta, that by sea just discussed and that over land made the ports a profitable prize. Generally, 
these two routes operated as complements, when one wasn’t possible, the other was used. Hence 
the ten percent port revenue from within Sindh itself was only a fraction of profits to be made. 
Both the Portuguese and the Dutch had made consistent speculations on what net profit 
would be accumulated if they could become the sea-based intermediaries between Thatta and 
Hormuz. A Dutchman Pieter Broecke said in 1619 of the region:
From Lohoor one may navigate through a river into the kingdom of Sinde, which is also part 
of the realm of Chachalm or the Great Moghul. The main commercial centres there are named 
Sinde Tatta and Diolsinde. Here a great abundance of beautiful textiles are produced, which 
are mostly transported by the Portuguese to Ormus and from there to Persia and Arabia. This 
is mostly done by Italians, Persians, and Moors, who all of them are engaged in this important  
trade between Ormus and Bassora, a city in the Cinus Persicus.5
Dutch traders were in control of Iran ever since 1623, when the VOC had a factory in Iran had 
noticed in 1634 that an estimated revenue of 680,340 Dfl was generated over land between Sindh 
and Iran, and if it had been carried by sea, a profit of 1,011,500 Dfl was possible.6 They also 
recognized that the Portuguese were purposefully making this difficult for the Dutch. Through 
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alliances with local traders, and sales of arms to local rulers, the Portuguese had secured an 
allegiance, such that Dutch traders would find themselves stranded for several days at Lahori 
Bander and other smaller ports such as Karatje, the predecessor to modern day Karachi, without 
merchants even coming to visit them. Only when they learned that Thatta was where they ought 
to go, did they realize that the Portuguese had secured loyalty there. 
 The Dutch had almost nothing to trade which the Sindhis wanted, having arrived here 
only because of a command by VOC directors to get rid of the surplus sugar mistakenly 
accumulated in Batavia. Whenever they attempted to make a sale by first allowing the inspection 
of samples, they would be told that the same item could be bought cheaper from the Portuguese.7 
Minimum prices for sales were set on all goods by the VOC, except sugar which was to be sold 
for one main reason, to get rid of the surplus.8 
Changes both in Persia and South Asia led to the decline of Thatta by the beginning of 
the 19th century. The Mughals gained control over Sindh, making Lahore the main manufacturing 
base, and Hormuz fell due to the Safavids and English. Aurangzeb established Aurangabander in 
the mid-1600’s, and thus the Mughals gained more control over the Western Indian coast and its 
oceanic trade. Similar contests for Gujarat by the Mughals, especially under Akbar9 against local 
Sultans prove that the Mughals had realized that the Indian ocean commerce and revenue it 
generated was crucial to their land-based imperial interests. The Portuguese role in this route was 
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thus reduced by the 1630’s, after which the English set up more permanent factories, only to be 
removed and permitted again and again by the Talpur Mirs in the early 1800’s. 
Interestingly in the case of Sindh, merchants often petitioned their regional statesmen, the 
Talpur Mirs, to have the English removed. The company needed to claim that trade had been 
stifled under the Talpurs, and that the East India Company was setting up factories in order to 
“benevolently” open up the region to commerce, which was evidently an anachronistic and self-
serving claim. Evidence shows that the opposite was true. But former EIC officials such as 
Outram and Eastwick spoke out strongly against the East India Company, as did numerous 
agitators for autonomy in the early 1900’s. The heightened political discourse through the 1930’s 
would recall the great economy under Talpur reign, and use it to champion secession from the 
Bombay Presidency. 
The British annexation of Sindh in 1843 by Sir Napier presented new challenges for the 
Sindhi commercial network and the routes established through the early modern 16th-18th 
centuries. Commercial activities were reoriented towards new centers in London and Bombay. 
Indigo production in Sindh, which along with Gujarat was once one of the highest in the world, 
was shifted to Bihar. Two networks based out of Shikarpur and Hyderabad respectively had 
different trajectories of negotiation. The Shikarpuris continued on the strength of previous 
network connections, while the Hyderabadis sought connections throughout the region under the 
control of the Bombay Presidency. It is true that colonial rule reduced the viability of Sindh as a 
financial and commercial network base: 
While, prior to the annexation, Sind was a participant in a wide-ranging system of 
interregional and international trade, under British rule, its function was increasingly reduced 
to that of an outlet for the agricultural production of the Punjab. In the second half of the 
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nineteenth century, the bulk of the investment the British made in Sind was in the 
construction of a modern harbour in Karachi and of railway lines linking the port with the 
Punjab.10
The global role of Karachi was established through a colonial economic relation in which grain 
and raw materials were exported through Karachi’s newly built harbors and manufactured goods 
from the industrializing world were sold in Karachi’s newly built marketplaces. A landed and 
agricultural class of rural notables from Punjab, a mixed Hindu and Muslim business community 
of Sindhis, a bureaucratic class of colonial administrators from the Bombay Presidency and 
European merchants, all came together to motor the colonial economy.  By the end of the 19th 
century, the port city Karachi became the largest grain exporter of the Indian subcontinent, fixing 
its role as an urban outpost for demands made elsewhere. 
 Some argued that Bombay’s revenue paid for the construction of the port of Karachi, but 
later separatists contested the claim that Sindh had become financially dependent on Bombay 
and argued that it was fully capable of supporting itself. The port benefited the Punjab the most, 
and Punjabi officials were happy to derive opportunities from the port without having to include 
Sindh as a part of its province, even when some British officials made such recommendations.11 
 Another factor in the changes in Sindh through colonial rule involved the arrival of new 
traders in greater numbers from Bombay, who for the first time, were sharing dominion with the 
notably prosperous Sindhi merchants. Parsi contractors, Jewish traders, Gujarati banias, Marwari 
traders, and Punjabis arrived for the first time at this rate to trade at the Karachi port, while 
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Ismaili Khojas and Kutchi Memons strengthened old ties.12 This replaced previous Shikarpuri 
and Hyderabadi bases, thus resulting in a steady decline in commercial activity for both upper 
and lower Sindh, out of Karachi. The Hyderabadi network, however, was able to survive and 
enter a larger global economy, through connection with Bombay. 
 A network of Hyderabadi merchants also called Sindwork merchants flourished after 
1860. Through the annexation period, they were able to exploit connections to Bombay, and thus 
the world well into the contemporary period. The base of these Sindworkies evolved from local 
merchants, shopkeepers, and generally retailers into the network. Initially, however, the transition 
wasn’t easy. The Talpur Amirs had made Hyderabad their capital, and thus the Hyderabadis had 
had state patronage of their financial and commercial skills. When Sir Charles Napier arrived, he 
moved the capital from Hyderabad to Karachi, thus eliminating the state’s patronage to 
Hyderabadis commercial activities. Thus immediately after annexation, Hyderabad’s merchant 
community suffered due to reduced opportunities.13 
 By 1860, however, the Sindworkies began trading along new network routes, through 
1914, the outbreak of World War One. They traded in goods from all over India, through 
Benares, Kashmir, and the Punjab. The increasing demand for “ethnic Indian goods” 
internationally led them to prosper, as did their ability to adapt to new local environments. Trade 
in “Oriental” crafts at newly opening “Oriental” shops in London and other cities both in Europe 
and North America drove demand. They eventually became intermediaries in new locations for 
the sale of all sorts of “Eastern” goods, ranging from Chinese and Japanese silk and far Eastern 
crafts, to Egyptian products. The five major areas of global expansion for the Sindworkies were, 
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“Gibraltar and North Africa, Egypt, Java, the Straits Settlements and neighbouring Sumatra, and 
the Philippines.”14 
 The outbreak of the First World War and the Great Game between Russia and the West 
had effects on both Shikarpuri and Hyderabadi merchants. Both merchant communities, but more 
so the Hyderabadi Sindworkies, took advantage of being subjects of the British crown and 
demanded legal protection and free travel across the British colonial globe. However, their 
previous pattern of travel into Central Asia, and thus Russia, could not be sustained through the 
early 20th century. There is evidence that some merchants traded in an age-old and highly 
valuable commodity through the rivalry with Russia: information. Functioning as spies, some 
merchants would sign contracts for information gathering in Central Asian locations for any 
fixed period of time. Legal problems arose on occasion because of this arrangement. In general, 
however, it seems the Sindhi merchants were unable to assess political tensions, and remained in 
Central Asia until after 1914, and suffered greatly by not disinvesting earlier.15 
 In Russia, state officials had increasingly become weary of the role Indian merchants 
(and therefore British subjects) were playing in the money market. Emperor Alexander II 
(1855-1881) officially capped the interest rates Sindhi financiers could charge. This limited the 
financiers a little, but greater regulation was sought and increasing legal restrictions were enacted 
into the 20th century. In 1877, Governor General Kaufman published a seven point circular which 
explicitly forbade the possession of land, contracts, and gifts of land for more than six months, 
and officially regulated the repayment of debt to the “Indian moneylenders.” The merchants 
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responded unhappily through a series of letters but to no avail.16 The state government of Russia 
enacted radical changes to the entire banking system of the country, thus greatly diminishing the 
role of these moneylenders, and reduced their numbers in the population: “Within two decades of 
the publication of that circular, the number of Indians in the Turkestan Krai dropped to less than 
1000, roughly two-thirds of the population having returned to India.”17 At this point, the 
connection between South Asia and Central Asia was greatly severed, the transformation in the 
banking and economy of Russia providing radical change and increased control over Central 
Asian trade.18 World War one also cut up the globe in new ways, such that South Asian British 
subjects travel and trade also became restricted in the Middle East.
 Karachi’s merchants believed that it was only when the British annexed the region in 
1843, had Sindh become a regulated province of Bombay such that the economy declined. As it 
was brought into the colonial relation, Sindh became a periphery to imperial centers in Calcutta 
and Bombay as well as London. Sindhi merchants began a movement to separate their city from 
Bombay’s governance in 1913 when a leader of Karachi’s Municipal Corporation, Harchandrai 
Vishindas, gave a speech that cited Karachi’s cultural uniqueness alongside Karachi’s relative 
impoverishment as proof that Karachi should be released from its subordination to Bombay. 
Karachi’s development had been neglected, its capacity for commerce was unmet, a deviation 
from its potential history. Regional distinction was linked to the problem of poverty, and the poor 
became the grounds upon which a contest over sovereignty between regional and imperial 
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leaders could be had. 
 The complaints against the Bombay Presidency included issues having to do with the 
decline of the port’s economic profitability. It seemed some great accident of misplaced trust that 
a British officer had annexed Sindh in 1843, and then by coincidence attached it to Bombay, a 
competing sea port. At the Sind Separation Conference of 1932, the speaker recalled the tale 
thus:
In 1830 when Alexander Burnes wanted to see Ranjit Singh in Lahore, his best way to get to 
him was through Sind, and the Sind rulers of those days gave free access to the British for the 
purpose. In 1838 the British armies were allowed free passage through Sind in their 
expedition to Afghanistan. It was because Sind was thus traversed by British officers and 
British-Indian troops from Bombay, that Sir Charles Napier took the opportunity to annex 
Sind in 1843. As is well known he did this against orders and practically acknowledged his 
guilt.
He went on to speculate on the counterfactual, that Sindh would have been attached to the 
Punjab or North India, such that Sindh would,
probably have been able to develop its port of Karachi with reference to its natural hinterland 
more freely than was possible in the rivalry of Karachi with Bombay when Bombay held the 
supreme power.19
The question here was of a “natural” ocean-hinterland connection through a port, presumably a 
long established historical one, which was remembered in the 1930s as the changes had come. 
The ushering of the sub-continent into World War II by the colonial administration, and that too 
on the heels of the economic depressions of the 1930s, without consulting any provincial leaders, 
surely prevented any resurgence of local economies after the provincial autonomy Act of 1935. 
However, these were the stated ambitions in the interwar period. 
 Enhancing Karachi’s ability to participate in world trade was central to the demand for 
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autonomy in Sindh. Along with this demand, came the claim that the region’s and the city’s 
poverty would be remedied by that enhancement. The complaints were that the port had been 
insufficiently developed, that roads from Karachi to the interiors were lacking, that there was no 
railway connecting Karachi to Delhi, and that the basic infrastructure for trade was lacking. 
Because of these deficiencies, Karachi had not been able to serve as a center of commercial 
activity to the degree that other ports had. Bombay’s prominence had allowed merchants more 
accustomed to Bombay and its regions to out-compete merchants exclusively located in Bombay. 
 Most importantly for our concerns, was the claim that were there more money flowing 
into the port city of Karachi, there would be resources available to solve the poor housing 
problem in the city of Karachi. That there weren’t meant that the poor housing issue would have 
to wait. Thus, through the first decades of the twentieth century when the Bombay Improvement 
Trust was rehousing slumdwellers, as flawed as that project was, Karachi’s leaders could not 
enlist a similar plan for their city. Nor however, is it clear that such a scheme is how they would 
have chosen to solve their poverty problem. The sole desire amongst Karachi’s leaders were to 
enhance the port city’s ability to become a home for world trade. That commercial goal was first 
and solving the problem of poor housing would have to wait. 
 On a visit to Karachi in 1918, the Viceroy and Governor General of India, Frederic 
Chelmsford, and his wife were welcomed by the municipal leaders of the city. On their greeting, 
they addressed Mr. Chelmsford thusly:
In this connection we may venture to suggest the urgent importance of a direct broad gauge 
railway line between Karachi and Delhi….also the necessity of direct broad gauge railway 
communication between Karachi and Bombay via Cutch. The public have been long agitating 
for these railways, and it is hoped that Government will see its way to overcome all possible 
obstacles thereto....We may here..make mention…application made to Municipality for a 
large piece of land for the establishment of Aerodrom, Flying School, and Aeroplane 
Terminal Station for Western India. Should this …materialize…will eventually annihilate 
distance between Karachi and England, to say nothing of Karachi and Delhi, and give an 
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impetus to the development of this City.20
The “annihilation” of distance was necessary for increasing trade and all the addresses to Mr. 
Chelmsford on this visit were about that. Since the capital had been moved from Calcutta to 
Delhi, Karachi’s elites were keen to make sure that the shorter distance between the capital and 
Karachi should have great benefits from them. They had complaints about the lack of 
expenditure in the past on the infrastructure:
We are sorry to observe the entire lack of activity in the past, on the part of Gov’t and Local 
Boards in providing trunk roads leading out of Karachi. In fact, the proceedings of the last 
Legislative Council of Bombay have disclosed the lamentable fact that Sind has been very 
greatly stinted on this respect as compared to the other parts of the Presidency. The lack of 
good roads leading out of the City has not only been keenly felt by all classes of the 
population, who are thereby confined to urban limits, but their necessity is so patent for the 
development of the country, for travel, trade and business of all kinds, particularly in the 
vicinity of a rising city of the importance of Karachi, that it is all the more surprising that the 
matter has apparently received no attention from the Authorities concerned.21
They were correcting this prior lack of attention by extending the Town Planning Act to Karachi, 
which was being used to fill swamp beds, build roads through areas, remove obstructive sites on 
land so that they could create communications across town and into the interior, and acquire land 
for improvements for which they wanted to raise loans in the open markets. None of these 
measures involved rehousing schemes like those in Bombay. Challenging Bombay’s sovereignty 
over Karachi demanded showing that Karachi could exceed Bombay commercially, and be more 
viable as a commercial center. Then perhaps after establishing parity with Bombay, could the 
poor housing issue be addressed.
 This neglect was not lost on the Governor General and Viceroy himself. Mr. Chelmsford 
responded to the above complaints, announcements, and welcome addresses by trying to redirect 
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the attention of the urban leaders towards their obviously growing labour and poor housing 
problem. He said: 
Municipal work is a fascinating subject, and you perhaps know that it has a particular 
fascination for myself. It was the main interest of my early years of public life, and I find that 
I am inclined still to approach Municipal affairs in the spirit of my first enthusiasm. It is a 
difficult subject also. It demands a broad outlook combined with close attention to details; an 
insight into the problems of the future, together with a close grip on everyday affairs; 
optimism combined with prudence. The two chief duties of a Municipality may be summed 
up in two words: Circumspice, Prospice [sic]. Look ahead but at the same time look around 
you. I can tell from the address I have just heard that you are mindful of the great possibilities 
and needs of the future. I may however also say that my experience is that the quiet steady 
work of ward Members and Members of Committees, which does not often catch the public 
eye is the most valuable work of all. The reason is that such work, and especially attention to 
the interests of the poorest neighborhoods and classes, is the foundation of municipal work; 
and the foundation must be thoroughly sound if it is to bear a great superstructure.22
He even tried to justify concern for the poor by citing its beneficial effects it would have on the 
war, something Karachi’s leaders were keen to prove that they could be helpful in:
You have rightly made mention of the war….you can help our common cause by conserving 
the man power of Karachi by seeing that the men who work at the docks and the sailors from 
the ships, live in surroundings which conduce to efficiency. You will thus add to the war 
services which you have already rendered.23
Strangely, the imperial governor general was imploring local urban leaders to have more concern 
for the poor, and Karachi’s locals were contesting Bombay’s sovereignty over them for just this 
reason. But yet, Karachi’s leaders deferred the problem of the poor thinking it could be solved 
later after the economy had picked up. Theirs was likely a belief in the good effects of a liberal 
economy, namely, that eventually everyone’s standard of living would be raised by increased 
trade. The Viceroy and Governor General repeated and ended his response to them in the 
following manner:
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In conclusion I may again refer to a matter which I have already mentioned in a general way, 
and impress upon you the extreme importance of extending a due share of both educational 
and hygenic advantages to the less favoured quarters of your city and of doing all in your 
power to brighten the lives and surroundings of the labouring classes. With the great 
possibilities of your city and the probable influx of larger numbers of this class, it will well 
repay you to bestow all possible care on the sanitation of new quarters as they arise and upon 
the decent housing of the poor....I thank you again, gentlemen for your kind reception…I 
shall now enjoy of becoming personally acquainted with the city and port of Karachi and with 
your leading citizens.24 
The question was left unanswered: whose responsibility were the urban poor? Who was to blame 
in creating the problem? According to Karachi’s leaders, the poor housing problem had to wait 
until parity and equity could be established for Karachi in relation to Bombay. The poor were not  
yet to be beneficiaries of modernization. Merchant and commercial interests had come to 
dominate political life in Karachi and those concerns had to be met first. 
 Urban housing had been a source of income in Karachi too, just as in Bombay. Urban 
property could provide income without much effort, and Parsi families, some of whom came 
from Bombay or Surat benefitted: “The pattern is complex, for Dinshaw’s urban landholdings, 
rather like rural zamindars, brought in a regular income with but little attention.” Such 
diversified sources of income made Karachi like Bombay, but for Karachi’s wealth, the scale 
needed to increase which could only happen through withdrawal from Bombay’s grip.25 Upon 
the opening of the Sukkur Barrage, there was a cotton boom between 1933-1947 due to increased 
irrigation and thus more Bombay-based firms set up outposts in Karachi.26
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 While the poverty of Sindh and Karachi could serve as a reason to demand autonomy, its 
solution had to be more circuitous. First, the commercial interests had to be met, and then, 
presumably, more money would be available to make poor housing projects possible. Until then 
the infrastructure for trade would get the first priority. Demands for control over Karachi 
continued through the nationalist period in the first half of the twentieth century. The conflict 
over Karachi’s role in the global market increasingly escalated in the inter-war period. What 
began as a religiously mixed Hindu, Muslim, and Parsi group of Karachi merchants wrestling 
control of Karachi away from Bombay’s bureaucrats in the early 1900’s, turned into the fear of 
“Muslim Raj” by the predominantly urban based Hindu merchant communities by the 1940’s. 
This fear was in spite of Muslim leaders insistence as late as 1945 that the success of Karachi 
and Sindh depended on the Hindu merchant’s prosperity. The successful propaganda of the 
Hindu Mahasabha had successfully instilled in Karachi’s Hindus a fear of their own numerical 
minority status. The era of communal politics had begun. 
 Karachi came to be imagined as the political capital of a Muslim homeland, and not the 
global trading center for which it was originally developed. Even upon independence, the 
competition for control over Karachi was recognized as a threat to democracy in Pakistan less 
than one year after the country’s creation in 1947. Hashim Gazdar, speaking of the government 
of Pakistan’s move to detach Karachi from the adjacent Sindh province and centrally administer 
the city as the nation’s first capital, warned in May 1948, 
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Sir, if you do not want to make democracy a farce, if you do not want tracking towards 
absolute dictatorship, you should have respect for the people of Sindh…we do not want to 
give up Karachi.27 
Gazdar’s foresight cannot be lost on any observer of the history of Pakistan, whose postcolonial 
history went on to be an oscillation between democratically elected, federalist rule punctuated by 
bouts of military dictatorships. The political imagination throughout suggested that to control the 
city was to control the country.
 
Aden: Labour Colony
 If Karachi was a distant and subordinate city to Bombay, and thus constructed itself as 
temporally behind on the path of improvements and development, Aden was another matter 
altogether. Aden served as a fueling station for shipping industries settled in Bombay or Karachi 
and leading industrialists who sent ships through Aden’s port had no interest in investing in 
Aden’s infrastructure. Instead, Aden was a labour colony of the purest kind, where free labour 
was available in abundance and no prior relations existed between employers and labourers so 
that a purely rational interest in commerce drove the terms of engagement in Aden. Local leaders 
in Aden were doubly marginal to political power, numerous countries’ tradesmen had found in 
Aden an abundant supply of cheap labour and no demand whatsoever for representative 
government or representative politics of any kind which could induce them to include the 
labouring population into the imagination of the settlement of the city.
 The housing conditions of Aden’s labourers were alarming and Bombay’s merchants had 
everything to do with evading responsibility for the housing conditions of the vagrants and 
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coolies of Aden. In the beginning of 1921, the resident at Aden assembled a committee to look 
into the conditions due to a particular visit to the “pukka houses, their privies and chains.” These 
were more permanent constructions which the resident had expected to find in better condition 
than the temporary shelters erected throughout. Instead he reported, “The committee might 
consider the hillside better than the houses.” The committee was assembled to “examine and 
report on the dwelling places of the houseless vagrant population of Aden, beggars, coolies etc,” 
consider the sanitary effect on the rest of the population in Aden, and make suggestions.28 The 
committee learned that the percentage of people in Aden who were houseless amounted to 14.7% 
in 1911 and 11.1% in 1921, which was between 3500 and 4500 persons in total.29
 Several solutions were suggested, some more controversial than others. The most visible 
problem were the arrival of Somalis into Aden. Officials believed that if they could control 
Somali immigration they would solve a major portion of the problem. However, they were 
reluctant to single out one group, and anticipated that the Government would “object to 
legislation against a particular race...” The population in Aden was also dependent on Somali 
immigration for the supply of meat. The scheme proposed by those in Aden would have every 
Somali who entered the port deposit a fee, Rs. 50 was the example, which they could retrieve 
upon leaving. If they didn’t leave then they would have forfeited the funds which could be used 
by the Government to pay for deportations. “Landing fees” were already collected and raising 
those in total would affect Indians, Arabs and Somalis and so it would be roundly objected to.30 
Some other suggestions involved stricter enforcements of rules about housing and condemnation 
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of landlords who had allowed overcrowding. This too was rejected on the grounds that the 
problem was so great that there was nowhere else but the crowded buildings for people to live. 
The problem was one of insufficient housing.
 But if the quantity of housing in Aden was insufficient, who would build it, and with 
what funds? One suggestion was that the Military works build huts for certain coolies,31 a 
common suggestion in Bombay too where huts had often been erected by the government in 
order to remedy the housing shortage. The main question that remained was who was supposed 
to pay for the houses that needed to be built, whether huts or more permanent structures? There 
were hardly any local funds in Aden and Aden being administered through Bombay and for the 
needs of Bombay’s commercial community, meant that the only people with a real financial 
capacity in Aden were Bombay’s capitalists. It was also due to their demands for labourers in 
shipping and fueling that the population in Aden had grown so much. Thus it was said that: 
The next proposal is that all land in Hedjuff Bay to the south side of the main road should be 
earmarked at once for the housing of the coolis and casual labour employed in that bay, and 
with this object that all land in private hands in this Bay, to the South of the road, which has 
not already been built upon, should be rescued, and that inducements should be offered to 
capitalists to build approved types of house for the exclusive use of the coolies.32
The basic idea was to have private ventures which depended on and worked through Aden build 
the housing themselves. However, here they were struck with the same problem as elsewhere, 
namely that the rents recovered from poor labour housing would never sufficiently cover the 
initial cost to build the housing. The coolies were paying roughly 8 annas (16 annas to 1 Rupee) 
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per month for their housing and their wage wouldn’t allow them to pay any more.33 Thus there 
could be no market incentive to build the housing in the first place, which is clearly why Aden 
was suffering from a housing shortage at all. Since that wouldn’t work the alternative suggested 
was the passing of a law which would require employers to pay a tax which would go towards 
the building of housing. A committee person said, “The responsibility for housing these coolies 
in a proper way should rest on the employers who benefit by their labour...”34 Although, the 
employers themselves would surely work hard to defeat any such legislation. The committee 
looking into the housing conditions in Aden was at a loss, it seemed no plan would induce the 
sufficient growth of the supply of poor housing in the port.
 A questionnaire was sent out to the leading merchant houses and employers of Aden, as 
well as the police staff. The list included the firm of Cowasjee Dinshaw and Brothers, Mr. Kaiky 
Muncherjee, and other Parsi, Gujarati, and Sindhi firms who conducted their operations via 
Aden, mostly in the area of Tawahi, where private firms were operating sheds and housing units 
for their coolies. All of these were found to be insanitary and overcrowded, the inhabitants 
succumbing often to disease and malnutrition. It was firmly decided that the enforcement of 
overcrowding rules had to occur in Tawahi, but in particular that the owners of the buildings be 
dealt with not the inhabitants. The committee on the houseless in Aden clearly consisted of 
people who came to believe that the employers were unduly taking advantage of their labourers 
and the employers were to be surveyed and induced to cooperate with the sanitation needs of 
Aden’s population at large. Aden had become a labour colony for Indian merchants. Beyond the 
need to enforce housing regulations, the committee also suggested that the movement of Somalis 
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into Aden be restricted. The questionnaire was also used to gather additional information about 
whose responsibility the houseless population would be, and whether those questioned had any 
awareness of the gravity of the situation. 
 The Deputy Superintendent of Police of Aden provided some of the most interesting 
answers about how the problem in Aden had arisen. He spoke of the “half starved and emaciated 
Arab population” who used Aden for a place to get a few months work and then left. He spoke of 
the “indolent and impudent neighbor the Somali who though smart, getting tired of his nomad 
life, prefers to remain a few months at Aden, doing little work, but showing more arrogance.” 
Every Somali, he said, was “clannish” and thus always supported by his caste and thus never was 
a beggar. About the real business of Aden and where the wealth goes, the Deputy Superintendent 
said: 
It is well known to every one that Aden itself is a coaling station, produces nothing but salt. 
One of the salt works is managed by an Italian firm and the other by an Indian firm. Although 
they have made a profit of millions of rupees in the last few years with practically very little 
capital they have not built a single house for themselves at Aden or a single hut for the 
comfort of their coolies at Shaikh Othman although they are said to have built palatial 
buildings for themselves in Italy and in India.
     Messrs Luke Thomas and Co., Cory Bros., P. and O. Coy and C. D. Bros. as coaling and 
shipping Agents have also made their fortunes through the sheer hard labour of coolies but 
they have not tried to ameliorate the condition of their coolies by supplying them with free 
quarters or any kind of relief.
     The export business of hides, skin, coffee, gum, was &c. is mostly in the hands of 
foreigners who exepting very few, themselves live in hired quarters and leave the place after 
making their fortune. The cloth and grain business is in the hands of Banias and Khojas of 
India who do not buy or build any houses for themselves or for hire except at their own native 
place in India. Very few Arabs prosper as big merchants as no sooner they get little money as 
brokers or merchants than they develop bad ways and having a shaky character soon fail in 
business and their properties pass to the hands of Jews who are at present the moving masters 
of riches and property in Aden. According to my knowledge 60% of the new houses under 
construction are now mortgaged with Mr. Banin and other Jews of Aden. Although the Rent 
Act is in force in Aden the landlords have succeeded in increasing the rents to nearly 100% 
throughout the last seven years which rent the cooli class of people cannot afford to pay at 
any rate.35
Aden was a thoroughly colonized labour colony and the frustration was felt even by the local 
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police who contrasted the “palatial buildings in Italy and India” while under-housing Aden’s 
local population. The superintendent also spoke with great insight on the population of labourers 
in Aden:
Local labourers are all from the Interior of Arabia. Their number is approximately 5,000. 
They consist of coal, ship and salt work coolies, contractors, Military works, and S. and T. 
coolies, buildings (day) labourers, boat boys and wharf coolies, etc. Most of these are 
houseless and sleep at the sleeping slums, makayas, eating houses, tea and coffee shops, in 
open places and in public streets in the bazaar. A few of the Settlement and Military works 
stone breakers prefer hill crevices as a resting place for the night. In fact these people are 
houseless but not vagrants or beggars. These daily labourers save about Rs. 30 to Rs. 40 in 
about six months time and return to their country. Most of these coolies hire cots for a night 
for which they half an anna. Each such person keeps his box at the eating house which 
contains what his coolie life requires. These sleeping slums, makayas, tae and coffee shops 
are not all provided with latrines hence these people have to make use of public latrines 
which are not only very dirty but very few in number. It will not be out of the way to mention 
that there is not a single urinal in the whole of Aden except one very clumsy at the Maala 
Wharf hence street corners, hill sides secluded places, sea-shores, coal stacks, and lonely bye-
lanes are used as places for urinating and obeying the call of nature.36
This kind of vivid description could not even be found for Bombay or Karachi where there didn’t 
seem to be any inquiry into the housing conditions in great detail. Local leaders in Aden were 
doubly marginal to political power, numerous countries’ tradesmen had found in Aden an 
abundant supply of cheap labour and no demand whatsoever for representative government or 
representative politics of any kind which could induce them to include the labouring population 
into the imagination of the settlement of the city. The superintendent of police thought the only 
way to solve this problem in Aden was to get the cooperation of coaling and shipping agents, 
without their investment in Aden the housing problem would never be solved.
 Capital was solely being extracted out of Aden, nothing was being reinvested in the place. 
Bombay’s merchants were a part of that problem and were not seen as co-colonial subjects. 
Bombay was seen as an imperial city in its own right, from the perspective of Aden’s officials. 
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When given the questionnaire, the merchant houses confirmed this perspective. They absolved 
themselves of all responsibility to house the labourers whom they employed, saying that there 
job was merely to pay a wage, not to provide housing. Mr. Framroze Cowasji Dinshaw, when 
asked whether he thought it would be a good business proposition for him to build houses or 
barracks for coolies said, “At the present moment I do not think it worth putting my money into 
properties when one can get 6% and 7% out of Government loans and more out of investments.” 
When asked whether he knew that the building he was letting out to his labourers was found to 
be in violation of a housing code against overcrowding, he said, “No I rent my house to a party 
and make no enquiry as to how many live in it.” He did say that he preferred them to have as few 
as possible but that he had no knowledge of the actual state of living conditions in his building as 
he gave it to another party to let out, but that he had “never seen it myself.”37 When Mr. 
Mohamed Abdulla Hassonali, another merchant operating through Aden, was asked the same 
questions, he said that he was also unaware of the overcrowding because he let his building to a 
“muccadum” and “told him of the number allowed.” About whether he would consider building 
better housing he said, “I am doubtful and would only do so on a guarantee.” Mr. Cowasji 
Dinshaw had said the same thing, that “we only deal with the Muccadums and not with the 
coolies.” This was in fact a great example of a rational labour market in which there were no 
bonds or connections or any prior relationship between employer and wage earner, just the 
transaction of labour for a wage. Numerous layers of intermediaries often operated within the 
labour market, muccadums and sub-muccadums under them. When asked again whether he 
thought he had any obligation to his labourers he said,
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No, we are not supposed to as we want to keep the wage low. I am supposed to pay them per 
hour or per day and they are to find their own quarters. We pay our Muccadums Rs. 20 or so 
per month as a retaining fee to look after the coolies. 
He said he had no other solution than to recommend that the labourers sleep in the open air rather 
than in closed quarters because the open air was preferable.38 Another employer, Mr. W. Meek of 
Cory Brothers and Company, Ltd., said that the problem was that at Hedjuff he was only allowed 
to put up “kutcha houses which can be pulled down at an hour’s notice.” Had he been allowed to 
put up sufficient houses, he claimed he would have done it.39 
 In total fifteen to twenty employers were questioned to varying degrees and they all said 
the same thing. They all absolved themselves of any responsibility to house their labourers in 
adequate conditions because they couldn’t make up the cost of the construction of the housing. 
They also claimed no immediate knowledge of the labour housing problem since they relied on a 
chain of jobbers to find and house the labourers. Aden was not their home, moreover. They lived 
elsewhere, as the police superintendent had said, in their palatial buildings some distance away. 
If Aden’s urban landscape was thoroughly excavated by the need for poor human settlements and 
succumbed to disease and decay, it didn’t matter, Aden was only a thoroughfare for the world 
trade routes which depended on shipping from the Indian subcontinent westwards. 
 Aden also functioned as port of embarkation for aspiring migrant labourers from the 
Indian subcontinent, but this ambition wasn’t always welcomed by the government. Merchant 
houses based out of Bombay of course needed the growing supply of labour, it would help keep 
costs down, and insure that their shipping needs would not be interrupted by needless strikes or 
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demands for better wages. The British government had authorized measures for the “repatriation 
of paupers and indigents” who were found far from home across imperial territory. Stories 
abounded of people boarding ships, disembarking at various ports, and finding themselves in 
new places in search of work and livelihood. Many were destitute Indians being repatriated, 
some were US citizens, in yet some cases Indians were found conveying an indigent Chinese 
person. Sometimes, when such a person was found not belonging to the place he had travelled to, 
officials would catch him and make petitions and pleas to be given funds to send him back home. 
Some of these pleas were challenged. Others secured funds to get sent back home and used the 
legal measures as a route back while others resisted authorities and sought to get away, and stay 
in the place in which “they didn’t belong.” Aden was a very popular destination for such 
adventure-seeking and often destitute migrants,40 probably because it served as a midway point 
for ships heading almost anywhere westwards. 
 In some cases, the indigents in Aden were temporarily housed by merchant houses mainly 
operating out of Bombay but having satellite offices and quarters in Aden. One letter from 
Captain F. de B. Hancock, the Acting First Assistant at Aden wrote:
To Assistant Resident, in charge Harbour Police, Aden.
Sir, I have the honour to inform you that the Governor of Jibouti has sent over to 
Aden by s.s. “Wissman” three indigent British subjects (Singalese) who were 
stowaways from Colombo on board the steamship “Cao-Bang.” These men are being 
maintained at present by Messrs. Cowasji Dinshaw & Brothers pending their 
deportation to Colombo, for which I have the honour to ask that you will make the 
earliest possible arrangements.41
This condition, of being housed by the merchant house, was important to establishing the legality 
of their being classified as “indigent.” In response to the request, a letter was written back to 
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Cowasji Dinshaw and Brothers indicating that the three indigents would be deported soon, but 
they were to be reminded 
...of Government Notification No. 2612, dated 20th April 1904, whereunder the landing of 
indigent persons in Aden is rendered penal.” In such a case, the owners of the ship 
“Wissman” would have been in violation of the “Aden Paupers & Pilgrims Regulations of 
1887. 
The resident at Aden built up their defense which rested on the meaning of the word “indigent.”  
He wrote, 
The word “indigent” is not defined in the Regulation or the Notification; but it is 
reasonable to suppose that it means a person who can neither maintain himself by 
his own resources nor with the aid of any other person, such aid being certain, 
regular and unbroken. A wife or a child who has no means of her or its own can yet 
be properly said to be not indigent if she or it is regularly supported by the husband 
or the father. Similarly a person regularly supported by a relation or even a stranger 
cannot, I submit, be said to be an indigent for the purposes of the regulation. But the 
moment a person is thrown upon the uncertain charity of others, he should, I believe 
be considered an indigent person for the purposes of the Regulation.42
In this case, since the three travelers were being taken care of by Cowasji and Dinshaw, they 
were not indigent, and thus the owners of the ship the “Wissman” did not violate the regulations. 
Further, these indigents had been brought from Jibouti, a French port, and on the principle of 
reciprocity and since they were Singalese, and thus British subjects, they should be paid for to 
return. 
 Managing the mobility of paupers had become an issue across the empire by the early 
twentieth century. Merchant houses based out of Bombay were able to serve as suitable shelters 
from time to time for labourers and migrants, but in the process, they also served to continue the 
constant supply of labour which was necessary in to make commerce profitable across these 
distant ports. 
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Conclusion
 This chapter has looked at Bombay from the outside, from the perspective of Karachi and 
Aden, subsidiary cities of the Bombay Presidency. The poor in each of these cities were used as 
grounds upon which Bombay’s sub-imperial position was challenged; and in so doing, served to 
turn the problem of poor housing into a competition for representation over the poor. Through a 
subsumption of the urban poverty problem, Karachi’s merchants were able to argue that it had 
not modernized as much as Bombay. Challenging that subsidiary role resulted in demands for 
municipal self-governance for the city of Karachi. The issue of housing for the labouring poor 
was thoroughly sidelined by the interests of merchants who made connections between Bombay, 
Karachi, Aden, and beyond. Merchants in Karachi wanted to catch up to Bombay’s stage of 
development through projects which would provide infrastructure to connect Karachi to regional 
hinterlands. Aden’s was conceptualized as nothing more than a labour colony for the Indian 
capitalist. 
 While the process of urbanization had resulted in slums in all major cities across the 
Bombay Presidency, including Bombay, Karachi and Aden, and indeed in commercial cities 
across most of the world, a particular engagement with the temporality of capitalist development 
sustained notions of regional distinction. These regional distinctions lent credibility to autonomy 
movements which eventually removed Bombay as the seat of power over these cities, but it also 
productively delayed the problems of the urban poor. In Aden, the total abandonment of the 
urban poverty problem was visible, while in Karachi, a desire to match Bombay’s stage of 
commercial advancement meant that leaders advocated building infrastructure for more 
commercial opportunities, not a restraining of commercial ambitions.
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 Particular regional contexts situated the history of these cities while their relation to 
Bombay drove the attitudes towards housing the poor. Thus, as anti-imperial movements and 
regionalist aspirations grew in the early 20th century, it wasn’t only those in Bombay who could 
control what Bombay meant within the colonial network of cities. Leaders from other cities 
imagined Bombay as a sub-imperial authority of its own kind. Those outside Bombay were 
critical of forms of extractive sovereignty or interference in their urban life which were centered 
in Bombay. People in cities outside of Bombay but connected to it started to see Bombay as an 
instrument of imperial power and contested Bombay’s role as a monopolizer of colonial capital. 
The problem of how to represent local urban poverty within regional and imperial frameworks is 
the subject of the next and final chapter.
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Chapter Seven: 
Representing the Poor 
In the rhetoric of late nineteenth and early twentieth century urban observers, the 
problems of urban poverty became sites upon which claims to unique regional political 
formations could be established. As we saw in the previous chapter, Karachi and Aden’s regional 
histories were used to obscure and delay the resolution of the urban poverty problem. In 
Bombay, similar dynamics drove the discussion about the location of the urban poor as well, but 
in Bombay, they took on a particularly anti-imperial vision. Rising national leaders in this period 
raised the question: who were the poor’s sovereign, and who should house the urban poor? In 
imperial policies there were attempts to patriate the poor, to find out exactly who they 
“belonged” to and return them to their original source. Determining the original source required 
figuring out who was responsible for them. Which nation? Which community? Capitalists or 
urban governments? Which empires? Were they a public problem or a problem for private 
interests? 
This chapter follows the struggles to “repatriate” the poor, i.e. to return the poor to their 
place of origin or even citizenship. It argues that the outcome of such discussions around 
repatriation depended on an obfuscation of the history of urban poverty. That obfuscation of the 
poverty problem occurred in three ways: through the creation of urban representation, the 
absolving of imperial responsibility and forcing of return migrations through repatriation, and the 
making of anti-colonial and nationalist ideology by the Indian economists. Numerous records 
within the archives of the Bombay Presidency are called “Paupers and Indigents: Landing, 
Repatriation and Deportation” which contain cases of indigent travelers traveling far from their 
place of origin who either used imperial legislation and resources to find their way back home or 
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tried to avert surveillance altogether. In addition to these itinerants, the settled urban poor 
became contested sovereign subjects between the imperial state and emergent nationalisms. 
These emerging anti-colonial and nationalist movements deployed a particular reading of the role 
of the Indian city which deferred the problem of urban poverty.
This chapter begins with the problem of establishing representatives for the urban poor in 
the late 19th century during census operations. Then it follows the movements of paupers and 
indigents across the empire from the turn of the century and the desire on the part of officials to 
make their “homes” responsible for the poor. As cities became conduits of intensifying human 
mobility, by which paupers and indigents travelled, the question of how to understand the city 
and its relation to poverty came to the fore. The Indian economists in particular interpreted the 
city as a secondary effect of changing social conditions in the countryside. We consider the role 
of the city in the writings of a key thinker of the school of Indian Economics, Radhakamal 
Mukerjee, and the way in which the city was demoted in the nationalist imagination. Mukerjee 
wrote influential treatises on “India’s economics” and most importantly for our purposes, 
collaborated with one of the fathers of urban planning, Patrick Geddes. According to their 
writings, colonialism had established the port cities as bases from which “foreigners” exploited 
the agrarian countryside and drained India’s wealth to metropolitan London. “Natives” were now 
championed as the sole custodians of India’s poverty, and they laid the foundation for a national 
state-led economic development which was the goal of the self-rule movements. When 
discussions of labour and especially Indian labour, intersected with or interfered with the nation 
building exercises of such moderate nationalists, the question of labour became secondary to the 
problem of political representation and autonomy from the imperial order.
328
On Behalf of the Poor
 While previous census takers had found Bombay’s population to be cooperative through 
the enumeration effort, the famine and plague caused major doubts in the minds of inhabitants 
about the goodwill of city officials. People feared their lives were being interfered in, or that 
when they were sent to the hospital they were being sent there to die without any contact from 
their families. Human activity was more concentrated in Bombay’s urban landscape than in 
London’s, or in official terms, “fearfully more intense.”1 The fear was on both sides. These 
doubts and the fear were responsible for causing a rupture between state and society at the turn 
of the 20th century, when inhabitants began to see themselves as a world apart from officials who 
claimed to care for them. This left the urban poor further vulnerable to the fluctuations of 
markets and in the hands of those who claimed to speak on behalf of them and care for them. 
 That this was colonial India only exacerbated the problem, adding an overtone of cultural 
distance between state officials and subjects of the state to the widespread privatization of 
representation for the poor. British officials felt particularly incapable of encountering those 
natives who were not acclimatized to English ways, such as those who didn’t speak English, 
weren’t educated in the English style, or had manners and customs quite foreign to colonial 
officials. Intermediaries were now considered necessary to manage the working and illiterate 
population in particular, which paved the way for the notion that an Indian elite should take care 
of the Indian poor. 
 One particular incident, which was discussed in the second chapter, showed how 
institutionalized this dynamic was becoming, that native leaders were taking it upon themselves 
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to speak on behalf native masses. On the 31st of January in 1880, leaders of the Hindu 
community were invited to meet at the Municipal Hall to find ways to increase the cooperation 
of the “working and illiterate population” in Bombay. A public meeting was held at Madhav 
Bagh in the middle of Bombay in order to explain the real objects of the census to the masses 
who had developed numerous doubts about why they were being counted. To announce the 
meeting, notices were placed in newspapers and fliers printed in Gujarati and Marathi were 
circulated. Approximately four to five thousand people attended the meeting, over which native 
leaders presided such as Mr. Javerilal Umiashankar, Mr. Varjivandas Madhavdas, Rao Bahadul 
Gopalrav Hari Deshmukh, Mr. Gangadas Kishordas, and Mr. Raghunath Narayen Khote. 
 There were several doubts in people’s minds about the purpose of the enumeration 
efforts. Some thought the Census was being conducted to increase tax collection by the 
Government. A particular suspicion was raised about each family being asked how many males 
and females were in each household, and how many were married. This type of interference in 
their life seemed particularly startling. The leaders and officials presiding over the meeting 
answered that if the Government wanted to raise more tax revenue, they could do so without 
resorting to a Census, which only cost them money. They also explained that the main purpose of 
the Census was, 
to ascertain the social and economic condition of the people, and the changes which had 
taken place in that condition at stated intervals, and to provide for schools, dispensaries, 
sanitation, and in a period of famine for increased supplies of food-grain, should the actual 
addition to the population be ascertained by means of the Census.2 
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There were further questions on how to fill out the various columns of the forms, and what was 
to be done if someone were staying with you temporarily on the night of the census or had just 
left on the night of the enumeration. Interestingly, what should be done if someone is living on 
one’s verandah, sleeping outside, do they count as in the  house? The answer was yes, every 
person had to be enumerated.
 By the turn of the century, inhabitants had become irritated by officials with all their 
inquiries into various matters of peoples lives. In one particular incident, when asked about their 
religion, the householder who was filling out the schedule responded, “The spirit of the 
Inscrutable” or “Father, Monotheist; Mother, Atheist; and Son, Theist.” The Census writer 
commented that such answers were “clearly inspired by a desire, not uncommon among persons 
who should know better, to air a meagre wit at the expense of the Abstraction Office.”3 During 
the plague most especially, critics were emerging who challenged the much celebrated rise of 
human mobility across the commercially free world.
Quantitative and qualitative analyses of housing conditions made it possible for some 
people to read the overcrowded urban landscape as inert, unchangeable and non-reformable 
while for other observers, the poor became marked as being of a different cultural type from 
those who lived in less dense housing. For local and imperial observers alike, Bombay’s 
labouring and urban poor came to stand in for all of Bombay. Until the moment of building 
housing through Government funds, the building of housing was a private affair and not 
something that the Government had any part in, just like in London. That there was too little of 
housing available was a failure on the people’s part who must have either preferred to live in 
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overcrowded conditions, either to save money, be close to neighbors and relatives, or afford 
seasonal work. This was all true even through major calamities or natural disasters which would 
cause the population to fluctuate rapidly. The cotton boom of the 1860s and the famines of the 
1870s caused migration into the city, while the plague of 1896 and 1897 caused an exodus. Such 
rapid fluctuations in the population caused overcrowding in the former case while causing empty  
homes in the latter. 
More importantly, such rapid fluctuations created pressures to find representatives who 
would speak on behalf of the poor in order to manage the urban poverty problem. There was no 
way a small cadre of officials and elites were going to be able to intervene in the dynamics of the 
whole city, instead, local representatives had to be found. To get a sense of just how small the 
British population was within Bombay, we can see the included Europeans in the census reports. 
In counting the number of Bombay residents who came from outside India, census officials 
reported, 
Of those born outside India nearly 6,000 come from the United Kingdom, over 2,000 each 
from Persia and Arabia and 1,000 from Afghanistan. With the exception of our own 
nationality the remaining European nations are but poorly represented; Germany with 257, 
Austria-Hungary with 206, Italy with 175 and France with 135 being the principal 
contributors…4
Britishers made up just less than 0.6% of the urban population, i.e. six-tenths of one percent in 
1911.
 In Bombay, it had been decided that Government intervention was necessary to manage 
the excesses of trade and create a truly public citizenry. The costs were the main impediment. 
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The poor functioned as a limit to colonial rule. The British government was waiting for native 
leaders to organize systems of poor relief amongst themselves. The government would sit back 
and assess and judge whether the natives were financially and morally ready to start such 
programs, and then provide minimal resources in terms of legislative or financial support for 
such ventures. Native leaders would hear complaints like the health officers’, and wait for the 
British government to start such programs as they had heard existed in England. Meanwhile, the 
production and consumption of housing continued from the ground up. Besides the relatively 
minimal interventions in supplies of water, roadways, lighting or other amenities, urban officials 
were enlisted in the more scientific process of counting, assessing, and understanding the degree 
of land use in the city, in order to gain an accurate portrait of housing conditions in the city.
Indigent Migrants
 As such port cities and commercial connections grew through the 19th and 20th centuries, 
labouring migrants sought opportunities in distant places. While rural to urban migration was a 
major factor in the urbanization of the subcontinent, the cities were also stopping points to 
locations beyond India. Migrants could be found in East Africa, Europe, and North America 
amongst numerous other places. A series of acts passed by authorities in the 1890s gave the 
Government the funds to send homeless travelers back to their place of origin. 
 There were doubts about the motivations of such indigent migrants. Officials were 
suspicious that they they were using government funds to pay for passage to new locations where 
they may find work or escape authority altogether. The indigence and pauper-hood of the found 
migrant had to be established by the local officials whenever they petitioned for government 
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funds to ship people back. Local officials were also suspected of collaborating with the indigent 
migrants to get funds and send paupers “home.” One circular meant to correct a 
misunderstanding about “the Instruction contained in the Circular Despatch of the 17th July, 
1888, regarding the relief by Her Majesty’s Consular Officers of Distressed British Indians” 
which stated, 
It is pointed out that these instruction were not intended to authorize the repatriation of Indian 
subjects at the expense of Indian revenues, without previous reference to the India Office or 
to the Government of India. It is considered desirable to discourage the arrival in Europe of 
impecunious natives of India by preventing, except under special circumstances, their 
gratuitous repatriation. 
 I am to state that the Instructions must be understood as authorizing only such 
temporary relief, in the way of maintenance, as may appear to you, in the exercise of your 
discretion, to be absolutely necessary, and that before you incur any expense as regards the 
provision of a passage to India, you should, in all cases, refer either direct to the Government 
of India, or to the Secretary of State for India, through the Foreign Office. When the requisite 
authority has been granted, you should obtain an undertaking that the applicant will return at 
once to India.5
Sending poor migrants back home was a potentially costly practice, and had the risk of being 
taken advantage of by adventurers. For example, a traveler named “Premchand” who was going 
to London from Sindh to work, was found in 1905 with only twelve pounds with him. He told 
authorities the “usual story” about being robbed while aboard a ship. In his other pocket, another 
two pounds were found but he claimed he was merely saving this and couldn’t do business with 
that money, so he was requesting authorities help for a return home. His request, being found as 
suspicious, was denied since he, “choose to visit Europe for his own purposes.” He was told to 
find his own way back home.6 The same reminder and letter from above had warned about the 
costs and concluded: 
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Reasonable expenditure incurred in either case will be defrayed out of the revenues of India. 
The Indian Government will not undertake to defray expenditure incurred in assisting Indians 
to pass from one port to another, except under the conditions above stated.
Proof of pauper-hood would be necessary to use imperial money to be sent home.
 The poor were traveling and becoming a burden on local institutions such as hospitals, 
indigent travelers’ homes, and rest houses even within London. Authorities were trying to find 
ways to manage the growing problem, and the first step was to return the poor to their place of 
origin, where they could be taken care of by those who were presumably rightfully responsible 
for them. 
 Some people did manage to find help. A man named Arjun Sheoram was found in 
London. He was described as a “destitute native of Bombay” and worked as a domestic servant 
for a European woman named Sarah Bronson. Ms. Bronson wrote a letter about Mr. Sheoram, 
and complained that he had, “started behaving impertinent towards me...for two months, so I 
dismissed him.” Mr. Sheoram was diagnosed with a locomotor ataxy and was hospitalized in 
London, where he stayed “for free for 90 days...and officials are writing because one cannot stay 
longer than 60 days.”7 Limitations on number of days one could stay at a hospital for free, for 
example, became one way to control the costs. Numerous cases like these were found, from 
places as far as New Caledonia, Cadiz, Bologna, England, Jamaica, Peru, Noumea, Port Said, 
and even the United States.
 The case from the United States was from California, a man who was associated with the 
beginnings of the Ghadar Party. He was not only stigmatized for being a poor traveler, but the 
finding of seditious pamphlets on his body made officials even more worried. His name was 
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Sawan Singh, and he was described as a native of India, found in England, who had arrived from 
San Francisco. The pamphlet in his possession criticized Indians for allowing the British to make 
them stupid and subservient, and called on them to rise up. Sawan Singh was described as 
occasionally deranged and yet sometimes of perfectly sound mind. He was thought to be 
destitute and dangerous. He had approached authorities in London asking them to help him find a 
job but they didn’t help him. Instead, they sent him to Calcutta with instructions to keep him on 
surveillance.8
 Such cases, including the fear of seditious migrants, increased the desire by high imperial 
officials to manage the problem of poverty across the Empire. Sending indigent travelers back 
“home,” a word used by officials, not the natives themselves, belied a desire to patriate the 
problem of poverty within national communities. Costs for housing the poor had to be managed 
somehow, and imperial officials couldn’t afford such expenditures so they were seeking to 
absolve themselves of responsibilities by sending travelers back home. Some travelers, 
undoubtedly, must have been using the funds to get themselves from one place to another, having 
learned how to use officials and their laws for the accomplishment of their own aims.
Indian Economists Representations of the City
That was the social backdrop to the emergence of the Indian Economists as spokesmen 
for Indian development. They read Indian hunger as a symptom of British arrival and Western 
styles of modernization. Radhakamal Mukerjee and Dadabhai Naoroji together branded “Indian 
Economics.” Their thoughts became the ideological basis of Indian Nationalism by more famous 
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figures such as Gandhi, Nehru, and Jinnah. They all agreed that where there was supposed to be 
prosperity and increased standards of living as a result of British “improvements,” there was 
widespread poverty, famine, and hunger. 
 Dadabahi Naoroji was an intellectual and an industrialist, the paternal uncle of J. Tata, 
and a cotton trader himself. He gave a lecture in Bombay to the Bombay Branch of the East India 
Association entitled “Poverty of India” in 1876. This would later be expanded into his most 
famous publication “Poverty and Un-British Rule” in 1901.9 His conceptualization of the poverty  
of India in the late 19th century utilized new conceptions about territory and space.10 It also 
established poverty as the reason for anti-colonial agitation and compiled poverty statistics 
within a national and territorial framework. Naoroji made famous the “drain of wealth” thesis11 
in which he argued that India’s status as a colonial outpost meant that much more wealth and 
tribute were taken out of India than was ever put back in. The trade relation was never equal and 
the balance always lay on the side of the English. His “drain of wealth” thesis argued that the 
British had set up port cities on India’s coasts so that they could extract surplus wealth from the 
interiors in the form of raw materials and ship them to England where they would be 
manufactured into secondary goods and then sold to the world including to Indians themselves. 
A political moderate, he didn’t criticize British presence on Indian soil but chastised the British 
for not treating India the way they would have their own country. He believed surplus wealth 
ought to be re-invested in India itself, not drained to another country. 
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Radhakamal Mukerjee was particularly interested in town - country relations, and his 
friendship with Patrick Geddes furthered his interest in the Indian City. Geddes worked at the 
University of Bombay as a lecturer. He wrote the introduction to Mukerjee’s book, The 
Foundation of Indian Economics, published in 1916, in which he said, 
The[ir] little old university and cathedral townlet [thus] swiftly grew into a world-city, yet 
one fundamentally of slum, overcrowded from the depopulated villages of Highlands and 
Islands, of Lanarkshire and Ireland alike. The same process spread everywhere, in 
Birmingham and the Midlands, Lancashire, Yorkshire; each developed its Black country, and 
next throughout the world.12
Geddes created a spatial temporality to each city’s slum formation. For him, the process which 
produced a “black country” in each town had its prototype in Glasgow and then spread from 
England to the rest of the world. The process of “black country” production in each town spoke 
to the uniformity taking hold of the world, the widespread presence of inequality and slums that 
could be expected everywhere, and the trajectory established Western Europe as first and the rest 
afterwards which created a temporal dominance for Europe, i.e. the ability to make the template 
and write the prototypical narrative of urban modernization. Against this hierarchy of urban life 
with English towns at the top, the Indian Economists wrote the possibility not of resistance to 
modernization but means for competition in prescribing their own path for modernization.
For Mukerjee, the British were held responsible for both India’s “new” commercial and 
urban life and its concomitant poverty and disease. His concern wasn’t that the modern system 
itself produced poverty, rather his concern was that Indians were not equal participants in 
Industrial modernity’s operations, nor were India’s unique historical conditions adjusted for. 
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While British arrival had created a rupture with India’s past, Mukerjee’s plan involved 
reintegrating what he saw as the best aspects of India’s past, his own romantic historical 
constructions, into the economic organization for India’s industrial future. 
Geddes used Mukerjee’s ideas to accomplish his goal of town planning which included 
the preservation of the “heritage” of India, and picked out Mukerjee’s main point to be: 
Etho-polity, culture, and art are not the finished products, the urban monopolies, the 
townsman now-a-days thinks them: on the contrary, their greatest renewals have come to him 
from the fields; and will again.
In accordance, Mukerjee had said, 
In India more than in any other country the great intellectual, social, and religious movements 
have originated in villages, and, nurtured by their thoughts and aspirations, at last reached the 
cities. The soul of India is to be found in the village, not in the city. In modern Europe, on the 
other hand, the discoveries in intellectual or social life are made in the city and are then 
communicated to the village, which receive them as gospel truths. The city sets the example. 
The village imitates….[in India] The village is still almost self-sufficing, and is in itself an 
economic unit.13
This was the particular relationship between city and country established by the Mukerjee, 
namely one of a difference with Europe. In Europe, the city was the site of history while in India 
the village was the site of India’s history. Perhaps Geddes’ reading of Mukerjee was more 
generous and Geddes used his reappraisal of the “urban monopolies” which townsmen presumed 
to have, an idea he learned in India, as a way of developing an influential strand within urban 
planning that was preservationist, for which he is remembered till today. Mukerjee however, 
thought such a condition unique to India and not equally applicable to Europe.
Mukerjee expressed alarm at the exodus into the cities of cultivators and other village 
men, but denied that an industrial/urban revolution was happening in India. According to him, 
the urban population of India was still fundamentally rural in nature. For him urban life was 
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temporary while rural life was timeless and essentially Indian. Mukerjee stated, “Of India more 
than any other country it can be said that the nation lives in the cottage. Nearly 85 percent of the 
total population live in the country.”14 He thought migrants to the city were of a temporary sort, 
and said that migration 
...does not involve a permanent change in residence.… The Indian factory hand is 
primarily an agriculturalist. His real home is in his native village, not in the city 
where he works.15 [italics mine]
The notion of a “real home” justified a constant shifting of a critical gaze from the city to the 
country in early 20th century India. Whenever urban ills were found they were thought to have 
“real” origins in the villages and it was villagers who needed to be protected from the extractions 
of city life. This was thus the predominant view about urban life, its inhabitants, 
industrialization, and the village based economy of India, and explained why there may have 
been relatively little thinking on the city amongst nationalists in India.16
 Gandhi too had similar notions. He had blamed the railways for the spread of disease, 
famine, and poverty, characterizing the worst aspects of modernization by saying:
It must be manifest to you that, but for the railways, the English could not have such a hold 
on India as they have. The railways, too, have spread the bubonic plague. Without them, 
masses could not move from place to place. They are the carriers of plague germs. Formerly 
we had natural segregation. Railways have also increased the frequency of famines, because, 
owing to facility of means of locomotion, people sell out their grain, and it is sent to the 
dearest markets. People become careless, and so the pressure of famine increases. They 
accentuate the evil nature of man. Bad men fulfill their evil designs with greater rapidity. The 
holy places of India have become unholy. Formerly, people went to these places with very 
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great difficulty. Generally, therefore, only the real devotees visited such places. Nowadays, 
rogues visit them in order to practice their roguery.17 
Gandhi’s ideas were undeniably romantic, he was criticized for it in his own time by his some of 
his contemporaries. He believed that Indian social life had been contained in local self-contained 
villages prior to the railways. However, his concerns pointed to the increasing view that cities 
were the locales of extractive markets, outwards from which radiated railways to spread disease 
and produce hunger. Emergent nationalism was predicated on the kinds of views set up by the 
Indian Economists. Cities were not the places in India in which ambitious national leaders could 
have any pride. Even Bal Gangadhar Tilak said in 1896: “It is indeed hard to believe that 
Bombay the beautiful can really be so unclean and unhealthy.18
Deferring Indian Labour
 Mukerjee disagreed with union organizers and the Marxists, who were 
demanding control of their wage. He believed economic organization demanded the greatest use 
of modern capital, yet without compromising or eroding the wanted aspects of Indian social life. 
Again distinguishing India from an undifferentiated “West,” he said,
disparity of wealth, the luxury of the few capitalists and the appalling poverty of labourers, 
and the consequent chronic social unrest, present a striking contrast with the spirit of co-
operation which pervades the Indian industrial organization.19 
The spirit of cooperation between labourers and capitalists was of course a kind of fantasy 
Mukerjee was championing. Mill strikes and labour conflicts between scavengers and the city 
341
17 Gandhi and Anthony Parel, Hind Swaraj and Other Writings (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 47.
18 Mahratta, December 20, 1896, as cited in Echenberg, Plague Ports, 51.
19 Mukerjee, Foundations of Indian Economics, 339.
made up much of political life in Bombay as early as the plague as we saw in earlier chapters.20 
But Mukerjee denied that history. It is possible that Mukerjee was reading the indebtedness of 
migrants and workers and their sense of loyalty towards capitalist patrons as a “spirit of 
cooperation.” With this feature of an “Indian industrial organization” in mind, Mukerjee 
advocated the increase of “native” manufacturing and wanted more technical education for the 
people. Mukerjee also rhetorically posed the questions, 
Should India adopt the Western economic institutions in order to repeat in her own soil the 
social evils of the West? Should the Indian industrial system be a feeble echo of the Western 
organization with its trade-union disputes, strikes, lock-outs, and social crises? Should India 
introduce into her country the conflicts of labour and capital, and thus destroy for ever the 
communal spirit which dominates her economic life even in the present day?21 
He clearly thought that uniquely Indian social institutions of family and caste could result in the 
equitable distribution of wealth. Such Indian institutions would protect Indian industry with the 
kinds of conflicts between labour and capital which had pervaded the “West.” He was adapting 
industrialism to India’s unique cultural conditions and in the process eliminating any class based 
conflicts around the conditions of labour from the history of India. Mukerjee’s reading was kind 
of magnificent in its ability to ignore such conflicts around him.
 For the Indian Economists, inequality was not read as endemic to markets but endemic to 
India’s subordinate role on a world stage. Mukerjee mapped the conflict between city and 
country onto Europe versus India. He thought India had to chart a different course for its 
modernity, which would involve new connections between town and country with the notion that 
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they could “work together.” This led to the expansion of the labour market as new interiors could 
be exploited for labour and resources, and competitive pressures were embraced which would 
produce successive races to the bottom for decades to come. Since India’s creativity and vitality 
was to be found in its villages, a fundamental difference was posited between India and Europe/
World where the city was the prime mover of modernity in Europe, while a mythically static, 
unchanging village was valorized in India. Whereas industrialism in the Western nations had 
divided their peoples into antagonistic classes, in Indian industrialism people would be brought 
together. 
India will not adopt Western industrialism in its modern phase with its all too exclusive 
adherence to the principle of division of labour, its deficient organization towards general 
well-being….India will tend to establish a solidarity between the village and the city, the 
labourer and the employer, the specialist and the layman, the multitude and the genius, the 
brain worker and the manual labourer....India will not allow the city to exploit the village, she 
will retain the vitality of life and culture of the village.22  
This “solidarity” Mukerjee advocated for between “the multitude and the genius” didn’t 
overcome the hierarchy between those two, but instead absolved one of the burden of exploiting 
the other. 
Pursuing this fantasy to its conclusion, Mukerjee imagined that the result of this unique 
Indian industrial life would be: “Thus, gradually, there will be developed in India a race of 
traders and merchants, who will lead India in the struggle for commercial predominance among 
the trading nations of the world.”23 The assumption to his prediction was that India did not have, 
prior to British arrival, a “race of traders and merchants,” nor did India ever lead “the struggle 
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for commercial predominance.” Mukerjee’s account of commercial development in India, when 
it did rely on historical knowledge, used ancient evidence, but didn’t reach into the few centuries 
prior to British rule into India’s early modern history of oceanic trace and commerce. Thus even 
as he criticized narratives of progress provided by the British, he accepted wholesale many of the 
myths of modernity’s ruptures, especially those we saw created in the first chapter. 
 Labour supply and labour control were the central issues in the management of India as a 
colony.24 The problem of labour concerned local and international merchants and was necessary 
to fulfill the dreams of developing India into a profitable enterprise. For many critics of poor 
housing schemes, the issue of housing was an effect of a labour problem and skeptics didn’t 
believe solving poor housing could ever remedy what was truly a labour problem. But solving 
the labour problem was next to impossible, especially since leading nationalists demanded that 
labour cooperation was the only way to achieve a united national front against the colonizers and 
allow India to “catch up” to the developmental stage of its masters - a necessary precondition to 
India’s freedom.
 Even in 1921, 84 percent of the population of the city was born outside of Bombay. 
Employers blamed the lack of discipline in their labour force on the migratory nature of their 
employees. John Whitley of the Royal Commission on Labour in India, said in 1931: 
the main industries of India are manned by a mass of agricultural workers temporarily 
forsaking the mattock and the plough to add to their income by a brief spell in industry...[it is 
a] truth of primary importance that the great majority of those employed are at heart 
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villagers.25 
This idea, along with the presumed indigenous institution of the “jobber,”26 explained for the 
capitalists the lack of effective labour discipline for production and explained for union 
organizers why labour couldn’t effectively mobilize on its own behalf.
 Narratives of India’s difference due to its colonial relationship had influenced thinkers 
like Mukerjee, as we saw above, to suggest that cooperation between workers and their 
employers was the only way to overcome that colonial difference. In 1920, the All India Trade 
Union Congress was formed out of interactions with dispersed trade unions and the rising 
International Labour Organization (ILO). Often run by the main leaders of the Indian National 
Congress, the All India Trade Union Organization was a mainstream organization. In attempts to 
bring Indian labour issues on to the platform of the ILO at large though, dual standards were 
encountered. It was if the labour question in Western countries was not comparable to the labour 
issues in India. 
Harold Butler, the director of the ILO, visited India in 1938, he said:
It is clear that the introduction of industrialization is breeding the same problems in the East 
as the West, but against an eastern background their order of importance appears in a different 
light. The western mind is mainly preoccupied with questions of wage rates, working hours, 
unemployment, social insurance, protection against industrial accidents and disease, the 
safeguarding of women and children against exploitation, the organization of factory 
inspection, relations between employer and worker, to which have been added in 
comparatively recent years the questions of housing, nutrition and vocational training. All 
these problems have made their appearance over the eastern horizon...Nevertheless...it would 
be misleading to suggest that these problems, important as they are, dominate the social 
consciousness of the East. They necessarily yield priority to the fundamental and interlocking 
problems of population, poverty, illiteracy and disease.27
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Ironically, poverty and inequality had become the condition for difference between the East and 
West. Poverty and inequality were not read as an outcome of similar processes across the East 
and West and thus the sign of sameness, an interpretation for which there was so much evidence. 
The problem of labour had to be solved in India by first “catching up” to the West and then 
addressing poverty later. 
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Conclusion: 
The City and Indian History
 Those who migrated between city and country were central to the process of modern 
urbanization, providing a flexible labour pool and engaging opportunities differentially to 
integrate themselves into urban life at the turn of the 20th century. Upward mobility was 
possible; it was from the stock of a dynamic population in western India that enterprising 
migrants could turn into merchants, industrialists, tradesmen, and money lenders. Yet the social 
relations which kept people moving also created unequal successes so that ambitions were not 
always matched by outcomes. The stigmatization of poor housing only furthered the inequities 
which had led to it. Urban reformers emerged who sought to provide basic and clean shelter to 
maintain the viability of the city as a center for trade. However, moneyed interests brought their 
own agendas to the project of urban reform, ultimately undermining its ability to proceed. The 
possibility of government lines of credit for urban reform appealed to Karachi’s merchants as 
proof that they were being left out of an urban modernization process, while in Aden, merchants 
were able to escape demands for poor housing reform by appealing to the fact that as Indian 
merchants they were not accountable for the state of housing in Aden. Migrants moved in and 
out of the cities, bringing and taking with them capital and new ideas. In these processes, both 
the city and country were changed. Bombay, being embedded in global flows and exchanges, 
suffered through the war-time economy just as other cities did. Opportunities for the lowest ranks 
within the city were of the first to contract when depressive episodes arrived.
 The civilizing mission imperialists embarked on made it impossible to see the dynamics 
of spatial and social mobility at play in the building of the city as an interconnected modern 
space. Eager to see India as potentially similar and yet perpetually different, Henry Maine for 
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example, thought that India contained within it the entire past of Europe’s history. Thus India 
was comparable to Europe in its ability to be like Europe, but different in that it was stuck in 
Europe’s past. A scholar of this imperial ideology writes:
For men like Maine...India was at once a land of Teutonic village ‘republics’; it was ‘the old 
heathen world’ of classical antiquity; it was a set of medieval feudal kingdoms; in the coastal 
cities ‘something like a likeness of our own civilization’ could even be discerned...28
Henry Maine confirmation of India’s difference with his own civilization found an exception in d 
India’s coastal cities. He stated the above in a lecture in 1875 at Cambridge after serving as a 
member of the Viceroy’s Council in India. The idea was that the cities were temporally ahead of 
the “village republics” and so closer to a future time in which Europe’s civilization existed. 
Societies were to move from kinship to territory or status to contract, and India’s coastal cities 
were approaching the latter but not quite there. Coastal India and its cities were ahead of India’s 
interiors temporally, and spatially akin to European societies. Rather than seeing city and 
country, commerce and agriculture, trade and cultivation, in a single temporal or spatial 
framework, Maine cast them as one behind the other. 
This difference of Indian social life, its exceptional urbanism which can seem warranted 
because of the prevalence and persistence of urban poverty in cities like Bombay and Karachi 
achieved widespread currency for decades to come after Henry Maine’s speech. Radhakamal 
Mukerjee deployed it at the turn of the century and nationalists sustained the idea through 
narratives of colonial exploitation of national territory. Economic developers, modernizers, and 
even philanthropists have often found uniquely Indian configurations of poverty in cities such as 
Bombay and Calcutta. 
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28 Thomas R. Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
66.
Through implicit and sometimes explicit comparisons, this study has considered the 
historical development of inequality in housing and its formation on those very terms used by 
analysts of poverty in the North Atlantic. Doing so has implied that Bombay’s, Karachi’s, and 
Aden’s development are commensurable to their urban counterparts elsewhere. 
Beginning with a methodological conceit of the commensurability of Indian social life 
has also meant that unique features of Indian urbanism can be situated in their particular 
contexts, so that the specific political economy of Western Indian life is connected to the world 
economy rather than read as a world apart. Issues like the wage, legitimacy of shelter, labour 
markets, and expanding markets in grains, cotton, and sugar were formidable structural 
constraints in which everyday migrants negotiated their changing roles, sometimes enabling the 
very structures which could later constrain them. The search for housing, its construction, and 
subsequent stigmatization made Bombay’s migrant workers similar to their counterparts in other 
world cities, and yet there were differences.
For example, the circular mobility of rural to urban migrants made it possible for many to 
flee Bombay during the cotton bust in the 1860s and during the plague in the early 1900s, both 
events triggered by Bombay’s connectedness to places beyond its formal and political 
boundaries. Bombay was perhaps the largest city in the world in the 19th century where 
population actually decreased during periods of distress. In no other major city did the working 
classes have homes to return to when urban opportunities disappeared or their livelihoods were 
threatened. However, the more difficult question is how to read the significance of that fact? 
Does return migration and a decline in the urban population suggest that Bombay was not a 
home, that migrants did not become urban in their outlook? Does it suggest that Western India 
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was only partially urbanized or occasionally urbanized but remained a predominantly agrarian 
economy? Or can we, by looking specifically at who was able to return home and who had cut 
off their ties to their villages assess the specific nature of mobility and urbanization for particular 
social groups? As we saw in the discussion on the plague and its effects, the lowest classes and 
many Muslim workers were unable to flee the city during the plague, having nowhere to go 
when the city became infested with disease. With this in mind, we can also reconsider the status 
of circular migration in the debates over India’s development.
 The persistence of urban poverty in cities like Bombay and Karachi presented a problem 
for the legitimacy of colonial sovereignty by the turn of the century. It made urban intellectuals 
and social analysts doubt the credibility of the British civilizing mission. For the earliest critics 
of British rule, like Dadabhai Naoroji, India had not been treated equally to England. British rule 
in India had been “un-British” and unfavorable to Indians. Rather than developing India’s 
economy and capacity to sustain itself, the British, he argued, had merely extracted surplus 
wealth from the country and used it to develop England. This “drain of wealth” thesis became the 
signpost of nationalist agitation by the early 20th century and influenced nationalist and Marxist 
thinking on the subject.29 Nationalists such as Gandhi and Nehru embraced the thesis and moved 
quickly to find the roots of poverty, which they likely noticed primarily in the cities in which 
they lived and worked, in agrarian exploitation, so that even the urban poor were seen to be 
effects of an original cause of poverty elsewhere in rural life. Village life became a major 
concern of most nationalists. The dynamics within the city, of commerce and labor, were 
rewritten as external to the drama of India’s history.
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29 Bipan Chandra, The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India: Economic Policies of Indian 
National Leadership, 1880-1905 (New Delhi: People's Pub. House, 1966); Irfan Habib, Essays in Indian 
History: Towards a Marxist Perception (New Delhi: Tulika, 1995).
 The salience of the ideas about India’s difference is particularly striking when we 
consider that these ideas emerged within an imperial Indian rubrics at the exact same time that 
“urban studies” was emerging as an analytic endeavour designed to understand and manage the 
excesses of urbanism in the United States. What we now refer to as the “Chicago school” is a 
good example. For these thinkers, the city was a social laboratory. Using qualitative methods and 
rigorous data analysis, the “school,” if it can be called one school given the debate amongst its 
cohort, spanned the turn of the 20th century into the 1950s. The University of Chicago had the 
country’s first department of sociology, opening in 1892. While anthropology was the discipline 
of the space of the village and “backwardness,” thus coinciding with the rise of colonialism and 
European territorial expansion into hitherto unknown areas of the world, sociology was 
homegrown and due to domestic changes within its environs. This period of intellectual activity 
coincided with a population shift from what was thought to be the “rural, homogenous, agrarian 
community to the vast, heterogenous, industrial metropolis.”30 
 The Chicago school was nonetheless breaking away from sociology which was more 
speculative and fragmented. It sought to make models, use data to discern patterns, and create a 
whole analysis of the dynamics driving social relations. The earliest faculty were connected to 
German universities, and influential members included Robert Park, Ernest Burgess, and Louis 
Wirth. These figures were central in developing the “ecological model” of the city, i.e. the notion 
that the city had natural growth processes which could be observed and used to predict future 
outcomes of urban development. 
 Most importantly, many studies focused on areas of decay or slum areas to explain why 
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30 Mark S. Ackerman & Wayne Lutters, “An Introduction to the Chicago School of Sociology,” Interval 
Research Proprietary, (1996): 1. 
such processes occurred, and how corresponding effects like crime, corruption, and “vice” fit 
into the urban whole. The assumption was that social ills within the city were produced precisely 
within the city as one organic whole which developed according to predictable models of 
urbanization. A critique of this view has come to be known as the “L.A school” of urban studies 
which challenged the assumptions of the Chicago school beginning in the 1970s, when 
deindustrialization was wreaking havoc on the viability of labor and the predictability of the 
urban spatial form. While the Chicago school had posited concentric zones of ecological 
evolution in the 1920s, by the 1970s, the L.A. school saw in cities sites of intensified local-global 
connections, such that unpredictable and haphazard development and under-development 
unconstrained by national governments and their agendas were the norm of urban life.31
 Nonetheless, for Louis Wirth the city was modernity. He said, “...what is distinctively 
modern in our civilization is best signalized by the growth of great cities.” The urban way of life 
could exist outside of what was formally a city. The urban way of life radiated outwards and 
influenced rural communities as well. Wirth shared with other contemporaries an almost 
irrational fear of the effect of cities on human society. Wirth said, 
The influences which cities exert upon the social life of man are greater than the ratio of the 
urban population would indicate, for the city is not only in ever larger degrees the dwelling 
place and the workshop of modern man, but it is the initiating and controlling center of 
economic, political, and cultural life that has drawn the most remote parts of the world into its 
orbit and woven diverse areas, peoples, and activities into a cosmos.32
It would be worth juxtaposing these ideas to the pervasive notion that colonial India was in 
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32 Louis Wirth, “Urbanism as a Way of Life,” The American Journal of Sociology Vol. 44, No. 1 (July 1938), 
1-2. 
entirety a village, even its cities were seen as dense village forms, or at best as Maine said, 
something approximating “our civilization” but not quite there. If the urban way of life was 
consuming the West then the rural way of life was unshakeable in the East, it could not be 
overcome, and became reified as the essential India, made by the colonial encounter. 
 Such notions of India’s difference influenced urban intellectuals within India who even as 
they criticized colonial power, accepted wholesale some of the misconceptions about the 
formation of the cities. Misunderstandings persisted and led to the story of Indian cities being 
told as one of difference, of an almost modern space which couldn’t fully escape its past and 
come into the present. The Indian cities were overwhelmed by the constant intrusion of the past, 
by way of villagers constantly migrating to urban spaces and not transforming into urbane 
residents. Therefore they were not quite the same as but close to European “civilization.” The 
dominant way of correcting this problem by the 1940s became the notion that more commerce, 
privatization of markets, and subsequent individuation of people, would one day make India 
catch up, and be like the West. New attempts at development such as rapid industrialization, 
planning, and techniques for more intensive agrarian production would be sought for the 
remaining decades of the 20th century. Such projects would depend on precisely the kind of 
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